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Abstract
This thesis examines the political economy of exchange rate policy-making from a 
theoretical  and  an  empirical  perspective.  It  argues  that  conventional  means  of 
understanding this subject are problematic, and it develops an alternative framework for 
analysis  based on a Marxist  methodology. From this  perspective exchange rate  policy-
making is understood to be a component part of a wider governing strategy that is made by 
the  core  executive  with  a  view  to  regulating  class  struggle,  to  providing  favourable 
conditions for capital expansion, and for ensuring a sufficient degree of freedom for the 
pursuit of high political goals.
This  theoretical  framework  is  applied  empirically  through  an  examination  of 
Britain’s return to the gold standard in 1925. In contrast to conventional explanations for 
this policy decision it is argued that the return to gold was the central component of a 
governing strategy designed to address long-term economic and political difficulties in the 
British  state  through the  imposition  of  financial  discipline  and the  ‘depoliticisation’ of 
economic  policy-making.  Furthermore,  in  contrast  to  conventional  assessments  of  the 
policy as having been a disaster, it is also argued that the return to gold was a relative 
success. Though failing to resolve Britain’s economic difficulties, the policy was generally 
successful  in  containing  class  unrest  and  in  enabling  the  core  executive  to  displace 
pressures over economic conditions and policy-making away from the state.
The substantiation given to the alternative theoretical view of exchange rate policy-
making by these empirical claims is also supported by an examination of the policy regime 
developed after the collapse of the gold standard, and by a brief examination of Britain’s 
membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism from 1990-1992, which is shown 
to have  direct  parallels  with the return to  gold.  On this  basis,  the  thesis offers  a firm 
foundation for drawing wider generalisations about the political economy of exchange rate 
policy-making in terms of an alternative Marxist perspective.
v
List of Abbreviations
ABCC : Association of British Chambers of Commerce
BE : Bank of England
BCU : British Commonwealth Union
BIS : Bank for International Settlements
CCBE : Chambers of Commerce of the British Empire
CPGB : Communist Party of Great Britain 
CSMA : Cotton Spinners Manufacturers Association
EEA : Exchange Equalisation Account
EEF : Engineering Employers Federation
ERM : European Exchange Rate Mechanism
FBI : Federation of British Industries
FBIGC : Federation of British Industries Grand Council
FRBNY : Federal Reserve Bank of New York
IFTU : International Federation of Trade Unions
ILP : Independent Labour Party
LCC : London Chambers of Commerce
LRD : Labour Research Department
MAIE : Manchester Association of Importers and Exporters
MAGB : Mining Association of Great Britain 
MFGB : Miners’ Federation of Great Britain
MRC : Modern Records Centre
NCEO : National Confederation of Employers Organisations 
vi
NFISM : National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers 
NUM : National Union of Manufacturers 
NUR : National Union of Railwaymen
PRO : Public Record Office
TUC : Trades Union Congress
TUCGC : Trades Union Congress General Council
TUCPC : Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress
TWF : Transport Workers Federation
vii
Introduction : Exchange Rate Policy-Making
In simple terms an exchange rate is merely the price of one currency expressed in 
terms  of  another.  In  terms  of  political  economy however,  an  exchange  rate  forms  the 
principal  means  through which  a  national  state  is  integrated  into  the  global  economic 
society. Exchange rate policy is therefore of far-reaching importance for a wide variety of 
factors in both national and international life,  ranging from levels  of economic output, 
employment, prices, and trade, to political relations within and between states themselves. 
One only has to look at  events within the European Monetary System during the early 
1990s for instance, or to more recent events during the 1999 Asian crisis and the moves 
towards European monetary union, to appreciate the political and economic impact that 
exchange rate policy-making can have.
The management of exchange rate policy therefore is not only a pertinent, but a 
central  issue  for  analysis.  At  present  however,  the  range  of  academic  approaches  to 
understanding  this  process  suffer  from  a  number  of  limitations  and  shortcomings. 
Primarily, these derive from the methodological problem that such explanations ignore the 
more fundamental question, upon which political economy itself rests, of why society itself 
assumes the various forms that it does. In neglecting this core concern, existing approaches 
present accounts of exchange rate policy-making based upon a social framework which is 
assumed rather than explained, and in which the relation between political behaviour and 
wider socio-economic conditions is derived in a purely exogenous and speculative fashion.
In  contrast,  this  thesis  argues  that  exchange  rate  policy-making  can  only  be 
understood  by  viewing  political  and  economic  behaviour  as  integral  parts  of  a  social 
whole.  The  methodological  difficulties  of  current  approaches  can,  to  some  extent,  be 
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overcome by the adoption of a Marxist perspective that begins precisely with the question 
of social form. On this basis, the process of exchange rate policy-making is derived from a 
prior analysis  of the composition of capitalist  society,  and from an examination of the 
position of state managers within this wider context. Subsequently, the thesis argues that 
exchange rate policy-making should be seen as a key node of economic policy-making in 
general,  which  is  formulated  with  a  view  to  regulating  the  crisis-ridden  process  of 
capitalist production. Exchange rate policy-making is therefore understood as a component 
part  of  a  wider  governing  strategy  for  the  management  of  class  relations  and  for  the 
provision of favourable conditions for capital accumulation.
This however also needs to be shown empirically as well as theoretically. As such, 
this broad theoretical outline is applied to an in-depth empirical examination of Britain’s 
interwar gold standard policy from the First World War until  the 1930s, and also more 
briefly to Britain’s membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism from 1990-
1992.  In  so  doing,  this  thesis  provides  evidence  in  support  of  both  a  new  means  of 
approaching  the  understanding  of  exchange  rate  policy-making  in  general,  and  for 
understanding these policy episodes in particular.
This introductory chapter highlights the main theoretical and methodological issues 
that are involved in the analysis of exchange rate policy-making. It begins by outlining the 
main themes and issues encountered under the various types of exchange rate systems, and 
examines their key benefits and disadvantages. This is followed by a critical examination 
of  the  existing  literature  on  the  issue  of  exchange  rate  policy-making,  and  by  the 
development of an alternative approach to understanding this subject based upon a Marxist 
methodology.
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Exchange Rate Regimes : A Brief Overview
An ‘exchange rate regime’ can be defined as a specific set of official institutional 
arrangements, mechanisms, and tools that are used to influence or control the value of the 
national currency on the international foreign exchange markets.  Though classifications 
vary,  a  broad  but  useful  means  of  categorising  regimes  is  in  terms  of  the  degree  of 
flexibility they accord to the movement of the exchange rate. On this basis, the range of 
possible regimes can be seen to lie along a continuum from completely flexible rates at one 
end to permanently fixed rates at the other. This section examines the operation of these 
regimes, and outlines some of the benefits and disadvantages they are seen to provide.1
Under  a  flexible  or  ‘floating’ exchange  rate  regime  the  value  of  the  national 
currency is  determined principally by the market  and is  free to move on a daily  basis 
according to changes in supply and demand. One of the main advantages of this kind of 
regime is often considered to be that these movements in the exchange rate serve to offset 
disequilibria  in  the  balance  of  payments,  thus  freeing the  domestic  economy from the 
constraints of the international environment. A balance of payments deficit due to a decline 
in national competitiveness for example (such as rising inflation or an ‘external shock’) 
will cause a depreciation in the exchange rate.2 This will make domestic exports cheaper 
and foreign imports more expensive, thereby stimulating exports, deterring imports, and 
helping to restore macroeconomic balance.  A balance of payments surplus on the other 
hand is thought to work in the opposite direction, causing an appreciation in the exchange 
rate and serving to reduce exports and encourage imports. In this way, by accommodating 
changes in national economic conditions and performance, a floating regime is therefore 
1 On the various types of exchange rate regime see for example Williamson (1983), pp.56ff; Kenen (1988),  
Ch.3; Argy (1990); Frankel (1999); IMF (1999).
2 All assumptions are of course subject to the condition of ceteris paribus.
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believed to free policy-makers from the constraints  of the external  environment  and to 
enhance their autonomy for the pursuit of domestic objectives such as high employment 
and economic growth. Allowing the market to set the value of the exchange rate is also 
often  thought  to  be  more  likely  to  produce  a  rate  more  in  line  with  the  underlying 
‘fundamentals’  of  the  national  economy,  such  as  its  level  of  competitiveness  and 
productivity,  thus  providing  less  risk  of  misalignment  and  helping  to  ensure 
macroeconomic stability and efficiency.3
Critics  of  floating  regimes  however  argue  that  they  do  not  necessarily  liberate 
national economic policy-making or provide these macroeconomic benefits. Large or rapid 
movements in the exchange rate for example may conflict with less flexible variables such 
as domestic prices and wages, with serious implications for levels of national output and 
employment.  An  appreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  can  erode  export  competitiveness, 
leading to bankruptcies and rising unemployment, whilst a depreciation may lead to rising 
inflation  through  the  effects  of  higher  import  prices  and  rising  export  demand. 
Furthermore,  with the market  itself  being primarily concerned with making profits and 
minimising  exposure  to  risk,  a  floating  regime  may  also  fail  to  conform  to  national 
economic fundamentals and may in fact lead to misalignments and exchange rate volatility 
as a result of changes in market sentiment. As such, the national economic impact of a 
floating rate may be far from costless,  and policy-makers may not therefore be able to 
ignore its consequences.4
3 Argy (1982), pp.27-8; Williamson (1983), pp.37ff: On floating exchange rate regimes see for example 
Sohnen (1969); Brittan (1970); Williamson (1983); Kenen (1988); Melamed (1988).
4 Black (1979), pp.176-7; Williamson (1983), pp.37ff; Kenen (1988), pp.19-2; Minford (1989), p.212: The 
empirical record concerning floating regimes has been the subject of much dispute. See for example Kenen 
(1988); Argy (1990); Flood and Rose (1995); Caramazza and Aziz (1998).
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These points have led some commentators to argue in favour of more restrictive 
regimes in which the authorities undertake to actively regulate the exchange rate. This can 
take  the form of a  ‘managed’ regime,  under which the authorities  may simply seek to 
mitigate against excessively sudden or sharp fluctuations in the rate (known as ‘leaning 
against  the  wind’,  or  ‘dirty  floating’),  or  may  take  a  more  stringent  form,  with  the 
authorities  seeking  to  maintain  the  rate  within  a  certain  range  (rigidly  specified,  pre-
announced  or  otherwise),  by  ‘fixing’,  or  ‘pegging’ the  national  currency  to  another 
currency, or a weighted basket of currencies. This itself can also take various forms, such 
as an ‘adjustable peg’ in which the rate may be periodically realigned if and when it is 
deemed necessary, or a ‘crawling peg’, in which gradual and incremental movements in the  
rate are themselves built into the system. At the most extreme, the authorities may even 
abandon the national currency altogether and fix the exchange rate irrevocably by entering 
into a monetary union with other currencies.5
A major benefit that is often claimed in support of restrictive regimes is that they 
can ensure a steadier and more appropriately valued exchange rate than a floating regime, 
thus enabling greater macroeconomic stability and certainty.6 This is also buttressed by the 
discipline imposed by the exchange rate itself. In contrast to a floating regime in which 
changes in national economic conditions and policies are offset by an adjustment in the 
exchange rate,  under  a  more  restrictive regime it  is  national  economic  conditions  and 
policies themselves that are confined within the necessity of having to maintain the rate.7 A 
decline  in  economic  competitiveness  and  a  balance  of  payments  deficit  leading  to  a 
depreciation in the rate for example, will  compel the authorities to impose deflationary 
5 Sohnen (1969), pp.184ff; Argy, (1982; 1990); Williamson (1983), pp.56-76; Kenen (1988), pp.24-9.
6 Sohnen (1969), ps.74, 188; Williamson (1983), pp.60-1; McCallum (1996), p.224.
7 Black (1979), pp.9-10.
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measures  in  order  to  raise  its  value.  In  turn,  these  will  also  serve  to  put  pressure  on 
domestic costs and prices, thus ensuring that competitiveness and macroeconomic balance 
is regained. In contrast, a balance of payments surplus leading to an appreciation of the rate  
will induce the authorities to adopt an expansionary economic policy, causing domestic 
prices to rise and the rate to fall. In this way, a restrictive regime can provide an ‘external 
anchor’ for  the  national  economy,  helping  to  prevent  the  governing  authorities  from 
pursuing excessively inflationary or deflationary economic policies, and helping to ensure 
that domestic economic conditions remain internationally competitive.8
Managed and pegged exchange rate regimes however do not necessarily resolve the 
problems of misalignments and instability. Difficulties can arise for example if economic 
conditions in the country to whom the national currency is pegged themselves change and 
force an alteration in the exchange rate. This may force the governing authorities to adopt 
economic policies with a detrimental effect on national economic and political conditions, 
producing  an  internal-external  policy  conflict.  A looser  economic  policy  stance  in  the 
country to whom the national  currency is pegged may compel the adoption of policies 
leading to rising inflation, whilst a tighter stance may force the imposition of deflationary 
policies leading to domestic economic contraction and rising unemployment. In the event 
of  this  policy  conflict  becoming acute,  doubts  over  the  resolve  or  the  capacity  of  the 
authorities to bear the social burdens necessary to maintain the rate may lead to mounting 
speculatory pressure against the national currency itself, and may even lead to the collapse 
of  the  regime.  Moreover,  official  influence  over  the  exchange  rate  also  raises  the 
possibility  of  miscalculation  or  even  the  deliberate  abuse  of  this  power,  with  similar 
8 Sohnen (1969), passim; Black (1979), ps.28-9, 179; Williamson (1983), pp.46-56; Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1988); Kenen (1988), p.36, 45; Giovannini (1993), pp.111ff.
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results.  A mistaken  or  deliberate  undervaluation  for  instance,  such  as  an  attempt  to 
stimulate  export  growth,  may lead  to  inflation,  while  an overvalued rate  may produce 
excessive  deflation  and  speculation.  Officially  determined  exchange  rates  may  also 
become  under-  or  overvalued  over  time  as  national  economic  conditions  themselves 
change,  and also contain the possibility  of creating wider  international  tensions should 
their effects impact adversely upon other countries.9
One way of resolving some of these difficulties is to adopt an even more restrictive 
regime in  the form of  a  monetary union.  By establishing  a  single  currency with other 
nations a powerful signal can be sent to the market that there will be no future change in 
the rate or in the policies needed to maintain it. By curtailing the potential for a speculative 
attack,  monetary  union  may  therefore  offer  all  the  benefits  of  certainty  and  stability 
provided by managed or pegged regimes whilst avoiding the associated risks of disruption. 
On the other hand however, should a single currency itself become misaligned in relation 
to national economic fundamentals, then serious economic and political difficulties can 
result  as  the  ability  to  offset  such  changes  with  an  alteration  in  the  rate  is  no  longer 
available.10
Theories of Exchange Rate Policy-Making
Having  outlined  some  of  the  key  themes  and  issues  associated  with  various 
exchange rate regimes, this section now surveys the existing literature on exchange rate 
policy-making. In broad terms, it is possible to distinguish between three main approaches 
9 Sohnen (1969); Brittan (1978), pp.51-76; Black (1979), ps.8-9, 193; Lamfalussy (1981), p.47; Williamson 
(1983); Kenen (1988), pp.30-6; McCallum (1996), p.225.
10 Giovannini (1989); Goodhart (1995).
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to  this  issue.  These  can  be  described  as  the  ‘rational  choice’ approach,  the  ‘country 
characteristics’ approach, and the ‘interest group’ approach.11
The ‘Rational Choice’ Approach
By far the most common means of addressing the question of exchange rate policy-
making,  the  ‘rational  choice’ approach  is  founded  upon  an  econometrical  analysis  of 
policy-making behaviour based on a series of interactions between equally rational, self-
maximising  groups  of  public  and  private  actors.12 Consistently,  the  substance  of  this 
approach is  drawn from the  debate  over  ‘rules  versus  discretion’ in  economic  policy-
making, concerned with whether a policy regime based on discretionary management or 
fixed rules will produce the most optimal outcome in terms of economic performance and 
citizen welfare. Traditionally,  the main conclusion of this debate has been to assert  the 
superiority  of  a  ‘rules-based’  regime,  and  to  view  discretionary  policy-making  as 
containing an inherent predisposition towards inflation and macroeconomic instability.13
The  main  thrust  of  this  argument  is  premised  upon  the  ‘time-inconsistency 
problem’.  This  is  the  apparent  paradox that  a  discretionary  regime in  which  policy  is 
constantly  adjusted  in  order  to  maintain  an  optimal  position  will  lead  to  less  optimal 
outcomes than a rules-based regime under which the same policy is consistently followed 
11 For alternative typological reviews of the literature on exchange rate policy-making see Eichengreen 
(1995); Hefeker (1997): Several areas of the literature on exchange rate regimes such as those concerned  
with optimal currency areas and those engaged in prescribing optimal regimes for developing, transitional, 
small and/or open economies are discounted here on the basis that they deal with technical and/or normative 
issues rather than the specific question of exchange rate policy-making itself. For examples see Tower and 
Willett (1976); Miller et al (1989); Argy and de Grauwe (1990); Claassen (1991); Åkerholm and Giovannini 
(1994); McKinnion (1996).
12 Examples include Friedman (1968); Helpman (1981); Cukierman and Meltzer (1986); Hamada (1987); 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1988); Levine et al (1989); Minford (1989); Miller and Sutherland (1992); Panić 
(1992); Bordo and Kydland (1995); Bayoumi and Bordo (1998).
13 See for example Simons (1936); Fischer (1990); Guitián (1992); Keech (1992); Schaling (1995); Hefeker 
(1997).
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in every circumstance regardless of whether or not it  is  optimal under those particular 
conditions.14 The reasoning behind this is that private actors are assumed to tailor their 
economic behaviour in terms of price and wage formation according to their expectations 
as to the future level of inflation. Whilst expectations of a stable inflation rate will lead to 
stable price and wage formation, expectations of rising inflation will lead to ever higher 
levels  of prices and escalating wage demands as private actors seek to compensate  for 
declining real incomes. The determination of these future expectations however is seen to 
be  the  policy-making  record  of  the  authorities,  who  are  believed  to  face  an  inherent 
temptation to create just such a rise in inflation in order to stimulate economic activity and 
electoral popularity.15
In order to be successful though, an inflationary expansion must be at least partially 
unexpected,  as  anticipated  inflation  will  lead  private  actors  to  revise  their  economic 
behaviour accordingly by pushing up prices and wages in advance. The central dilemma 
for the authorities then, is that an increase in economic activity and electoral popularity 
resulting  from  unexpected  inflation  is  necessarily  short-lived.  Whilst  the  expansion 
initially encourages economic growth, as labour becomes increasingly scarce wages and 
hence  also  prices  are  driven  up,  causing  the  economy  to  contract  and  output  and 
employment to fall. Eventually, the level of real economic activity will return to its pre-
expansion levels, only this time with a higher level of inflation. Unless the authorities are 
now prepared to accept this state of affairs they must once again seek to produce a surprise 
expansion.  However,  with  private  actors  now  aware  of  this  strategy,  inflationary 
expectations will have risen, and successive expansions will therefore need to be of an ever 
14 See Kydland and Prescott (1977); Barro and Gordon (1983). 
15 Lamfalussy (1981), p.48; Keech (1992), pp.267-9.
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greater magnitude in order to produce the desired effect, thus leading to escalating inflation 
and macroeconomic instability. In addition, the public may also now be inclined to exact 
punishment upon the authorities by refusing to re-elect them.16
From a rational choice perspective the solution to this problem for the authorities is 
considered to be the adoption of a policy ‘rule’ that binds their future economic policy 
behaviour,  such  as  a  constraint  on  the  future  growth  of  the  money  supply,  inflation 
targeting by an independent central bank, or a fixed exchange rate regime. By entering into 
such commitments, the authorities can influence the expectations and hence the economic 
behaviour of private actors, thereby checking and perhaps even reducing inflationary price-
wage rises. In this way, although a policy rule itself may not be optimal for the particular 
economic conditions faced, the adoption of a rule is therefore thought likely to lead to 
greater optimal economic and electoral outcomes than a discretionary regime.17 
In order for this to occur however, private actors must believe that the policy rule is 
credible and that the authorities will not renege on their commitment. If credibility is not 
ensured then inflationary expectations and economic behaviour will remain unaltered or 
become even more  unstable,  and  the  cost  of  reducing  inflation  in  terms  of  economic 
contraction  and unemployment  is  likely  to  be  high.  If  on the  other  hand credibility  is 
ensured, then changes in expectations and behaviour are more probable, thereby making 
the reduction of inflation easier to achieve.18 In order for a rule to be credible however it 
must possess certain characteristics. Simplicity and visibility are both necessary so that 
private actors can understand the rule and observe when it is being broken, whilst the more 
costly a rule is to break for the authorities the more likely it is that the commitment will be 
16 Friedman (1968); Sayer (1982), pp.243-4.
17 Friedman (1968); Kydland and Prescott (1977); Willett and Mullen (1982); Giavazzi and Pagano (1988); 
Fischer (1990); Keech (1992).
18 Kenen (1988), p.51; Argy (1990), p.72; Giovannini, (1993), p.111.
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believed.19 As such, it is therefore also often argued that ‘externally based’ rules enmeshed 
in wider international commitments possess greater credibility than ‘domestically based’ 
rules, as the costs of breaking such a commitment in terms of international recriminations 
can be higher than those incurred by annoying one’s own populace.20 
On this basis it is frequently stated that where it involves international agreements, 
the most credible and hence the most optimal rule is that of a fixed exchange rate. This it is 
argued, enables the authorities to legitimately claim that there is more at stake in adhering 
to the rule than merely the exchange rate regime itself, and thus to help convince private 
actors  that  the  rule  will  be  obeyed.21 Others  though argue  that  due  to  the  speculatory 
dangers inherent in such a regime, more optimal rules are provided by monetary union or 
by a rule that incorporates an ‘escape clause’ (a so-called ‘contingent rule’). Under this 
latter regime it is recognised from the outset that the rule can be legitimately abandoned in 
the event of severe strain on the unwritten understanding that the authorities will remain 
actively committed to working towards its resumption as soon as possible. In this way, the 
imposition of such a rule is thought to be less likely to lead to detrimental and destabilising 
outcomes as the authorities are free from the necessity  of having to impose damaging 
policies to maintain the rule in difficult circumstances, and because the punishment costs 
of breaking the rule itself will be less severe.22
The rational choice argument that the authorities will prefer a rules based regime, 
and that a pegged exchange rate might constitute an optimal rule is however of limited 
explanatory  utility  for  the  question  of  exchange  rate  policy-making  generally.  As 
19 Kydland and Prescott (1977), p.487; Argy (1990); Giovannini, (1993), p.111; Ruge-Murcia (1995).
20 Lamfalussy (1981), pp.42-44; Kenen (1988), pp.45-6; Minford (1989), p.208; Giovannini (1993), pp.110-
14.
21 Black (1979), p.182; Goldstein (1990); Giovannini (1993), p.110.
22 Aghevli and Montiel (1991); de Kock and Grilli (1993); McKinnion (1996).
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Giovannini points out for example, the conclusion that such a view inevitably leads to, 
namely that floating exchange rates are temporary responses to severe strains and will be 
exchanged  for  a  restrictive  regime  as  soon  as  possible,  is  inconsistent  with  both  the 
prevalence and the longevity of floating regimes.23 Moreover, a fixed exchange rate is not 
the only possible exchange rate rule, and floating regimes can themselves also be viewed 
in this manner. Indeed, with the market free to speculate against currencies not backed by 
sound economic policies it is even possible to argue that a floating exchange rate provides 
a more optimal rule than a fixed regime, by offering a clearer, quicker, and more forceful 
signal to private actors as to when the authorities are pursuing inflationary policies, thus 
providing more incentives for the authorities themselves to maintain a sound policy stance. 
As such, with both floating and restrictive regimes understood in terms of a policy rule, 
and with no necessary reason for the authorities to prefer one over the other on the basis of 
rational choice, the value of this approach for interpreting exchange rate policy-making 
behaviour must therefore be doubted.24
The ‘Country Characteristics’ Approach
In contrast to the rational choice approach in which exchange rate policy-making is 
seen to be determined by the interaction between public and private actors, the ‘country 
characteristics’ approach views the key determinants to be the particular structural features 
and circumstances of the country in  question.  From this perspective,  though a  rational 
choice analysis is sometimes incorporated, exchange rate policy-making is predominantly 
seen as a technocratic decision based on a cost-benefit analysis of all the available options, 
23 Giovannini (1993); See also Schwartz (1993).
24 Sohnen (1969), pp.236-7; Brittan (1970, 1978). Black (1979), pp.192-4.
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and as involving a trade-off  between various social,  political,  and economic  objectives 
such as low unemployment and inflation versus competitiveness, or the loss of monetary 
autonomy versus the benefits of a restrictive regime. As such, the idea of ‘optimal’ policies 
is replaced by the notion of adaptation and of shifts between exchange rate regimes in 
response to changing circumstances as the authorities seek to maintain their policy goals. 
This  approach is well  summed up by Frankel’s  mantra,  that  whilst  each exchange rate 
regime is right for some countries at some time, ‘no single currency regime is right for all 
countries or at all times.’25
Analyses of exchange rate policy-making from this perspective often conjure up 
long lists of important characteristics. These are frequently seen to include for example: the  
size and openness of a country’s economy, the structure of its international trade relations, 
its degree of economic development, its vulnerability to exogenous shocks and balance of 
payments  problems,  its  exposure  to  international  capital  mobility,  the  character  of  its 
microeconomy (i.e. the degree of capital and labour mobility, price/wage flexibility etc.), 
the nature and diversity of the commodities it produces, the effectiveness of its domestic 
economic  tools,  and  the  divergence  in  its  inflation  rate  compared  to  that  of  other 
countries.26 One common argument from this approach for example, is that countries who 
have small, open economies and/or an extensive geographical concentration of trade (such 
as close links to a major trading partner) will prefer a restrictive exchange rate regime in 
order to protect themselves against economic uncertainty and exchange rate instability. It is 
also argued that this preference may be shared by countries who desire to improve their 
anti-inflationary credibility,  who are  lacking strong public institutions,  or who have an 
25 Frankel (1999), p.1; Examples also include Melvin (1985); Argy (1990); Savvides (1990); Aghevli and 
Montiel (1991); Giovannini (1993); Delbecque (1994); Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1994); Milesi-Ferretti 
(1995); Edwards (1996); Oatley (1997); Caramazza and Aziz (1998); IMF (1999); United Nations (2000).
26 See Argy (1982), pp.28-30; Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1994); Frankel (1999); United Nations (2000).
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underdeveloped financial sector. Floating regimes on the other hand, are often considered 
to be preferred by countries that  are  large, economically well  developed,  who have no 
suitable partner with whom to peg, and/or have well developed financial markets, strong 
public  institutions  such  as  an  independent  central  bank,  and  a  good  anti-inflationary 
record.27
Alongside  these  ‘economic’  structural  factors,  another  important  aspect  of 
exchange rate policy-making according to this approach is seen to be the structure and 
particular characteristics of the domestic political sphere. Milesi-Ferretti for example offers 
an analytical  model  based on rational  choice  in  which exchange rate  policy-making is 
determined by the relative strength and stability of the government in comparison to that of 
its  main  opposition  party.  In  this  particular  example,  a  weak  and  unstable  right-wing 
government faced with a potentially strong left-wing opposition is hypothesised to prefer a 
floating rather than a restrictive regime, as the latter will allow the opposition to improve 
their own economic policy credibility and hence their electoral prospects by committing 
themselves to a continuation of the same policy.28 A similar analysis is provided by Oatley, 
who  argues  that  a  left  wing  government  faced  with  a  rising  exchange  rate  and  an 
independent central bank will prefer a fixed exchange rate regime in order to enable the 
pursuit of a less restrictive monetary policy, while a right wing government faced with an 
uncompetitive economy and rising inflation will have an incentive to adopt a restrictive 
regime in order to enforce a tighter monetary policy.29 Continuing in this vein, others have 
also argued that more unstable countries are unlikely to adopt pegged regimes because the 
electoral  costs  of  having  to  abandon  it  will  be  prohibitively  high.  Such  systems  are 
27 Argy (1982), pp.28-30; (1990); Aghevli and Montiel (1991); Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1994), pp.34-6; 
Oatley (1997), Ch.2; Frankel (1999); United Nations (2000), pp.82-3.
28 Milesi-Ferretti (1995)
29 See Oatley (1997), especially Ch.2.
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therefore seen to be more likely to be adopted by stronger governments as these will be 
more able to defend the regime and to weather any political storms that may ensue.30
Proponents  of  the  country  characteristics  approach  however,  are  on  the  whole 
divided and uncertain as to the exact effects that various characteristics will have on the 
choice of exchange rate regime, and over which are to be accorded most importance in the 
policy-making process. Black for example has argued that strong policy-making authorities 
may prefer a floating rather than a fixed exchange rate regime in order to enable the pursuit 
of  domestic  policies  necessary  for  enforcing  economic  discipline  and  stability,  while 
conversely weaker authorities experiencing inflationary difficulties may prefer a restrictive 
regime for the discipline that this provides.31 Moreover, whilst it is generally agreed that 
large economies will tend to opt for a floating regime, and that small open economies with 
large trading partners will tend to regulate their exchange rate, others have argued instead 
that  the  crucial  determinant  is  not  the  degree  of  size  or  openness,  but  the  level  of 
divergence between a country’s rate of inflation and those of its main trading partners. 
Even here though, disagreement persists. Some for instance argue that a greater degree of 
divergence  will  be  more  likely  to  lead  to  a  restrictive  regime  in  a  bid  to  reduce  the 
differential, though others claim that this will lead instead to a floating system in order that 
the gap can be offset through the exchange rate.32
Furthermore, while it is often argued that countries with rigid economic structures 
are more likely to choose a flexible regime as a shelter from the external environment, it is 
also  argued  that  such  countries  may  choose  a  restrictive  regime  to  help  eliminate 
30 Edwards (1996); Caramazza and Aziz (1998).
31 Black (1979).
32 Argy (1982), pp.29-30; Melvin (1985).
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fluctuations.33 Conversely,  it  has  also  been  claimed  that  countries  with  highly  open 
economies who might be expected to adopt a fixed regime in order to minimise the impact 
of exchange rate fluctuations may prefer rather to adopt a floating regime for the insulating 
benefits that this can provide.34 These inconsistencies have been further replicated in the 
recent  debate  over  the  effects  of  globalisation,  with  some  arguing  that  policy-making 
authorities have sought to use fixed regimes in order to mitigate the effects of international 
capital  movements on the  current  account,  and  with others  viewing moves  to  floating 
regimes for the same reasons.35
Such problems and inconsistencies then, also render the attempt to approach the 
subject of exchange rate policy-making from a country characteristics approach extremely 
difficult. As Argy has put it, such an approach is ‘highly contentious’, and as Delbecque 
points out, it is an area of theory with no ‘conventional wisdom’.36 Such lack of agreement 
over the impact of various political and economic factors, as well as over which factors are 
themselves important, means this approach also has little in the way of explanatory value. 
Indeed, as Honkapohja and Pikkarainen concur, “overall the country characteristics do not 
help very much to explain the countries’ choice of exchange rate regime.”37
The ‘Interest Group’ Approach
The  third  and  final  view of  exchange  rate  policy-making contained  within  the 
literature is that of the ‘interest group’ approach. In contrast to the previous perspectives, 
this approach addresses the question of exchange rate policy-making from an examination 
33 See Savvides (1990); Aghevli and Montiel (1991); Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1994); Åkerholm and 
Giovannini (1994).
34 Argy (1982), pp.28-30.
35 Cf. Savvides (1990); Helleiner (1999); United Nations (2000).
36 Argy (1982), p.29; Delbecque (1994).
37 Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1994), pp.41ff; also Delbecque (1994), p.55.
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of the interests of various economic groups and sectors within the national economy, and 
of their transmission to, and interaction with the policy-making process. Considerations of 
economic efficiency or political expediency are generally held to possess relatively little 
weight, and instead the primary emphasis is on the distributional conflict between socio-
economic groups with different exchange rate preferences. Exchange rate policy-making is 
therefore held to flow from the relative balance of power between these groups and their 
respective degree of political organisation and articulation. As Frieden explains, the choice 
of exchange rate regime is dependent on “how intense preferences are, how concentrated 
and organised  the  various  interests  are,  and  how political  and  other  social  institutions 
influence their interaction.”38
A central tenet of the interest group approach is that different economic groups and 
sectors hold different preferences both for the type of regime and the level of the exchange 
rate that is desired, and that these will be determined by the degree to which these groups 
are exposed to international competition.  It is commonly argued for example that those 
whose activities chiefly involve international trade and payments will favour a restrictive 
exchange rate regime in order to diminish the risks involved during the course of their 
business. Subdivisions within this sector include groups whose activities involve a high 
degree of foreign acquisitions (purchases or investments) who are also thought to prefer an 
appreciated  exchange  rate  in  order  to  obtain  such  assets  more  cheaply,  whilst  those 
competing with foreign producers on the global market are believed to prefer a depreciated 
exchange rate in order to make their business more internationally competitive.39 
38 Frieden (1991), p.450; For examples see Vaubel (1990); Frieden (1991, 1998, 2000); Havrilevsky (1994); 
Walsh (1994, 2000); Hefeker (1997).
39 Differences also exist within this group. Frieden (2000) for example argues that producers of standardised 
goods have a stronger interest in the level of the exchange rate as the price of their goods will be the only 
variable on which they can compete, whilst those competing largely on quality or other non-price variables 
are less concerned. Also see Walsh (1994, 2000); Hefeker (1997).
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In  contrast,  groups  and  sectors  with  business  activities  more  heavily  weighted 
towards the domestic market (e.g. service industries and producers of non-tradeables), are 
believed to be less concerned about exchange rate fluctuations and to be more anxious for 
the authorities to retain the freedom to adjust economic policy in response to changing 
circumstances, in particular to be able to pursue an expansionary policy during a downturn. 
Within  this  category  there  are  also  subdivisions.  Those  industries  who  are  facing 
competition from imports are thought to favour a lower rate in order to render their foreign 
rivals less competitive, whilst those who are not subject to competition from imports are 
seen to favour a relatively higher exchange rate in order to raise the domestic market price 
of their goods relative to those of the tradeables sector and to reduce the price of imports 
entering into their production process.40
Within  this  general  model  there  are  also  several  variants.  Hefeker  for  example 
focuses  attention  on  the  activities  of  internationally  orientated  business  and  financial 
sectors, arguing in the case of the European Union that in countries with close relations 
between major banks and producers of tradeables, these banks will be strongly in favour of 
monetary union as this will harmonise banking standards and thereby increase their profits. 
A divergence of interest in this instance is thus established between the large and small 
sectors  of  the  national  banking  community,  as  those  who  are  smaller  and  less 
internationally orientated will be likely to lose out and will thus oppose such measures.41 
This view is echoed by Vaubel, who also subdivides the tradeables sector itself into large 
and small enterprises, with the former also preferring more rigid exchange rate regimes.42 
In a similar manner, Walsh has argued that the key determinants of exchange rate policy-




making  are  the  structure  of  national  bank-industry  relations  and  the  stability  of  the 
government.  According  to  this  version,  where  banks  and  industry  have  a  closely 
interdependent  relationship  they  are  both  thought  to  prefer  stable  and  competitive 
exchange  rates,  and  will  present  a  united  front  to  policy-makers.  Whether  or  not  the 
government will actually adopt such a policy however is thought to depend on its degree of 
stability.  As with  some of  the  analyses  of  the  country characteristics  approach,  Walsh 
claims that unstable governments are unlikely to attempt to pursue a restrictive exchange 
rate policy as the economic and political benefits of this policy will take time to accrue, 
whilst in the meantime the unpopular aspects of such a policy could threaten their electoral 
fortunes.  On the other hand, in countries where banks and industry have a much more 
autonomous relationship both will have independent preferences for exchange rate policy. 
Policy-makers will thus be confronted with relatively weak and contrasting preferences, 
and  the  policy  response  is  likely  to  be  based  on  short-term  partisan  and  electoral 
considerations that are also unlikely to result in the adoption of a restricted exchange rate 
regime.43
As  with  the  other  conventional  approaches  to  exchange  rate  policy-making 
however, the interest group approach is also subject to a number of criticisms. As Oatley 
points out for example, policy-makers cannot afford to ignore the political and economic 
consequences  of  exchange  rate  policy  as  a  whole  regardless  of  the  preferences  of  the 
dominant sector, and moreover, the interest group model does not show how competing 
demands  over  exchange  rate  preferences  are  reconciled  by  the  political  process. 
Furthermore,  it  is  also  unclear  as  to  whether  economic  sectors  actually  possess  the 
exchange rate preferences attributed to them. The ability of banks and large international 
43 Walsh (1994; 2000).
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traders to obtain exchange stability through the use of forward markets for example, means 
that  not  all  will  favour  a  restrictive  exchange  rate  regime,  while  the  preference  of 
international exporters for a lower exchange rate will be mediated by their use of imports 
in the production process. In contrast to the standard logic of the interest group approach, 
international  exporters  with  a  high  degree  of  import  usage  may  actually  prefer  an 
overvalued exchange rate  in order to reduce their import costs and to help drive down 
wages. In consequence, such difficulties also mean that as with the previous approaches to 
the question of exchange rate policy-making, an approach focusing on the role of interest 
groups is fraught with problems and unable to provide any substantial answers.44
An Alternative Theory of Exchange Rate Policy-Making
In addition to their individual and specific difficulties, the approaches to exchange 
rate policy-making outlined above are also open to challenges on broader methodological 
grounds. In particular, these approaches can be criticised for their failure to address the 
more fundamental and logically prior question of why society itself takes the form that it 
does.  Whilst  attributing  causal  importance  to  the  relation  between  public  and  private 
actors, the political and economic characteristics of individual countries, and the role of 
interest  groups, traditional  approaches make no attempt to understand why these social 
phenomena  themselves  should  exist,  but  instead  treat  them  in  a  taken-for-granted, 
ahistorical,  positivist  manner.  The  key  difficulty  this  poses  for  an  understanding  of 
exchange rate policy-making is that there is no means of tracing any internal connection 
between the aims and motivations of policy-makers and the characteristics of the wider 
society  in  which  they  operate.  The  relation  between  political  behaviour  and  socio-
44 See Oatley (1997), pp.16-18.
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economic factors has thus to be derived in an exogenous and speculative fashion, leading 
to systematised accounts that are more descriptive than analytical, and which ignore the 
fundamental  constraints  that  are  imposed  upon  exchange  rate  policy-making  by  the 
structural composition of society itself.
It  is  possible  to  surmount  such  difficulties  however  through  the  adoption  of  a 
Marxist  methodology.45 The  key  advantage  of  such  an  approach  is  that  from  this 
perspective the  varied  and apparently  distinct  phenomena  of  a  society are  not  seen as 
independent  and  automatically  given ‘things’,  but  as  integral  elements  of  a  constantly 
developing organic and unified whole. As such, this enables a conceptualisation of social 
phenomena such as political  and economic behaviour as being related in a way that is 
internal  and  necessary  rather  than  external  and  contingent,  thus  providing  a  basis  for 
inquiry that does not rely on the incorporation of arbitrary factors ‘from outside’.46 The 
reason why such a methodological approach is able to do this is because it is precisely the 
question  of  social  form  which  is  taken  as  the  starting  point  for  analysis.  Indeed,  an 
examination that begins in this way is essential because as Marx points out, “society does 
not  consist  of  individuals,  but  expresses….the  relations  within which these individuals 
stand.”47 The first question that needs to be asked therefore is, ‘why do social relations 
assume the forms they do’?
45 The specific position adopted here is that of ‘open Marxism’. See for example Bonefeld et al (1992; 
1992a); Burnham (1993; 1994).
46 Marx (1973); Bonefeld (1993); Bonefeld et al (1995).
47 Marx (1896), p.265.
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Social Form and Capitalist Production
A Marxist  analysis  of  social  form begins  by drawing a  distinction  between the 
appearance  and  the  essence  of  social  phenomena.48 In  contrast  to  their  external  and 
immediate impression as independently existing ‘things’ or autonomous realms of activity, 
the various ‘forms’ of which social reality is comprised, such as the distinction between the 
‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres, or ‘the state’ and ‘the market’ for example, are seen instead 
as  the  multifarious  ‘theoretical  expressions’  of  relations  between  people  that  are 
determined during the process of production. For Marx, it  is the specific way in which 
human labour power is organised in the course of social production which is therefore seen 
to comprise the essence or the content of social form. The various phenomena of a society 
are thus seen in terms of forms that are assumed by the social production process, and as 
the forms in-and-through which human labour obtains existence. Such phenomena are not 
therefore seen to be related in an external manner in terms of cause and effect,  but are 
understood to be internally related through their constitution as the diverse forms that are 
assumed by the same set of social relations.49
According  to  Marx,  these  social  relations  of  production  have  since  the  most 
primitive days of human history been defined along class lines. Through the gaining and 
retention of control over the means of production, one class has managed to exploit another 
through the unremunerated extraction of surplus labour. The concept of ‘class’, which is 
therefore  central  to  an  understanding  of  social  form,  is  thus  not  seen  in  terms  of 
sociologically defined groups of people confronting each other, and nor is it seen to relate 
48 Marx (1991), p.956, writes for example that: “All science would be superfluous if the form of appearance 
of things directly coincided with their essence.”
49 Marx (1896), ps.95-9, 165; Marx (1913; 1973); Marx and Engels (1965), pp.39ff, (1998); Bonefeld et al 
(1992); Burnham (1993; 1994).
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simply to the existence of class consciousness or political struggle (neither of which are 
necessary for classes as-such to exist), but is regarded instead as an exploitative relation 
arising from the process of social production. As de Ste Croix explains, the concept of 
‘class’ refers to “the collective social expression of the fact of exploitation, the way in 
which exploitation is embodied in a social structure.”50
A subordinate class however does not simply accept its position in the social order. 
The existence of class exploitation also gives birth to resistance to this exploitation, and 
hence to ‘class struggle’. As with the concept of class therefore, ‘class struggle’ is also not 
something which is seen simply in terms of consciously directed political action, and nor is 
it conceived as the occasional outburst of open and direct resistance by workers. Instead 
class struggle refers on the one hand to an ongoing process of resistance by the labouring 
class  to exploitation,  and on the other,  to  the ongoing efforts  of the dominant  class  to 
impose and maintain it.51 Though in political  terms not all members of a class will  act 
according to their ‘objective’ class interests, the fundamental significance of class for the 
process of social production means that the nature and development of the relations of 
production, and hence the nature and development of the social forms that they assume, are 
nevertheless conditioned as a whole by their class character, and by the struggle that this 
entails. As Marx puts it for example:
“The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out 
of the direct producers determines….its specific political form. It is in each 
case the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to 
50 de Ste Croix (1983), pp.43-4: Also see Marx (1847), p.162; Marx and Engels (1998): For an open Marxist 
view of class see Bonefeld et al (1995); Burnham (2001): For views of class in terms of political 
consciousness or struggle see for example Elster (1985); Roemer (1986); Lekas (1988); Evans (1999). 
51 Bonefeld et al (1995), p.20; Holloway (1995).
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the  immediate  producers….in  which  we  find  the  innermost  secret,  the 
hidden basis of the entire social edifice.”52
The outcome of class struggle however is by no means certain. In contrast to more 
deterministic interpretations of Marx in which this is postulated in terms of the inevitability  
of proletarian revolution, on a more open reading it is seen as a process with no fixed lines 
of  development,  and as  something  which  is  inherently  open-ended.  As such,  the  most 
important feature of a class society is not then the way in which human labour is organised 
in a technical sense in terms of its specific division of labour and the kind of work that is 
undertaken,  but  the  way  in  which  class  struggle  is  contained  and  class  exploitation 
reproduced.53
In capitalist society this takes place through the mechanism of the ‘value form’. 
The capitalist mode of production is distinguished from other forms of social organisation 
not by the existence of money or commodities, but by the production of commodities for 
the purpose of exchange. Social production is undertaken in a private context by isolated, 
independent,  and  autonomous  producers,  and  takes  place  in  an  uncoordinated  manner 
without reference to any social plan or design. The social connection between producers in 
a capitalist economy is therefore not felt directly, but is only revealed in an indirect manner 
through the exchange of commodities on the basis of their value. This is determined by the 
productivity  of  labour,  and  is  expressed  in  terms  of  the  average  amount  of  socially 
necessary labour time that a commodity takes to produce. ‘Value’ then, is not seen as a 
property  of  commodities  themselves  (although  it  appears  as  such),  but  since  it  is  the 
average amount of labour time that is  socially necessary which determines the value of a 
52 Marx (1991), p.927: Also Marx (1847), p.330.
53 See de Ste Croix (1983), pp.51-2; Clarke (1988); Holloway (1991); Bonefeld et al (1995).
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commodity (and not the time that each individual commodity takes to produce  per se), 
‘value’ is seen as the product of a particular social framework, as the reified and alienated 
form in which labour appears under capitalist relations.54
The social content of capitalist relations is one of class exploitation. While the mass 
of the population are separated from the direct means of producing their subsistence and 
must sell their labour power on an ongoing basis in order to survive, the minority of the 
population  who  own  the  means  of  production  are  able  to  exploit  the  labour  of  this 
propertyless  mass  for  their  own  material  benefit.55 The  specific  means  by  which  this 
exploitation  takes  place  is  through  the  extraction  of  ‘surplus  value’.  This  process  is 
described by Marx in the form of the circuit of capital, expressed in its general formula as: 
M–C…P(lp-mp)…C’–M’.  In  the  first  phase,  M–C,  the  owner  of  ‘money  capital’,  i.e. 
capital  in the form of money (M), buys the commodities (C) of labour-power (lp) and 
means of production (mp) on the market.  In the second phase,  the production process, 
these  are  put  together  to  function as  ‘productive capital’ (P).  Here,  by compelling  the 
worker through the labour contract to provide his labour power for a greater length of time 
than that represented by the amount of wages received in remuneration, the capitalist is 
able  to extract  a volume of unpaid labour time which is embodied in the commodities 
produced (C’) as surplus value. In the final phase, C’-M’, this expanded sum of value in 
the commodity form is thrown onto the market for sale in order to be converted into a sum 
of money greater than that with which the capitalist started out (M’). The whole process is 
then repeated, ideally on an larger scale so as to facilitate ever greater levels of capital 
accumulation.56
54 ‘Value’ here refers to exchange value as opposed to use value. On this concept see Marx (1990; 1992); and 
also Rubin (1975).
55 Marx (1896), pp.256-71. 
56 Marx (1992) Chs.1-4; also see Fine (1989), Chs.7-9.
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This desire of capital for increased expansion however is not merely subjective, but 
is driven by the competitive pressure of capitalist production itself. By such means as the 
reduction  of  wages,  the  lengthening  of  the  working  day,  and  the  improvement  of 
productive technique  and technology,  it  is  possible  for  an individual  capital  to  force a 
greater exploitation of labour and to produce commodities in less time than that which is 
socially necessary, thus enabling it to obtain a higher rate of profit and capital expansion. 
This increase in the social productivity of labour however also imposes discipline on all 
other  capitals  through changes in the value of their  commodities,  compelling others to 
follow suit and leading to such measures becoming widespread and generalised. Inefficient 
capitals who fail to keep pace with such developments come under growing pressure in the 
form of declining productivity and a falling rate of profit. Eventually, if adaptation is not 
forthcoming bankruptcy will ensue, capital will be destroyed, and workers will lose their 
jobs.  In  this  way, by pressurising capital  to increase  its  exploitation  of labour,  and by 
eliminating  those  capitals  that  fail  to  do  so,  the  competitive  dynamic  of  capitalist 
production is transmitted to all capitals through the mechanism of the value form, thus 
serving to keep social relations within the limits of the profitability of capital, and thereby 
helping to ensure its continued class domination over labour.57
Social Reproduction and Crisis
The circuit of capital however cannot be understood as a single circuit, but as an 
expression of the movement of capitalist production in general presupposes the existence 
of  innumerable,  interrelated  circuits  throughout  society.  Each phase of  the  circuit  thus 
appears simultaneously ‘as a point of departure, of transit, and of return’ for the process of 
57 See Clarke (1988), p.99-105; Marx (1992); Bonefeld (1993), p.25.
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capital expansion as a whole. In its entirety then, the circuit is comprised of a unity of all 
the  particular  capitals  in  existence,  each  forming  but  ‘partial  movements  of  the 
reproduction process of the total social capital.’58
This process however does not proceed smoothly but is unstable and vulnerable to 
disturbance  and  crises  as  a  result  of  class  struggle.59 The  disruptive  capacity  of  class 
struggle  inheres  through the dependency of the  circuit  of  capital  on labour  power and 
money. In the first instance for example, capital requires sufficient quantities and qualities 
of labour power to exploit. If these are not found to be readily available, due perhaps to 
industrial  action  or  from  a  lack  of  adequate  skills  in  the  workforce,  then  capitalist 
production will be inhibited or even prevented.60 In the second and more indirect instance, 
disturbances  are  felt  through  the  role  played  by  money  in  capitalist  production  as  a 
measure of value in the form of price, and as the mediator of commodity exchange.61 
In general terms, such disturbances to the price mechanism (inflation or deflation) 
are the result of changes between the amount of money and the amount of commodities 
that are in circulation. The exact causes of such disturbances however are neither simple 
nor straightforward. To neo-classical and Keynesian theories for example, they are thought 
to  be  the  result  of  distortions  to  market  equilibrium  such  as  restrictive  trade  union 
practices, monopoly pricing, excessive alterations in the money supply due to incompetent 
or irresponsible government policies, or from excessive or insufficient levels of effective 
demand for goods. The resolution to monetary crises is thus seen to lay with the resolution 
of these contingent difficulties.62 
58 Marx (1992), p.180.
59 The most systematic treatment of crisis in Marx’s writings is Marx (1954). 
60 de Brunhoff (1978), pp.9-36.
61 Commodity prices are believed to fluctuate around their values. See Rubin (1975); Marx (1991), Ch.48.
62 For example see Keynes (1923), Ch.1; (1936); Friedman (1968); Parkin (1975); Brittan (1978); Frisch 
(1983); Milgate (1983); Gilbert (1986).
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The  problem  with  these  explanations  however  is  that  they  make  no  causal 
connection  between  such  disturbances  and  the  process  of  capitalist  accumulation.  In 
contrast, from a Marxist perspective monetary disorders are seen to result precisely from 
the class basis of capitalist production. The volume of goods (or rather value) produced for 
example is seen to be determined by the volume of capital entering into the circuit and by 
the degree to which it is able to exploit labour. The productivity of labour, the technique, 
technology, and intensity of production however are all factors that are subject to class 
struggle. Generically, disturbances from this side assume the pattern of boom and slump. 
Increases  in  productivity  and  expanding  markets  through  an  increased  exploitation  of 
labour produce economic growth, leading to an increase in the volume of capital seeking 
expansion, a growth in the level of credit advanced, and falling unemployment. This is also 
accompanied by rising prices as the demand for goods also increases, as firms seek to raise 
profits, and as workers press for higher wages. Eventually however, the boom gives way to 
a  crisis  of  overproduction.  As  the  exploitation  of  labour  increases,  the  mass  of  value 
produced exceeds the ability of the market, founded on the restricted purchasing ability of 
the masses, to absorb it  at  a price yielding a sufficient  rate of profit.  This  leads to an 
‘excess supply’ of commodities, a fall in prices and profits, rising unemployment, and a 
contraction in social  production. This process however also creates the conditions for a 
renewed expansion. Rising unemployment subjects labour to increased discipline, allowing 
for lower wages and more intense exploitation, capitals come under pressure to improve 
efficiency in order to survive, whilst bankrupt and struggling firms are absorbed by larger, 
more productive concerns.63
63 Marx (1992), p.156: Also Marx (1896), p.160; (1954); (1991), pp.472-3; Mandel (1975).
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The volume of money in circulation is also related to this process. Wage levels for 
example depend on the relative strength of capital and labour, whilst the volume of credit 
expanded depends on the perceptions of industrial and financial sectors as to their future 
levels of profitability – i.e. the future ability of capital to successfully exploit labour. The 
money  supply  is  also  determined by the  level  of  state  spending and economic  policy, 
though  this  too  is  made  in  relation  to  conditions  of  capital  accumulation.  While  it  is 
possible for economic policy to be made with reference to ‘political’ aims, this itself is 
directly  related  to  ‘economic’  conditions.  There  is  no  need  for  example  to  seek  to 
manipulate  a  pre-election  boom  if  the  economy  is  already  performing  well,  whilst 
expanding state spending and credit may also be motivated by a desire to avoid the social 
difficulties associated with a crisis of overaccumulation.64
The effects of monetary disturbances on the circuit of capital need to be examined 
according to their particular circumstances. Rising and falling prices can at different times 
for example both prove to be beneficial and detrimental to capitalist production. Inflation 
can  help  aid  the  accumulation  of  capital  and  the  flow  of  the  circuit  by  stimulating 
profitability  and  by  eroding  real  wages  and  debts,  but  can  also  deter  capital  from 
embarking upon the circuit by creating instability and uncertainty over future economic 
conditions. Eroding the ability to measure the value of commodities can undermine the 
value form, rising costs can prompt an intensification of class struggle as workers seek 
higher wages, the international competitiveness of the national economy may be reduced, 
and speculation may be encouraged at the expense of productive activity and investment. If 
taken to extremes, inflation can also lead to the destruction of the currency itself and to a 
64 Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972); Mandel (1975); Gamble and Walton (1976); Rowthorn (1977); Goldthorpe 
(1978); Fine (1979).
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collapse of capitalist relations. A period of deflation can also be beneficial to the circuit of 
capital. This can serve for example to check damaging inflation and can help to restore 
conditions  for  capital  accumulation  within  the  value  form  by  enforcing  competitive 
discipline and improving national economic competitiveness. On the other hand however, 
deflation can also impede the circuit of capital by creating instability and uncertainty, by 
reducing prices and profits, by intensifying class conflict as capitalists seek to reduce costs 
and wages, and by raising the real  value of debts and reducing productive activity and 
investment.65
In order for the circuit of capital to flow normally, certain conditions must therefore 
be met. A ready supply of skilled, appropriately priced and disciplined wage-labour, as 
well the necessary materials for production is essential in order for capitalist accumulation 
to take place at all, whilst a relatively stable currency is necessary to serve as a means of 
expressing value in the form of price, and for encouraging capital  to embark upon the 
process of expansion. Such factors however are not naturally or self-reproducing, and nor 
are they able to be produced from within the circuit itself. Instead, the provision of such 
factors requires intervention from ‘outside’ the circuit. In order to illustrate how this  is 
achieved entails an examination of the capitalist state.66
The Capitalist State
At first glance the capitalist  state appears as a neutral  ‘public’ sphere of human 
activity distinct and autonomous from the ‘private’ sphere of capitalist relations contained 
65 Ball (1964), pp.19-20; Jackman et al (1984), pp.184-5; Heathfield and Russell (1996), p.19.
66 Marx (1970), p.32; (1990), p.170; de Brunhoff (1978), ps.9-60, and passim; Fine (1979).
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within civil society. The state presents itself as an impartial arbiter, discriminating between 
competing particular interests to act in the ‘national’ or ‘general’ interest’ for the benefit of 
all  its  citizens.67 From  a  Marxist  perspective  however,  such  appearances  are  illusory. 
Instead,  the state is  not seen as a dispassionate force that is  external  to society,  but is 
regarded as an intrinsic aspect of the capitalist mode of production and to be fundamentally 
concerned with ensuring the reproduction of capitalist class relations.68
The capitalist state is seen to have emerged from the long drawn-out social changes 
and revolutions that led to the decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. The driving 
force behind these changes is considered to have been class struggle. The resistance of 
serfs to exploitation on the one hand, and the desire of the lords to impose ever greater 
exploitation  on  the  other,  led  to  a  search  for  more  efficient  and  profitable  ways  of 
extracting surplus labour. This led ultimately to the development of commercial agriculture 
and industry, the expansion of trade, and to the increasing monetisation of society. Such 
developments  however  also  led  to  the  recomposition  of  class  relations.  The  open and 
directly coercive relations of feudal exploitation were supplanted as capitalism progressed 
by relations of formally free and equal individuals meeting in the market as buyers and 
sellers of commodities on the impartial bases of the rule of law and money. Behind this 
veneer of apparent equality however, class relations had not been abolished but had simply 
assumed a new form. Ownership of the means of production was now concentrated in the 
hands of a small minority on the legal basis of the ‘rights’ of private property, while the 
67 Such a view of the state is commonly expressed for example in the literature on ‘globalisation’. See Cerny 
(1990), Ohmae (1990); Hirst and Thompson (1996); Strange (1997).
68 de Brunhoff (1978); Clarke (1988, 1991); Burnham (1996).
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mass of the population were now forced by the indirect coercive pressures of the market to 
continually sell their labour power to this minority in exchange for wages.69
An inherent and fundamental feature of these social changes was the emergence of 
the  capitalist  state.  In  contrast  to  the feudal  absolutist  state  in  which the political  and 
economic  spheres  of  social  life  were  fused  and  indistinguishable  (a  person’s  political 
position determining their economic position in the social hierarchy and vice versa), the 
capitalist state was predicated instead upon an institutional separation from civil society, 
and  hence  upon  the  delineation  of  social  life  into  distinct  ‘public’ and  ‘private’,  or 
‘political’ and  ‘economic’ spheres.  In  giving  political  form  to  the  newly  constituted 
relations of production in this way, the capitalist state materialised as an institutional form 
of social relations designed to uphold and legitimise the formal rights of private property 
and the inherent class divide this contains. The relation between the state and the process 
of capitalist production is thus not one which is external and contingent, but one that is 
internal and necessary. The state itself is conceived in terms of a form of social relations, 
and  as  such  is  seen  to  be  primarily  concerned  to  ensure  their  reproduction  and 
maintenance.70
Such a view of the state thus stands in direct contrast to views that emphasise its 
‘fractionalist’, ‘instrumentalist’, ‘pluralist’, or ‘relatively autonomous’ character. The state 
is not understood as an institutional ‘structure’ capable of being appropriated and wielded 
by various social groups, sectors, classes, or ‘fractions of capital’ for their own ends, and 
nor is it seen to be capable of acting either in the interests of one part of capital at the 
expense  of  another,  or  with  disregard  to  ‘economic’  forces.  Approaches  towards 
69 Clarke, (1988), p.17; Holloway (1995). pp.138-41; Burnham (1996), p.99-100: On the emergence of the 
capitalist state see for example Polanyi (1957); Strayer (1970); Poggi (1978); Anderson (1986). 
70 Clarke (1988); Bonefeld et al (1995).
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understanding the state which regard it as something that is connected to, but nonetheless 
external from capitalist society, are all unable to conceptualise the limits to state behaviour 
in terms of the necessity for it to act in the interests of capital. They are unable for example 
to explain why the state persistently acts in the interests of capital despite variations in the 
complexion  of  the  political  authorities  over  time,  and  are  similarly  unable  to  explain 
instances  of  similarity  in  the  behaviour  of  states  with  different  social  and  political 
structures during certain historical periods.71 In contrast, it is through the form of the state 
itself as a ‘publicly’ constituted institutional framework for upholding the rule of law and 
money – the necessary conditions for capitalist production and class exploitation – that the 
necessity for the state to act in the interests of capital is derived.72
The  maintenance  and  reproduction  of  capitalist  relations  by  the  state  involves 
continual action in order to regulate class struggle and to address the various crises that 
emerge  as  a  result  of  the  instability  of  the  capitalist  social  form.  This  does  not  mean 
however that the state acts in the interests of all specific capitals, or that it  acts in the 
interests of any particular fraction of capital. Since the circuit of capital exists only as a 
unity of innumerable competing circuits, and since capital itself needs to be transformed 
into all three of its money, productive, and commodity forms in order to expand, the state 
can only seek to provide the necessary conditions within which capital expansion can take 
place, and hence can act only in the interests of capital-in-general.73 
71 Such as the widespread adoption of ‘monetarism’ during the 1980s. For views from a fractionalist 
perspective see Crouch (1979); Longstreth (1979); Jessop (1983); Ingham (1984); Van der Pijl (1984): For a 
critique see Clarke (1978): For views from a ‘relative autonomist’ perspective see Block (1977; 1980): For 
instrumentalism see Miliband (1969).
72 Clarke (1988); Bonefeld (1993).
73 Marx (1992), p.133. writes that: “Money capital, commodity capital and productive capital…do not denote 
independent varieties of capital whose functions constitute the content of branches of business that are 
independent and separate from one another. They are simply particular functional forms of industrial capital, 
which takes on all three forms in turn.” Also see Marx and Engels (1965); Barker (1978); de Brunhoff 
(1978); Clarke (1988), p.138; Fine (1989), p.178; Bonefeld (1992), pp.116-19; (1993), pp.53-4; Burnham 
(2001). 
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The key means  by which  the  state  does  this  is  through its  ‘economic  policies’ 
concerning  the  management  of  labour  power  and  money.  Through  its  various  social, 
employment,  welfare,  and  education  policies  for  example,  the  state  seeks  to  confine 
working class expectations within the boundaries of profitable capital accumulation and to 
ensure a sufficiently trained and disciplined workforce for exploitation, whilst through its 
credit, fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies the state seeks to ensure a relatively 
stable  currency  and  to  regulate  the  price  mechanism  in  a  manner  conducive  to  the 
continued flow of the circuit of capital.74 The limits on state behaviour resulting from the 
specific form of capitalist society however, cannot be fully determined from an analysis of 
‘the state’ in isolation. As Barker has pointed out, ‘the state’ does not exist in the singular, 
but only as part of an international collection of states. A proper understanding of the state 
and  the  constraints  imposed  upon  its  activities  therefore  requires  an  analysis  of  this 
international context.75 
The International Context
For Marx, capitalism is analysed as an inherently global form of social relations. 
The tendency to create the world market is seen to be ‘directly given in the concept of 
capital itself’, and competition on the world market is seen to serve as ‘the very basis and 
living  atmosphere  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production.’76 From  this  viewpoint,  each 
individual nation state is therefore considered to be but one part of a unified global whole, 
as ‘a territorial fragmentation of a society which extends throughout the world’, and the 
74 As Kalecki (1943) contends, the idea that the state will thus maintain full employment if it only knows how 
is ‘fallacious’, since this will inevitably undermine the precarious nature of labour within capitalism.
75 Barker (1978).
76 Marx (1973), p.408; (1991), p.205.
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character of the world system is thus defined by the constitution of political authority on a 
national basis, and by the accumulation of capital on an international level.77 The global 
capitalist  system  is  not  then  seen  to  be  a  mere  sum  of  its  parts,  an  aggregation  of 
compartmentalised units, but is as Picciotto explains, ‘a single system in which state power 
is allocated between territorial entities.’78 In other words, national states are but ‘political 
nodes’ in the global flow of capital.79
The power and legitimacy of the national state is dependent upon a continually 
expanding  accumulation  of  surplus  value  within  its  borders.  In  turn,  with  a  policy  of 
autarky  only  viable  for  the  provision  of  the  most  basic  standards  of  living,  such 
accumulation is itself fundamentally dependent upon international  trade and commerce. 
The prosperity and stability of national social relations therefore rests not only upon the 
successful integration of the domestic economy, or ‘national’ circuit  of  capital  into the 
international circuit, but also upon the prosperity and stability of the international circuit 
itself.80
Conditions within national states are therefore subject to global pressures that lie 
beyond their individual power to control, while a crisis in one ‘node’ of the global system 
can  rapidly destabilise  other parts.81 As such,  the behaviour  of  each state  in economic 
policy terms is conditioned not only by a need to attract  and retain capital  in order to 
secure  domestic  social  reproduction,  but  also  by  the  need to  ensure the  well-being of 
international  capitalist  relations  as  a  whole.  Whilst  states  are  therefore  forced  into 
competition with each other in order to  entice capital  to  their  territories,  they are also 
77 Holloway (1996), p.125; Picciotto (1991, 1991a).
78 Picciotto (1991), p.217; (1991a).
79 Bonefeld et al (1995), p.8; Holloway (1996), pp.116-29.
80 de Brunhoff (1978); Burnham (2001).
81 Clarke (1991), p.54; Bonefeld et al (1995), p.13.
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forced to co-operate in order to ensure the successful maintenance and continued flow of 
the circuit of capital both nationally and globally.82
This  dependency  upon  international  conditions  places  certain  pressures  and 
restrictions upon national economic policy-making. As Barker points out, the limits to the 
form, development, and management of each individual state is subject both to the level 
and  development  of  domestic  class  struggle,  and  to  global  conditions  of  capital 
accumulation  in  general,  themselves the  result  of  class struggle on a  global  scale.83 In 
overarching  terms,  this  means  that  each  state  must  provide  internationally  favourable 
conditions  for  surplus  value accumulation  within  its  borders  or  capital  will  seek more 
profitable  avenues  elsewhere,  provoking  balance  of  payments  difficulties,  national 
economic and political crises, and ultimately threatening the stability of domestic capitalist 
relations.84 However, because crises are an inherent feature of capitalist relations, states 
cannot  hope to achieve their resolution, but can only seek to mitigate their effects  and 
strive to gain a better position for themselves within the global system.85
Given the role of money in capitalist production a key element in achieving these 
aims is the necessity for states to ensure the international convertibility of their national 
currencies. This is needed in order to integrate the various components of the global circuit 
itself and to enable the flow of international trade and payments. The means by which this 
convertibility takes place is determined by the exchange rate regime, the particular form of 
which therefore conditions the means through which the dynamics and pressures of the 
global economy are transmitted to the domestic circuit, and conversely, through which the 
82 de Brunhoff (1978), p.175; Burnham (1996), p.105; Holloway (1996), pp.122ff. 
83 Barker (1978); Bonefeld (1992), p.122; Burnham, (1993, 2001); Panitch (1994), p.69; Holloway (1996), 
p.129. 
84 Bonefeld et al (1995); Burnham (1993, 1996).
85 Clarke (1988), p.119; Bonefeld et al (1995), p.75.
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international  influence  of  the  domestic  circuit  itself  is  felt.86 In  order  for  currency 
convertibility to be successful however, global confidence in the national currency must be 
secured. If such confidence is not forthcoming, for example due to a relative decline in 
national competitiveness or because of disturbances to the national circuit of capital, then 
global integration will be threatened and domestic crisis will result. In this way, just as the 
value form transmits the competitive discipline of capitalist relations to individual capitals 
through the role of money, so it also transmits global capitalist discipline to national states 
through the international system of exchange rates.87 
Having now traced the constraints and limits of state behaviour in a general sense, 
an analysis of specific state behaviour requires a more focused examination of the way in 
which key policy-makers themselves are influenced by the constraints of the capitalist state 
form.  In  order  to  understand  the  behaviour  of  specific  states  in  exchange rate  policy-
making terms it is therefore necessary to move from an analysis of the state and the global 
context to an analysis of national state managers.
State Managers and Exchange Rate Policy-Making
In economic policy-making terms the most important set of actors within the state 
are those of the ‘core executive’. This is defined here as those leading figures within the 
government  (usually,  though  not  exclusively  members  of  the  Cabinet),  and  the  senior 
officials  at  the  Treasury  and  the  central  bank.88 The  overarching  aim  of  these  state 
managers given their position within the state is to secure the reproduction of domestic 
86 de Brunhoff (1978), passim, especially Appendices II and III.
87 de Brunhoff (1978), pp.139-40; Clarke (1988), p.112; Bonefeld et al (1995), p.13.
88 This definition of the ‘core executive’ contrasts with that provided by Rhodes (1995), p.12. which is too 
broad and directs attention away from the key bases of power within the state, and also contrasts with 
Bulpitt’s preference for the notion of ‘the Court (1983; 1996) which in focusing on the role of party leaders is 
deemed too narrow.
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capitalist  relations  through  the  provision  of  national  and  global  conditions  for  capital 
accumulation.  National economic policy-making is driven by the need to regulate class 
struggle and to create conditions conducive to domestic stability and a more favourable 
integration for the state into the world system. Within this broad-based remit however, state 
managers are also driven by more subjective aims and ambitions. In general terms these 
can be seen to reside in a range of ‘high political’ goals, such as the gaining and retaining 
of office,  and the augmenting of their  status, authority,  prestige,  influence and the like 
within their respective departments, organisations, and parties. In more specific terms, high 
political activity is associated with those matters of state that are of particular importance 
such  as  foreign,  defence,  and  economic  policy,  and  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  ‘low’ 
politics, defined by Buller simply as those ‘matters deemed to be too dull, time consuming 
or awkward to deal with’.89
The achievement  of these various goals  however  is  no simple task.  In  the first 
instance the ability of the state to secure the accumulation of capital is circumscribed by 
the limits of the state form itself in terms of the need to contain class struggle and by its 
dependency upon global conditions. In addition, the core executive are also subject to a 
wide array of other pressures and constraints. These derive for example from membership 
of international bodies and organisations, from departmental or party political matters, and 
from the demands of social interest groups and public opinion generally. The formulation 
and development of economic policy therefore takes place within the limits not only of the 
capitalist state form but also within the constraints of what is actually viable given the 
various national, cultural, social, and political attributes of the state in question.90
89 Buller (1999), p.697: Also see for example Bulpitt (1983), ps.64-5, 82; (1996), p.224; Holm (2000). 
90 Gamble (1974), p.4; de Brunhoff (1978), p.84; Bulpitt (1996), p.255.
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To help  them achieve  their  aims,  state  managers  seek  to  develop  a  ‘governing 
strategy’. This will identify the key problems that are faced and will provide a plan for 
their resolution based on the historical, institutional and ideological context within which 
they  are  operating.91 A particularly  useful  strategy  for  state  managers,  as  Bulpitt  has 
argued, is to seek to establish and maintain a degree of ‘governing autonomy’ from the 
various  pressures  with  which  they  are  faced.  The  more  space  and  freedom that  state 
managers have to implement key policy tasks, the higher is the likelihood of these being 
implemented in a competent fashion, and hence the greater is the prospect of achieving 
high  political  aims.  The  challenge  for  the  core  executive  therefore  is  to  develop  a 
governing  strategy  that  will  enable  them  to  ensure  favourable  conditions  for  capital 
accumulation, to achieve the successful integration of the national and international circuits  
of  capital,  and  to  attain  sufficient  autonomy  with  which  to  engage  in  high  political 
activity.92
While members of the core executive may at times find it desirable or necessary to 
pursue  a  governing  strategy  based  on  the  directly  visible  involvement  of  the  state  in 
capitalist relations, as with the ‘Keynesian’ mode of economic policy regulation in Britain 
after 1945, such an approach contains inherent dangers.93 A major risk for example, is that 
openly visible state intervention can lead to the politicisation of issues previously regarded 
by most people as being purely ‘economic’ (such as wage-levels and working conditions), 
and can thus lead to growing demands and pressures over these issues being directed at the 
state. In turn, such politicisation also runs the risk that a crisis in the ‘economic’ sphere will  
necessitate  overt  state  action  in  order  to  secure  the  continued  reproduction  of  capital, 
91 On this see Buller (1999).
92 See Bulpitt (1983), Chs.2-4; (1996), pp.124-7; Bulpitt and Burnham (1999), pp.17-18.
93 See Burnham (1999), pp.42-5; (2001), pp.130-131.
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thereby exposing the class character of the state through openly contravening its claim to 
act  in the general  interest.  A key danger of a governing strategy based on a politicised 
mode of economic policy-making is therefore that in such circumstances this can aggravate 
class unrest, and may even lead to a wholesale crisis of political authority itself.94
A more useful approach for the core executive therefore, can be to try and remove 
key areas of economic policy-making from the realm of political accountability through a 
governing strategy of ‘depoliticisation’ – a concept which has been developed in recent 
years through the works of Burnham and Bonefeld. The central feature of such a strategy is 
that  it  seeks  to  relocate  core  aspects  of  economic  policy-making  away  from  the 
discretionary control of the state, placing them instead under the control of ‘independent’ 
and  ostensibly  ‘non-political’  bodies  and/or  policy  rules.  Though  state  officials  will 
invariably retain  a  degree  of  ‘arms-length’ control  over  key economic  policy issues,  a 
successful governing strategy of depoliticisation will enable the core executive to distance 
themselves from the policy-making process, and in so doing will enable them to disclaim 
responsibility and hence accountability for such matters.95
In contrast  to a  politicised mode of economic policy regulation,  in which class 
discontent over economic conditions can lead to growing pressure against the state itself, 
under a depoliticised regime class dissatisfaction and pressures are instead diverted into 
purely  ‘economic’  or  ‘political’  channels  (such  as  working  conditions,  democratic 
representation, human/civil rights etc), neither of which leaves room for questioning the 
organisation  of  society  as  a  whole.96 Moreover,  by  ‘locking-in’ the  future  direction  of 
economic policy through a credible relinquishing of discretionary control,  a strategy of 
94 Fine (1979), p.178; Bonefeld and Burnham (1996).
95 See for example Bonefeld and Burnham (1996); Burnham (1999, 2001).
96 Fine (1979); Clarke (1988), Ch.5; Burnham (1999; 2001).
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depoliticisation can also serve to condition the expectations, and hence the behaviour of 
capital and labour, confining these within the limits set by the policy regime. The ability to 
constrain expectations is further increased if the set of rules and bodies to which economic 
policy-making tasks are reassigned are themselves constituted ‘externally’ as part of an 
international system. This will enable the authorities to present the regime as being bound 
up with wider political issues (such as global political and economic stability, or European 
integration for example), and will increase the costs of regime change, thereby enhancing 
its credibility and depoliticising effects.97
A key  advantage  of  a  depoliticisation  strategy  therefore,  is  that  this  can  ease 
pressure on the state by fragmenting class struggles over economic conditions and policy-
making,  and  by  redirecting  them  into  constitutionally  safe  channels.  Moreover,  by 
furnishing  the  core  executive  with  a  means  of  insulating  themselves  from the  adverse 
political and social effects of their economic policies, and by effectively conditioning the 
expectations of capital  and labour, such a strategy can also leave state managers better 
placed to enforce policies designed to assist the accumulation of capital and regulate class 
struggle, and can provide them with a greater degree of governing autonomy for the pursuit  
of their high political goals. These various points have been well summarised by Burnham, 
who writes for example that:
“Depoliticisation as a governing strategy is the process of placing at one 
remove the political  character of decision-making.  State  managers  retain 
arm’s-length  control  over  crucial  economic  and  social  processes  whilst 
simultaneously benefiting from the distancing effects of depoliticisation. As 
a  form of  politics  it  seeks  to  change market  expectations  regarding  the 
effectiveness and credibility of policy-making in addition to shielding the 
government from the consequences of unpopular policies.”98
97 See Kenen (1988), ps.18, 45-52; Giovannini (1993), p.123; Buller (1999), p.697.
98 Burnham (2001), pp,127-33: Also see Bonefeld and Burnham (1998), p.34; Burnham (1999), pp.45-50.
41
It is against this background of economic policy-making in general that exchange 
rate policy-making in particular needs to be examined. More specifically, exchange rate 
policy-making  needs  to  be  analysed  as  a  component  part  of  the  development  and 
implementation  of  a  governing  strategy,  made  by  the  core  executive  with  the  aim of 
ensuring favourable conditions for national and global capital accumulation, the regulation 
of class struggle, and the attainment of high political freedom. The specific exchange rate 
regime that will  be adopted or maintained at  any one time is thus dependent upon the 
particular context and aims of the governing strategy. 
A floating or managed exchange rate regime for example may be consistent with 
the adoption of a policy rule (such as inflation targeting by an independent central bank) 
and a mode of depoliticised economic policy regulation, but may also be adopted should 
the state authorities wish to pursue a strategy of politicised circuit  regulation, enabling 
them to exercise discretionary management and flexibility in pursuit of their aims. A fixed 
exchange rate regime on the other hand, can provide a particularly useful policy rule for 
the pursuit  of a depoliticisation strategy.99 Not only does a fixed exchange rate regime 
enable the integration of the national and international circuits of capital in a way which 
ensures that the competitiveness of the national economy remains within the confines of 
internationally  defined conditions for capital  accumulation,  but such a regime can also 
facilitate the presentation of both the effects and the responsibility for economic policies as 
deriving  from, and as  belonging  to  the  international  regime  itself  rather  than the  core 
executive. A fixed exchange rate, especially one embedded in a wider set of international 
commitments, can thus provide a key element in a strategy of depoliticisation.100
99 Burnham (2001), pp.127-33.
100 Goldstein (1990), pp.84-5; Oatley (1997), ps.24, 41-2.
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Concluding Remarks
This  chapter  has  examined  the  subject  of  exchange  rate  policy-making  from a 
theoretical perspective. It has outlined the conventional means of understanding this issue 
and  has  highlighted  some  of  the  difficulties  that  these  accounts  face.  An  alternative 
approach to this subject was then proposed based on a Marxist methodology which sought 
to  address  the  issue  of  exchange  rate  policy-making  by  conceptualising  political  and 
economic  behaviour  as  internally  related  elements  of  a  unified  social  whole.  This 
illustrated  how  social  phenomena  can  be  seen  as  forms  of  social  relations  that  are 
determined during the process of production and by the development of class struggle. In 
capitalist society the form taken by these relations was seen to be expressed in the circuit 
of capital, in which capital expansion is achieved through the exploitation of labour. This 
process was also shown to fundamentally involve the state as a regulator of class relations, 
and  to  be  constituted  on  an  inherently  global  basis,  with  national  states  themselves 
constrained by the dynamic of international capitalist competition. Within this overarching 
framework,  the  primary  concerns  of  the  core  executive  were  considered  to  be  the 
reproduction of capitalist relations and the attainment of high political goals. Economic 
policy-making was analysed in terms of the development of a governing strategy for the 
achievement of these aims, and exchange rate policy-making was regarded as a component 
part of this governing strategy.
This alternative approach stands in sharp contrast to existing accounts of exchange 
rate  policy-making.  It  argues that  exchange rate  policy is not made in the technocratic 
pursuit of ‘optimal’ policies for the maximisation of economic growth and prosperity, and 
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nor is it determined by a country’s particular structural characteristics or by the dominance 
of certain socio-economic interest groups. Instead, exchange rate policy-making is seen as 
a  component  part  of  a  wider  governing strategy made with a  view to regulating class 
struggle, to providing favourable conditions for the expansion of capital, and for ensuring 
that the core executive possess sufficient freedom with which to pursue their high political 
aims.
In order to examine how this takes place in more detail, it is necessary to focus 
empirically on exchange rate policy-making within a particular state. Here, the key focus 
for this study shall consist of an examination of Britain’s interwar gold standard policy. 
The structure for the rest of the thesis is therefore as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the current 
literature on Britain’s interwar gold standard policy and provides a contrasting view based 
upon  the  alternative  theoretical  approach  to  exchange  rate  policy-making.  Chapter  3 
establishes the backdrop to the development of the policy by charting the growth of an 
economic and political crisis in the British state from the nineteenth century. Chapters 4 
and 5 cover the period leading up to the return to gold between 1920 and 1925, showing 
this policy to have been the key component of a governing strategy designed to address 
Britain’s economic and political  difficulties.  Chapter 6 analyses and assesses the initial 
success of this policy from 1925 to 1928, chapter 7 examines the breakdown of the regime 
during 1929-1931, while in chapter 8 the emergence of a new regime for economic policy 
regulation during the 1930s is also examined. The concluding chapter outlines how the 
findings of this thesis provide a basis for drawing wider generalisations about the political 
economy of exchange rate policy-making, and contains a brief examination of Britain’s 
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membership  of  the  European  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism from 1990-1992  in  order  to 
demonstrate the contemporary relevance of the argument presented.
45
Chapter 2 : The Gold Standard
Britain’s return to the gold standard at the prewar parity in 1925 was a decision of 
fundamental importance not only for Britain but for the international political economy as 
a  whole  during  the  interwar  period.  It  is  a  subject  which  has  long  been  a  source  of 
controversy  and  debate  among  scholars,  though  it  is  also  one  which  still  holds 
contemporary relevance,  frequently forming a text-book model for fixed exchange rate 
systems such as the European Exchange Rate Mechanism or the single European currency. 
Given the  sheer  volume of  material  devoted  to  this  subject  then,  the  relevance  of  yet 
another examination may not therefore appear to be readily apparent. The advantages of 
this  however,  are two-fold.  In the first  instance,  analysing the return to gold using the 
alternative theoretical approach to exchange rate policy-making outlined in the previous 
chapter offers a new means of understanding and assessing this decision. Secondly, this 
analysis  therefore  also  provides  a  basis  from  which  wider  generalisations  about  the 
political economy of exchange rate policy-making can be drawn.
This chapter thus examines Britain’s interwar gold standard policy as a case study 
into  the  political  economy of  exchange rate  policy-making.  It  begins  by  outlining  the 
technical  mechanisms and historical  background of the regime, and critically examines 
conventional  explanations  for  Britain’s  decision  to  return  to  it.  Following  this,  an 
alternative theory and assessment of Britain’s return to gold are then proposed on the basis 
of the alternative theoretical approach to exchange rate policy-making.
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The Gold Standard
The ‘gold standard’ was a fixed exchange rate regime in which the value of the 
national currency was directly defined not in terms of another currency, but in terms of 
gold. To participate in the regime a country had to guarantee that its currency could be 
freely converted into a legally defined amount of gold at its central bank, that gold could 
likewise be converted into a set amount of national currency, and that it could be imported 
and exported without restraint. In this way, gold formed the ‘standard’ against which the 
value of all participating currencies could be measured and compared with each other. The 
exact  ratio  at  which  the  amount  of  gold  represented  by  one  currency  equalled  that 
represented by another was known as the ‘parity’, or the ‘par value’. In Britain’s case for 
example,  one pound sterling could be converted during the nineteenth century into 113 
grains of fine gold, exactly the same amount as was contained in 4.86 US dollars, thus 
establishing a parity with the dollar of £1=$4.86.1 This did not mean however that the 
exchange  rates  of  gold  standard  countries  were  totally  rigid.  Instead,  factors  such  as 
interest rate differentials and the cost of transporting and insuring gold created a margin 
around the par value, known as the ‘gold points’,  within which currencies were free to 
fluctuate.  As such,  the gold standard  effectively formed an international  exchange rate 
regime  in  which  participating  currencies  were  bound  together  within  tightly  defined 
limits.2
The  classical  view  of  the  gold  standard  during  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth 
centuries was of an automatic and self-regulating mechanism for maintaining balance of 
payments equilibrium between participating countries.3 This was based on an assumption 
1 Hawtrey (1933), pp.31-7; Officer (1996), pp.49-60.
2 McKinnion (1996), Ch.2; Officer (1996), Ch.3.
3 Scammell, (1965), p.113; Tomlinson (1990), pp.17-18.
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that the balance of payments were determined primarily by international commodity flows 
(i.e. the balance of trade), and that these in turn were determined by relative changes in 
domestic price levels. The process by which this was thought to operate can be clearly 
demonstrated  through  the  use  of  a  two  country  model.  Starting  from  a  position  of 
equilibrium, a rise in the price of goods produced by country X above those produced by 
country Y would lead to a decline in the demand for its exports, creating a balance of trade 
deficit and a fall in the exchange rate. If this reached or dropped below the gold export 
point, then it would become profitable for traders to convert the currency of country X into 
gold and use this to purchase goods from country Y. With that currency exchanged for gold 
now lying dormant in its central bank, the outflow of gold from country X would thus 
reduce its money supply, curtailing economic demand and putting downward pressure on 
domestic prices, while at the same time the money supply of country Y would be increased 
as imported gold was converted into currency, thus putting upward pressure on its prices. 
Eventually, prices in country X would fall such that demand for its exports would rise, 
whilst prices in country Y would rise such that demand for its exports would fall, thus 
restoring balance of payments equilibrium.4 
Another  important  feature  of  this  system  however,  was  that  in  automatically 
keeping  the  price  levels  of  all  participating  countries  broadly  in  line  with  each  other 
(within limits defined by the gold points), adherence to a gold standard also ruled out the 
pursuit of discretionary economic policies since any undue expansion or restriction of the 
domestic money supply would simply be offset by movements of gold. As such, the regime 
was not only seen as a means of securing equilibrium, but was also seen as a valuable 
4 See Hume (1752); Scammell (1965), pp.105-6; Triffin (1968), pp.121ff.
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safeguard against political interference with the economy, thus ensuring the maintenance of 
non-inflationary economic policies.5
In reality however the classical theory proved to be inconsistent with the empirical 
evidence, as large flows of gold were uncommon. Instead, rather than allowing substantial 
losses of gold, central banks sought to defend their gold reserves by raising interest rates 
whenever  the  exchange  rate  approached  the  gold  export  point.  As a  consequence,  the 
classical theory became modified to take account of such behaviour, giving rise to a new 
interpretation of the gold standard mechanism in terms of capital flows and interest rate 
differentials.  According to  this  model,  rising prices  and a  falling exchange rate  within 
country X would lead to an increase in domestic interest rates, serving to attract and retain 
capital, thereby mitigating or stopping any outflow of gold. Moreover, higher rates would 
also constrain domestic credit,  thus reducing the money supply and once again putting 
downward pressure on domestic prices. On the other hand, according to an unwritten code 
of central banking conduct known as the ‘rules of the game’, country Y, now experiencing 
an inflow of gold was supposed to expand domestic credit by maintaining or lowering its 
interest rates. Again, this would lead to an increase in its money supply, rising prices, an 
outflow of gold, and the restoration of balance of payments equilibrium.6 In contrast to the 
classical theory therefore, from this perspective membership of the gold standard no longer 
ruled out discretionary policy-making, but permitted a degree of flexibility within certain 
parameters. While the governing authorities remained obliged to maintain convertibility at 
the par value and the free movement of gold, policy-makers were nonetheless seen to be 
relatively free in terms of the choice and timing of their response to gold flows.7
5 Scammell, (1965), p.113; Tomlinson (1990), pp.17-18.
6 Scammell (1965); Collins (1990), pp.181-8; Gomes (1993), pp.148-50.
7 Scammell, (1965), p.113; Tomlinson (1990), pp.17-18.
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Again  however  the  reality  was  somewhat  different.  Rather  than  allowing 
movements of gold to exert their full effects on domestic prices, central banks habitually 
broke the rules of the game by seeking to ‘sterilise’ their  impact through open market 
operations such as the sale and purchase of securities in order to increase or decrease the 
volume of funds available to the money market.8 As such, some commentators have also 
proposed a third interpretation of the gold standard mechanism known as a ‘target zone’ 
approach. In this version the gold standard is seen to have been a policy rule, and the key 
determinants of gold flows are considered to have been its degree of credibility.  If the 
official commitment to the regime was deemed by the market to be credible, then a fall in 
the exchange rate to or below the gold export point would induce speculators to purchase 
the national currency in the expectation that the authorities would soon take the necessary 
action  to  raise  it  back  within  the  gold  points,  or  ‘target  zone’.  In  consequence,  such 
speculation  itself  would  lead  to  a  self-correcting  inflow  of  capital,  thus  convincing 
speculators  as  to  the  correctness  of  their  actions  and  helping  to  ensure  the  continued 
credibility of the regime. In like fashion, a rise in the exchange rate to or above the gold 
import point would lead to speculative sales of currency in the belief that its value would 
soon fall, thereby also helping to ensure that it remained within its target zone. In this way, 
the  constraints  imposed  on  discretionary  policy-making  by  the  operation  of  the  gold 
standard  are  considered  to  have  been  much  weaker  than  those  envisaged  by  earlier 
theories. As well as possessing discretion over the choice and timing of their response to 
movements in the exchange rate, a credible commitment is believed to have given policy-
makers  the  ability  to  pursue short-term economic  policies  contrary  to  those  needed to 
8 Scammell (1965), p.107; Gomes (1993), pp.119-21. 
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maintain the par value of the currency, with the only constraint  being the need to take 
eventual action to maintain the rate.9
Historical Background
Historically,  the  gold  standard  developed  in  an  unplanned  and  uncoordinated 
manner  during  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries.  The  first  country  to  place  its 
currency on a gold basis was Britain, who established the de facto convertibility of sterling 
in 1717, followed by de jure convertibility in 1821. As the nineteenth century progressed, 
an  increasing  number of  countries  joined Britain  on the  system,  abandoning the  more 
commonplace  silver  or  bimetallic  (gold  and  silver)  standards  as  the  value  of  silver 
diminished following a rapid increase in its world supply. By the 1880s, all the world’s 
major trading nations had placed their currencies on the gold standard, making it the first 
truly international exchange rate regime.10
The  relative  stability  and  smooth  functioning  of  what  is  now  known  as  the 
‘classical’ gold standard era however, was largely due to a series of unique and largely 
fortuitous conditions. The progressive expansion and generally open character of the world 
economy provided capital with a continuous supply of new markets as outlets for surplus 
value; the growth in the world supply of gold largely kept pace with the rising demand for 
monetary gold and ensured that its value, and hence its utility as the basis of the money 
supply remained relatively stable;  and the political and economic disorganisation of the 
working class on an international scale enabled countries to swiftly return to the regime if 
9 McKinnion (1996), p.31; Eichengreen and Flandreau (1997), pp.101ff: Examples of the gold standard as a 
policy rule also include Bordo and Kydland (1995); Miller and Sutherland (1992); Hallwood et al (1996).
10 Scammell (1965), p.103; Officer (1996), p.42; Eichengreen and Flandreau (1997), p.4.
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ever they were forced to depart from it.11 The system was also underpinned by a substantial 
degree of central bank co-operation between the major gold standard countries (namely 
Britain, America, France, and Germany), and by the role played by the Bank of England, 
which by virtue of Britain’s nineteenth century economic dominance and the associated 
status of sterling as the world’s primary currency, formed the central orchestrating agency 
of the regime.12 
By the early part of the twentieth century however, these conditions were becoming 
progressively  undermined.  The  growth  of  international  economic  activity  was  fast 
outstripping the growth in the world supply of gold, destabilising its value; the spread of 
economic protectionism and an intensification of Imperial rivalries were eroding openness 
in world trade; the growth in working class organisation was putting growing pressure on 
the ability of state authorities to pursue policies of strict  economic orthodoxy;  and the 
decline in Britain’s economic dominance was eroding the global position of sterling and 
the centrality of the Bank of England. In 1914, under the mounting pressures of the First 
World War, the system finally collapsed.13
Throughout the war the free exchange of currencies was severely constrained as 
countries introduced widespread controls and sought to regulate their exchange rates in line 
with the demands of the conflict. By 1919 free exchange had been largely resumed, though 
the  severity  of  the  financial  and  economic  dislocation  caused  by  the  war  now forced 
countries,  with the  exception  of  America  (who remained on gold),  to  adopt  a  floating 
exchange rate regime. This was subject to great volatility as intense political and economic 
11 Primary producing countries for example were frequently unable to pursue deflation in order to avoid 
economic crises, though almost always engaged in a rapid return to the system. Britain’s adherence to the 
gold standard was also suspended in 1797 due to the Napoleonic wars, and was also temporarily suspended 
in 1847, 1857, and 1866. See Eichengreen (1996); McKinnion (1996), p.31.
12 Kemmerer (1944), pp.198-202; Scammell, (1965), p.105; Aldcroft and Oliver (1998), pp.46-7.
13 Tomlinson (1981), pp.27-42; (1990), pp.15-24; Ingham (1984), p.174.
52
turmoil  engulfed the immediate postwar period. A fierce world boom during 1919 was 
followed in 1920 by an equally severe slump, while social unrest appeared to be endemic. 
Faced  with  these  difficulties,  state  authorities  around  the  world  became  increasingly 
convinced of the need for a return to a gold standard in order to provide stability and 
facilitate an economic recovery. In 1925 Britain re-established sterling on a gold basis at its  
prewar  parity  of  $4.86,  providing  the  signal  for  many other  countries  to  re-link  their 
currencies  to  gold  (though  rarely  at  their  prewar  ratios)  and  heralding  the  start  of  a 
generalised move back to global exchange rate stability. By 1928 this process had largely 
been completed, and an international gold standard was once more a reality.14
The reconstructed system however was fundamentally weak and unstable. Despite 
the  onset  of  another  global  boom  during  the  mid-1920s,  the  regime  was  steadily 
undermined by a growing crisis of overproduction within the global circuit of capital. By 
1929 the  world  economy was  rapidly  plunging  into  the  deepest  depression  ever  seen, 
putting the system under even more pressure. In 1931, economic and financial turmoil in 
Central Europe led to a speculative attack on the pound, forcing Britain to abandon the 
gold standard, and leading many other countries to do likewise. By 1932 most countries 
had now moved to a managed exchange rate regime, leaving only the United States and a 
small  ‘gold  bloc’ of  European  countries  remaining  on  gold.  Despite  various  efforts 
throughout  the  1930s  to  re-establish  the  international  gold  standard,  a  combination  of 
global political and economic instability, and social tensions resulting from the depression 
now ruled out any such prospect and precluded all but the most basic international co-
operation. A US devaluation in 1933 added to the difficulties and uncertainties facing the 
world economy and put the remaining gold standard countries under growing deflationary 
14 See Brown Jr (1940), passim; Kenwood and Lougheed (1971), Chs.11-12; Eichengreen (1993), passim.
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pressure  in  order  to  maintain  their  par  values.  In  1936 this  pressure forced France  to 
devalue and to leave the gold standard, triggering the dissolution of the gold bloc, and by 
1938 the US was the only country remaining on gold.  As an international  regime,  the 
system was finally consigned to history.15
Theories of Britain’s Return to the Gold Standard
The literature on Britain’s return to the gold standard at the prewar parity in 1925 
has to date been characterised by a general lack of consensus over the reasons for the 
decision,  and  explanations  have  drawn  upon  an  eclectic  mix  of  various  overlapping 
motives and themes. One of the most common of these is that the return was driven largely 
by subjective values and ideational factors. The longevity of Britain’s commitment to the 
regime is seen to have given rise to deeply ingrained ‘sentiments’, ‘habits’, and ‘governing 
traditions’, and adherence to a gold standard at $4.86 is thought to have been regarded by 
the vast majority of people as the normal and natural way of life. This is also thought to 
have been reinforced by considerations of ‘national pride’ and ‘prestige’ deriving from the 
international role of the pound, and by a belief that Britain even had a ‘moral obligation’ to 
ensure its convertibility into gold at the par value. Britain’s departure from the regime is 
thus considered to have been regarded as a purely temporary affair, with a return to gold 
thought to have simply been the ‘accepted thing to do’. The belief in the righteousness and 
permanency of the system was such that, as Youngson puts it, not to have engaged in a 
swift return would have been ‘revolutionary’, and indeed there is considered to have been 
no real thought or discussion of any alternative regime or exchange rate.16
15 Brown Jr (1940); Drummond (1981); Scammell (1991); Eichengreen (1996); Aldcroft and Oliver (1998).
16 Youngson (1960), pp.26-7: Also see Gregory (1926), p.56; Winch (1969), p.89; Brown Jr (1970), pp.173-8; 
Moggridge (1972), pp.86-97; Sayers (1976), p.135; Aldcroft (1983); Tomlinson (1990), pp.43-60.
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Another prominent theme however is that the restoration of the gold standard at the 
prewar par was also driven by economic considerations, primarily by a desire to resolve 
Britain’s postwar difficulties of high inflation and unemployment. From this view, Britain’s 
state  authorities  are  either  seen  to  have  attributed  prewar  levels  of  prosperity  to  the 
institutional framework of an international gold standard and to have therefore seen its 
recreation as  the  best  means  of restoring  Britain’s economic fortunes,  or  to  have been 
wedded  to  the  dictates  of  classical  economic  theory,  with  its  postulate  that  a  stable 
monetary framework was essential for the maximisation of trade and employment. From 
both positions it is argued that state officials believed that a return to gold at $4.86 would 
secure international confidence in sterling and provide certainty and stability for Britain’s 
international trade,  thus facilitating the import  of essential  items such as food and raw 
materials, and helping to restore Britain’s export and financial service sectors. Supporting 
this, the gold standard would also provide a bulwark against inflation, a large cause of 
which was thought to have been due to the political misuse of the money supply during the 
war, and would thus force adherence to sound and ‘responsible’ economic policies, and 
ensure  that  Britain  remained  competitive  by  forcing  domestic  prices  to  conform  to 
international levels. A return to gold by Britain would also encourage other countries to do 
the same, thereby aiding the restoration of international stability and facilitating the general  
postwar recovery of the world economy. From this perspective therefore, the decision to 
return to gold is thought to have been motivated by a desire to ‘return to 1913’ and as 
having essentially been an ‘employment policy’.17
17 Gregory (1925), pp.21-2; Puxley (1933), p.23; Brown Jr (1940); Kemmerer (1944); Williams (1959), 
pp.46-7; Sayers (1960), (1976), pp.110-11; Youngson (1960), pp.231ff; Moggridge (1972), pp.98-100; Winch 
(1969), passim; Howson (1975), pp.140-1; Aldcroft (1983); Williamson (1984); Middleton (1985), p.92; 
Tomlinson (1990), p.42; Skidelsky (1992), pp.190-2.
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A contrasting theme in the literature however is that the return to gold was a policy 
made not  in  the interests  of  Britain’s  economy as a  whole,  but  to  serve the particular 
interests of the financial sector of the City of London. From this view, the City is seen to 
have wanted a return to gold at the prewar parity in order to restore its pre-eminence as an 
international financial centre and to restore its earnings capacity following the detrimental 
impact  of the war,  whilst  the government  are  thought  to  have been ‘imbued’ with the 
notion that the prosperity of the City was of paramount importance regardless of the effects 
the policy might have on other sectors. In part the desire to secure the well-being of the 
financial sector is thought to have been motivated by a desire to compensate for Britain’s 
long-declining industrial sector, though for the most part it is considered to have been the 
result of the undue influence exerted by the City over the policy-making process through 
its  historically  close  institutional  and cultural  links  with  the  Bank of  England and the 
Treasury.18
Besides economic considerations, a further theme in the literature is that the return 
to gold was motivated by political factors. For some, the policy is thought to have been 
driven primarily by the desire of senior officials at the Bank and the Treasury to regain 
their traditional control over economic policy that had been lost to politicians during the 
war.19 For others however, the move is thought to have also been driven by the desire of the 
authorities to insulate themselves from the pressures of rising social demands on the state. 
Bank  officials  are  thought  to  have  been  driven  by  a  desire  to  avoid  government 
interference and possible nationalisation, while government officials are thought to have 
been  anxious  to  avoid  the  political  fallout  resulting  from the  move  back to  economic 
18 See for example Gregory (1925), pp.51-2; Williams (1959), pp.46-51; Youngson (1960), ps.27, 234; 
Pollard (1969, 1970; 1976); Winch (1969), p.86; Moggridge (1972), ps.86, 97; Longstreth (1979); Ingham 
(1984); Broadberry (1989), p.49; Peden (1991), p.60.
19 See for example Lowe (1978), and to an extent Skidelsky (1969).
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orthodoxy. By placing monetary policy under the control of the gold standard, officials 
would effectively be able to disclaim responsibility for the effects of monetary policy, and 
indeed for economic policy in general since this was now subordinate to the necessity of 
maintaining the exchange rate.  It would, as Williamson puts it,  “protect  the Bank from 
dangerous  demands  for  even more  Ministerial  intervention,  and  Ministers  from public 
responsibility for unpleasant policies.”20
Assessments of the Policy
Assessments of Britain’s return to gold tend to fall into one of two categories. The 
first  of  these  is  that  the  policy  was  a  complete  disaster  which  created,  or  at  least 
substantially  contributed  to  domestic  economic  depression,  chronically  high 
unemployment,  and  industrial  unrest.  This  interpretation  derives  from  the  original 
Keynesian critique of the decision, with its central claim that the re-stabilisation of sterling 
at $4.86 overvalued the pound by an estimated 10% against the US dollar given relative 
prices in Britain and America. This is seen to have made Britain’s exports more expensive, 
and to  have  compelled  employers  to  try  and reduce  their  production costs,  the  largest 
element of which was frequently the cost of wages. In turn, the attempt to impose large 
wage cuts is thought to have provoked fierce trade union resistance, leading to industrial 
unrest and ultimately to the general strike of 1926. Moreover, although the return to gold is 
seen as having facilitated a revival in the City’s financial earnings, the effect of the high 
pound is thought to have depressed exports and to led to an increase in imports, thereby 
putting  pressure  on  the  balance  of  payments  and  necessitating  high  levels  of  tax  and 
20 Williamson (1984), pp.110-11: Also see Tomlinson (1981; 1990); Ingham (1984), pp.173ff; Middleton 
(1985); Clarke (1988), p.149; Peden (1988).
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interest rates in order to defend the parity. The combined result therefore, is that while the 
City  prospered,  Britain’s  economy  as  a  whole  stagnated  and  unemployment  rose  to 
unprecedented heights.21
According to this analysis, the return to gold at the prewar par is considered to have 
been a serious policy mistake and an abject failure. Britain’s authorities are believed to 
have misjudged the difficulties that the return would entail, basing their assessments of the 
expected level of adjustment on inappropriate price indices and on the erroneous belief that 
domestic  prices  and wages  would  adjust  themselves  quickly  and smoothly  to  the  new 
exchange rate.  Any adjustment  difficulties  were thus  believed to have  been temporary, 
easily surmountable, and largely incidental to the long-term benefits of economic stability 
and prosperity.22 As such, proponents of this viewpoint also argue that sterling should have 
been valued at a lower rate more conducive to maximising British trade and employment. 
This, it is claimed, would have lessened the pressure on Britain’s exporters, thus helping to 
ensure a higher level of economic growth, lower interest  rates and unemployment,  and 
industrial peace.23
In contrast to this interpretation however, the second assessment of Britain’s return 
to  gold  argues  that  the  problems  experienced  after  1925  were  not  as  bad  as  is  often 
maintained (a key claim for example is that Britain’s rate of economic growth during the 
1920s was comparatively favourable in historical terms),24 and that they were primarily due 
21 See Keynes (1925); Sayers (1960), pp.92-3; Pollard (1969, 1970; 1976); Moggridge (1972), pp.98-105; 
Winch (1969), pp.68ff; Ham (1981), pp.55-6; Peden (1988), pp.19-20; Eichengreen (1992), p.303: Estimates 
on sterling’s overvaluation against the dollar vary from 11-14% by Dimsdale (1981), to 20% by Wolcott 
(1993), to 20-25% by Redmond (1984).
22 Keynes (1925); Sayers (1960), pp.88-9; Winch (1969), p.83; Moggridge (1972); Pollard (1976), pp.221-3.
23 Keynes (1925); Harrod (1951), p.358; Moggridge (1969); Pollard (1969); Skidelsky (1969, 1992); Winch 
(1969), p.90; Pelling (1974), p.306; Pressnell (1978); Dimsdale (1981); Ham (1981); Peden (1988), pp.22-3; 
Wolcott (1993).
24 Feinstein (1963), pp.1-4; Lomax (1964), pp.32-3; Aldcroft (1967, 1983); Dowie (1968).
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to factors other than the return to gold at $4.86. The unexpected behaviour of the US trade 
cycle for example is seen by many as a key contributory factor. US prices at the time of 
Britain’s return were widely expected to rise and to therefore ease the pressure of adjusting 
to $4.86, whilst the actual course of American prices proved to be downwards, thus making 
the degree of adjustment required that much greater than had originally been anticipated. In 
addition,  the  difficulties  of  British  industry  are  thought  to  have  been  compounded by 
economic dislocation in its traditional export markets, and by competitive devaluations by 
France and Belgium, both of whom returned to gold in 1926 at substantially undervalued 
exchange rates. Growing speculation on Wall St. throughout the latter half of the 1920s is 
also thought to have exacerbated the situation by forcing many other countries, including 
Britain, to maintain high interest rates in defence of their gold reserves, while domestic 
factors such as the rigidity of prices and wages is also seen to have exerted a large causal 
influence,  buoyed  by  overly  generous  and  freely  available  unemployment  benefits, 
excessive  trade  union  power,  the  immobility  of  labour,  and  the  persistence  of 
uncompetitive production methods and practices.25
From  this  perspective  it  is  contended  that  the  return  to  gold  at  $4.86  cannot 
therefore be seen as the primary cause of Britain’s difficulties. The decision to return is not 
seen as a policy error, but is instead regarded as having been sound and justifiable on the 
basis of those conditions that were known at the time. Supporters of this view maintain that  
it  was  not  unreasonable  in  1925 to  have  expected  Britain’s  economy  to  withstand an 
exchange rate  of  $4.86,  that  there  was  no  viable  alternative  to  a  gold  standard in  the 
circumstances of the 1920s, and indeed that the policy itself was supported by the vast 
25 Gregory (1926), pp.45ff; Williams (1959), pp.47-51; Sayers (1960), pp.93-7; Youngson (1960), p.237; 
Aldcroft (1983), p.94; Peden (1991), pp.68-9; Thomas (1992).
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majority of domestic  opinion.26 As such,  proponents of this  assessment  also claim that 
while returning to gold at a lower rate might have helped Britain’s export industries in the 
short-term,  it  would  not  have  resolved  Britain’s  longer-term  economic  problems,  and 
indeed may even have made matters worse. A lower par,  it  is  argued,  would not have 
obviated the need for improved competitiveness  from British industry,  would not have 
solved the problems of domestic  price and wage rigidity,  and would not have enabled 
Britain  to  escape  from  economic  dislocation  in  its  export  markets,  or  from  the 
undervaluations  of  France  and  Belgium.  In  consequence,  it  is  argued  that  while  a 
devaluation may have eased the immediate  pressure on British industry,  it  would have 
ultimately served to delay the process of adjustment, thus making the eventual changes that 
difficult to achieve.27
Problems with the Literature
Current approaches to understanding Britain’s return to the gold standard are not 
without merit, especially insofar as they draw attention to the desire of state officials to 
avoid inflation and to displace political responsibility for the effects of economic policy. 
They are however, also subject to a number of shortcomings. Accounts which emphasise 
the role of values and ideational factors such as ‘tradition’, ‘prestige’, or ‘economic theory’ 
for example, do not explain how and why such factors come into existence and endure in 
the first instance, and reveal little about the actual development of the gold standard policy 
itself. The tradition and prestige of Britain’s adherence to the regime for instance is of-
itself insufficient to explain the return to gold in 1925 since such factors were also present 
26 Einzig (1932), pp.44-58; Youngson (1960), p.234; Palyi (1972), p.75; Alford (1986), pp.34-8: Also see 
Williams (1959), pp.47-51; Sayers (1960), pp.93-7, (1976), pp.212-13; Aldcroft (1967), (1983), pp.136-7; 
Tomlinson (1990), p.72; Redmond (1992), p.353.
27 Einzig (1932), pp.44-58; Brown Jr (1940); Williams (1959), pp.48-51; Sayers (1960); Howson (1975), 
p.31; Dimsdale (1981); Alford (1986), pp.34-8; Peden (1988), pp.20-2; Tomlinson (1990), p.72.
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after  1931  when  Britain  did  not  return  to  the  system,  and  while  it  may  have  been 
‘revolutionary’ not to return to gold after the war, this too does not adequately explain why 
the decision was made. Accounts emphasising such factors are also problematic in that 
they  overlook the  political  and  economic  considerations  involved in  the  decision,  and 
ignore the benefits that the policy was expected to provide for state officials.
A second  problem with  conventional  accounts  concerns  the  timeframe  of  their 
analysis,  with  the  general  contention  being  that  the  official  motivations  for  the  return 
originated in response to events during and immediately after the First World War. This 
view is expressed most clearly in those accounts which understand the policy to have been 
an  attempt  at  addressing  Britain’s  postwar  difficulties  by  seeking  to  restore  prewar 
conditions in order to maximise economic activity. The problem with this however is that 
an  analysis  that  begins  with  the  First  World  War  ignores  the  influence  of  prewar 
developments  upon  the  motivations  of  state  managers.  While  the  effects  of  the  war 
undoubtedly exacerbated the problems faced by Britain’s authorities, the origins of these 
difficulties are for the most part to be found in the period before 1914. Overlooking the 
prewar era thus precludes a view of the return to gold as having been a response to longer 
and more  deep-rooted  problems in  Britain.  While  the  effects  of  the  war  are  therefore 
certainly crucial for understanding the development of the gold standard policy, they alone 
are hence also insufficient to explain it.
A third difficulty with conventional approaches relates to the claim that the return 
to gold was a policy made primarily in the interests  of the financial  sector.  It is never 
explicitly shown precisely how and in what way these interests were transmitted to the 
policy-making authorities, and exactly how they managed to enjoy precedence over those 
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of other sectors beyond a reference to unspecific historic and cultural linkages between the 
City, the Treasury and the Bank of England. Furthermore, it is also questionable that such a 
divergence of interests between various economic sectors actually  exists in the manner 
supposed. From the analytical perspective of the circuit of capital for example no single 
‘fraction’ of capital  can have substantially different interests from those of capital  as a 
whole, since capital itself must transmute through all three of its forms (M-P-C) in order to 
expand.  The  interests  of  finance,  industry,  and  commerce  must  therefore  be  seen  as 
interwoven rather than autonomous, while state managers, as politically responsible for 
conditions in the domestic circuit generally, must also therefore be seen as concerned with 
the  total  pattern  of  domestic  economic  activity  rather  than  with  the  ‘interests’ of  any 
particular sector.
Fourthly, traditional accounts are also problematic inasmuch as they focus on either 
the  ‘economic’ or the ‘political’ aspects  of  the policy rather than conceptualising it  as 
having been simultaneously both a political and an economic strategy, thus failing to grasp 
the full complexity of the decision. Accounts which emphasise the economic advantages of 
the  policy  for  example,  usually  in  terms  of  reducing  unemployment  and  facilitating 
prosperity, typically ignore its political benefits in terms of shielding members of the core 
executive  from ‘social  pressures’ (understood  in  more  specific  terms  as  pressure  from 
capital  and labour),  while accounts which do emphasise these political  benefits in turn 
often fail to recognise the economic advantages they offered. The ‘political’ advantages 
provided  by  insulating  the  state  authorities  from  social  pressure  for  example,  also 
possessed  the ‘economic’ benefits  of  helping to  reduce the expectations of  capital  and 
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labour towards future levels of state intervention, the high level of which was serving to 
reduce private enterprise and sustain economic inefficiencies.
An Alternative Interpretation
In contrast to conventional interpretations of Britain’s return to the gold standard at 
$4.86, an analysis based on the alternative theoretical view of exchange rate policy-making 
developed in the previous chapter offers a markedly different way of understanding and 
assessing the policy. From this perspective, the return to gold is not seen as having been 
driven by ideational factors or a desire to restore prewar conditions, and nor is it seen as an 
attempt to maximise Britain’s trade and employment or as having been designed primarily 
to  serve  the  financial  interests  of  the  City.  Instead,  the  policy  is  seen  as  the  central 
component of a wider governing strategy designed to provide favourable conditions for 
capital  accumulation,  to  regulate  class  struggle,  and to  secure greater  freedom of high 
political manoeuvre for the core executive. More specifically, the policy was designed to 
address long term political and economic difficulties within the British state by putting 
pressure on capital and labour to become more competitive and to shift to more advanced 
industrial sectors, to reduce and confine class unrest, and to ease the pressure on the state 
authorities through the depoliticisation of monetary and economic policy-making.
The political and economic difficulties facing Britain in the 1920s had their origins 
in  developments  during  the  last  third of  the  nineteenth  century.  At  this  time Britain’s 
position  as  the  world’s  most  powerful  economy  was  under  threat  from  increasing 
international  competition,  a  relative  decline  in  productivity,  and  a  growing  over-
dependency on export industries of diminishing global importance. From 1910 the political 
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stability of the British state itself was also under threat from an increasingly organised and 
disaffected labour movement infused with the idea of using radical means to further its 
position. The seriousness of this situation was augmented by the effects of the First World 
War. The material demands of the conflict put Britain’s economy under enormous pressure, 
depleting  its  reserves  and  further  distorting  its  pattern  of  productive  activity  towards 
outdated  and  declining  industries,  while  high  levels  of  inflation  further  undermined 
Britain’s economic competitiveness and helped to sustain labour unrest. These effects were 
further enhanced by a huge expansion of the state into almost all areas of economic life, 
which  helped  to  strengthen  the  organisation  of  both  capital  and  labour,  and  which 
transformed economic conditions and policy-making into overtly political issues. At the 
same time as this expansion now made state officials themselves directly responsible for 
domestic economic conditions, it also raised the expectations of capital and labour as to 
what could be achieved through the use of state power after the war, thereby making the 
resolution of these problems more difficult, and constraining the high political freedom of 
the authorities.
By the end of the war the key aims of the core executive were to return control and 
responsibility for economic conditions to the market, to contain and reduce inflation and 
labour  unrest,  and  to  encourage  an  economic  recovery  and an  adjustment  in  Britain’s 
economic structure in order to meet the changed conditions of the postwar world. The 
central means of achieving these aims was a governing strategy based upon a return to the 
gold standard at the prewar par. This, it was thought, would aid the postwar recovery of the 
global economy by encouraging other nations to return to gold, would provide stability for 
Britain’s  international  economic  activities,  and  would  firmly  re-integrate  Britain’s 
64
economy within the competitive discipline of the global circuit of capital, thereby forcing 
domestic  prices  and economic conditions  to  conform to those prevailing elsewhere.  In 
addition it was also felt that returning to gold at the specific rate of $4.86 would ensure 
credibility in the policy, and that the relatively high value of the exchange rate would put 
pressure  on  the  domestic  economy  as  a  whole,  forcing  down  prices  and  wages  and 
encouraging  producers  to  move  into  internationally  expanding  branches  of  economic 
activity. The financial discipline of the regime would also be reinforced by the necessity of 
maintaining an all-round tight economic policy stance,  including high levels of interest 
rates and taxation, in order to defend the parity until the economy adjusted.
A credible return to the gold standard was also seen to possess definite political 
advantages.  By  placing  control  of  monetary  policy  in  the  hands  of  the  politically 
‘independent’ Bank of England, and by locating this within the wider framework of an 
automatic and globally constituted system, membership of the regime would serve to lock-
in the future economic policy direction of the state as a whole (since this would now be 
subordinated to the needs of maintaining the parity), and would enable state officials to 
depoliticise the issues of economic conditions and policy-making. This would help to ease 
the pressure on the authorities and to increase their freedom of high political manoeuvre in 
several ways. Firstly, this would serve to reduce and contain the expectations of capital and 
labour as to the future economic policy behaviour of the state; secondly it would redraw 
the  boundaries  between  the  ‘political’  and  the  ‘economic’,  thereby  disarming  and 
redirecting class struggles over economic issues away from the state. Thirdly, the regime 
would effectively blur the borders of political responsibility (and hence accountability) for 
economic  conditions  between  the  government  and the  Bank of  England;  and  fourthly, 
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adherence to a gold standard would simplify the management of economic policy through 
the provision of a clear signal in the form of gold movements as to whenever domestic 
economic conditions began to diverge from those pertaining internationally.
From this alternative viewpoint Britain’s interwar gold standard policy is not seen 
to have been a mistake or a failure, but is best described as having been a relative success. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  policy  largely  failed  to  force  any  substantial  adjustment  or 
competitive breakthrough in the British economy, and though prices fell, wages remained 
rigid. This created growing difficulties for the state authorities, who became unable to exert 
their full freedom of manoeuvre in interest rate policy due to rising political concerns over 
unemployment, and eventually led to the collapse of the gold standard regime itself as the 
lack  of  any  significant  domestic  adjustment  combined  with  the  emergence  of  an 
international economic crisis during the late 1920s to produce a speculative attack on the 
pound during 1931. 
In terms of its political effects however, the return to gold can be viewed as having 
been  a  success.  The  regime  established  a  credible  and  depoliticised  framework  for 
economic policy-making, effectively removing monetary policy from the political agenda, 
and with the exception of unemployment (which remained a key political issue throughout 
this  period),  the  authorities  generally  were  no  longer  seen  to  be  responsible  by 
representatives  of  capital  or  labour  for  domestic  economic  conditions.  Moreover,  the 
renewed gold standard also enabled state officials to displace whatever pressure did arise 
over economic conditions, while the threat posed by labour unrest and militancy was also 
reduced. As such, despite the constraints over interest rates, the gold standard can therefore 
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be seen to have eased the political difficulties of the British state and to have provided the 
core executive with a greater degree of high political freedom.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has examined the key themes and issues surrounding Britain’s return 
to the gold standard in 1925 and has outlined an alternative means of understanding the 
policy based on the alternative theoretical approach towards exchange rate policy-making 
developed earlier. From this perspective, Britain’s return to gold is seen as a component 
part  of a wider governing strategy designed to regulate  the domestic  circuit  of capital, 
contain labour unrest, and improve core executive freedom for the pursuit of high political 
goals. More specifically, it is argued that Britain’s return to gold was designed to address 
long-term political  and economic difficulties within the British state by encouraging an 
economic adjustment and improved competitiveness, and by displacing responsibility for 
economic conditions and policy-making away from the state through the depoliticisation of 
monetary and economy policy-making. The following chapters develop this argument in 
more detail.
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Chapter 3 : The Crisis of the British State
Britain’s  interwar  gold  standard  policy  was  the  key  component  in  a  wider 
governing  strategy designed to  address  a  growing economic  and political  crisis  in  the 
British state. This crisis began to develop during the latter part of the nineteenth century 
with  the  onset  of  relative  economic  decline  and  an  increasingly  outmoded  pattern  of 
economic activity, and grew in intensity in the years immediately preceding the First World 
War with an upsurge of labour unrest and militancy posing a serious threat to political 
stability. The crisis was further exacerbated by the effects of the war itself, which not only 
added to  Britain’s  economic  weakness  and to the  growing strength of  labour,  but  also 
transformed economic conditions and policy-making into an overtly political issue, thus 
leading  to  growing  pressure  on  the  state  authorities  and  greatly  curtailing  their  high 
political freedom of manoeuvre. The purpose of this chapter is to outline and explore these 
issues.
The Origins of the Crisis
During the mid-nineteenth century Britain was the world’s most powerful economy. 
It produced almost a third of the world’s manufacturing output, provided well over a third 
of  its  industrial  exports,  supplied  much of  its  capital,  and  accounted  for  a  fifth  of  all 
international  trade.  Industrially,  Britain’s  strength  derived  from  its  ‘staple’ exports  of 
textiles, heavy metals, shipbuilding, and from the 1870s engineering equipment and coal, 
though  with  few  natural  resources  of  its  own,  ever-larger  amounts  of  imported  raw 
materials and foodstuffs were necessary to sustain its industrial activities and burgeoning 
urban population, resulting in a persistent and worsening balance of trade deficit. This was 
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prevented from developing into a wider balance of payments problem however by Britain's 
invisible  earnings  from  items  such  as  shipping  services,  though  primarily  from  the 
financial  activities  of  the  City  of  London,  the  world’s  dominant  financial  centre.  The 
earnings  of  the  City,  supported  by  a  high  demand for  British  industrial  goods  and by 
sterling’s role as the world’s primary vehicle currency, were not only able to plug the trade 
gap  but  were  also  sufficient  to  furnish  Britain  with  an  overall  balance  of  payments 
surplus.28 
This pattern of economic activity was underpinned by a series of fortuitous factors. 
An  unprecedented  expansion  of  the  world  economy  driven  by  the  spread  of 
industrialisation  and  coupled  with  the  existence  of  captive  Empire  markets  ensured  a 
continuous  demand  for  British  goods  and  capital,  while  a  domestic  combination  of  a 
relatively weak and disorganised labour movement and a credible commitment on the part 
of Britain’s state managers to maintain the orthodox economic policy framework of a gold 
standard, a balanced budget, and a minimal state helped ensure continued economic and 
political  stability.29 These  factors  however  were  soon  under  threat.  Increasing  global 
competition,  the development of more advanced productive methods and techniques by 
other  nations  (especially  the  US and Germany),  and  a  changing composition  of  world 
demand  towards  newer  and  more  advanced  commodities  such  as  vehicles,  chemicals, 
electrical  and consumer goods eroded Britain’s competitive advantage and rendered its 
industrial base increasingly outmoded. At the same time, the financial dominance of the 
City was also coming under pressure from the growth of rival centres in Paris, Berlin, and 
New York, while domestic pressures for social reform were leading to a steady rise in the 
28 Bird (1946, 1946a); Hill (1946, 1946a); Ashworth (1960); Kenwood and Lougheed (1971); Alford (1996), 
Chs.1-3.
29 Scammell (1965), passim; Kenwood and Lougheed (1971); Tomlinson (1981); Fulcher (1991), pp.38ff.
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level of state spending and undermining the pursuit of economic orthodoxy. The effects of 
these developments on Britain’s relative economic performance were dramatic. From the 
middle of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the First World War, Britain’s share of 
world manufacturing output fell by over 50%, its global share of industrial exports fell by 
more than 10%, and its rate of GDP growth, averaging around 2% throughout the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, had declined to just over 1%.30
The long-term seriousness of this problem however was not yet fully recognised, 
and the immediate response to these developments was muted. International demand for 
British goods and capital was still relatively strong, and with British trade and investment 
to  Empire  and developing countries  continuing to  rise,  the incentive to  modernise  and 
adjust production remained weak.31 Furthermore, while Britain’s difficulties did not pass 
unnoticed, especially during the Great Depression of the 1870s and 1880s, they also failed 
to generate any widespread concern among contemporaries. Though several commentators 
drew attention to Britain’s shortcomings in relation to the US and Germany, and though 
several government inquiries were set up to examine the situation, the generally accepted 
view was that these problems were temporary and that there was nothing fundamentally 
wrong with Britain’s pattern of economic activity.32 This view gained further credence as 
Britain recovered from the depression to enjoy an economic boom during the early 1900s, 
and was further augmented by the continuation of Britain’s absolute economic dominance 
despite  its  relative  decline.  Though facing  an  increasingly difficult  challenge,  by 1914 
30 On Britain's relative economic decline see Ashworth (1960); Matthews (1964); Dowie (1968); Weiner 
(1981); Coates and Hillard (1986); Elbaum and Lazonick (1987); Newton and Porter (1988); Dintenfass 
(1992); Lowe (1995); Rose (1995), pp.233-7; Alford (1996), Chs.1-4; Garside and Greaves (1997).
31 Kahn (1946), Ch.5; Kenwood and Lougheed (1971); Rose (1995), pp.232-3; Alford (1996), Chs.1-4.
32 See for example the Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Depression of Trade 
and Industry (1886). C.4893.
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Britain was still the world’s most important economy, its leading exporter, and its foremost 
financial centre.33
Alongside  these  growing  economic  difficulties,  the  prewar  period  was  also 
characterised by a rising political challenge from organised labour. Discontent had forced 
the authorities to concede a number of important social reforms, including an extension of 
the  franchise  to  working  class  males,  while  the  growth  of  trade  unionism  and  the 
establishment of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in 1868 had forced state officials to 
concede  their  legal  recognition.  With  the  formation  of  the  Labour  Representation 
Committee in 1900 (later becoming the Labour Party in 1906), hopes were also rising that 
Parliamentary representation could help to secure improvements in working class living 
standards. By 1910 however, the hope of making progress by working within the capitalist 
system was turning to disillusion. Persistent judicial attacks on the industrial and political 
activities of labour such as the Taff Vale and Osborne rulings had put increasing pressure 
on the trade union movement, real wages were being eroded by the inflationary impact of 
the economic boom, and the electoral prospects of the Labour Party were under increasing 
threat following the adoption of socially reformist policies by the Liberals.34
This  growing dissatisfaction was reflected in the increased popularity of radical 
French and American ideas of using direct action to further working class aims. Especially 
popular among the labour rank-and-file, though with even traditionally moderate sections 
of the labour movement and many middle-class activists now also adopting an increasingly 
militant character, the result was an unprecedented outbreak of social disorder throughout 
Britain between 1910-1914 known as the ‘Great Unrest’. A pandemic of frequently violent 
33 Kahn (1946), Ch.5; Alford (1996), Chs.1-3.
34 See Cole (1948), pp.284ff; Fulcher (1991), pp.56-96; Aris (1998), pp.71-96.
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and  unofficial  strikes  erupted  on  an  unparalleled  scale  and  intensity  in  virtually  ever 
industry (though especially pronounced in the key sectors of coal and transport), with the 
average number of new stoppages virtually double the annual average for the previous 
decade, and with the average number of working days lost increasing almost five-fold.35
The  sheer  size  and  intensity  of  the  unrest  was  deeply  alarming  to  many 
contemporary observers. Industrial employers, official labour leaders, and state managers 
alike were united in their belief that the ‘old world’ was falling apart, and many feared that 
revolution was now imminent. Despite resorting to the use of armed troops to maintain 
order on a number of occasions however, state officials remained anxious both to avoid 
inflaming the situation, and to avoid having to implement any far-reaching social reforms. 
The official response to the crisis was instead characterised by a reliance on short-term, ad 
hoc measures designed to limit the progression of the unrest and to placate any immediate 
dangers. Some limited minimum wage concessions for example were introduced to try and 
appease  those  groups  of  workers  who  were  particularly  worse  off,  and  an  Industrial 
Council  for  conciliating  in  disputes  was  established  in  1911  in  a  bid  to  consolidate 
moderate labour opinion behind the government.36
Such  measures  were  initially  successful  in  containing  the  excesses  of  labour 
discontent, though from the end of 1911 the unrest grew in intensity, forcing employers to 
concede significant improvements in working class living standards and heightening fears 
within official circles of revolutionary action. In 1914 these fears were raised still further 
when the three largest and most powerful trade unions, the Mining Federation of Great 
Britain (MFGB), the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), and the Transport Workers 
35 Calculated from Cole (1948), pp.284ff; Butler and Butler (1994), p.373; Aris (1998), passim.
36 Cole (1948), pp.284ff; Fulcher (1991), pp.101ff; Pelling (1992), p.133; Aris (1998), passim.
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Federation (TWF) tentatively agreed to form the ‘Triple Alliance’ – a mutually supportive 
arrangement  in  which  all  employment  contracts  would  be  co-ordinated  to  expire 
simultaneously.  By  giving  the  unions  huge  bargaining  power  in  any  subsequent 
negotiations through their ability to inflict acute disruption upon the economic life of the 
country, it now seemed as if the challenge of labour was sharpening. In August however 
the danger was supplanted by an even more serious threat to the stability of the state with 
the outbreak of the First World War.37
The Impact of War
The economic and political effects of the war were profound and far-reaching. The 
world economy was shattered, huge problems of intergovernmental debts and reparations 
were created, the United States was transformed from the world’s greatest debtor nation 
into the world’s largest creditor, and had now superseded Britain as the world’s leading 
industrial power. The war also compelled many countries to seek new avenues of trade and 
to drive towards autarky and industrialisation, leading to an enormous over-expansion in 
the international production of key wartime commodities such as heavy metals, coal, and 
primary  produce.  For  Britain  these  developments  also  meant  the  loss  of  many  of  its 
overseas  markets,  while  those  that  remained  were  left  faltering  under  poor  economic 
conditions.  The  City  too  was  badly  affected  by  the  war,  losing  up  to  a  quarter  of  its 
overseas  assets,  and  now faced  a  rising  challenge  from New York for  the  role  of  the 
world’s leading financial centre.38 
37 Cole (1948), pp.327ff; Pelling (1992), p.131; Aris (1998), p.93.
38 Morgan (1952), pp.306-11; Brown Jr (1970), pp.170-1; Roberts (1995); Rose (1995), pp.240-2.
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Britain’s ability to meet such challenges was also weakened. Though the conflict 
stimulated some improvements in industrial techniques such as mass production, Britain’s 
economic activities remained overwhelmingly concentrated in the staple export trades, its 
plant  and  machinery  were  old  and  war-ravaged,  and  practically  no  technological 
progression had been made compared to emerging rivals such as Japan and the United 
States.39 The  decline  in  Britain’s  competitiveness  was  also  intensified  through  huge 
wartime inflation as average wages and retail prices virtually doubled, and as wholesale 
prices rose by some two and a half times, while to compound these problems the national 
debt had now rocketed from £650 million to £7800 million as a result of financing the war 
primarily through extra borrowing rather than higher taxation.40
Another important effect of the war was the vast expansion of directly visible state 
control over the economy that it necessitated, and the transformation that this produced in 
relations between the state, capital, and labour. This expansion was not immediate or pre-
planned, but excepting the rapid nationalisation of the mines and railways, occurred on a 
gradual and ad hoc basis in response to the failure of the free market to meet the demands 
of  the  war  effort.41 This  was  especially  apparent  in  spring  1915,  when a  crisis  over  a 
shortage of military supplies precipitated the collapse of the Liberal government and the 
establishment of the first wartime coalition, and was swiftly followed by the introduction 
of an array of measures to tighten control over the economy. An informal agreement with 
the trade unions over production methods was swept aside, with strikes and ‘restrictive 
practices’ both being made illegal, while regulations on prices and wages were increased, 
and controls were extended to cover working hours and the allocation of labour, which 
39 Cole (1948), pp.373-4; Johnson (1968), ps.86-7, 488-9; Kirby (1995), pp.53ff; Alford (1996), pp.111-16.
40 Feinstein (1972), Table.65; Butler and Butler (1994), p.383.
41 Morgan (1952), Ch.2.
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now also included military conscription. Even so, it was not until the establishment of the 
second wartime coalition in 1916 that state controls began to be applied in any systematic 
manner, with these measures being rapidly and progressively extended to all aspects of 
economic life.42
The expansion of state control however did not eliminate labour unrest. Despite an 
initial truce, disturbances continued throughout the war, driven largely by grievances over 
rising  inflation,  profiteering  by  sections  of  industry,  and  the  government’s  draconian 
handling of labour. Though smaller in scale than the Great Unrest, the wartime disquiet 
was also punctuated by several  large strikes, most notably in the coal and engineering 
industries, and was still of grave concern to the authorities, especially given the military 
dangers of a decline in war production. Also disconcerting was that the unrest was still 
overwhelmingly led by radicals enthused with the idea of overthrowing capitalism, such as 
the  newly  established  Shop  Stewards  Movement,  and  further,  that  the  key  focus  for 
labour’s grievances now lay not with employers but with the state itself, which with the 
extension of economic control was now considered to be directly responsible for domestic 
economic conditions.43
The government’s response to the unrest was to continue with its prewar strategy of 
attempting to contain rather than resolve these difficulties. In a bid to ameliorate discontent 
higher  wages  and  price  controls  were  introduced,  the  Labour  Party  obtained  its  first 
Cabinet Ministers, and great postwar social reforms were promised in key areas of working 
class concern such as health, housing, education, and the franchise.44 Hopes of reform were 
also encouraged by the establishment in 1916 of an official enquiry into postwar relations 
42 Pigou (1947), pp.111-15; Cole (1948), po.353ff; Morgan (1952), Ch.2; Fulcher (1991), pp.105ff; Cronin 
(1991); Lowe (1995), pp.30-6; Pugh (1995), pp.10ff; Aris (1998), pp.109-10.
43 Carter (1917); Cole (1948), pp.355-61; Middlemas (1979), pp.125-31; Aris (1998), pp.127-36.
44 Morgan (1952), pp.52-6; Pugh (1995), pp.10ff.
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between the state, capital, and labour, known as the ‘Whitley Committee’. Though few of 
the committee’s recommendations ever came to fruition, proposals for a series of wide 
ranging changes to prewar relations, including the extension of basic minimum wages and 
giving  labour  a  degree  of  control  over  production,  were  largely  successful  in  eroding 
support for more radical measures.45
The war also had a significant impact upon bilateral relations between the state and 
capital. Despite the incorporation of many businessmen into the state’s system of wartime 
administration, industrialists continued to lack any central organisation of their own and 
were increasingly uneasy about the perceived growth in the influence of labour. To counter 
this threat, the Federation of British Industries (FBI) was established in 1916 to represent 
the views of industry to the state.46 Internal divisions within industry however prevented 
the  Federation  from establishing itself  as a  fully  representative  organisation.  Employer 
groups such as the British Manufacturers Association and the Master  Cotton Spinners’ 
Federation  refused  to  join,  the  National  Farmers  Union  later  disaffiliated,  and  the 
Engineering Employers Federation (EEF) were in constant rivalry with the FBI over its 
claim to be the representative voice of British industry.47 This conflict was not resolved 
until 1919 when an EEF initiative led to the establishment of the National Confederation of 
Employers’ Organisations (NCEO) to deal specifically with labour issues such as wages 
and working conditions and the FBI agreed to restrict its interest to more general matters, 
thereby establishing each organisation as the recognised authority within their respective 
fields. As such, the NCEO played a relatively minor role in expressing the view of industry 
on  economic  policy  during  the  interwar  years,  and  it  was  the  FBI  who  despite  their 
45 Welton (1960), pp.102ff; Johnson (1968), ps.48ff, 164-5; Sheldrake (1991), pp.29-36.
46 Modern Records Centre (hereafter MRC) MSS.200/F/4/35/5. ‘FBI: Its Aims and Activities’ (FBI), 1920; 
Blank (1973); Grant and Marsh (1977); Grant (1983); Turner (1984).
47 Grant and Marsh (1977), p.20; Turner (1984a), pp.37ff; Cronin (1991), pp.69-70.
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absentees formed the largest and most influential of Britain’s employer organisations. A 
variety of smaller bodies such as the National Union of Manufacturers (NUM) and the 
Association  of  British  Chambers  of  Commerce  (ABCC)  also  formed  a  periphery  of 
business opinion, though these were also less important than the FBI and the NCEO.48
The strains of war also led to changes in the institutional organisation of the state 
itself. The expansion of government spending and a proliferation of new Ministries eroded 
the budgetary control of the Treasury, while the funding of the war effort through large 
borrowing and the issuing of currency notes by the Treasury also undermined the Bank of 
England’s  control  over  interest  rates.  The  centrepiece  of  the  government’s  prewar 
economic policy, adherence to the gold standard, was also eroded. Though legal adherence 
was upheld throughout the war (albeit at the slightly devalued rate of $4.76) in order to 
provide a stable conduit through which Britain and the Allied powers could obtain supplies 
and financial aid from the United States, in reality this was merely nominal as an inability 
to insure gold shipments effectively meant that in de facto terms the gold standard was no 
longer operative.49 Moreover, as the war progressed rising inflation and a growing trade 
deficit  put  sterling  under  growing  pressure,  making  continued  adherence  increasingly 
costly and raising Ministerial doubts as to the utility of continuing on the regime. Senior 
Bank and Treasury officials though remained successfully adamant throughout the war as 
to the necessity of maintaining legal convertibility. Sir John Bradbury (a joint permanent 
secretary  to  the  Treasury)  for  example  warned  that  leaving  the  regime  would  have 
‘economic  consequences  of  a  disastrous  character’,  Brien  Cokayne  (the  then  Deputy 
Governor of the Bank of England) stated that it would be ‘a feather in the German cap’, 
48 MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C299. ‘The NCEO and the FBI : Historical Summary of Relationship’; Grant and 
Marsh (1977), pp.17-21; Turner (1984a); Fulcher (1991), pp.111-17.
49 Hawtrey (1933), p.90; Morgan (1952), pp.356-7; Boyle (1967), pp.109ff; Moggridge (1969), pp.11-12.
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while John Maynard Keynes (a Cambridge economist seconded to the Treasury during the 
war) argued that it would dislocate the entire pattern of imports and exports essential for 
the war effort.50
Perspectives on the Postwar State
Along with these various difficulties the war also raised to prominence the wider 
question as to the form that the postwar state should take. For state officials themselves, 
although a primary need was considered to be improved competitiveness and a shift in 
industrial  production to newer and more advanced lines in order to meet the changing 
economic realities of the postwar world – a point strongly emphasised for example by the 
Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy (the ‘Balfour Committee’) in 1919 – there 
was as yet no consensus as to how this was to be achieved. Some, such as the Ministry of 
Reconstruction, were urging a more expansionary and interventionist state in order to help 
stimulate  economic  growth,  reconstruction,  and  social  reform,  while  a  less  restrictive 
attitude  towards  state  spending  was  also  urged  in  1919  by  the  report  of  the  Haldane 
Committee on the postwar machinery of British government.51
The most influential opinions on the postwar state form however were those of the 
Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges After the War (known as the ‘Cunliffe 
committee’ after its Chairman Sir Walter Cunliffe, the former Governor of the Bank of 
England), which held exactly the opposite view. Dominated by senior officials at the Bank 
50 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO) T170/90. ‘The War and Finance’ (Bradbury), 1915; ‘The Financial  
Prospects of this Financial Year’ (Keynes), 9/9/15; ‘Is the Suspension of Specie Payment Necessary’ 
(Keynes), 3/8/14; PRO:T170/14. Untitled Memo. (Bradbury), 1915; Bank of England (hereafter BE) G1/420. 
Cokayne to Strong 12/6/17; Morgan (1952), Ch.1; Johnson (1971), passim.
51 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/31/1. ‘Report upon Post-War Priority and Rationing of Materials’ (Ministry of 
Reconstruction), 1918; Johnson (1968), pp.107-9; Winch (1969), p.67; Kirby and Rose (1991), pp.21-3; 
Lowe (1995), pp.36-8. Report of Balfour Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy (1918). Cd.9035.
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and the Treasury, this committee emphasised that the main difficulties Britain would face 
in the postwar era would be high inflation and labour unrest,  and argued that the best 
means of addressing these was to re-establish a properly functioning gold standard at the 
prewar parity. This, it was claimed, would provide a firm and automatic means of checking 
inflation (seen as the key cause of social unrest), would directly expose domestic economic 
conditions to the competitive discipline of the global market,  thus helping to enforce a 
productive adaptation, and would also ensure that the directly visible involvement of the 
state in economic affairs was kept to a minimum, thereby easing the pressure on the core 
executive. Possible alternatives to gold or to $4.86 as the par value were not discussed, and 
only the actual means of bringing these conditions about was subject to any debate.52
As such,  the  committee  were  fully  agreed  that  a  period  of  deflation  would  be 
necessary  after  the  war  in  order  to  enable  a  return  to  gold  at  the  prewar  parity.  Key 
committee members, particularly Cunliffe and Bradbury, emphasised that the only means 
of improving Britain’s competitiveness and restoring the value of the pound was to reduce 
domestic  prices,  and that  this  would require a reduction in domestic purchasing power 
(primarily  wages),  a  contraction  in  the  money  supply,  and  higher  interest  rates.  The 
possibility  of  accommodating  inflation  through  a  depreciating  exchange  rate  was 
mentioned only cursorily, with Bradbury noting that this would produce ‘a much larger 
amount of friction’ than a policy of deflation.53 
It was also readily apparent however that deflation would be difficult to implement, 
and that it  would contain great  social  dangers.  Cokayne for example  (now the Bank’s 
Governor) pointed out that it  would be ‘a very painful process’, Cunliffe agreed that it 
52 The following is from various memos and minutes of evidence in PRO:T185/1-2, and PRO:T1/12434.
53 PRO:T185/1 and PRO:T1/12434. Cunliffe committee minutes 18/3/18, 7/5/18, 10/6/18, 8/7/18, 9/7/18. 
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would  not  be  very  ‘palatable’,  while  Bradbury  also  maintained  that  there  would  be 
‘considerable difficulty’ in reducing wages given the imminent extension of the franchise. 
The return to gold, he warned, would be incompatible with the government’s ‘very large 
and very costly schemes of social reform’.54 Moreover, with the postwar expectations of 
capital and labour as to the economic policy behaviour of the state likely to be high, the 
committee were also anxious to ensure that postwar monetary policy remained free from 
political interference. This was not simply to ensure that politicians did not succumb to the 
electoral  temptations of inflationary public finance,  but was also designed to shield the 
core  executive  as  a  whole  from  the  political  difficulties  that  would  accompany  a 
discretionary  mode  of  economic  policy-making.  Responding  to  proposals  for  the 
establishment of a state controlled central bank after the war for example, Cunliffe argued 
that those in charge would have to be ‘super-human’ in order to handle the responsibility, 
while as Bradbury put it:
“We are just about to sail on uncharted seas and to enter into a new world. It 
is  quite possible,  human nature  being fallible,  that  those directors  might 
make an error which would be disastrous to the country. Do you not think it 
would  be  difficult  to  find  people  to  act  as  directors  with  an  absolutely 
unfettered discretion on a matter of such vital importance as that?”55
In  August  1918  the  committee  published  its  first  interim  report,  emphatically 
recommending that Britain return to a normally functioning gold standard ‘without delay’. 
The regime was presented as an ‘automatic machinery’ for keeping British prices in line 
with world levels and for ensuring that monetary policy was ‘permitted a freedom from 
54 PRO:T185/1-2. Minutes of Evidence 7/5/18; 10/6/18; 8/7/18; 16/10/19; Cunliffe committee minutes 
4/3/18; PRO:T1/12434. Minutes of Evidence 11/7/18. 
55 PRO:T185/1-2. Minutes of Evidence 7/5/18; 8/7/18; PRO:T1/12434. Cunliffe committee minutes, 25/2/18, 
19/3/18, 9/7/18.
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State  interference’ not  possible  ‘under  a  less  rigid  currency  system’.  The  report  also 
warned  that  failure  to  return  risked  ‘very  grave  danger’  of  ongoing  inflation,  and 
maintained that continued uncertainty over monetary policy would hamper the revival of 
British industry and finance. Though the committee made no specific prescriptions as to 
exactly how a return was to be brought about (with much being thought to depend on 
future circumstances), it nonetheless made a series of proposals designed to prepare the 
way.  These  included  a  cessation  of  state  borrowing,  a  re-establishing  of  interest  rate 
movements  in  line  with  the  gold  reserves  of  the  Bank  of  England  (the  minimum 
recommended level of which was £150 million), a progressive reduction and limiting of 
the fiduciary issue (that part of the note issue un-backed by gold), and for control of the 
money supply to be handed back to the Bank in order to ensure that this was ‘as free as 
possible from State interference.’56 
Similar  views  were  also  mirrored  at  this  time by an  internal  Bank of  England 
committee established specifically to press the government for a return to gold, and by a 
less prestigious government committee entitled the Committee on Financial Facilities After 
the War.57 In addition, officials  were also anxious to mobilise support for these aims as 
soon as possible in order to help condition postwar expectations. Cokayne for example was 
keen to emphasise the need for higher interest rates and lower wages in order to check 
inflation and to reduce the ‘prevalence of the ‘Strike’ habit’, while Bradbury warned that 
the ‘restoration of the currency’ would ‘probably be the most urgent of all reconstruction 
56 Committee of Currency and Foreign Exchanges : First Interim Report. Cd. 9182. August 1918.
57 BE:ADM16/2. ‘Report of the Special Committee…’ (Bank of England), 26/11/18; PRO:T172/1499B. 
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problems’, and called for a rapid publication of the Cunliffe committee’s interim report in 
order ‘to steady public opinion’.58
The views of the labour movement on the postwar form of the state were closely 
shaped  by  its  wartime  experience.  Dissatisfaction  with  inflation,  profiteering,  and  the 
state’s economic policy stance had increased support for radical ideas, as had the success 
of the Russian revolution, and many expected the prewar sharpening of class conflict to be 
resumed in the postwar period. In contrast, the war had also given a boost to moderate 
labour  opinion,  having  demonstrated  that  it  was  possible  to  further  working  class 
objectives from within rather than against the state, and as such many within the labour 
movement were now also predicting a great new era of social reform and working class 
advances within capitalism itself, and were calling for the continuation of state economic 
controls  over  planning,  prices  and  profits.  In  addition,  the  war  had  also  given  a 
considerable impetus to the size, organisation, and authority of the labour movement as a 
whole. Trade union membership had grown to 5.5 million from 3.4 million in 1913, trade 
unions themselves were now increasing in size through a series of amalgamations, and the 
extension of the franchise was expected to raise electoral support for the Labour Party. 
Furthermore, the war had also widened the outlook of organised labour beyond the narrow 
confines  of  its  more  traditional  issues  such  as  wages  and  working  conditions,  and  its 
interest in much wider policy areas such as foreign affairs and national economic policy 
was now increasing.59
Despite  this  however,  in  terms  of  detail  and  substance  labour’s  proposals  for 
postwar  policy remained limited.  The more radical  aim of overthrowing capitalism for 
58 BE:G1/420. Cokayne to Strong 23/9/18, 19/11/18; PRO:T172/895. Cokayne to Bonar Law 16/10/18; 
PRO/T1/12202 [37716]. Bradbury to Bonar Law 7/10/18.
59 Cole (1948), pp.366-86; Johnson (1968), pp.219-46; Fulcher (1991); Butler and Butler (1994), p.373; 
Labour Party general election manifestos in Dale (2000).
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instance was not accompanied by any specific plans as to what should be put in its place, 
while  more  moderate  proposals  such  as  calls  for  widespread  nationalisation  and  a 
programme  of  welfare  benefits  and  state  provision  of  work  to  deal  with  postwar 
unemployment  remained  vague  and  largely  aspirational  in  character.  Indeed,  the  only 
really  developed  and coherent  scheme put  forward  by  labour  at  this  time was for  the 
introduction of a progressive fiscal  policy and a capital levy on war wealth in order to 
reduce  the  national  debt.60 In  terms  of  the  postwar  state  form therefore,  while  many 
radicals  within the labour  movement  remained in  favour  of  revolutionary  action,  most 
official  labour  opinion  maintained  an  orthodox  outlook.  The  majority  of  trade  union 
leaders  remained  committed  to  a  policy  of  gradualism  and  social  reform  rather  than 
conflict  and  revolution,  most  Labour  Party  MP’s  were  drawn  from  a  trade  union 
background  and  still  remained  chiefly  concerned  with  traditional  labour  issues,  while 
prominent figures within the Labour Party such as Ramsay MacDonald, Philip Snowden 
(the Party’s economic policy spokesman), and H. D. Henderson were increasingly anxious 
to allay public fears of labour radicalism and to impress the Party’s ‘fitness to govern’ upon  
the British electorate.61
The views of capital on the postwar state form were also shaped by the experiences 
of war. Unease about the enhanced strength of organised labour for example had led to the 
general view that it was now necessary to rein back the movement’s wartime advances. For 
some such as the FBI the hope was that this could be achieved through the establishment 
of a new and more harmonious relationship with labour, with high wages and industry-
provided welfare  benefits  being granted in return for a permanent  easing of restrictive 
60 ‘Labour Problems After the War’ (Labour Party), 1917; ‘Labour and the New Social Order’ (Labour Party),  
1918; Labour Party Annual Reports 1917-1918, and 1923. Appendix VII; Cronin (1991), pp.61-2.
61 Snowden (1934), p.531; Johnson (1968), pp.219-46.
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practices and improved efficiency, though for others such as the NCEO and the EEF the 
view was of a much more one-sided postwar relation, calling for the legal abolition of trade 
union practices altogether and offering nothing in return.62 
On postwar  economic  and monetary  policy however,  the views of  capital  were 
more tentative. Unfamiliar with many of the issues involved many industrialists, especially 
the FBI (whose primary concern at this time was with expanding its membership base and 
who were therefore keen to avoid advocating potentially controversial views), remained 
content  to  leave  these  issues  to  those  considered  to  be  experts  in  such  matters. 
Nevertheless, representatives of capital remained broadly in favour of a return to economic 
orthodoxy. The ABCC and the London Chambers of Commerce (LCC) for example were 
both supportive of a return to gold, the FBI also accepted the need for deflation in order to 
raise  the value of the  pound (though urged that  this  be gradual  so as not  to  endanger 
postwar recovery), while the FBI, the ABCC, and the Institute of Bankers all stated that in 
their view the war had revealed it to be ‘more than ever necessary for us to maintain the 
integrity of the pound sterling’. The view of the City, as signalled by the Chairmen of 
Britain’s leading banks, though concerned about technical details such as the size of any 
future gold reserve, was also in favour of deflation and a return to gold.63
On this basis, the general view of capital in terms of the postwar state form was in 
favour of a limited and temporary period of state assistance, leading ultimately to a return 
to a minimalist state. Throughout the war for example, one section of industrial opinion 
known as the ‘productioneers’ felt that Britain’s military struggle with Germany would be 
62 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/32/2. ‘Reconstruction after the war’ (FBI), 6/12/17; PRO:CAB24/74. V. Caillard (FBI 
President) to Secretary of War Cabinet. 12/2/19; Carter (1917); Turner (1984), pp.13-14.
63 PRO:T185/1-2. Minutes of Evidence 10/6/18, 11/6/18, 11/7/18; FBI memo to the Cunliffe Committee 
10/7/18; Evidence of Holden, Schuster, and Goodenough; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/1-2. FBI Bulletins (1918-
1919 issues); Hume (1963); Moggridge (1972), p.96; Catterall (1976); Turner (1984a), pp.38-9; Cronin 
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continued  after  the  Armistice  in  the  form of  a  trade  war,  and  now perceived  distinct 
benefits from closer contacts with the state, calling for a period of large-scale intervention 
such  as  protective  subsidies  and  tariffs  to  help  facilitate  industrial  modernisation  and 
postwar reconstruction. The majority of industrial opinion however considered such views 
to be misplaced. While most industrialists remained keen for a degree of short-term state 
protection in order to  assist  with reconstruction,  any notion that this should be further 
extended was greatly opposed. As the FBI put it for instance, government interference was 
not only ‘cumbersome, expensive, and irritating’, but was ‘fatal to commercial efficiency 
and enterprise’. Instead, most industrialists were in favour of the removal of state control 
over industry as soon as possible, and for the introduction of large cuts in tax and public 
spending  in  order  to  stimulate  production  by  reducing  costs  and  raising  profits.  The 
predominant attitude of industry to the postwar state form was therefore that this should be 
restricted to the provision of a minimal economic framework within which business and 
the  free  market  could  operate  unimpeded,  a  view  well  summarised  by  the  British 
Commonwealth Union (BCU) and the Parliamentary Industrial Group. As they explained:
“The policy of the State in relation to industry and commerce after the war 
should be to afford the maximum of assistance in their maintenance and 
development,  and to  interfere  as little as  possible  with their  control and 
management.”64
The Battle for the Postwar State
64 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/32/2. ‘Industry in Parliament’ (BCU); ‘Reconstruction after the war’ (FBI), 6/12/17; 
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Among these competing perspectives on the postwar state form, the government 
themselves as yet had no solid view on the subject and the Armistice was accompanied by 
acute panic as to the course of action that should now be taken.65 The central dilemma 
confronting the government in the immediate postwar period was to reconcile the need for 
increased  economic  competitiveness,  efficiency,  and output,  with  the  need to  avoid  an 
intensification  of  labour  unrest.  With  the  postwar  situation  expected  to  be  volatile, 
Ministers were once again concerned that labour disquiet had the potential to develop into 
an explosive revolutionary situation, and were desperate to avoid a recession during the 
transition to peacetime lest this should light the fuse. To this end a key aim of Ministers 
was to abolish the state’s directly visible control over the economy and to return control 
over  economic  conditions  to  the  market.  This  it  was  believed,  would  not  only  help 
stimulate an economic recovery, a revival of exports, and raise output and efficiency, but 
would also enable state officials to relinquish their overt responsibility for the economy, 
and would help reduce the expectations of capital and labour regarding postwar conditions, 
thereby easing political pressures.66 As Austen Chamberlain, the Chancellor in the postwar 
coalition  government  (which  now  excluded  the  Labour  Party)  from  January  1919 
explained,  the  increasing  reliance  of  capital  and  labour  on  the  state  was  not  only 
prolonging industrial unrest, since with the government expected to step in at any moment 
‘neither side would say the last word as to what they were prepared to concede’, but was 
also exacerbating Britain’s political and economic difficulties.67 With reference to the wool 
industry for example, Chamberlain stated that:
65 Johnson (1968); Wrigley (1990), p.91.
66 Middlemas (1979), pp.120-46; Wrigley (1990), pp.7-8; Aris (1998), pp.155ff.
67 PRO:CAB23/9. Cabinet Meeting 28/1/19. 
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“The moment you began control you were inevitably driven to complete 
control  which,  if  prolonged,  led  to  nationalisation,  which  was  therefore, 
only a question of  time.  Control  eliminated  all  the usual  motives  which 
induced economic production. The whole burden of making things move 
was thrown upon the Controller, and all the moral machinery interested in 
increasing production became moribund.”68
A major problem for the government however lay with the high extent of the state’s 
directly visible involvement with the economy, and with the heightened expectations of 
capital and labour this had engendered. With labour now pressing for the retention of key 
controls and for the restoration of restrictive practices, and with industry maintaining that 
the government’s priority should be protection and increased productivity, it was clear that 
any  attempts  to  either  retain  wartime  productive  practices  or  to  engage  in  a  rapid 
dismantling of state control risked provoking large-scale unrest. As such, the majority of 
the Cabinet were now of the view that while the more contentious areas of state control 
needed to be relaxed, a complete withdrawal from the economy would take some time to 
achieve.69
Despite  this,  the  government’s  fears  of  social  turmoil  were  nonetheless  soon 
realised. The slow pace of social reform and the emergence of a mild recession after the 
Armistice triggered a new series of severe disturbances across the country (especially acute 
in the transport, coal, engineering, and shipbuilding industries) on a scale which surpassed 
even that of the prewar period. The number of new strikes during 1919 was more than 
twice the annual average for the previous decade, and the number of working days lost was 
more than twice the annual average during the Great Unrest.70 Moreover, the character of 
the unrest  was also disconcerting.  Though still  largely directed at  the state rather  than 
68 PRO:CAB23/15. ‘Draft Minutes of a Meeting…’, 5/8/19.
69 Johnson (1968), passim; Middlemas (1979), p.142; Wrigley (1990), ps.80ff, 135-41; Kirby and Rose 
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employers,  many  strikes  were  now  also  officially  sanctioned,  and  were  believed  by 
Ministers  to be driven by Bolshevist  ideas. Indeed,  with unrest  now even spreading to 
sections of the police and the armed forces, officials were increasingly anxious about the 
security of the state itself. Compounding this fear, the Triple Alliance had now resumed 
their activities following a wartime interlude, and domestic turmoil also seemed to be part 
of a wider international  convulsion,  with revolution in Hungary and with the threat  of 
revolution in Austria, Germany, and parts of the British Empire.71
Such  trouble  however  was  not  unexpected.  As  one  official  report  remarked  in 
January 1919, the wonder was ‘not that it had come so soon, but that it has been delayed so 
long.’72 Nevertheless, despite such warnings the government had made no real preparations 
for dealing with the postwar situation and once more sought to address the difficulties with 
short-term,  ad  hoc measures  designed  to  consolidate  moderate  opinion  against  labour 
radicalism. As Bonar Law (the leader of the Conservative Party) explained, responsible 
trade unionism was now ‘the only thing between us and anarchy’.73 As such, many of the 
social reforms promised during the war were now introduced. Trade union practices were 
quickly restored,  the majority of working hours were reduced, wages were temporarily 
frozen at their inflated wartime levels, and unemployment benefits were both extended and 
increased.74 The  government  also  successfully  managed  to  head off  unrest  in  the  coal 
mines, a potential trigger for Triple Alliance action, by establishing a Royal Commission to 
examine conditions in the industry, and further sought to address the unrest by setting up 
another  National  Industrial  Council  with  the  apparent  aim  of  helping  to  restructure 
71 Johnson (1968), pp.301-2; Wrigley (1990); Fulcher (1991), pp.122-9.
72 PRO:CAB24/74. ‘Fortnightly Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the U.K…’, 28/1/19. 
73 Ibid., 29/1/19, 12/2/19; PRO:CAB24/90; PRO:CAB27/59; PRO:CAB27/60. Cabinet Meetings; Johnson 
(1968), passim; Middlemas (1979), pp.139-45; Wrigley (1990); Aris (1998), pp.138ff.
74 Johnson (1968), passim; Wrigley (1990), pp.85-92.
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relations  between the  state,  capital,  and  labour.  Like  its  1911 predecessor  though,  the 
Council  was again in reality designed to provide the authorities with shelter from their 
immediate difficulties.75
Alongside  these  measures,  Ministers  also  sought  to  develop  and  implement  a 
longer-term strategy for dealing with the situation. In February a fast-track inquiry was 
established  to  examine  means  of  bringing  about  a  rapid  economic  revival,  with  its 
Chairman, Sir Auckland Geddes arguing that the main problem facing the government was 
its commitment to pursue the ‘inconsistent policies’ of social reform and a return to the 
gold standard.76 Although a quick return to gold at the prewar par would he claimed, be a 
sound policy, given the size of the government’s debt, its pledges of social reform, and the 
volatile social situation, such a move was deemed to be impossible at the present time. As 
he explained, there would be ‘enormous political and social difficulties’ in implementing 
the necessary deflation. As such, Geddes thought that a return to gold should therefore be 
postponed,  and  instead  maintained  that  it  was  ‘absolutely  essential’  to  allow  the 
continuance of wartime inflation in order to stimulate the economy and avoid even greater 
industrial unrest. This view was also held by Bonar Law, and by the Prime Minister, Lloyd 
George, now primarily concerned with the threat of revolution and of the opinion that the 
essential aim was to ensure ‘a certain contentment in the labour world’. Despite strong 
opposition  from  Chamberlain,  who  claimed  that  continued  inflation  would  penalise 
exporters and place ever greater pressure on sterling, the inquiry therefore concluded in 
contrast to the Cunliffe committee, that the introduction of deflation to bring about a return 
to gold at $4.86 should be delayed, and that in the meantime inflation should be sustained 
75 Cole (1948), pp.389ff; Middlemas (1979), pp.139-41; Wrigley (1990), pp.131ff.
76 PRO:CAB24/74. ‘Proposed Industrial Enquiry’, 11/2/19. 
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in order to encourage domestic economic activity.77 That there would now be no quick 
return to an operational gold standard was made fully certain in late March when Britain 
formally  departed  from  the  regime.  With  the  cost  of  maintaining  the  exchange  rate 
becoming ever more prohibitive in the face of high inflation and a growing trade deficit, 
and  with  the  government  in  no  position  to  bear  the  social  consequences  of  deflation, 
sterling’s  convertibility  into gold  was  officially  terminated,  and from the  beginning  of 
April the pound became a floating currency.78
As spring progressed the economic situation also changed markedly. Driven by an 
international  economic  boom,  by  pent  up  domestic  demand  for  consumer  goods,  by 
industrial  restocking,  and  by  the  government’s  loose  economic  policy  stance,  Britain 
embarked  on  one  of  the  fiercest  periods  of  expansion  in  the  twentieth  century.  This 
however, had both positive and negative effects for the state authorities. On the one hand, 
the  economic  boom  eased  the  transition  to  peacetime,  and  despite  the  risks  allowed 
officials  to  ease  the majority  of  state  controls.  Restrictions  on industrial  materials  and 
foreign  trade were mostly  removed by mid-1919 and by the  end of  the year  the only 
significant regulations remaining were the continued control of the mines and railways and 
some  import  restrictions.79 On  the  negative  side  however  the  boom also  continued  to 
destabilise  the  domestic  circuit  of  capital  and  undermine  Britain’s  competitiveness. 
Speculation developed into frenzied proportions, the trade balance continued to decline 
with  a  surfeit  of  imports,  sterling  continued  to  deteriorate,  and  inflation  rose  sharply. 
Average retail prices in 1919 for example were now more than twice their prewar levels, 
wholesale prices were more than two-and-a-half times higher, while rising demands for 
77 PRO:CAB24/75. ‘Rehabilitation of Trade and Provision of Employment’ 17/2/19, 21/2/19; ‘Notes of a 
Conference of Ministers’ 25/2/19; 26/2/19; Johnson (1968), pp.391ff.
78 Various in PRO:T170/140 and PRO:T176/16; Morgan (1952), pp.197-8; Clay (1957), pp.116-17.
79 Morgan (1952), pp.61-6.
90
wages (which rose by nearly 50% during the course of the boom) continued to exacerbate 
class unrest. Moreover, with profits now relatively easy to come by, the boom also served 
to insulate the economy from the need for competitive improvements, encouraging many 
industrialists to reconstruct along old and safe, rather than newer lines, and stimulating 
many  sectors  (especially  the  staple  trades)  to  overexpand  in  relation  to  the  ‘real’,  as 
opposed to the ‘artificial’ boom level of international demand.80
The Hard Line
By  mid-1919  the  threat  of  revolutionary  labour  action  was  thought  by  the 
authorities to be diminishing. This was apparently confirmed by the reaction of the labour 
movement  to  the publication  of  the final  report  of  the Royal  Commission  on the coal 
industry  in  June.  Despite  supporting  the  miners  on  many  issues,  the  report  remained 
ambiguous on the subject of nationalisation, further dividing radical and moderate labour 
opinion. While labour radicals (particularly the MFGB) now began calling for the use of 
direct action in order to force the government to nationalise the mines, the majority of 
labour  opinion  now  began  to  move  back  towards  what  were  considered  to  be  more 
attainable traditional aims such as improved wages and living standards. The Labour Party 
conference and the executive body of the TUC (the Parliamentary Committee) for example 
both now declared themselves to be against the use of direct action for political ends, with 
80 Figures calculated from Feinstein (1972), Tables 51-52; Butler and Butler (1994), p.383: Also see Pigou 
(1947), pp.161-3; Morgan (1952), pp.267ff; Johnson (1968), pp.402-9; Alford (1996).
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the latter warning that such measures would inevitably lead to a national strike and to a 
doomed attempt at revolution.81
At the same time however, official concerns over the growth of public spending and 
inflation  were  intensifying.  Despite  the  conclusions  of  the  Ministerial  inquiry,  both 
Cokayne and Montagu Norman (the Bank’s Deputy Governor) were increasingly anxious 
for a rise in interest rates in order to reduce inflation and prepare the way for a return to 
gold,  and  while  such  a  move  was  at  the  present  time  held  to  be  ‘unthinkable’ by 
Chamberlain  due  to  the  still  potentially  volatile  social  situation,  the  Chancellor  was 
nonetheless  agreed that the unchecked growth of inflation now posed ‘a danger to the 
stability of the country’.82 Towards the end of the summer however the official line began 
to harden. The effects of the war and the imposition of harsh settlement conditions under 
the Versailles Treaty were placing the German economy under severe strain, weakening 
their economic threat and further undermining the case for prolonged state intervention, 
whilst  at  the  same time officials  were becoming  ever-more frustrated  at  Britain’s  own 
economic performance. Many employers (especially in the coal and steel industries) were 
condemned by the government for their unwillingness to modernise and restructure whilst 
simultaneously engaging in profiteering and calls for state protection, the labour movement 
were seen as ungrateful for social reforms, and both were seen to be colluding in order to 
maintain high prices and wages and to avoid the need for higher productivity.83 
According to Lloyd George the main problems now facing Britain were the high 
incidence of labour unrest, the ‘diminution of output’, and continuing inflation, which was 
81 Labour Party Annual Report 1919, pp.116-23; TUC Annual Report 1919; Branson (1977), pp.15-53; 
Middlemas (1979), pp.148-55; Wrigley (1990), pp.210-16.
82 PRO:T172/1059. Cokayne to Chamberlain 10/7/19; BE:ADM34/8. Norman Diaries 7/7/19 – 18/7/19; 
PRO:CAB27/72. Chamberlain 26/7/19.
83 Various in PRO:CAB23/15; Johnson (1968); Branson (1977), pp.48-9; Wrigley (1990), pp.234-5; Cronin 
(1991), pp.76-7.
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seen to be ‘at  the bottom of the trouble in this country more than any other industrial 
cause’. Along with Chamberlain, the Prime Minister was now also of the view that it was 
essential for Britain to reduce its expenditure and increase production, while at the Bank of 
England Cokayne too was continuing to argue that inflation needed to be reduced, stating 
that this was leading to ever higher demands for wages and was driving down sterling with 
the risk of producing ‘widespread distress’ given Britain’s dependency on imports. A rise in 
interest rates in order to reduce prices and raise the pound was thus deemed by the Bank to 
be ‘urgent’, and a rapid return to gold was considered to be of such ‘vital importance’ that 
it was ‘well worth a temporary sacrifice.’84
With public opinion also now believed to be increasingly opposed to inflation, in 
August the government signalled their hardened stance by rejecting the nationalisation of 
the coal mines. This move brought an immediate strike declaration from the MFGB, and 
led the Triple Alliance to call a ballot on a general strike. Despite the alarming nature of 
these developments however, it was now increasingly apparent that such measures did not 
have the full support of the labour movement and that the Alliance leadership themselves 
were divided.  Seizing  the  opportunity,  the  government  successfully  managed  to  widen 
these splits by ensuring a generous settlement for the NUR in an unrelated railway dispute, 
thus dividing the Triple Alliance and effectively forestalling the threat of any unified strike 
action.85
Though  the  immediate  danger  of  acute  unrest  had  now  been  averted,  the 
government nevertheless remained wary. A permanent anti-strike organisation (the Supply 
and Transport Committee) was established in November to deal with any future recurrence 
84 PRO:CAB23/15. ‘Draft Minutes of a Meeting…’ 5/8/19; PRO:CAB27/72. Cokayne to Chamberlain 
25/9/19; ‘Note by the Chancellor’ 26/7/19; Wrigley (1990), ps.192ff, 234. 
85 Cole (1948), pp.370-92; Johnson (1968), pp.384ff; Branson (1977), pp.15-33; Middlemas (1979), p.149; 
Wrigley (1990), pp.174ff; Aris (1998), pp.160ff.
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of labour disquiet, and officials remained cautious over any rise in interest rates for fear of 
the  social  consequences.86 As  the  pressure  on  sterling  intensified  however,  and  as  the 
authorities  became  increasingly  confident  of  their  ability  to  deal  with  any  unrest,  the 
government finally agreed to a rise. Treasury bill rates were increased to 5.5% and Bank 
Rate moved up to 6% in a bid to check inflation and restore the control of the Bank of 
England over the money market. This was followed in December by the publication of the 
final report of the Cunliffe committee, which re-emphasised the conclusions of the interim 
report in favour of a return to gold at $4.86, by a public declaration from Chamberlain that 
the  government  had  formally  accepted  the  report’s  recommendations,  and  by  the 
introduction of measures to progressively reduce the fiduciary issue as the first stage of 
implementing the report’s proposals. The attempt to address the economic and political 
crisis of the British state was now underway.87
Concluding Remarks
This  chapter  has  outlined  the  development  of  an  economic  and  political  crisis 
within the British state from the latter part of the nineteenth century. This was expressed in 
terms  of  a  relative  economic  decline,  a  progressively  outmoded  pattern  of  economic 
activity, and a sharp increase in labour unrest and militancy from 1910. It has also shown 
that  the  general  state  of  opinion  in  Britain  at  this  time  was  slow  to  realise  the  full 
seriousness of these developments, and that it was only following the severe impact of the 
First World War that the authorities began making any concerted attempt to address the 
86 PRO:CAB23/19; BE:ADM34/8. Norman Diaries 19/9/19.
87 Final Report of the Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges After the War, (1919). Cmd.464; 
BE:G1/420. Cokayne to Strong 19/11/19; PRO:T1/12437. Bradbury to Chamberlain 6/12/19; House of 
Commons Debates. 15/12/19. Vol.123, Cls.43-6; Johnson (1968), pp.461-89; Morgan (1952), pp.150ff; Clay 
(1957), pp.120-3.
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situation.  To this end, the primary aims of Britain’s state managers as they entered the 
postwar  era  were  to  withdraw the  state  from its  directly  visible  involvement  with  the 
economy, to raise Britain’s competitiveness,  modernise its pattern of economic activity, 
and to contain and reduce the threat posed by labour unrest and militancy. 
Though as yet not fully developed, the central component of the governing strategy 
adopted to achieve these aims was that of a return to the gold standard at the prewar parity 
of $4.86. This was to be implemented following a period of deflation and retrenchment, 
which would clear the way for a return by reducing prices and wages and by raising the 
value of the pound. A return to gold would then provide state officials with an automatic 
anti-inflationary  framework  for  economic  policy-making,  keeping  domestic  prices  and 
wages within internationally defined limits, serving to undermine the inflationary cause of 
class unrest, and encouraging producers to move to newer and more advanced industrial 
sectors.  Adherence  to  the  regime  would  also  increase  the  high  political  freedom  of 
manoeuvre  available  to  the  core  executive  by  depoliticising  the  issues  of  economic 
conditions and policy-making, thereby helping to lower the expectations of capital  and 
labour, and to displace pressure over economic conditions away from the state. The next 




Chapter 4 : The First Steps, 1920-1922
This chapter follows the attempt by Britain’s state authorities to impose deflation 
and retrenchment in order to prepare the way for a return to the gold standard at the prewar 
par. It shows that officials were moderately successful in reducing prices and wages, and in 
disengaging  the  state  from its  directly  visible  involvement  with  the  economy,  but  that 
despite this the pound remained below par and economic conditions and policy-making 
remained politicised. As such, continuing political pressure and unrest associated largely 
with the effects of deflation eventually forced state officials to ease their economic policy 
stance. By 1922 the core executive had turned away from deflation and had adopted a 
‘waiting policy’ in the hope that sterling could be restored to par through US inflation and 
a fall in the dollar.
Deflation and Retrenchment
After  the  turmoil  of  1919 state  officials  entered  1920 determined to  complete  the 
withdrawal of the state from its directly visible involvement with the economy and to 
reduce inflation as a prerequisite for a return to the gold standard at the prewar par. 
The wartime expansion of the state and the postwar boom had both insulated Britain’s 
economy from competitive pressures, while the politicisation of economic conditions 
and policy-making had put the state authorities under increasing pressure from capital 
and labour and had restricted their freedom of policy manoeuvre. At the same time, 
these problems were also compounded by rising inflation, which had intensified class 
unrest and had exacerbated Britain’s relative economic decline. For state managers the 
imposition  of  deflation  and the  return of  control  over  economic  conditions  to  the 
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market  were  thus  considered  essential  in  order  to  restore  competitive  discipline, 
reduce  prices,  raise  the  pound,  and  address  the  threat  posed  by  labour  unrest. 
Following this, a return to gold was deemed necessary to prevent any resurgence of 
such difficulties by ensuring that domestic economic conditions (especially prices and 
wages) remained within internationally defined levels, and by providing the monetary 
authorities with a technocratic and depoliticised means of regulating Britain’s circuit 
of capital.
These aims however contained an number of corollaries. Higher levels of interest rates 
and taxation as well as stringent cuts in public spending would be required to tighten 
credit, force down prices, balance the budget, and raise the value of sterling. This also 
necessitated the restoration of the Bank of England’s control over interest rates, which 
in turn required the reduction and restructuring of the national debt and the return of 
control  and  responsibility  for  economic  conditions  to  the  market.  This  process 
however would also be essentially predicated upon a recomposition of class relations 
in  favour  of  capital  and  thus  contained  the  inherent  danger  of  provoking  labour 
opposition and further unrest. With present levels of production being sustained only 
by  an  expanding  supply  of  credit,  a  tight  monetary  and  fiscal  stance  would  put 
pressure on producers to cut costs (primarily wages), and to find more efficient means 
of extracting surplus value, either by improving existing practices or by moving to 
newer  lines  of  industrial  production.  Rising  unemployment  and  cuts  in  public 
spending  (primarily  on  social  services)  would  also  serve  to  undermine  labour’s 
resistance to deflation,  while the withdrawal of directly visible state control would 
augment the control of employers over the process of production. As Ralph Hawtrey 
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(the Treasury’s Director of Financial Enquiries) for example later described it: 
“The  treatment  of  adverse  exchanges  by  a  high  Bank  Rate  may  quite 
accurately  be  described  as  inducing  a  depression  of  trade,  with  its 
accompaniments of a shrinkage of profits and of employment.”1
At the  same time as  such measures would impose  competitive  pressures  upon the 
economy, they would however also enable state officials to deal with these social and 
political  problems  by  eschewing  responsibility  for  economic  conditions,  thus 
displacing  pressure over  economic  policy-making away from the  state  and forcing 
capital and labour to resolve their differences without recourse to state involvement.1 
Restoring the control of the Bank of England over interest rates and adhering to an 
apparently  automatic  exchange rate  system would act  as  a  self-imposed constraint 
upon  the  discretionary  capacities  of  the  monetary  authorities,  with  the  public 
impression  of  a  non-political  mechanism  effectively  insulating  officials  from  the 
unpalatable consequences of their economic policy stance. The Treasury for example 
could claim that responsibility for interest rate decisions now lay with the Bank, while 
the  Bank (in  rare  departures  from its  traditional  wall  of  silence)  could claim that 
interest rate decisions were now made according to the dictates of the gold standard, 
responsibility for the adherence to which lay with the government. As Hawtrey later 
explained:
“The  principal  ground for  entrusting credit  regulation  to  an independent 
Central Bank is to place it outside political criticism. If the intervention of 
the  Government  is  to  be  a  normal  part  of  credit  regulation,  the  way is 
1 BE:ADM16/3. ‘Gold and Bank Rate’ (Hawtrey), 11/7/25.
1 Various in PRO:T171/235; Grigg (1948), pp.73-4; Howson (1975), ps.25, 33.
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opened to political criticism.”2
The outstanding benefit of a return to the gold standard was therefore that it would 
provide state managers with a credible and transparent policy rule for manipulating the  
expectations  and  hence  the  behaviour  of  capital  and  labour,  thus  enabling  the 
application of financial discipline while simultaneously displacing political pressure 
over  economic  conditions,  and  making it  simpler  and  easier  for  the  authorities  to 
manage Britain’s circuit  of  capital.  As Basil  Blackett  (the Treasury’s Controller  of 
Finance) explained, a gold standard would equip the authorities with ‘an automatic 
barometer of credit’, providing a clear indication as to the world position of Britain’s 
prices and to the necessity or otherwise for a move in interest rates.1 Or as Hawtrey 
again put it,  a discretionary monetary policy would be problematic since it  would 
depend:
“purely on the judgement of the Bank [of England] which may be fallible, 
and is far less clearly understood by traders etc. concerned. With a gold 
standard the dangers of excessive prices are apparent to everyone and the 
movement  in  the  Bank  reserves  is  at  once  a  warning  which  everyone 
understands. In consequence the credit adjustments are made more easily 
and more certainly.”2
The  need to  impose  such  measures  was  increasingly  apparent  during  the  early 
months of 1920. By the spring retail prices were now two-and-a-half times higher than 
they were before the war, wholesale prices were three times higher, real wages were at 
record levels, and sterling had recently fallen to an ignominious low of $3.20. Economic 
2 BE:EID4/102. ‘The Fiduciary Issue’ (Hawtrey), 6/5/27; Hawtrey (1933), pp.83-90: Also see BE:G1/464. 
Notes by Norman (1927); BE:OV9/480. ‘Substance of a Lecture…’ (Niemeyer), 22/2/29.
1 PRO:T172/1384. ‘Dear Money’ (Blackett), 19/2/20; Also BE:G1/506. ‘Economic Developments in Post-
War Britain’ (Blackett), December 1935.
2 PRO:T172/1499B. ‘How Does a Gold Standard Work in Regulating Credit?’, (Hawtrey). Insert mine.
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output and productivity remained lethargic, the balance of payments were in an parlous 
condition, while the need for an adjustment in Britain’s pattern of economic activity to 
keep  abreast  of  shifting  global  economic  conditions  (such  as  changes  in  productive 
technology,  methods,  and  consumer  demands)  was  becoming  increasingly  acute.  State 
officials also remained concerned with the level of labour unrest, with the number of new 
stoppages now rising to their highest ever levels and with the number of working days lost 
remaining higher than the annual average during the Great Unrest.3
As such, throughout the initial part of the year senior Bank and Treasury officials 
began strongly pressing for higher interest rates in order to check inflation and raise the 
value of sterling to enable a return to gold. At the Bank, Norman warned that continuing 
with low rates would ‘ruin us’, while Cokayne argued that deflation was essential in order 
to stimulate exports, reduce wages, and to attract and retain capital. Though the Governor 
recognised that this process would ‘necessarily be a painful one’, it was also considered to 
be ‘unavoidable’ and in the final analysis the difficulties involved were thought to be ‘as 
dust in the balance compared with the restoration of free trade and the removal of social 
unrest  and  political  discontent.’4 At  the  Treasury,  officials  such  as  Hawtrey,  Sir  Otto 
Niemeyer (a Treasury undersecretary), and Sir Warren Fisher (the Permanent Secretary) 
were also calling for higher rates in order to reduce prices and wages, and even Blackett, 
initially  urging  caution  in  order  to  avoid  further  economic  and  social  disruption,  and 
initially of the view that a rate of 6% was ‘as high as it is safe to go on political and social 
grounds’, was soon advocating an increase to 8% given the urgency of the situation.5
3 Calculated from Butler and Butler (1994), pp.373-4; also see Kahn (1946), passim; Morgan (1952), pp.267-
97; Alford (1996), pp.122-4.
4 BE:ADM34/9. Norman Diaries 9/3/20; PRO:T172/1384. ‘Memo. as to Money Rates’ (Cokayne), 25/2/20. 
5 PRO:T172/1384. Niemeyer to Blackett 3/2/20; ‘Cheap or Dear Money’ (Hawtrey), 4/2/20; ‘Memo. as to 
Money Rates’ (Cokayne), 25/2/20; Fisher to Chamberlain 11/3/20l; ‘Dear Money’ (Blackett), 19/2/20; 
Blackett to Chamberlain 4/3/20.
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The government too were keen to encourage the process of economic adjustment 
and decontrol, especially with regards to the overexpanded wartime industries. In the case 
of  coal  for  example,  the  Cabinet  view was  that  ‘a  decrease  in  industrial  activity  was 
inevitable, and the sooner it came the better’, and Ministers were also anxious to divest 
themselves of any responsibility for the sector, stating that they ‘would never be free until 
they resigned their control  over the industry’. With the labour situation still  potentially 
volatile however, Ministers also remained cautious. Rapid decontrol of the industry was 
thought to carry the danger of rising coal prices, wage pressure, and the risk of a general 
strike,  while major Cabinet figures were also unconvinced about the need for a rise in 
interest rates. Lloyd George and Bonar Law for example were anxious about the effect of 
higher rates on the government’s debt servicing and housing programme (seen as a key 
bulwark against  labour radicalism and unrest),  while  Chamberlain  remained concerned 
about  how  high  interest  rates  might  go  once  deflation  was  unleashed,  and  about  the 
political criticism that this would attract.6
At the same time however,  the conditions for implementing deflation were now 
increasingly opportune. Public opinion was mounting against high levels of inflation and 
public spending, the state’s remaining wartime controls were now scheduled for removal in 
1921, and although the threat of action from the MFGB or the Triple Alliance was still 
present, the risk of any immediate and serious unrest was judged to have passed its peak. 
Strike activities were now decreasing in number and moderate labour opinion was thought 
to  be  in  the  ascendancy.  By  March  the  Chancellor  had  accepted  the  necessity  for  a 
‘gradual’ deflation,  and  in  April  tighter  measures  were  finally  imposed with  a  rise  in 
6 BE:ADM34/9. Norman Diaries. 4/2/20 – 30/3/20; PRO:CAB23/20-21. Cabinet Meetings 21/1/20; 31/3/20; 
3/6/20; Various in PRO:T172/1384.
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interest rates to 7% and with the introduction of a deflationary budget of tax increases and 
public spending cuts.7 
Into the Slump
At the same time as deflation was being introduced however, the global boom was 
also coming to an end. The immediate impact of the boom had been to exacerbate the vast 
wartime expansion in the international production of key primary and industrial  goods, 
profoundly unbalancing relations of supply and demand between the various branches of 
the world economy. This misalignment was made worse by the now declining need for 
commodities of high wartime demand such as coal  and heavy metals, by the return to 
international markets of producers shut out during the conflict, by the proliferation of new 
European states (each of whom sought to develop their own industrial capacity as rapidly 
as possible),  and by the deeply contentious  issues of reparations and war debts,  all  of 
which  added  to  prevailing  political  and  economic  tensions  and  uncertainties.  Such 
difficulties  were  also  exacerbated  by  the  mass  export  and  price  cutting  activities  of 
Germany necessitated by the need to meet the high levels of reparations imposed by the 
Allies, by a rapid international growth in tariffs and other protectionist measures, and by 
the  disintegration  of  the  international  system  of  exchange  rates  that  had  been  held 
artificially stable during the war. The result of these various factors was to produce a global 
crisis of overproduction, causing a severe slump in the price of both primary and industrial 
goods.8
These developments impacted severely upon the British economy, the expansion of 
which during the boom had been primarily based upon the anticipation of recapturing old 
7 BE:ADM34/9. Norman Diaries 4/2/20 – 30/3/20; Various in PRO:T172/1384; Morgan (1952), ps.91-106, 
206-7; Clay (1957), pp.125-6; Middlemas (1969), p.97; Wrigley (1990), pp.253-62.
8 Pigou (1947), passim; Kenwood and Lougheed (1971), pp.173-202; Eichengreen (1992), pp.102ff.
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export markets. As such, the collapse in world demand left many firms burdened with large 
debts and diminished profitability, and left the banking system overexposed to struggling 
sectors.  In addition, the domestic forces of restocking and consumer spending that had 
helped drive the boom forward were also now coming to an end, with the combined result 
that Britain plunged into its worst recession for fifty years. Industrial production, still yet 
to recover to prewar levels fell by 19% during 1920-21 (with above-average falls in the 
staples industries), and unemployment rose from under 300,000 to over 2.2 million by 
October 1921.9
The  recession  however  was  not  completely  unfavourable  for  the  authorities. 
Between 1920-22 British wholesale prices fell by more than 25%, retail prices by around 
10%,  and  money  wages  by  between  25-30%.10 Sterling  rose  consistently  (though  not 
continuously)  throughout  the  period,  and  the  balance  of  payments  current  account 
improved to a surplus of £337 million from a deficit of £45 million in 1919. Officials were 
also able to maintain their budgetary rectitude, transforming a deficit of £1690 million in 
1919 into a £237 million surplus by 1921, reducing public spending by 60%, and putting 
around 80% of the national debt onto a medium to long term basis as compared to 50% at 
the end of the war.11 The slump also helped officials to facilitate the final decontrol of the 
economy. In 1921 the remaining wartime ministries such as Munitions, Shipping, and Food 
were  abolished,  the  mines  and  railways  were  returned  to  private  ownership,  and  all 
wartime controls had been removed by the end of 1922.12 Moreover, the attitude of the 
state authorities towards labour also continued to harden. The Emergency Powers Act of 
9 Clay (1957), p.134; Middlemas (1969), pp.95-6; Feinstein (1972), Tables 1, 51, 52, 57; Branson (1977).
10 Calculated from Labour Bulletin. June 1929; Pigou (1947), p.207; Morgan (1952), pp.267ff; Feinstein 
(1972), Tables 17, 65.
11 Morgan (1952); Moggridge (1969), p.15; Brown Jr (1970), pp.198-202; Feinstein (1972), Table 37; 
Howson (1975), p.25; Sayers (1976), pp.125-6; Cronin (1991), p.76.
12 Cole (1948), pp.401-2; Tomlinson (1990), pp.52-63; Cronin (1991), pp.88-9.
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1920  gave  the  state  wide-ranging  powers  to  deal  with  the  threat  of  any  large-scale 
disruption  such  as  that  posed  by  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  was  seen  by  the  TUC’s 
Parliamentary  Committee  as  a  move  striking  at  the  very  existence  of  the  trade  union 
movement itself.13
The high incidence of unemployment during the slump also further weakened the 
strength and radicalism of organised labour and helped to further consolidate moderate 
opinion within the labour movement. Trade union membership fell from 7.9 to 6.6 million 
between  1920-1922,  while  the  influence  of  labour  radicals  became  increasingly 
marginalized  despite  the  consolidation of  radical  groups  with  the  establishment  of  the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in August 1920. This was evidenced earlier in 
the year when trade unionists voted resoundingly against calling a general strike to force 
the nationalisation of the coal mines, and was also apparent in the growing professionalism 
of the TUC and the Labour Party, with each having now developed a penchant for stability 
above unrest and a vested interest in the maintenance of their newly improved status.14
Despite  the  benefits  of  the  slump  however,  the  recession  initially  led  to  an 
intensification of class conflict as faltering economic conditions induced many employers 
to try and reverse labour’s previous gains by seeking to cut wages, intensify work, and 
reassert  control  over  industrial  production.15 This  though  was  met  with  determined 
resistance  from labour,  who  at  this  point  were  still  in  a  strong  position.  Trade  union 
membership during 1920-21 rose from 7.9 to 8.3 million, the number of new strikes in 
1920 was the highest yet during the twentieth century (and was not surpassed until the 
13 MRC:MSS.292/20/6. TUCPC meeting 27/10/20; Tomlinson (1990), pp.58-65; Middlemas (1979), 
pp.152ff.
14 Calculated from Butler and Butler (1994), p.373; Labour Party Annual Report 1920, p.9; Branson (1977), 
p.56; Challinor (1977), Ch.10ff; Middlemas (1979), pp.161-3; Jones and Keating (1985), p.56; Tant (1993).
15 Middlemas (1969), p.97; Clegg (1979), ps.23, 151-2; Wrigley (1990), pp.253-81.
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1940s), while the amount of working days lost had so far only been superseded in 1912 
and 1919. Moreover, despite the dramatic rise in unemployment this resistance was also 
markedly successful. Though wholesale prices fell by about a fifth, and though the cost of 
living declined by 10% during 1920-21, money wages remained virtually unchanged and 
real  wages  actually  rose.16 Further,  despite  the  erosion  of  labour  radicalism politically 
motivated unrest  also continued to  alarm the government,  with the prospect  of British 
military support for Poland in their war with Russia producing a wave of disquiet during 
the summer that threatened to develop into a revolutionary situation. A TUC council of 
action was appointed to call a general strike, and the situation was only defused when a 
Polish victory dispelled the need for external assistance.17
In addition, labour also remained critical of government policy on a range of other 
issues.  Though  Britain’s  economic  crisis  was  primarily  thought  to  be  the  result  of 
international  factors  such  as  the  reduced  purchasing  power  of  foreign  nations,  high 
inflation,  exchange  rate  instability,  and  continued  uncertainty  within  Europe,  the 
government’s  foreign policy  stance was also deemed to  be a  key factor.  An economic 
blockade  of  Germany,  the  isolation  of  Russia,  and the  imposition of  harsh reparations 
conditions for example, were all seen to have helped create and compound the adverse 
global economic situation. As such, with the majority of labour opinion now looking to 
reformist rather than radical measures, the remedy for the economic crisis was seen to lay 
with  concerted  international  action  and  an  expansionary  policy  in  order  to  restore 
purchasing  power  abroad  and  to  help  revive  the  world  economy.  To  ameliorate  the 
domestic impact of the recession the government were also urged to adopt a similar policy 
16 Calculated from Hansard 10/5/28. Col.217; Pigou (1947), p.207; Feinstein (1972), Tables 51-2, 64; Butler 
and Butler (1994), ps.373-4, 383; MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C531 Pt.1. Labour Bulletin June 1929, Tables I-II. 
17 Branson (1977), pp.50-6; Jones and Keating (1985), pp.44-5.
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of expansion including schemes for public works and increased unemployment benefits, 
and were also attacked for their  apparent indifference  towards,  and for their  refusal  to 
accept any responsibility for the high level of unemployment.18
For representatives of capital Britain’s economic problems were also seen to flow 
from the international situation, though in contrast to labour the solution was seen to lie 
with domestic rather than international measures. In particular, the reduction of production 
costs by cutting wages, taxation, and public spending was seen to be essential in order to 
overcome  the  recession  by  improving  Britain’s  competitiveness.  Industrial  attitudes 
towards the state however, remained less decisive. On the one hand, many industrialists 
were reluctant to seek government assistance for fear that this could lead to a renewal of 
unwanted  interference,  though  on  the  other  hand  many  were  now  critical  of  the 
government for their lack of direct help, and especially for its policy of high interest rates 
which was seen to be a key contributory factor in many of their economic ills.19
Despite the continued politicisation of economic conditions and the worsening state 
of the economy however, neither capital nor labour regarded the notion of returning to gold 
as a contentious issue. As such, despite the criticism of their economic policy stance, this 
lack  of  opposition  enabled  state  officials  to  continue  adhering  to  the  principles of  the 
Cunliffe  report.  Indeed,  though  critical  of  government  policy,  representatives  of  both 
capital and labour remained actively in favour of a return to an international gold standard. 
Both the Labour Party and the trade unions for example were increasingly concerned with 
the effects of exchange rate instability and the low value of the pound, with one joint trade 
union-Labour Party committee stating that a low pound meant higher import prices and 
18 ‘International Economic Policy’ (Labour Party), 1919; Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1920; 
Cronin (1991), pp.113-14.
19 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/3. FBI Bulletins (1920 issues); Layton (1925), passim; Turner (1984), p.10; Cronin 
(1991), pp.78-9.
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thus a higher cost of living, and calling for immediate legislation to reduce the money 
supply until sterling rose back to par.20 The general view of industrialists was also of a 
similar persuasion, with a national conference of manufacturers and producers declaring in 
February 1920 that a rise in the pound and the re-establishment of global exchange rate 
stability  was  of  the  ‘utmost  importance’.21 Such  views  were  also  bolstered  by  the 
conclusions of an international conference of experts held in Brussels to consider means of 
resolving the international economic crisis, which called on national states to start taking 
measures in order to return to gold at parities appropriate to their postwar circumstances.22
State officials however were initially slow to realise the extent to which the slump 
was affecting Britain. Economic problems were thought to be confined to specific areas 
and industries, and by mid-1920 both Treasury and Bank officials were of the view that 
domestic  economic  conditions  were  returning  to  normality.  Officials  were  however 
concerned with the level of criticism being directed at the policy of high interest rates. 
Fisher for example derided such criticisms as ‘ill-informed’ and ‘self-interested’,  whilst 
Blackett regarded the ‘intense hostility’ as ‘only natural’ given the economic situation. As 
such, Treasury officials were also keen to avoid putting excessive strain on the economy, 
and sought to prevent deflation from damaging ‘legitimate’ economic activity. As Blackett 
again put it:
“a policy of steady deflation has to steer very gingerly between the Scylla of 
new inflation and the Charybdis of a financial crisis destroying credit and 
20 TUC Annual Report 1920. p.119.
21 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/3. FBI Bulletins 9/2/20. 3(6); 16/2/20. 3(7). 
22 See Clay (1957), pp.136-7; Eichengreen (1992), pp.152-7.
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stopping new production.”23
Moreover, officials were also quick to realise that there would be no early return to 
gold. With the United States now also adopting a policy of deflation to improve economic 
efficiency,  raising sterling to its prewar parity with the dollar  would require  a level of 
interest rates which as Chamberlain pointed out would be ‘politically impossible’.24 Indeed, 
even Norman, now Governor at the Bank and one of the most ardent proponents for a 
quick return to gold had by September abandoned any hope of higher rates in the near 
future.  As he observed, the freedom of the Bank was now constrained by the fact  that 
interest  rates  were  ‘now a  political  as  well  as  a  financial  question’,  and  as  such  any 
resolution of ‘the everlasting difficulties about increasing wages’ was now ‘sadly remote’.25 
The recognition that there would be no quick return was formalised in November when the 
prohibition on the export of gold in place since April 1919 was put on a statutory footing in 
the Gold and Silver (Export Control) Act, extending the embargo until the end of 1925.26
Despite this setback, the continuing deterioration of the economy, and the growing 
political pressure, officials remained firmly committed to the policy of deflation and firmly 
opposed to any substantial increase in state intervention to alleviate the difficulties of the 
recession. As Norman put it for example, any relaxation of interest rates would not only 
fail to improve the competitiveness of Britain’s export industries, but in raising the value of  
Britain's  war  debts  to  the  US would  also  be  ‘unwise  if  not  dangerous’.27 Direct  state 
23 PRO:T171/235. ‘General Results of the Financial Policy…’ (Blackett), 2/7/20; PRO:T171/180. ‘Note on 
Present Conditions in Finance and Industry’ (Blackett with comments by Fisher), 28/6/20; PRO:T171/235. 
‘Draft Brief for the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Progress of Trade Since the Armistice’ (unsigned 
Treasury memo), July 1920; BE:G3/176. Norman to G. Pallain 17/5/20; Also see Kynaston (1999), pp.100-3.
24 Various in BE:ADM16/2; On US deflation see Eichengreen (1992).
25 BE:ADM16/2. Norman to P. Jay. 6/9/20; BE:G3/176. Norman to P. Jay 8/9/20, 22/9/20. 
26 PRO:T176/37. Untitled memo (Niemeyer), 22/7/20. 
27 BE:ADM34/9. Norman Diaries 23/12/20; 28/12/20; Also see Sayers (1976), p.124.
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assistance too, remained limited and insubstantial. Though some minor legislative aid for 
exports and the protection of key industries was introduced, larger and more interventionist 
schemes  such  as  public  works  were  rejected  on  the  basis  that  the  present  level  of 
unemployment was inescapable and that any attempts to avoid it would be inflationary and 
damaging to Britain’s long-term economic prospects.28 As one Treasury report for instance 
explained,  while  immediate  action  on  unemployment  was  needed  in  order  to  avert  ‘a 
serious state of unrest and a probable cause of social disaster’, increased state intervention 
would serve only to ‘check the fall in prices….and so delay the recovery of productive 
enterprise.’29
A Strategic Retreat
Despite these measures however, the recession continued to worsen during 1921 
and the government remained under pressure. Although the number of new stoppages now 
fell, the labour situation also continued to deteriorate, with the annual amount of working 
days lost more than tripling to over 85 million, a level greater than the entire years of the 
Great  Unrest  combined,  and  a  scale  only  ever  surpassed  in  the  general  strike  year  of 
1926.30 Moreover,  the labour movement were also continuing to attack the government 
over the state of the economy, especially over high unemployment, and for their foreign 
policy stance, which was seen as helping to sustain the international crisis.31 On the other 
hand however, labour radicalism also continued to decline. This was clearly evidenced by 
28 Various in PRO:CAB27/115 and PRO:T172/1208; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/4. FBI Bulletin 3/1/21. 4(1); 
Also see Pigou (1947), pp.139-42; Hancock (1962); Rose (1995), pp.243-4.
29 PRO:CAB27/115. ‘Draft Interim Report of the Unemployment Committee’, September 1920; Blackett to 
Chamberlain 10/8/20.
30 Calculated from Butler and Butler (1994), pp.373-5; Also see Lovell and Roberts (1968), pp.72-4.
31 Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1921; MRC:MSS.292/135.01/1. ‘Draft Manifesto on 
Unemployment’ (Labour Party), 12/1/21; MRC:MSS.292/135.2/1. Emergency National Joint Council 
conference 8/12/21.
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events  following the  government’s  announcement  in  February  that  control  of  the  coal 
industry would be handed back to private ownership six months ahead of schedule at the 
end of March. This was followed by a declaration from the new owners that wages would 
be severely reduced, provoking the MFGB and its Triple Alliance partners to declare a 
strike, and prompting the government in turn to declare a State of Emergency and dispatch 
troops  to  the  coalfields.  Skilful  negotiations  by the  government  however  succeeded in 
persuading  the  Triple  Alliance  to  temporarily  postpone  their  action  and  to  re-enter 
discussions with the MAGB. Although these proved to be futile, clear divisions between 
the leadership of the Alliance were now starting to emerge, with the MFGB refusing to 
permit  joint  control of the strike and with the leaders of the NUR and the TWU now 
wavering over  their  commitment  to  the  miners.  Subsequently,  the  NUR and the TWU 
withdrew their support for the MFGB, leaving them to struggle alone to their  eventual 
defeat at the end of June. This event, known in labour annals as ‘Black Friday’ marked a 
significant  turning point  in the class struggle.  With the Triple Alliance now effectively 
dead,  and  with  the  prospect  of  concerted  labour  resistance  to  the  ‘capitalist 
counteroffensive’ receding, employers began to press home their advantage. In turn, the 
labour movement began to further turn their attention away from long-term aims such as 
nationalisation, and towards the more immediate goals of defending wages and working 
conditions.32 With labour now weakened and fragmented however,  this rearguard action 
was also largely unsuccessful, and though the cost of living fell by 20% from 1921-22, real 
wages, trade union membership, and the scale of labour unrest all began to decline.33
The  government  also  remained  under  pressure  from  capital,  with  increasing 
32 Snowden (1934), pp.559-63; Cole (1948), pp.386ff; Branson (1977), pp.50ff; Middlemas (1979), pp.152-
60; Tomlinson (1990), pp.58-65; Wrigley (1990), pp.211ff.
33 MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C531 Pt.1. Calculated from Labour Bulletin June 1929, Tables I-II; Pigou (1947), 
p.207.
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demands  from  business  for  cuts  in  tax,  public  spending,  and  wages,  and  for  further 
reductions in the level of state economic intervention.34 The government were now also 
under  fire  over  the  subject  of  monetary  policy,  with even the  habitually  cautious  FBI 
becoming increasingly critical. Recent developments such as international exchange rate 
instability  and continued  political-economic  turmoil  in  Europe  could  not,  they  argued, 
possibly have been foreseen by the Cunliffe committee, and with these circumstances now 
making the  recommendations  of  the  committee  much more  difficult  to  implement,  the 
Federation began calling for an official enquiry to review the situation. The government’s 
policy of deflation was, as they put it, now a ‘principal obstacle’ to any economic recovery, 
and ‘a change in that policy might prove of some advantage in the present crisis.’35
In spite of this however, the views of capital were not critical of the policy aim of 
returning to the gold standard as-such. The City for example were largely in favour of the 
policy (and of using deflation to do so), though there were strong dissenting voices from 
Reginald McKenna (the Chairman of the Midland bank), and to a lesser degree from other 
bankers such F. C. Goodenough (the Chairman of Barclays),36 while the criticism of the 
FBI was not primarily directed at the return to gold itself. Indeed, as they maintained, it 
was still
“highly desirable that an arbitrary control of the currency in all European 
countries  should,  if  possible,  be  replaced  by  some  automatic  means  of 
regulation.”37 
34 BE:G30/6. ‘An Appeal by Bankers of the UK’, 12/5/21; ‘An Appeal by Merchants, Manufacturers, and 
Shipowners of the UK’, 20/6/21; Cronin (1991), pp.89-90.
35 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/4. FBI Bulletins (1921 issues); MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C204 Pt.1. ‘The Trade 
Depression’ (FBI), 7/10/21; ‘Memo. of Points Raised at a Special General Meeting…’ (NCEO), 20/1/21; 
Various in MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C531 Pt.1.
36 BE:ADM34/9-10. Norman Diaries 23/12/20; 28/12/20; 16/2/21; Catterall (1976), p.44; Kynaston (1999), 
passim.
37 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/4. FBI Bulletins 12/7/21. 4(27); 19/7/21. 4(28).
111
The concerns of the Federation lay instead with the use of deflation in order to 
return  to  gold at  the prewar  par,  a  policy  which they claimed would be economically 
damaging and would ‘perpetuate instability for an indefinite period’. With economic and 
monetary  stability  now  being  regarded  as  ‘of  far  greater  importance  than  the  re-
establishment  of  any pre-war  ratio with gold or  any other standard of  value’,  the FBI 
argued that the par value of any return to gold should be set  at  a level appropriate  to 
providing stability at the prevailing level of costs and prices. While no particular rate of 
return was proposed, as Sir Peter Rylands (the FBI’s President) put it with no apparent 
dissent, a parity of around $4 ‘would meet all the necessities of trade’.38
Despite the growing dissatisfaction with deflation however, Norman continued to 
resist pressure for lower interest rates. Any reduction,  he claimed, would be premature 
given the uneven effect of the deflation so far, as whilst the fall in wholesale prices was 
thought to have ‘proceeded well and without serious troubles’, retail prices were proving to 
be more stubborn. As retail prices formed the basis for the cost of living and hence for 
wage negotiations, and since the high level of the cost of living was believed to be a key 
factor  in  the  coal  strike  and  in  the  poor  industrial  situation  generally,  the  continued 
pressure of high rates was believed to be essential in order to force a reduction in retail 
prices  and to bring about  ‘a general reconsideration of wages in a downward direction’. 
Nevertheless, with criticism of high interest rates continuing to grow the Governor was 
now increasingly pessimistic about avoiding a cut. As he put it:
“high rates have done a good deal, but are now being so bitterly attacked – 
in the Press, at Westminster and by intrigue – that I am fearful if they can 
38 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/4. FBI Bulletins. 18/10/21. 4(41); 29/11/21. 4(47); MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/2/1. 
‘AGM of the F.B.I’, 23/11/21, pp.28ff; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/2. The Trade Depression’ (FBI), 7/10/21. 
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last.”39
Such fears indeed proved to be well-founded. With Cabinet  officials  anxious to 
ease the political pressure over the economy, in March Treasury bill rates were reduced to 
6% followed by a cut in Bank Rate (now the dominant short term rate with the diminishing 
importance of Treasury bills) to 6.5% in April. This was also followed by further cuts to 
6% in June, 5.5% in July, and 5% in November.40
Having failed to maintain the pressure of high rates, Norman, in conjunction with 
Benjamin  Strong,  the  Governor  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York 
(FRBNY),  began to  devote his  efforts  towards  facilitating the  revival  of  the 
international  economy  and  to  the  construction  of  a  new  regime  for  its 
management.  With many of the world’s  economic  difficulties simultaneously 
now also political ones however (such as reparations, war debts, and tariffs), 
Norman was convinced that the restoration of a sound global economy could 
only be achieved by the removal of ‘economic’ issues from the ‘political’ sphere,  
and by treating them as purely technocratic questions to be resolved by experts 
in such matters. As such, the two Governors were keen to base the core of the 
new  system  around  a  reconstituted  international  gold  standard,  operating 
through a network of politically independent central banks, each of which would 
in turn act according to a specified set of technical criteria.41 Speaking of these 
plans  to  a  central  banking  colleague  in  October  1921 for  example,  Norman 
wrote:
39 BE:G3/177. Norman to Strong 17/2/21 – 23/5/21; BE:OV37/20. Norman to W. H. Clegg 28/2/21.
40 Treasury bills were gradually withdrawn from circulation. See Morgan (1952); Sayers (1976), pp.124-5.
41 BE:G3/177. Norman to Strong 23/7/21; 13/10/21; BE:G3/179. Norman to A. R. Wagg 5/7/23; 
BE:ADM16/2. ‘Central Banks’, 15/2/21; Clay (1957), Ch.5; Boyle (1967), pp.202-6; Sayers (1976), pp.121-
23; Cottrell (1995), pp.88-9, (1997), passim.
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“finance and economies are at the present moment too much in the hands of 
politicians for us Central Bankers to take any overt action, but I think the 
time may come when the boot will be on the other leg.”42
The cuts in interest rates also sparked further debate within the Treasury over the 
immediate future of monetary policy. Some such as Robert Horne (the Chancellor from 
April)  and Hawtrey  for  example  were  now opposed to  continuing  with  deflation.  The 
Chancellor doubted whether Britain’s economic competitiveness could in fact be improved 
by lower prices given that sterling was now free to float, arguing that this might simply be 
offset by a rise in the pound, and instead favoured a policy of maintaining price stability. 
With the recent turmoil of sharp inflation and deflation having left Britain’s trade in ‘a 
thoroughly jangled state of nerves’, the time was not he claimed, right for deflationary 
experiments,  but  for  ‘old-fashioned  soundness’.43 For  Hawtrey,  Britain’s  economic  and 
social difficulties were also directly attributable to currency instability and to the high level 
of interest rates which, he claimed, had now forced British prices below a level at which 
they could safely be stabilised. Continuing with deflation he warned, thus not only risked 
inflicting  ‘permanent  injury’  upon  the  economy,  but  could  also  lead  to  ‘disastrous 
consequences’ of  a  wider  financial,  social,  and  political  nature,  as  well  as  a  future 
resurgence of inflation as workers and employers sought to recoup their losses. As such, 
Hawtrey also argued in favour of a policy of price stability. Indeed, with deflation in the 
United  States  having now led to  the  absorption by  America  of  a  huge  amount  of  the 
world’s gold,  and with an outbreak of US inflation thus now thought to be inevitable, 
Hawtrey claimed that a policy of holding British prices steady would not only ameliorate 
42 BE:G3/177. Norman to Strong 13/10/21: Also see BE:G3/178. Norman to Moll 22/2/22; Norman to the 
Governor of the National Bank of Roumania 22/2/22.
43 PRO:T176/5. Pt.1. Horne to Niemeyer, July 1921. 
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domestic problems, but would also help sterling to return to par with minimal disruption as 
American inflation led to a depreciation in the dollar.44
The majority of official opinion however did not regard the lowering of interest 
rates as signalling a wholesale relaxation of the deflationary stance or any long-term shift 
in policy outlook away from improving Britain’s economic competitiveness by forcing 
down prices  and of minimising the  directly  visible  economic  intervention of  the state. 
Rather, the cuts were seen as a strategic and temporary retreat in response to political and 
economic pressure. Niemeyer for example continued to argue that deflation was essential if 
there was to be any return to gold, and was especially keen to maintain the pressure on 
retail prices and wages. Retailers he argued, had become used to ‘easy returns with very 
little risk’ and were now ‘extremely unwilling’ to face up to genuine competition, while 
labour for their part had to accept lower wages. As he put it:
“It is generally admitted that if Britain’s trade is to compete in the markets 
of the world the prices of British goods must come down. This in effect 
means that the wages of British labour must come down.”45
On this Blackett also concurred. As he argued, the ‘vital matter’ was to increase 
Britain’s export competitiveness by continuing to force down production costs, and as such 
an inflationary stimulus would thus hinder Britain’s economic recovery by encouraging 
imports, restricting exports, and by creating renewed pressures for higher wages. A policy 
of lower interest rates was thus opposed on the basis that it would initiate:
44 PRO:T176/5. Pt.1. ‘The Credit Situation’ (Hawtrey),19/4/21; ‘Bank Rate’ (Hawtrey), 5/7/21; ‘The Genoa 
Currency Resolutions’ (Hawtrey), 4/2/22.
45 PRO:T172/1208. Niemeyer to Horne 3/10/21, 7/10/21; PRO:T176/5 Pt.2. Unsigned and untitled Treasury 
document. September 1921; untitled document (Niemeyer), 5/10/21. 
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“a new cycle of rising prices and rising wages and an increasing Budget 
deficit….just at the moment when with a little patience the most difficult 
period of the painful process of a return to sound conditions will begin to be 
succeeded by a revival of industry on a new basis of reduced wages and 
reduced prices.”46
Indeed, as Norman pointed out, Hawtrey’s views on price stability did not represent 
the majority of Bank and Treasury opinion, and moreover the Treasury’s general economic 
policy stance remained stringent  despite the cuts  in  interest  rates,  with high taxes  and 
public spending reductions still in force.47 Deflationary pressure was also sustained and 
augmented by the Treasury’s withdrawal of its wartime Currency Notes from circulation, 
reducing the money supply as part  of the effort  to  restore the Bank’s  control over the 
money market.48
Continued criticism of economic policy was also leading to significant discomfiture 
in official circles over the issue of state-economy relations, a subject which was considered 
extremely desirable to keep out of public discussion as much as possible, and on which the 
authorities were keen to maintain a hard line. The FBI’s calls for an enquiry into monetary 
policy  for  instance  were rejected  by Lloyd George  on the  basis  that  this  would foster 
economic uncertainty, while more detailed consideration of the means of continuing with 
retrenchment was hived off from the core executive, with the task of recommending means 
of  effecting  large  cuts  in  public  spending  being  given  to  a  committee  of  independent 
businessmen under  the  Chairmanship  of  Sir  Eric  Geddes.49 Chamberlain  too sought  to 
displace political responsibility for the economic situation, telling the FBI during his final 
46 PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. Untitled memo (Niemeyer), July 1921; Blackett to Chamberlain 8/6/21. 
47 BE:G3/178. Norman to Strong 24/2/22; Morgan (1952), ps.91-119; Johnson (1968), p.491.
48 Morgan (1952), ps.207-13, 376-7; Moggridge (1969), pp.15-16; Wrigley (1990), pp.240-1.
49 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/4. FBI Bulletins (1921 issues); Cronin (1991), pp.89-90.
116
days as Chancellor that the government had at best very little influence over the various 
economic factors with which they were aggrieved,  and telling the House of Commons 
under pressure over interest  rates on several  occasions that (despite their continued  de 
facto political control) such matters were now the sole responsibility of the Bank.50 At the 
Bank of England, Norman also remained anxious to ensure that the government did not 
jeopardise  their  recent  advances  by  extending  state  assistance  to  ameliorate  the  social 
effects  of  the  recession.  State  schemes  he  claimed,  were  ‘impossible  remedies  for 
unavoidable unemployment’, and with the primary need still to improve competitiveness 
the Governor argued that it would therefore be wrong to ‘diminish the economic efficiency 
and well being of a whole people, in order to benefit a small unemployed proportion’.51 
These views were also expressed by a Treasury-led conference of industrialists and 
financiers  convened  to  discuss  the  unemployment  crisis;  by  the  Board  of  Trade,  who 
warned that state assistance would remove the incentive for producers to reduce costs; and 
by the Treasury, which argued that state aid to the unemployed needed to be restricted to 
‘the  barest  minimum  needed  to  prevent  starvation’ in  order  to  avoid  diminishing  the 
incentive to work.52 Moreover, as Niemeyer pointed out, state intervention would not only 
be detrimental  to  economic competitiveness but  also contained political  risks in  that  it 
would  lead  people  to  believe  that  the  solution  to  Britain’s  difficulties  lay  with  state 
intervention, and would thus create ‘great exasperation’ when this inevitably failed.53
50 PRO:T176/13 Pt.1. ‘Relations Between the Treasury and the Bank of England’; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/4. 
FBI Bulletins. 22/2/21. 4(8); 8/3/21. 4(10). 
51 PRO:T172/1208. Notes of interview with Norman (H. Young), 27/9/21; BE:G3/177. Norman to Strong 
13/10/21. 
52 PRO:T172/1208. Unsigned and untitled Treasury document. September 1921; ‘Draft Proposals of 
Commander Hilton Young’s Committee’ 2/10/21; PRO:CAB27/119. ‘Trade in Relation to Unemployment’, 
26/9/21. 
53 PRO:T172/1208. Niemeyer to Horne 3/10/21, 7/10/21; PRO:T176/5 Pt.2. Unsigned and untitled Treasury 
document. September 1921; Untitled document (Niemeyer), 5/10/21.
117
The Waiting Game
For Britain’s state managers, the situation began to improve during 1922. Industrial 
production began to recover, wholesale and retail prices continued to fall, and sterling rose 
to $4.63 by December. The balance of trade also improved, the current account showed a 
third consecutive surplus, and with unemployment remaining high at around 1.9 million, 
the labour movement  became increasingly fragmented and demoralised,  falling to their 
weakest and least radical ebb for over a decade. Trade union membership also continued to 
fall,  the  number  of  new stoppages  declined  to  their  lowest  levels  since  1916 and the 
amount of working days lost (though still historically high) fell to their lowest levels since 
1918. The last  of the state’s wartime controls of the economy were also removed, and 
though certain aspects of state intervention (such as levels of public spending) remained 
larger than in 1914, control and responsibility for economic conditions had essentially now 
been restored to the market.54
Despite such advantages however, the extent of the actual deflation that had been 
achieved since 1920 had proved insufficient to raise sterling back to par. US deflation had 
helped to sustain the strength of the dollar, while the unwillingness of business to reduce 
its  prices,  and the success  of  labour’s  resistance  to large  wage cuts  had precluded the 
necessary domestic adjustment needed to force up the exchange rate. These factors also 
continued into 1922. Though employers continued to press home their advantage, securing 
victory in  the only major dispute  of  the year (in  the  engineering industry),  simmering 
tensions in the coal industry served as a warning against pressing too hard. As such, the 
54 Cole (1948), pp.386ff; Morgan (1952), Ch.2; Feinstein (1972), Tables 37, 57, 64; Cronin (1991), pp.87-92; 
Butler and Butler (1994), ps.373, 383-5.
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shorter working hours secured by labour in 1919 survived the slump virtually unscathed, 
and though money wages fell, real wages as a whole remained only slightly lower than in 
1920. State officials also continued to worry about the slow pace of the fall in retail prices 
which was still thought to be a key factor in holding up production costs and preventing 
any substantial improvement in Britain’s competitiveness.55
A further difficulty for the authorities was that despite the dissolution of the state’s 
wartime economic controls, economic conditions and policy-making nonetheless remained 
key  political  issues,  and  capital  and  labour  continued  to  hold  state  officials  largely 
responsible. For labour, Britain’s problems were still  considered to be the result  of the 
international situation and the government’s foreign policy stance, though monetary policy 
was now also of increasing concern. The Labour Party were now adding their voice to the 
FBI’s calls for an enquiry into its economic effects, and were critical of the high level of 
interest  rates,  while  the  TUC’s  newly  constituted  executive  body,  the  Grand  Council 
(TUCGC), was of the view that the recent experiences of inflation and deflation had both 
been detrimental to working class interests, and was now calling for a policy of domestic 
price stability. Both the Labour Party and the TUCGC were also increasingly concerned 
about  exchange  rate  instability  which  was  seen  to  be  ‘hampering  trade  and  retarding 
construction’, and for this the only remedy was considered to be a general return to a gold 
standard by the world’s main trading nations. As such, every country was implored to ‘take 
all possible steps to rehabilitate its currency’, while countries for whom a return to gold at 
their prewar parity was too impractical were urged to stabilise at more appropriate rates. 
Although no ‘appropriate’ rate was specified for Britain, there was also no dissent on the 
55 Snowden (1934), pp.559-63; Pigou (1947), p.207; Cole (1948), pp.376ff; Moggridge (1969), p.15; Fulcher 
(1991), p.115; Butler and Butler (1994), pp.383-5.
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notion of a return at $4.86.56
For representatives of  capital  on the  other hand the general  view was still  that 
reductions in wages, tax, and public spending were necessary to raise competitiveness, and 
that a policy of economic and monetary stability was required for a revival of trade and 
prosperity. While the FBI continued to call for an enquiry into monetary policy and to 
express concerns over the use of deflation to return to gold at the prewar par, a return to the 
gold standard itself was therefore still considered to be essential, while in the City the vast 
majority of opinion also remained supportive of both deflation and a return to gold.57 
More general support for a return was also bolstered by the conclusions of another 
international  conference  on  the  economic  crisis  (held  in  Genoa),  with  official  state 
representatives reiterating the conclusions of the 1920 Brussels conference in declaring 
support  for  a  general  return to  gold  at  parities  appropriate  to  postwar  conditions.  The 
conference also addressed growing concerns of an international gold scarcity by calling for 
greater central bank co-operation and for the adoption of a gold ‘exchange’ standard rather 
than a ‘full’ gold standard to economise on the use of gold. In contrast to the classical gold 
standard system in which central bank reserves consisted primarily of gold, it  was now 
determined that only ‘primary’ countries such as Britain and the US should hold reserves 
primarily of gold, and that the reserves of ‘secondary’ gold centres should be comprised of 
both gold and primary gold standard currencies, thus cutting down on the international 
56 MRC:MSS.292/110.1/1. ‘The Attack on Wages and Hours Standards’ (TUC/Labour Party), 1922; 
MRC:MSS.292/452/3. ‘On the Evils of Industrial Interruption and Trade Dislocation Caused by the 
Fluctuations of the Exchanges and Other Problems Arising out of the Banking System’ (TUCGC), 1922; 
Labour Party Annual Report 1922, pp.247-8; 1922 Labour Party General Election Manifesto in Dale (2000).
57 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/7 & 5; FBI Bulletins 31/1/22. 5(5); 21/2/23. 6(5); MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/2-3; 
‘Statement by the FBI’, 6/12/22; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/8/13. ‘Lower Production Costs and Trade Revival’, 
14/2/22; Catterall (1976), p.44; Kynaston (1999).
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demand for the precious metal.58
Despite such support for a return to the gold standard however, the persistence of 
political and economic difficulties during 1922 now led Britain’s state authorities to relax 
their  deflationary  stance  still  further.  Interest  rates  were  cut  to  3% by  July,  the  tight 
budgetary position was eased by cuts in taxation, and though large reductions in public 
spending continued,  these  too were relaxed due  to  political  pressures.  The severe  cuts 
recommended by the Geddes committee of £87 million were eventually scaled down to a 
slightly less extreme £52 million, and even the collapse of the coalition government in 
October (following a military debacle with Turkey), and the election of an apparently more 
orthodox Conservative government led by Bonar Law produced no substantial change in 
economic policy.59 International factors, especially the continuing uncertainty in Europe 
and tensions over reparations and war debts also remained problematic, and as Norman 
bemoaned, were now making it ‘well nigh impossible’ to attempt any return to gold at the 
present time.60
By the end of 1922, despite the attempt to impose deflation in order to prepare the 
way for a return to gold, Britain’s state officials nonetheless still found their freedom of 
high  political  manoeuvre  constrained.  Though  sterling  remained  close  to  par,  though 
industrial  production  was  recovering,  and  though  retail  prices  were  slowly  falling, 
economic conditions  in  general  remained poor,  unemployment remained high,  and real 
wages remained stubborn. Moreover, the continued politicisation of economic policy had 
forced a suspension of the deflationary strategy and a reduction in interest  rates, whilst 
58 Various in MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/16/8-9 and BE:ADM16/2; Hawtrey (1933), pp.93-101; Brown Jr (1970), 
pp.342ff.
59 Morgan (1952), pp.96-7; Boyle (1967), pp.152-62; Branson (1977), ps.69-70, 139; Middleton (1985), 
pp.43-4; Cronin (1991), pp.89-91.
60 BE:G3/178. Norman to Blackett 31/1/22; to Vissering 4/2/22; to V. Moll 6/2/22; and to Strong 21/3/22; 
BE:G30/8. Norman and H. Trotter (Deputy Governor) to the Chancellor, 22/6/22. 
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international conditions were also proving to be a fundamental bar to any return. With the 
immediate  strategy of  imposing deflation  to  enable  a  return to  gold at  the  prewar  par 
having now failed, and with deflation remaining politically and economically dangerous, 
official hopes increasingly turned instead to the possibility that sterling might be carried to 
par by eventual US inflation. As Norman put it, while a return to gold at the old par would 
‘certainly create difficulties’, these might be reduced should prices rise in America.61
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has examined the initial attempt by the core executive to address the 
economic and political crisis of the British state by imposing deflation and retrenchment in 
order to clear the way for a return to the gold standard at the prewar par. It has shown that 
by 1920 state officials were increasingly keen to address Britain’s economic difficulties 
and to deal with the threat posed by labour unrest and militancy, and that they sought to do 
so through a governing strategy based upon a return to gold. The gold standard was seen to 
offer  an  automatic  mechanism  for  ensuring  that  Britain  remained  internationally 
competitive, as providing a means of disciplining the expectations and behaviour of capital 
and labour, and as offering a shield from political pressure over economic conditions by 
depoliticising monetary and economic policy-making.
This chapter has also shown however that despite returning control over economic 
conditions to the market, and despite widespread support for a return to gold, economic 
conditions and policy-making in Britain remained politicised. As such, while deflationary 
measures were initially successful in reducing inflation and in undermining the strength of 
61 BE:G3/178. Norman to Strong 21/3/22; MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C531 Pt.1. Labour Bulletin June 1929, 
Tables I-IV; Pigou (1947), ps.150, 207; Feinstein (1972), Tables 51, 52, 66. 
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labour through the disciplining effects of unemployment, continued political pressure over 
economic  conditions  meant  that  Britain’s  authorities  were  unable  to  carry  through  a 
sufficient degree of deflation in order to raise the pound back to $4.86. By the end of 1922, 
the inability to force through deflation without provoking unrest had forced the authorities 
to ease their tight economic policy stance and to turn instead to a policy of waiting for US 
inflation to carry sterling back to par. This, it was now thought, would enable Britain to 
return  to  gold and avoid the  political  dangers  of  forcing  down prices  and wages.  The 
success or otherwise of this waiting policy is the subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 : The Return to Gold, 1923-1925
This chapter examines the final phase of Britain’s return to the gold standard. It 
shows  that  state  officials  were  becoming  increasingly  anxious  as  economic  conditions 
failed to significantly improve, as labour unrest remained an active issue, and as US prices 
failed to rise. As such, by 1924 the authorities now moved away from their waiting policy 
and sought more positive measures in order to address Britain’s continuing economic and 
political difficulties. While a return to gold at the prewar par was still considered to be a 
key means of preventing inflation and of depoliticising economic conditions and policy-
making, Britain’s authorities were now also of the view that this itself could be used as a 
means of forcing an adjustment in Britain’s economy through the deliberate imposition of a  
relatively high exchange rate. On this basis, a return to gold at $4.86 would help to impose 
financial discipline upon capital and labour in order to condition expectations and force an 
adjustment in Britain’s pattern of economic activity, while the depoliticising effects of the 
regime would provide officials with an effective shield from the unpalatable social and 
political effects of this process.
Hopes Abandoned
For  Britain’s  state  authorities  1923  began  with  much  promise  but  ended  in 
despondency as hopes of a return to gold were once again raised only to be disappointed. 
During the early part of the year things appeared to be progressing well. The hoped-for 
inflation  in  America  had  lifted  sterling  to  $4.76  by  February,  an  agreement  had  been 
reached with the US over Britain’s war debts, and the economy was continuing to recover 
from the slump. Unemployment maintained its decline, industrial production continued to 
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expand, and there were increasing signs that Britain was finally starting to adapt to the 
changing demands of the global economy as prices continued to fall, and as newer and 
more advanced branches of production began to grow more forcefully.1 Furthermore, the 
position of the labour movement also continued to weaken, and employers continued to 
press home their advantage. Money wages fell by 15%, real wages now dropped below 
their  prewar  levels,  and  although  the  prevalence  of  industrial  disputes  induced  the 
government to resurrect  the Supply and Transport Committee (re-named the Strike and 
Transport Organisation) as a precaution, the number of working days lost  in stoppages 
nonetheless fell to its lowest level since the end of the war.2
Increasingly optimistic, Treasury and Bank officials were now convinced that their 
difficulties were starting to recede and that a return to the gold standard was on the agenda. 
There was,  as Norman declared,  finally ‘a light at  the end of the tunnel!’3 Though the 
Deputy Governor of the Bank, H. A. Trotter, was keen to point out that there could be no 
return until the issues of war debts and reparations had been fully settled, officials were 
certain that US inflation would shortly take sterling back to par, and that plans for the final 
move would soon need to be devised. An informal committee was set up at the Bank to 
examine the matter.4
This optimism however proved to be misplaced, and despite the recovery Britain’s 
general  economic performance remained sluggish.  Unemployment  remained chronically 
high at around 1.6 million, the traditional export industries continued to struggle, and the 
1 Grigg (1948), pp.98-105; Middlemas (1969), pp.225-7; Alford (1986), p.45.
2 Figures from Feinstein (1972), Tables 51-2; Butler and Butler (1994), p.373; MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C531 
Pt.1. Labour Bulletin, June 1929, Table IV.
3 Norman to Blackett 26/2/23, in Clay (1957), pp.178-9; Brown Jr (1970), p.307.
4 BE:OV37/20. H. A. Trotter to W. H. Clegg 11/1/23; PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. Treasury Bonds’ (Niemeyer), 
24/1/23; ‘Notes on McKenna’s Speech’ (Fisher), 29/1/23; ‘Export of Gold to America’ (Hawtrey), 5/3/23; 
BE:C40/737. The Return to Gold’ (Hawtrey), 19/1/23; Niemeyer to Trotter 23/1/23; Notes by Niemeyer 
January 1923; Untitled Bank of England document, 16/5/23.
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growth  of  more  advanced  industries  remained  insufficient  to  offset  Britain’s  overall 
relative economic decline. Moreover, although the Cabinet remained anxious to encourage 
‘the development of trade and industry in all their branches’, the necessity for economic 
adaptation was still not yet being sufficiently realised by either capital or labour, both of 
whom remained strongly resistant to change.5 Trade unions for example were concerned 
that modernisation would lead to even higher unemployment, industrialists were still  in 
many  instances  able  to  make  a  satisfactory  profit  from  old  production  methods  and 
practices,  and were still  able to take  advantage of Empire markets,  while  the invisible 
earnings of the City too remained relatively weak due to its failure to adjust to changing 
global conditions. These impediments were also compounded by the structural remnants of 
the postwar boom, with many industries now burdened with excess capacity  and large 
debts, reducing the amount of capital available for new investment and restructuring. With 
a substantial portion of the financial sector having large investments in such industries, 
Britain’s banks were also unwilling either to make the new advances necessary for a shift 
in production, or to put financial pressure on firms to modernise lest this increase the risk 
of default.6
Furthermore, despite the fact that the state had now formally relinquished its direct 
wartime  control  over  economic  conditions  Britain’s  authorities  also  remained  under 
pressure over the economy. For the overwhelming majority of the labour movement the 
government’s  foreign  policy  was  still  regarded  as  a  key  factor  in  Britain’s  economic 
difficulties,  and  any  solution  was  still  believed  to  require  the  restoration  of  foreign 
purchasing power and economic stability through reconstruction loans, a revision of the 
5 PRO:CAB23/45. Cabinet Meeting 14/2/23; Various in PRO:CAB23/46.
6 Cole (1948), pp.376ff; Morgan (1952), pp.298-9; Feinstein (1972), Tables 1, 2, 17, 37, 57; Branson (1977), 
passim; Allen (1979), pp.74-6; Dintenfass (1992), p.30; Alford (1996), pp.119-21.
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peace treaties, and a settlement of war debts and reparations. Labour also maintained its 
attack on the government for its lack of action over unemployment and continued to call 
for policies such as ‘work or maintenance’ to ameliorate its effects, and for a capital levy to 
reduce  the  burden  of  the  national  debt  and  to  enable  increased  public  spending.  The 
question of monetary policy was also now a subject of growing debate within the labour 
movement. In January for example the Joint Research and Information Department of the 
TUC and the Labour Party added to calls for an enquiry into the issue, condemning the 
government  for  its  indifference  to  the  effects  of  deflation  and  for  the  continuing 
uncertainty. As they complained, “at present we have no definite currency policy, and it is 
high  time  that  the  subject  received  full  examination  in  the  light  of  its  effect  on 
unemployment.”7
Moreover,  the notion of deliberately managing monetary policy with the aim of 
maintaining  domestic  price  stability  (now being publicly  advanced  by  Keynes  and his 
associates such as Hugh Henderson) was also continuing to grow in popularity within the 
movement. As such, many including the National Joint Council of the TUC and the Labour 
Party, as well as the more left-wing Independent Labour Party (ILP), were now pressing 
for state control of the banking system in order to regulate credit for this end.8 There was 
however, no consensus on such matters within the labour movement and others were in 
favour of a return to the gold standard. The Joint Research and Information Department for 
instance claimed that international economic stability could only be achieved by a general 
7 MRC:MSS.292/135.01/1. ‘Proposals for Unemployment Policy’ (TUC-Labour Party Joint Research and 
Information Dept.), January 1923; Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1923.
8 Various in MRC:MSS.292/135.01/1; Keynes (1923); ‘Monetary Policy’ (H. D. Henderson), 14/7/23, in Clay 
(1955); Monthly Circular of the Labour Research Department, November 1923. No.8; December 1923. No. 
9; ‘Unemployment and Currency’ (A. Greenwood), Foreign Affairs. October 1923; ‘Unemployment 
Situation’, October 1923; Labour Party Annual Report 1923. Appendix III; Wootton (1925); Tomlinson 
(1990), p.66-7.
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return to gold by the world’s major trading nations at par values appropriate to existing 
exchange rates. As they explained:
 
“No  single  step  would  do  so  much  as  the  adoption  of  a  satisfactory 
international  monetary  policy  to  solve  the  problem of  unemployment  at 
home and abroad.”9
Economic conditions also remained a political  issue for capital,  though disquiet 
over  the  government’s  monetary  policy  stance  came  almost  wholly  from  industrial 
manufacturing. The ABCC for instance were of the view that the time was now ripe for 
taking steps to return to gold, whilst the only real opposition from within the City came 
from  McKenna,  who  was  now  also  calling  for  a  managed  money  policy.10 The  FBI 
however continued to argue that the remedy for Britain’s economic difficulties lay with 
improving  the  competitiveness  of  industry  by  reducing  production  costs,  and  as  such 
continued to press for lower levels of wages, taxation, and public spending. In addition, 
despite their internal tensions the Federation also continued to call for a re-examination of 
monetary policy, and though conceding that wider considerations could render ‘a further 
period  of  deflation  necessary  in  the  broader  interests  of  the  national  welfare’, were 
nonetheless still opposed to any return at the prewar par.11
With the government still  refusing to instigate an inquiry however, the FBI now 
established their  own committee of investigation which heavily criticised the notion of 
returning to gold at $4.86. Such a move, it warned, would not only dislocate trade and hit 
9 MRC:MSS.292/135.01/1. ‘Proposals for Unemployment Policy’ (TUC-Labour Party Joint Research and 
Information Dept.), January 1923.
10 PRO:T172/1499B. ‘Post-War Reports and Conferences’ (undated); MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/7. FBI Bulletins 
30/1/23. 6(5); 6/2/23. 6(6); Various in PRO:T176/5 Pt.1.
11 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/7-8. FBI Bulletins (1923 issues); MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/5. FBI Grand Council 
(FBIGC) Meeting 17/10/23; Boyce (1988), pp.178-9.
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Britain’s  exporters,  but would also increase the burden of the national debt, leading to 
higher taxes and unemployment. Moreover, the resulting deflation would put downward 
pressure on prices and wages, risking ‘the most serious social and political consequences’, 
and would lead the government  to ‘incur a heavy responsibility.’ Instead,  the FBI now 
added to calls for a policy of price stability, albeit with the qualification that this should be 
preceded by a mild dose of inflation in order to raise prices to a level sufficient to increase 
profitability and stimulate private enterprise.12
‘Nothing But Troubles…’
To state officials these domestic concerns were also accompanied by difficulties of 
an international nature. In January the crisis over reparations had reached a new low when 
France and Belgium re-occupied the Ruhr (a key industrial area of Germany) in a bid to 
secure payment, further disrupting global economic confidence and damaging hopes for a 
recovery,13 while in addition to this the gap between US and British prices which had been 
recently narrowing, was now starting to widen. In February the FRBNY raised interest 
rates to 4.5% in a bid to arrest inflationary pressures resulting from the continued flow of 
capital to America, though the Bank of England were forced by political pressures to hold 
their rates at 3%. This widening of the interest rate differential now led to a fall in US 
prices, a renewed rise in British prices, and a slow but sustained depreciation of sterling 
throughout the rest of the year.14
12 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/5. ‘Trade Depression and Unemployment’ (FBI), 12/10/23. 
13 Grigg (1948), pp.153-72; Eichengreen (1992), pp.147-50.
14 BE:OV4/30. ‘Capital Movements to and From London Pt.II’ (R. E. H. Allport), March 1934., p.17; Brown 
Jr (1940), p.713; Dimsdale (1981), p.317.
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By May the informal Bank of England committee established to examine the return 
to  gold  had  reached  some  provisional  conclusions.  Among  these  were  the 
recommendations  that  the  Treasury  and  Bank  note  issues  be  amalgamated  as  soon as 
possible  in order  to place control of the money supply solely with the Bank;  and that 
Britain should return to the gold standard once it was clear that this could be maintained 
without any great difficulty, namely when the Bank had held a gold reserve of £150 million 
under favourable conditions for two consecutive years, or by 1930 at the latest.15 Official 
opinion on monetary policy however was now divided. Though key members of the core 
executive  were  agreed  that  higher  interest  rates  could  still  not  be  actively  pursued, 
differences arose over whether or not to engage in some measure of inflation in order to 
ease the political and economic pressure. Hawtrey and Addis for example both advocated a 
period of low interest rates in order to raise British prices before then pursuing a policy of 
price stability, and a similar view was also held by Stanley Baldwin, the latest Chancellor 
of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister from May. Though insistent that the responsibility 
for  interest  rates  lay  with  the  Bank  of  England,  there  was,  as  he  told  the  House  of 
Commons ‘no greater necessity for this country….than cheap money’, and for keeping 
prices ‘steady and on a level’. Crucially, as he also pointed out, this now meant that the 
question of a return to gold could not now be ‘properly discussed’ within ‘a measurable 
distance of time’.16
Others however took a different view. Niemeyer for example remained implacably 
opposed  to  the  idea  of  inflation  and  regarded  any  reconsideration  of  the  long  term 
15 BE:C40/737. Untitled Bank of England document, 16/5/23. 
16 PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. ‘Export of Gold to America’ 5/3/23, (Hawtrey); BE:ADM16/3. Untitled Memo, (Addis) 
4/7/23; BE:C40/737. Untitled Memo (Addis), 1923; PRO:T176/13 Pt.1. ‘Relations Between the Treasury and 
the Bank of England…’ (undated); MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/8. FBI Bulletin. 31/7/23. 6(30); Parliamentary 
Debates. 13/6/23. Vol.165. Cls.607-8.
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deflationary  policy  as  ‘premature’,  whilst  for  Norman,  despite  the  fact  that  the  gold 
standard was not now ‘a question of practical politics’, a key benefit of a return was that it 
would  put  an  end  to  such  calls  for  higher  prices  by  definitely  fixing  Britain’s  future 
monetary policy.17 Antipathy to inflation was also shared by Bradbury. As he explained to 
Norman, although an amalgamation of the note issues was essential to provide ‘a strong 
bulwark’  against  political  interference  with  the  money  supply,  implementing  such 
measures  before political  pressures  had  diminished would be  a  ‘risky experiment’ and 
would merely incorporate undesirable ‘vices’ into the currency system ‘which both you 
and I wish to extirpate’. In addition, Bradbury was also concerned that the Bank should not 
allow themselves to be manoeuvred into bearing the responsibility  for any inflationary 
policy that the government might foist upon it. As he put it:
“if the Chancellor of the Exchequer designate continues to develop on the 
lines of his  recent speeches,  I should, if  I  had any responsibility  for the 
Bank, much prefer to leave him with the entire responsibility for his own 
experiments.”18
With the prospect of bridging the gap with US prices through deflation now bleak, 
official hopes were also gravitating once more towards the idea that US inflation could 
provide a solution. The difficulty now though was that the Federal Reserve were making it 
abundantly  clear  that  they  were  aiming  to  hold  US  prices  steady.  As  such,  Britain’s 
authorities turned their attention towards the possibility of forcing US prices to rise, and in 
May another Bank of England committee was established to examine whether or not this 
could be achieved by a strategic export of gold. Though Addis warned that the Americans 
17 PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. ‘Treasury Bonds’ (Niemeyer), 24/1/23; ‘Notes on a Question by Lord Vernon’ 
(Niemeyer), 24/4/23; ‘Note on FBI Memo.’ (Niemeyer), November 1923; BE:C40/737. Norman to Bradbury 
26/5/23; Clay (1957), pp.145-6.
18 BE:C40/737. Bradbury to Norman 25/5/23, 28/5/23.
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would merely sterilise any gold received, the proposal nonetheless attracted considerable 
attention within official circles and by the end of the year two variants of the ‘gold export 
scheme’ (a Treasury and a Bank version) were under consideration.19
In July however,  these uncertainties over monetary policy within official  circles 
were transmitted to the public when Norman raised interest rates to 4% in a bid to check 
the persistent fall in sterling. By directly contradicting the stated view of the Chancellor, 
the rise increased public interest in monetary policy still further, adding greater impetus to 
calls  for  an inquiry and a  managed money.20 Under  mounting pressure,  the  authorities 
began to grow increasingly worried. Cabinet Ministers for example were becoming ever-
more  concerned  with  high  unemployment,  with  Baldwin  now  describing  it  as  ‘the 
outstanding problem in the political life of the country’ and warning that failure to address 
it  ‘might  wreck  the  government’,  while  at  the  Bank  of  England,  Norman  was  also 
becoming increasingly anxious to get back to gold. As he explained to Strong: “We can 
have and perhaps deserve nothing but troubles until we are again anchored to Gold. How 
and when can we do it?”21
In October these difficulties were further compounded when the Minister of Labour 
(Sir Montagu Barlow) announced that the government would consider permitting a degree 
of  inflation  in  order  to  alleviate  the  effects  of  unemployment.  Coming  at  a  time  of 
heightened nervousness in the world economy (with the ending of the Ruhr occupation in 
September  having been followed by the  onset  of  hyperinflation  and social  disorder  in 
19 BE:ADM16/2-3. ‘Notes for the Treasury Committee’ (Norman), undated; ‘Memo. on a Project for the 
Formation of a Reserve in Connexion With the British Debt to the United States’ (Addis), 21/5/23; 
PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. ‘Monetary Policy’ (Hawtrey), October 1923; Niemeyer to Norman 21/11/23; Norman (and 
Bank of England) untitled memo. 21/11/23; Moggridge (1969), pp.16-17; Sayers (1976), pp.128-33.
20 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/8. FBI Bulletin 24/7/23. 6(29); the Times 7/8/23.
21 PRO:CAB23/45. Cabinet Meetings 2/7/23, 25/10/23; BE:G35/4. Norman to Strong 8/10/23. 
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Germany) the announcement triggered a large flight of capital and a run on the pound.22 
Despite  an  attempt  by  Baldwin  to  calm  the  markets  by  declaring  the  government’s 
commitment to price stability, the calling of a surprise general election in a bid to gain a 
mandate for protectionist  measures served only to inflame the situation,  and with fears 
rising that the ‘socialist’ Labour Party might win, sterling weakened even more.23 Such 
tensions were also not eased by the election result itself. Though the Conservatives were 
returned as  the single  largest  party,  they were now outnumbered on the issue of tariff 
reform by the Liberals and the Labour Party, both of whom were resolutely committed to 
free  trade.  Though  the  Conservatives  duly  formed  a  government,  they  were  therefore 
unable to implement the very policy on which the entire election had been fought, leaving 
the  future  direction  of  Britain’s  economic  policy  unsettled,  and  leaving  the  markets 
uncertain.24
Many of these difficulties and uncertainties continued into 1924. Sterling remained 
under pressure during the early part of the year, the gap with US prices continued to widen, 
and unemployment remained high at  1.4 million. The competitiveness of the old staple 
industries  also continued to  deteriorate,  the gold export  scheme was shelved for being 
likely to exacerbate public interest in monetary policy and further damage confidence in 
the  pound,  and  the  unstable  political  situation  also  continued.25 In  January  the 
Conservatives lost a vote of confidence and were replaced by the first minority Labour 
government, whilst the first half of 1924 also witnessed a resurgence of labour unrest as 
22 BE:ADM34/12. Norman Diaries 15/10/23; 2/11/23; Clay (1957), pp.207-10; Sayers (1976), pp.130-6; 
Eichengreen (1992), pp.147-50; Kynaston (1999), pp.105-6. 
23 Grigg (1948), pp.118-123; Sayers (1976), pp.130-2.
24 BE:G14/312. ‘Notes for the Treasury Committee’ (Norman), 19/12/23; BE:ADM34/12. Norman Diaries 
19/12/23; Grigg (1948), p.124; Boyle (1967), pp.165-6.
25 BE:G14/312. ‘Notes for the Treasury Committee’ (Norman), 19/12/23; Committee of Treasury extracts; 
BE:OV4/30. ‘Capital Movements to and From London’ (R. E. H. Allport), March 1934; Moggridge (1969), 
pp.16-22; Feinstein (1972), Tables 1, 37, 57; Sayers (1976), pp.128-33.
133
workers sought, often successfully, to reverse the attack on wages during the slump. The 
number of new stoppages rose to its highest level for three years, and to some it seemed as 
if a new wave of unrest akin to that of the immediate postwar era was emerging. The 
Labour Research Department (LRD) for example thought the outbreak marked the ‘revival 
of the industrial  movement’,  Snowden (the new Labour Chancellor)  described it  as  an 
‘epidemic’, and the government were prompted into seriously considering the use of the 
Emergency Powers Act.26
Moreover, the issue of monetary policy also remained politically sensitive. Norman 
for  example  was  increasingly  concerned  with  the  growing  attention  being  paid  to  ‘a 
permanent alternative to the gold standard’ as Keynes and his associates continued to argue 
for  a  policy  of  price  stability,  and as  sections  of  capital  and  labour  also  continued  to 
support a managed money.27 Many on the left, such as Oswald Mosley, John Strachey, J. A. 
Hobson, and the ILP continued to call for an inquiry into the issue and to press for an 
expansionist  economic policy and public ownership of the banking system, and indeed 
despite leadership opposition the Labour Party conference even passed a resolution to this 
effect. Many others within the labour movement, including the TUC and the Labour Party, 
were also critical of the idea of using deflation to return to gold at the prewar par, a move 
which was seen as likely to increase unemployment, damage the economy, and given that 
there was no real prospects for a general return to gold, would also fail to deliver economic 
stability.28 These  concerns  were  also  shared  by  prominent  figures  in  the  City  such  as 
26 Butler and Butler (1994), p.373; Monthly Circulars of the LRD during 1924; Labour Party and TUC 
Annual Reports 1924-1925; Snowden (1934), pp.633-5; Lovell and Roberts (1968), pp.72-3; Marquand 
(1977), pp.318-20.
27 BE:G14/312. ‘Notes for the Treasury Committee’ (Norman), 19/12/23.
28 PRO:T160/197. Evidence by Keynes to the Committee on the Currency and Bank of England Note Issues 
(hereafter the ‘Chamberlain-Bradbury committee’) 11/7/24; MRC:MSS.292/135.01/1. ‘A Practical Policy for 
Unemployment’, 17/6/24; PRO:T176/5. Pt.2. ‘Memo. on Proposed Raising of the Bank Rate’ (Joint Research 
Dept.), June 1924; Labour Party Annual Report 1924; Morning Post 13/6/24; Wootton (1925).
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McKenna, Goodenough, and Goschen, and by the FBI, who remained anxious as to the 
scale of deflation that would be needed to return to gold at the prewar par. With British 
prices presently considered to be around 10% higher than those in the US, deflation would 
they argued,  reduce trade (especially exports),  enlarge the burden of the national  debt, 
require  even  higher  taxes,  and  produce  rising  unemployment  and  ‘serious  industrial 
friction’ until domestic prices and wages adjusted.29
Hurrying Slowly
In spite of these difficulties however, by 1924 conditions were now improving for 
Britain’s  state  authorities.  Though  still  uncertain,  the  world  political  and  economic 
situation  was  beginning  to  look  more  stable.  The  introduction  of  financial  reforms  in 
Germany,  including the  creation of a  new currency (the Rentenmark)  and a  politically 
independent central bank (the Reichsbank) had begun the process of a return to stability, 
while an international committee headed by the US General Dawes had been established to 
examine  ways  of  balancing  the  German  budget.  The  resulting  plan  devised  by  the 
committee also contained measures for facilitating international economic reconstruction 
and recovery as a whole, based upon a global expansion of American credit to debilitated 
countries  through the  recycling  of  excess  US money capital.  In  particular,  US capital 
loaned to Germany would enable reparations repayments to be met, thus enabling many 
other  countries  to  meet  their  debt  obligations  and  ostensibly  resolving  the  protracted 
disputes  over  reparations  and  war  debts.  Indeed  as  1924  progressed,  global  economic 
29 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/9. FBI Bulletins (1924 issues); MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/3. ‘Taxation Policy’ 
(FBI), 27/2/24; PRO:T160/197. Evidence to the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee by the FBI (30/7/24), by 
Goschen, McKenna, Goodenough; PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. OGM Speech by McKenna, January 1924; Kynaston 
(1999), pp.114-15.
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conditions not only recovered but also developed into a new boom centred on European 
reconstruction and an upswing in America.30
Domestically,  the  worst  of  the  slump was also  now over.  Industrial  production 
surpassed prewar levels for the first time, and though the staple trades continued to suffer, 
Britain’s new industries continued to grow.31 The uncertainty over economic policy and the 
decline in sterling were also soon dispelled as the new Labour government announced its 
commitment to economic orthodoxy, in particular its desire to adhere to the deflationary 
principles of the Cunliffe report and to see Britain return to gold ‘as soon as possible’. 
Plans  for  a  capital  levy  were  also  dropped,  and  state  intervention  to  deal  with 
unemployment remained minimal, with the government claiming that the problem could 
only be  resolved by greater  economic  flexibility  and adaptation  to  global  conditions.32 
Furthermore,  despite  the  rise  in  industrial  unrest  the  labour  movement  also  remained 
weakened compared to recent years. Though the number of new stoppages rose, the actual 
number  of  working  days  lost  continued to  fall  and trade union membership  fell  to  its 
lowest point of the interwar period.33 By the middle of the year the resurgent unrest itself 
was now also subsiding. As the LRD observed, by July the ‘forward move’ had ‘distinctly 
slowed down in pace’, and by August it had almost disappeared.34
Also  of  benefit  to  the  authorities  was  that  while  the  notion  of  a  deliberately 
managed  money  was  gaining  wider  credence,  discontent  over  monetary  policy  was 
paradoxically now diminishing and the majority of opinion in Britain was not averse to a 
30 Clay (1957), Ch.5, pp.190-217; Kenwood and Lougheed (1971), pp.186-96; Eichengreen (1992), ps.147-
52, 224-6.
31 Feinstein (1972), Tables 51-2.
32 Various in PRO:CAB23/47, PRO:PREM1/76 and PRO:T208/55; PRO:T172/1499B. ‘Post-War Reports and 
Conferences’. Undated; Snowden (1934), pp.596-616; Cole (1948), pp.408ff; Marquand (1977), p.310.
33 Butler and Butler (1994), p.373.
34 Monthly Circulars of the LRD, June to September 1924.
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return to gold. The bulk of the labour movement remained primarily concerned with more 
directly tangible issues such as wages, working conditions, and unemployment, the TUC’s 
policy  charter  ignored  the  issue  of  monetary  policy  completely,  the  Labour  Party 
leadership were firmly wedded to the gold standard, and despite the more radical stance of 
the left the general attitude of labour remained indifferent towards the subject. Indeed as 
the  Labour  Party  later  put  it,  though  the  process  of  deflation  had  produced  ‘serious 
industrial and social consequences’, the issues of the gold standard and monetary policy 
were at this time ‘the subject of surprisingly little political discussion’.35
Similar  views  were  also  evident  from  representatives  of  capital.  The  ABCC 
continued to favour a return to gold and were now hopeful that this could be achieved 
within a ‘comparatively short period’, while City opinion, though divided over the use of 
deflation to force the issue, was also overwhelmingly in favour of an eventual return.36 
Even the FBI, despite their criticisms, were not opposed to a return to gold  per se, nor 
necessarily to the use of deflation, but were rather concerned with the use of excessively 
rapid deflation in order to return at the prewar par. Indeed, the Federation now considered a 
general  return  to  gold  as  essential  for  a  revival  of  both  international  and  domestic 
prosperity, and did not regard a managed money scheme as being practicable for anything 
other  than  a  temporary  interim  measure  preceding  a  return.  As  such,  whilst  the  FBI 
favoured a waiting policy in the hope that US inflation would carry sterling to par with 
only a ‘temporary retardation’ of exports, they also continued to accept that there were 
35 TUC Annual Report 1924, p.482; Monthly Circular of the LRD. April 1924. Vol. XIII. No.4; Labour Party 
Annual Report 1928; BE:OV9/262. ‘Purchasing Power of Gold’ (League of Nations), 20/11/28; Snowden 
(1934), pp.596ff; Cole (1948), pp.408ff; Boyce (1988), pp.180ff.
36 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/9. FBI Bulletins 29/1/24. 7(5); 5/2/24. 7(6), 12/2/24. 7(7); PRO:T160/197. 
Evidence to the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee by Schuster, Goschen, Currie, Leaf, Paish, McKenna, and 
Goodenough (Chairmen of Britain’s leading banks); PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. OGM Speech by McKenna, January 
1924; Grigg (1948), pp.181-4; Brown Jr (1970), p.338-9; Catterall (1976), p.44; Kynaston (1999), pp.114-15.
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‘other considerations’, primarily the need for global economic recovery, which could make 
deflation necessary.37
These improvements in domestic and international economic conditions combined 
with this easing of discontent over monetary policy and the general lack of opposition to 
the gold standard now enabled the authorities to begin considering a return to gold in more 
detail. At the Treasury concerns were now rising that Britain could ‘very suddenly’ be left 
isolated and weakened by a quick return to gold by the rest of the world, while at the Bank 
of England Norman was growing increasingly anxious for a rise in interest rates to bolster 
the pound. Political sensitivities over the issue however were still prevalent. Baldwin for 
example was fearful that renewed deflation could lead to a resurgence in labour unrest and 
the popularity  of Socialist  ideas,  and officials  generally  were keen to avoid re-igniting 
public interest in the subject.38 As Niemeyer maintained, public debate on monetary policy 
would raise hopes of a managed money and inflation, the loose talk of which had ‘already 
done us an infinitude of harm’, whilst as Norman pointed out, raising interest in the issue 
by announcing a specific date for a return would be ‘difficult and perhaps dangerous.’ As 
he explained:
“There  have  always  been  some  here  for  whom  the  idea  of  gold  was 
repugnant because they favoured, or pretended to favour, some new-fangled 
scheme:  there  have  been  public  speakers….who  were  liable  to  torpedo 
confidence at any time: there have been many who feared a crisis if prices 
were  deliberately  forced  down  and  margins  on  loans 
eliminated….Therefore,  on  the  whole,  my  feeling  is  that  however 
wearisome the pace has been, we have been wise so far to hurry slowly.”39
37 PRO:T160/197. FBI evidence to the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee 30/7/24; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/9. 
FBI Bulletins. 5/7/24. 7(31); 5/8/24. 7(32). 
38 BE:G3/180. Norman to Blackett 21/5/24; Norman to Silberling 13/6/24; 14/6/24; BE:ADM34/13. Norman 
Diaries 13/6/24; BE:C40/737. Norman to Strong 27/3/25, 24/4/25; PRO:T160/197. Niemeyer to Snowden 
5/4/24; PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. ‘Sterling and the Gold Standard’ (Hawtrey), 26/4/24; Williamson (1999), pp.169ff.
39 PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. Niemeyer to Snowden, March 1924; BE:G3/181. Norman to Strong 16/10/24.
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Unable to find a justifiable excuse for putting up interest rates however, Norman 
was forced to abandon the idea of a rise. Nonetheless, the pound soon began to appreciate 
as the FRBNY engaged in a series of cuts to 3% by August in a bid to allay domestic fears 
of  a  recession  and to  encourage a  return to  gold  by Britain  and Europe. As such,  the 
differential with New York was now sufficient to fuel expectations that Britain would soon 
return to gold at  the prewar par, provoking a speculative inflow of capital  and causing 
sterling to rise from the summer.40
With officials increasingly keen to engineer a return, in June an official committee 
known as the Committee on the Currency and Bank of England Note Issues (though better 
known as the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee after its two chairmen) was established. 
Ostensibly designed to consider the technical question of amalgamating the note issues, in 
reality the committee was set up to examine the means by which a return to gold could be 
brought about.41 In particular, the committee were concerned with the question of whether 
deflation should now be imposed in order to raise sterling to par quickly, or whether they 
should continue waiting for US inflation in the hope that this could be achieved with less 
friction. For key officials however, neither option offered an ideal solution. On the one 
hand, deflation was thought to be difficult to achieve and would entail a long period of 
high interest rates and economic dislocation.  As Hawtrey explained:
40 BE:ADM34/13. Norman Diaries 13/6/24; BE:G3/180. Norman to Strong 16/6/24; Brown (1940), Ch.12; 
Keynes (1951), p.229; Morgan (1952), pp.213ff; Howson (1975), p.56; Sayers (1976), p.139.
41 The committee was initially led by Austen Chamberlain, who was replaced by Bradbury after being made 
foreign secretary in the new Conservative government: BE:G35/5. Norman to Strong 26/2/25, 15/4/25; 
BE:G3/181. Norman to W. H. Clegg 13/10/24; BE:G3/180. Norman to Niemeyer 16/4/24; PRO:T160/197. 
Niemeyer to Snowden 5/4/24; Notes by Niemeyer; PRO:T176/5 Pt.1. ‘Sterling and the Gold Standard’ 
(Hawtrey), 26/4/24; Sayers (1976), pp.136-7.
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 “no method of returning to the gold standard at pre-war par (apart from a 
rise  in  prices  in  America)  can  avoid  the  depression  and  unemployment 
incidental to a fall in prices.”42 
On the other hand,  continuing  to wait  for US inflation was now thought  to  be 
increasingly futile, with the growing view being that US prices would not now rise and that  
British prices would therefore have to fall. As Norman for example put it, whilst American 
inflation ‘would make it much easier’ to return to gold, this was now unlikely and Britain 
would instead have to endure a ‘big fall in price.’ For Norman and Addis however (the 
Bank’s  representatives  to  the  committee),  this  was  still  considered  to  be  worth  the 
‘sacrifice’. Deflation, they argued, would not only force Britain to become competitive, but 
by enabling a return at the prewar par would also provide for economic stability, ensure 
international confidence in sterling, and prevent a future resurgence of inflation and hence 
‘further social disturbances, further strikes and discontent.’ Moreover, adherence to such an 
‘automatic’ regime  with  its  clear  economic  signals  was  also  seen  as  enhancing  their 
freedom  of  manoeuvre.  As  Norman,  complaining  of  the  Bank’s  organisation  again 
explained, ‘I certainly am not blessed with a ‘machine’ which so far runs itself that I am 
free to be away from London as much as I would like’, while as Addis put it, a government 
announcement of its intention to return would provide the Bank with ‘the reason, and if 
necessary the excuse’ for its actions.43
Aware of the potential dangers of deflation however, not least the possibility that 
this could lead to political pressures for the nationalisation of the Bank, Norman and Addis 
were also keen to ensure that responsibility for the operation of monetary policy would lay 
42 PRO:T176/5 Pt.2. ‘Sterling and Gold’ (Hawtrey), 4/7/24.
43 PRO:T160/197. Evidence of Norman and Addis to the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee 27/6/24; 
BE:G35/5. Norman to Strong. 18/2/25.
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entirely with the government. As the Governor again explained, while it was ‘difficult not 
to have political views’, it was however ‘dangerous to express them’, and whilst the Bank 
was willing in principle ‘to lend its services for the re-establishment of a free gold market 
in this country….[it] would not desire to participate in the result of Exchange operations.’ 
Furthermore, although the Bank would possess formal authority for sterling once Britain 
was back on gold, Norman was also insistent that the Chancellor would nonetheless remain 
‘the  ultimate  authority  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Currency,  and  therefore  of  the 
Exchanges.’44
A Shift in Strategy
Despite  the assertions of Norman and Addis however,  Britain’s state authorities 
were still undecided as to their course of action. Hawtrey for example favoured continuing 
to wait for US inflation, arguing that higher interest rates would create ‘another acute and 
serious unemployment crisis’, Bradbury now purported to have ‘no settled conclusions’ on 
the matter, and the Bank of England as a whole were also uncertain. As Cecil Lubbock (the 
Deputy Governor) explained to Strong:
“The question of the gold standard will no doubt be prominent before very 
long….something will have to be done soon: but are we to force our prices 
down, or will you allow yours to rise?”45
Though uncertain  over the timing of the return,  state  officials  were nonetheless 
resolutely  agreed  on  the  par  value,  with  the  rate  of  $4.86  now so  ingrained  that  the 
44 PRO:T160/197. Evidence by Addis to the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee 27/6/24; Comments by 
Niemeyer during the evidence of Goodenough 11/7/24; PRO:T172/1500A. Norman to Niemeyer 4/12/24; 
BE:G30/13. Norman to H. Schacht 6/12/24. 
45 PRO:T176/5 Pt.2. ‘Sterling and Gold’ (Hawtrey), 4/7/24; PRO:T208/54. ‘Sterling and the Gold Standard’ 
(Hawtrey), 24/7/24; PRO:T160/197. Bradbury to Farrer 24/7/24; BE:G3/181. Lubbock to Strong 25/8/24.
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Chamberlain-Bradbury committee did not even consider it to be worth discussing. This did 
not mean though that $4.86 was decided upon merely out of precedent, or that the lack of 
discussion  signified  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  authorities.46 Rather,  a  return  at  the 
prewar  par  was  seen  by  state  officials  to  be  fundamentally  important  for  the  whole 
structure  of  Britain’s  economy  and  its  integration  into  the  global  circuit  of  capital. 
Returning at a rate less than $4.86 would, it was thought, not only damage international 
confidence in sterling and diminish Britain’s capacity for invisible earnings, but would also 
mean higher import costs and renewed inflationary pressures. Moreover, a return at $4.86 
would not only encourage other countries to return, thereby facilitating global stability, but 
as Hawtrey later explained this was also considered to be the only credible rate available. A 
lower parity would undermine the credibility of Britain’s commitment to the gold standard 
by sending out a signal that further devaluations might follow in the future should similar 
difficulties arise. Thus:
“The advantage of the old parity was that, once the country had returned to 
it by a great effort, people would expect great efforts to be made to retain it. 
For that reason it would command a greater degree of confidence than a 
new rate chosen to suit the circumstances of a particular moment.”47
The need for Britain’s return to gold to be credible was therefore considered by 
officials to be of vital importance, not least for helping to shape the expectations and hence 
the behaviour  of capital  and labour by convincing them that there  would be no future 
change in monetary policy. As Norman put it, the situation was ‘much more a question 
46 A view held for example by Gregory (1925), pp.32ff; Brown Jr (1940), pp.609-12; Moggridge (1972), 
Chs.3-4; Howson (1975), Ch.3.
47 Hawtrey (1933), pp.233-4; PRO:T172/1499B. ‘How Does a Gold Standard Work in Regulating Credit?’ 
(Hawtrey), undated believed 1925; Evidence by Niemeyer to the Committee on Finance and Industry, 4/6/30. 
Minutes of Evidence Vol.2; BE:G14/312. Niemeyer to A. C. Turner 19/11/43; Clay (1957), pp.158ff.
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of….the psychology of the announcement than of the facts.’48 Indeed,  with uncertainty 
over monetary policy still a potential source of political difficulty for the authorities, the 
need for a credible commitment was even considered in many ways to be more important 
than the actual date of the return itself. As Norman, who did not now expect sterling to go 
to par for ‘months or years’, told Strong:
“There is no need for great hurry in our reaching gold parity, but there is 
great need for hurry in having a policy which is clear to everybody and 
which is definite and final.”49
The question of when to return to gold thus hinged upon which date was thought to 
be  the  most  credible,  or  as  Bradbury  put  it,  which  date  people  were  ‘most  likely  to 
believe.’ Officials though, were still in disagreement as to when this should be. Neither 
Chamberlain or Hawtrey for example suggested any particular date, Bradbury thought an 
eighteen month period to be the most credible, whilst Addis and the Bank’s Committee of 
Treasury  favoured  a  period of  twelve  months.  For  Norman  though,  the  best  date  was 
thought to be in three years time. As he explained, returning to gold at the prewar par in a 
shorter  period  would  entail  a  more  rapid  rise  in  the  pound  and  would  thus  be  an 
unreasonable proposition ‘to put before the man in the street’, risking antagonising public 
opinion and losing credibility.50 Announcing that Britain would return to gold in three years 
however would not mean that the authorities would have to wait that long for the benefits. 
On the contrary, Norman argued that the speculative inflow of capital that would follow a 
credible announcement to return at $4.86 would quickly lift sterling back to par well in 
48 PRO:T160/197. Evidence by Norman to the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee 27/6/24. 
49 BE:G3/180. Norman to Strong 16/6/24; Norman to Blackett 21/5/24; Norman to Silberling 13/6/24; 
14/6/24.
50 PRO:T176/5 Pt.2. ‘Sterling and Gold’ (Hawtrey), 4/7/24; PRO:T208/54. ‘Sterling and the Gold Standard’ 
(Hawtrey), 24/7/24; PRO:T160/197. Comments made by Chamberlain during Goodenough’s evidence to the 
Chamberlain-Bradbury Committee 11/7/24; Comments by Bradbury during the evidence of Norman and 
Addis to the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee 27/6/24; BE:ADM16/2. Minutes of the Committee of 
Treasury 23/6/24. 
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advance  of  the  date  set,  thus  providing  the  authorities  with  ‘extremely  valuable 
camouflage’, giving the public time to get used to the ‘new’ exchange rate, and drawing 
the political sting out of the move. As he again explained,
“if  you  can….draw  up  a  façade  which  impressed  everybody  with  its 
certainty as to its date, I believe long before that date arrives you will have 
reached  gold  and  the  agitation  will  have  died  away;  people  will  have 
forgotten about it.”51
In September the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee produced its first draft report. 
This advocated continuing to wait for US inflation but argued that Britain should return to 
gold  regardless  within  a  maximum  period  of  twelve  months.  The  draft  however  was 
criticised by senior officials for being too vague. Bradbury wanted more emphasis on the 
fact  that  the wait  for US inflation would be a short  one,  Norman thought it  to be too 
ambivalent  over  the  date  for  a  return,  whilst  Chamberlain  felt  that  it  should  be  more 
explicit in stating that the currency would be managed by the Bank of England and not the 
government. In October the committee produced a second revised draft report, though this 
too continued to propose waiting for a rise in US prices.52
By now however the emphasis in official  thinking was beginning to shift  more 
decisively in favour of a policy of deflation. Key authorities were increasingly of the view 
that Britain could no longer afford to wait for US prices to rise, and were also coming to 
recognise that a return to gold at the old par could itself be used as a means of forcing 
down  British  prices.  As  Strong  pointed  out,  it  was  now  ‘illusory  to  expect  price 
adjustments of themselves to effect a recovery of sterling’, and the only way forward for 
51 PRO:T160/197. Evidence by Norman to the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee 27/6/24.
52 PRO:T160/197. Bradbury to N. E. Young 11/9/24; Chamberlain to Young 13/9/24; Various copies of the 
committee’s reports; Moggridge (1969), pp.32-4; Sayers (1976), p.140.
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Britain was to return to gold with an act of ‘force majeure’. This view was also now shared 
by Niemeyer who maintained that a successful return did not require that British and US 
prices were level beforehand, but could only now be accomplished by actually putting the 
pound at par. As he later expanded, ‘when you get within a certain distance of par there is 
one thing….which will carry the last fence, and that is to put your rate at par, to say it is 
there.’53 On this assessment Norman too was now in full agreement. Indeed in his view, US 
inflation  would  now not  only  fail  to  reduce  the  price  difference  between  Britain  and 
America, but would itself trigger renewed inflation in Britain. As he told Strong,
“it would not be sufficient to wait for exchange parity to be reached merely 
through the price levels coming together. Indeed, if while we were waiting 
your prices were to raise….I  do not believe we could ever prevent  ours 
from following.”54
As this change in strategy was developing however the domestic political situation 
was becoming more uncertain. Embroiled in a political crisis over the alleged intervention 
of the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, in the trial of a Communist editor for sedition, 
the minority Labour government collapsed, forcing another general election.55 Moreover, 
as it became increasingly clear that the Conservatives were likely to win, the prospects for 
using a return to gold to impose deflation grew increasingly slim. As Norman bemoaned, 
the Conservatives were,
53 PRO:T172/1500A. Niemeyer to Norman 8/12/24; PRO:T172/1499B. Untitled Document 21/4/25; 
Evidence by Niemeyer to the Committee on Finance and Industry 4/6/30. Minutes of Evidence. Vol.2; Clay 
(1957), p.164; Moggridge (1969), pp.32-7.
54 BE:G3/181. Norman to Strong 16/10/24. 
55 On this see for example Middlemas (1969), pp.262ff.
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“apt to listen to the traders and manufacturers, who, while they profess a 
remote affection for gold and a real affection for stability, always want a tot 
of brandy (in the shape of inflation) before the level is fixed!”56
Unfortunately for the Governor the Conservatives were nonetheless re-elected and 
discussions  on  the  return  to  gold  were  once  again  paralysed.  The  political  upheaval, 
Norman  complained,  had  now ‘side-tracked  all  thoughts  on  gold  policy’,  had  left  no 
political desire to take the ‘drastic steps’ necessary to bring about a return, and no decision 
was now expected until possibly as late as 1927.57
‘Not a Word…’
By October 1924, all official attempts to return to gold since the end of the war had 
so far been thwarted. A quick return in 1919 had been ruled out for fear of the social and 
political  consequences  of  deflation,  the  dear  money policy  of  1920 had  been  forcibly 
abandoned by 1922 due to political  and economic pressures,  subsequent hopes for US 
inflation  had proved fruitless,  and  now the  renewed optimism of  1924 had  apparently 
collapsed  along  with  the  Labour  government.  On  top  of  this,  monetary  policy  also 
remained under fire from certain quarters. Continued attacks by Keynes and Henderson 
were now joined by several  sections  of  the  press,  while  many on the  labour  left  also 
remained critical. In particular, the newly established ‘national minority movement’ headed 
by the CPGB and the ILP continued to oppose any notion of a return to gold, arguing that 
this was being dictated by financial interests and warning that a return would mean higher 
interest rates, rising unemployment, and lower wages.58 On the side of capital, the FBI also 
56 BE:G3/182. Norman to Blackett 27/10/24. 
57 BE:G3/181. Norman to Strong 16/10/24. 
58 Sunday Express 5/5/25; Daily Mail, 5/3/25; ‘Will Unemployment Increase?’ (Henderson), 4/4/25 in Clay 
(1955); the New Leader 16/1/25; 13/3/25; the Workers’ Weekly (CPGB) January-March 1925; Monthly 
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continued  with  their  critical  stance,  questioning  whether  a  general  return  to  gold  was 
possible at the present time and reasserting their view that a unilateral return by Britain 
would fail to provide economic stability. These concerns were now also evident from other 
industrial groups, such as the Manchester Association of Importers and Exporters (MAIE) 
who claimed that a return to gold risked ‘disastrous consequences’ to trade, industry, and 
employment, and many traders were also anxious that a return would lead to higher interest  
rates and lower prices.59
Despite  these  criticisms  however,  conditions  in  general  were  nevertheless 
continuing to improve for state officials. The overwhelming majority of press and public 
opinion in Britain remained either uninterested or unconcerned about the prospect of a 
return to gold, and those explicitly against the policy remained in a minority. Moreover, 
following the subsidence of unrest the labour movement were once more returning to their 
traditional concerns and continuing to pay little heed to monetary policy issues, while the 
Labour Party leadership remained committed to a return to gold, with Snowden concurring 
in the view that there needed to be no prior convergence of British and US prices since a 
stable currency was itself ‘one of the essentials of a healthy state of trade’.60 
Representatives of capital were also increasingly positive towards a return to gold. 
The City were now universally in favour, with even McKenna describing the gold standard 
as  having  ‘great  and  striking  advantages’,  and  despite  their  concerns  many  within 
commerce and industry were also favourably predisposed. The LCC for instance declared 
Circular of the LRD, March 1925. XIV(3); Labour Party Annual Report 1930. p.35; Hancock (1962), p.107; 
Boyce (1988), passim.
59 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/4/1. ‘Finance’ (FBI), 5/2/25; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/6 and PRO:T172/1499B. J. 
S. McConechy (MAIE) to Nugent 24/1/25; to Churchill, 18/4/25; and to Sir A. Anderson 21/4/25; G. H. 
Fulton to FBI 17/3/25; MAIE Bulletin 24/7/24.
60 Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1924-1925; Monthly Circular of the LRD (issues from August 1924 
to May 1925); Workers’ Weekly January-February 1925; The Socialist Standard (1925 issues); the Observer 
8/2/25.
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their support for the policy, while many wholesale and retail interests were now looking 
forward to the boost to sales from lower prices.61 Though uneasy, the MAIE were also 
deferential  to the authorities, pointing out  that only the state authorities possessed ‘the 
necessary knowledge and experience’ to make monetary policy decisions, and despite their 
continued anxieties the FBI were now increasingly optimistic about the future economic 
situation.  The  rise  in  sterling  was seen not  as  a  deflationary  menace  but  as  a  sign of 
increased confidence in the British economy, international conditions were thought to be 
improving,  and  the  prospects  for  a  general  return  to  gold  were  looking  progressively 
brighter as countries began to recognise that it was ‘essential to check inflation by some 
automatic means.’ The Federation were now also against continuing to wait for a rise in US 
prices, arguing that this would produce domestic inflation, now seen to be detrimental to 
Britain’s  long-term prosperity. Though still  concerned about  the short-term effects  of a 
return to gold, the FBI were now also convinced that the majority of British opinion was in 
favour and that the move was ‘inevitable’.62 As such, although the authorities were thought 
to be holding sterling at an artificially high rate, thus increasing British costs and prices, 
the Federation were nonetheless of the view that British industry would simply have to 
adjust to the ‘new’ exchange rate. As they put it:
61 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/11. FBI Bulletins 27/1/25. 8(4); 3/2/25. 8(5); 10/2/25. 8(6); 
MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/6. G. H. Fulton to FBI 17/3/25; BE:G14/312. Norman to Bradbury 24/2/25; 
PRO:T172/1499B. Midland Bank Monthly Reviews. January-March 1925; A. de V. Leigh (LCC) to Baldwin 
and Churchill 16/3/25; Catterall (1976), p.44; Kynaston (1999), p.18.
62 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/6 and PRO:T172/1499B. MAIE Bulletin 24/7/24; J. S. McConechy to Churchill 
18/4/25; to Nugent. 24/1/25; FBI to Churchill 17/3/25; to G. H. Fulton 20/3/25; to R. A. Kerr Montgomery 
18/5/28; D. L. Walker (FBI General Secretary) to Sir R. A. Kerr Montgomery. 12/12/28; 
MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/9-11. FBI Bulletins (November 1924-March 1925). NB: In October 1924 the ‘FBI 
Bulletin’ changed its name to ‘British Industries’. For purposes of simplicity and continuity however it shall 
still be referred to as ‘FBI Bulletin’. Also see MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/4/1. ‘Finance’ (FBI), 5/2/25; ‘The Gold 
Standard and International Debts’ (Nugent), 6/2/25.; Layton (1925), pp.184-5; Hume (1963), pp.240-1; 
Boyce (1988), pp.189-90.
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“it  seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the restoration of our full 
competitive power requires the forcing down of our prices and costs until 
they  are  in  adjustment  with  the  value  of  the  exchange  as  fixed  by  our 
monetary authorities.”63
Furthermore,  despite  the  lack  of  political  will  on  the  subject,  at  the  Bank  of 
England  Norman  was  still  anxious  to  get  back  to  gold  as  soon  as  possible.  Equally 
sensitive to the dangers of public debate on the issue however, the Governor remained keen 
to keep it out of the limelight. As he told Strong:
“you know how controversial a subject it is – how it is everybody’s business 
– and how secretly it must be treated….not a word can be breathed until 
some decision has been reached.”64
As such,  though Norman was still  eager  to take more active measures to assist 
sterling, a rise in interest rates was ruled out for fear of the potential reaction. Instead, the 
Governor turned to less noticeable methods to strengthen the pound, using his influence 
within the City to bring about an informal embargo on foreign lending.65 Following this, 
Norman then travelled to New York to set upon a plan for bringing about Britain’s return. 
In consultation with senior figures at the FRBNY it was agreed that Britain’s embargo on 
the export of gold should be allowed to expire at the end of 1925, and that all official 
considerations  of  the  issue  would  be  delayed  until  March  in  order  to  keep  it  out  of 
Parliament until  the last  minute,  and away from the ‘irresponsible’ US congress which 
would  undoubtedly  raise  awkward  questions.66 Assurances  of  co-operation  were  also 
obtained, with the US agreeing to provide a credit facility of $500 million (later reduced to 
63 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/11. FBI Bulletin 30/4/25. 8(15). 
64 BE:G3/181. Norman to Strong 16/10/24; to W. H. Clegg 13/10/24; to B. Hornsby 10/11/24. 
65 Morgan (1952), p.366.
66 BE:G35/5. Norman to Strong 21/3/25; PRO:T160/197. Evidence by Norman to the Chamberlain-Bradbury 
committee 28/1/25; Boyle (1967), p.187.
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$300 million)  for  insurance  against  speculation,  and  guaranteeing  that  they  would  not 
engage  in  any  deliberate  inflationary  or  deflationary  measures  while  Britain  returned. 
Norman was also warned however that higher interest rates might be needed in New York 
in the near future to check domestic speculation, and that the deflationary pressure on the 
British economy following a return might therefore be greater than anticipated.67
Early  in  1925  events  began  to  gain  momentum.  In  January  the  Chamberlain-
Bradbury  committee  produced  its  third  draft  report,  also  recommending  that  the  gold 
export embargo be allowed to expire in December, but adding that the export of gold be 
permitted on license in the interim, and that the government should make an announcement 
to this effect in the near future. The draft also now put a figure on the scale of domestic 
adjustment  thought  to be required to  sustain the prewar par in the absence  of any US 
inflation, claiming that British prices would have to fall by 6%. The difficulties involved in 
this however were played down, with the draft arguing that this reduction was only 1.5% 
greater than that required to hold sterling at its present rate of $4.79, and that the actual 
extent of any adjustment would therefore be ‘comparatively small.’68 The already terminal 
case against easing the pressure on Britain’s industry through inflation or a lower exchange 
rate was further compounded by the publication of the latest report of the long-running 
Balfour committee, which reinforced official beliefs that the only solution to Britain’s long 
term economic decline was increased productive efficiency and an adjustment to changing 
global conditions.69
By now the position was looking uniquely ripe for a return to gold. Sterling was 
close to par, the political and economic situations were increasingly stable, and as Norman 
67 PRO:T175/9. Norman telegrams to Lubbock 7/1/25; Boyle (1967), pp.183-5; Moggridge (1972), pp.59-60.
68 Copies of the reports in PRO:T160/197.
69 Sayers (1960), p.90; Moggridge (1969), p.65.
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put  it  only  ‘certain  politicians  and  cranks’ were  now opposed  to  the  policy.70 Official 
opinion  on  the  plan  devised  in  the  US  however  was  divided,  with  senior  Bank  and 
Treasury figures concerned about the complications posed by the provision of US credits. 
As Niemeyer for example explained, such credits could not halt a determined speculative 
attack,  though  their  existence  would  complicate  the  situation  by  making  the  state 
responsible for the regulation of the currency. In the event that Britain should encounter 
any difficulty following the return, public opinion would therefore be likely to call for their 
use  instead  of  a  rise  in  interest  rates,  thus  serving  to  prolong  Britain’s  economic 
uncompetitiveness.  In  addition,  various  officials  at  the  Bank  were  also  nervous  about 
returning to gold before British and US prices had converged, warning that the risk ‘would 
be too great  and the  consequences  of  failure  too grave  for  us  to  commend it.’71 Such 
disagreement  however  left  Norman  unruffled.  As  he  remarked,  while  the  Bank  had  a 
‘general approval in principle but a strange opposition in detail’, its opposition would soon 
‘be worn down’.72
On The Seas of History
With the basic elements of a plan now all but settled, the focus of attention now 
turned to the new Chancellor, Winston Churchill.  Self-confessedly ignorant of financial 
and economic matters, Churchill did not pretend to understand the nuances of a return to 
gold and remained highly dependent on his advisors, Hawtrey, Niemeyer, Bradbury, and 
70 PRO:T175/9. Norman telegrams to Lubbock 7/1/25.
71 PRO:T172/1500A. Niemeyer to Norman 8/12/24; ‘The Cushion’ (Niemeyer), 20/3/25; Untitled and 
undated document by Fisher; BE:C40/737. Lubbock to Norman 9 & 10/1/25; Niemeyer to Norman 16/3/25; 
PRO:T175/9. Norman telegrams to Lubbock 7/1/25; Niemeyer to Lubbock 9/1/25; PRO:T160/197. Evidence 
by Addis to the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee 28/1/25; Sayers (1976), p.141.
72 BE:G35/5; Norman to Strong 24/1/25; BE:G14/312. Norman to Strong 24/4/25.
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Norman in such matters.73 Moreover, the Chancellor’s primary concerns lay not with the 
economic details, but with the political implications of the decision, and more specifically 
with assembling sufficient arguments with which to defend himself against any criticisms 
it might attract. As such, towards the end of January Churchill dispatched a memo to his 
advisors outlining his concerns. In particular the Chancellor was worried that a return to 
gold  would  lead  to  higher  interest  rates,  checking  economic  activity,  raising 
unemployment, and leaving the government (and especially himself) open to the charge of 
favouring finance over industry. In contrast, he wondered whether it would not be better to 
continue with a discretionary regime on the basis that the imposition of higher rates could 
be justified with the claim that even higher levels would be required under a gold standard, 
and  that  no-one  could therefore  ‘attribute  it  to  the  action  of  the  British Government’. 
Nonetheless,  whilst  ‘only very plain and solid advantages’ were thought to ‘justify the 
running of such a risk’, Churchill was also ‘ready and anxious to be convinced’ of the need 
for a return to gold.74 
All of Churchill’s advisors, with the exception of Hawtrey who continued to urge 
waiting for US inflation, now emphasised the importance of a quick return. The general 
consensus  was  that  a  decision  on  the  subject  could  no  longer  be  avoided,  that  the 
Chancellor would be exposed to immediate criticism whatever action he took, but that a 
return  to  gold  offered  distinct  political  and  economic  advantages.  The  overwhelming 
majority of public opinion in Britain they argued, was in favour of a gold standard, and it 
was also claimed that this would provide greater long-term economic stability and lower 
interest rates than a managed money. In contrast, failing to return would they warned, lead 
73 Boyle (1967), pp.179-81; Ponting (1994), p.293.
74 PRO:T175/9. Untitled Memo. (Churchill), 29/1/25. 
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to economic instability and a loss of international confidence in the pound, which would 
require even higher interest rates to prevent its collapse than would be needed to maintain 
the prewar par. For this, as Norman maintained, ‘the ignorant would doubtless blame the 
Chancellor’. In addition, Churchill’s advisors also emphasised that a gold standard would 
offer an easier means of managing economic policy, ensuring less economic fluctuations 
than a managed money and providing an effective defence against political pressure for 
inflation, the negative effects of which in terms of wage demands and social unrest were 
still alive in the memory. Moreover, as Niemeyer maintained, while a return to gold would 
not require a very large fall in prices, in the event that it should then this would not be a 
bad thing as the fall would have been inevitable in any case, and the gold standard would 
therefore  ‘have  shown its  use as  an instrument  of  danger’.  In  sum, continuing  with a 
managed money, as Niemeyer again put it, would not therefore produce an easing of the 
political  pressure,  but  on  the  contrary  would  lead  to  ‘great  disappointment  and 
considerable opposition’.75 
These views were also mirrored by the final report of the Chamberlain-Bradbury 
committee,  published  in  February.  The  report  maintained  that  conditions  were  now 
uniquely ripe for a return to gold, and that in the absence of US inflation British prices 
would only have to fall by a ‘significant, though not very large amount’ in order to hold the 
prewar par without any difficulty.  It also argued that this process would be aided by a 
credible  return,  claiming  that  a  ‘courageous  policy’  would  surmount  ‘apparently 
formidable obstacles with surprising ease’, and warned that continuing with a managed 
75 PRO:T172/1499B. ‘The Gold Standard’ (Hawtrey), 2/2/25; ‘The Gold Export Prohibition’ (Niemeyer), 
undated; ‘Gold Standard Bill’ (Niemeyer), Undated; ‘Commentary’ (Niemeyer), 2/2/25; Niemeyer to 
Churchill 6/2/25; Untitled Memos, 7/3/25, 21/4/25; ‘Note on Gold Standard’ (Niemeyer), 29/4/25; 
BE:G14/312. Norman to Churchill (undated); Bradbury to Niemeyer 5/2/25; PRO:T171/246. Niemeyer to 
Churchill 21/2/25.
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money would require higher interest rates in order to avoid any loss of confidence in the 
pound.76
Despite maintaining that these various points offered ‘a solid foundation both of 
argument and authority justifying the actions proposed’, Churchill however was not yet 
convinced and had yet to make any recommendation on the subject to the Cabinet.77 With 
unemployment still a politically sensitive issue, and with a return to gold at the prewar par 
recognised as requiring high tax and interest rates, the Chancellor remained anxious about 
the potential for criticism. Nonetheless, though sharply rebuking senior Treasury and Bank 
officials for their apparent lack of concern over unemployment, Churchill was forced to 
admit that in the end there was no alternative. As he explained:
 “I do not pretend to see even ‘through a glass darkly’ how the financial and 
credit  policy  of  the  country  could  be  handled  so  as  to  bridge  the  gap 
between a dearth of goods and a surplus of labour; and well I realise the 
danger of experiment to that end. The seas of history are full of famous 
wrecks.”78
In February however the rise in New York rates of which Norman had been warned 
took place with an increase to 3.5%, prompting the Bank of England to raise interest rates 
to 5% in March and to warn of a possible 6% rate in April in order to exert a final pull on 
sterling.79 At  such  a  crucial  stage,  officials  were  ever-more  anxious  to  ensure that  the 
subject of a return to gold did not become a topic of public debate. Cabinet Ministers, 
aware of but not participating directly in the discussions, were keen to keep quiet on the 
76 Report of the Committee on the Currency and Bank of England Note Issues. 5/2/25. Cmd.2393. 
77 PRO:T172/1499B. Chamberlain to Churchill 8/2/25; BE:C40/731. Bank of England to Strong 6/2/25.
78 PRO:T171/245. Churchill to Niemeyer 6/2/25; PRO:T172/1499B. Churchill to Niemeyer 22/2/25; Boyle 
(1967), p.188; Skidelsky (1969); Gilbert (1976), p.96.
79 BE:ADM34/14. Norman Diaries 19/3/25; Hawtrey (1933), p.117; Sayers (1976), pp.144-5.
154
issue in order to avoid exciting any renewed public interest,80 while Niemeyer, concerned 
that the rise would elicit a temperamental and public outburst from Churchill (who had not 
been  informed  of  the  move  beforehand)  sought  to  head  off  any  adverse  reaction  by 
dispatching  a  memo  to  the  Chancellor  pointing  out  that  the  responsibility  for  such 
decisions now lay squarely with the Bank and that political interference should be avoided. 
As he stated:
“It  is  not  either  necessary  nor  the  practice  for  the  Bank  to  consult  the 
Government of the day….We have neither claim to be consulted nor power 
to enforce our views; and I think it would be generally recognised that in 
order to avoid political interference on these matters it is not desirable that 
we should have any such claim.”81
In the  event  however  the rise  attracted  no great  criticism,  and though privately 
‘indignant’ Churchill  nevertheless  followed the line presented by Niemeyer,  telling the 
House of Commons that the Bank were acting independently and asserting that it would be 
an ‘inconvenient practice’ if the Chancellor were to state his opinions on such matters.82 
With the end now in sight, Churchill also invited several prominent figures from both sides 
of the monetary policy debate to a dinner party at which the competing arguments were put 
in  a  final  deliberation.  Representing  the  case  for  a  managed  money,  Keynes argued 
forcefully that  a  return to gold at  the prewar par  would overvalue the pound,  damage 
Britain’s  export  industries,  and  lead  to  downward  pressure  on  wages,  rising 
unemployment, and industrial unrest.  Bradbury, in contrast,  extolled the virtues of a gold 
standard. It was he said, a ‘knave proof’ mechanism that could not be rigged for political or 
80 PRO:CAB23/49. Cabinet Meeting 25/3/25.
81 PRO:T176/13 Pt.1. Niemeyer to Churchill 4/3/25; Leith-Ross (1968), p.95.
82 PRO:T176/13 Pt.1. ‘Relations Between the Treasury and the Bank of England….’ (undated); BE:G14/312. 
Committee of Treasury Minutes 25/3/25: The CPGB were one of the few to protest. See Workers’ Weekly 
18/3/25; Gregory (1926), p.40; Sayers (1976), p.144. 
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‘even more unworthy reasons’, and adherence to it  would ensure that Britain’s exports 
remained  competitive  by  forcing  cost  adjustments  in  slack  industries.  Britain’s  staple 
trades, he argued, were likely to contract whatever policy was adopted due to increasing 
foreign  competition,  and  the  best  future  for  Britain  lay  with  developing  its  means  of 
invisible earnings and in adjusting its industrial structure towards the production of higher 
quality  goods.  Once  the  arguments  were  in,  Churchill  asked  McKenna,  as  an  ex-
Chancellor, what he would do. In a stark reply, McKenna stated bluntly that there was no 
alternative to a return, though it would he warned, be ‘hell’.83 
Three days later on the 20th March the official decision was formally taken at a 
meeting  between  Norman,  Churchill,  Chamberlain,  Bradbury,  Niemeyer,  and  Baldwin 
(once more the Prime Minister).  It was agreed that Britain  would return to gold at  the 
prewar par, that the embargo on the export of gold would be allowed to expire at the end of 
December, and that there would be an official announcement of the return in the budget 
speech in April. Bank of England licences for the export of gold were to be available in the 
interim, any rise in interest rates was to be delayed until a week after the return in order to 
diminish any criticism of the decision, and the US credits were to be used only in the event 
of a substantial gold outflow.84
Following the decision the Cabinet were now informed,85 and to avoid the need for 
provocative legislation officials  sought to  enlist  the  informal  assistance of the banking 
sector in order to restrict the convertibility of gold for export purposes only. This, it was 
thought,  would make the gold standard easier to manage by reducing the level of gold 
reserves required by the Bank of England and by removing the potential for an internal 
83 The only surviving account of this meeting is in Grigg (1948), pp.182-4.
84 See PRO:T172/1500A; Also see BE:ADM34/14. Norman Diaries 20/3/25. 
85 The official minutes do not record specific Ministerial opinions. PRO:CAB23/49. Cabinet Meetings 
25/3/25, 27/4/25. 
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drain. The bankers however (especially McKenna), were reluctant to become involved and 
only agreed to do so after receiving explicit assurances that the length of their participation 
would be restricted to two years (later extended by a further year in 1927).86 Officials also 
considered applying a temporary limit to the fiduciary issue in order to buttress the anti-
inflationary credibility of the return by ruling out the possibility of a monetary expansion, 
though this idea was rejected. As Norman pointed out, such a move would not only fail to 
bind future governments and would hence lack credibility, but it would also arouse public 
debate  on  monetary  policy  and  would  therefore  be  ‘a  highly  controversial  point  at  a 
moment when sleeping dogs had better be left alone.’87
Concluding Remarks
In 1920 Britain's governing authorities began pursuing a policy of deflation and 
retrenchment in order to clear the way for a return to the gold standard at the prewar par. 
Tight economic policies would drive down prices and wages and raise the value of the 
pound, while disengaging the state from its directly visible control of the economy would 
reduce the expectations of capital and labour, thereby easing the political pressure on the 
state.  Following  this,  the  re-establishment  of  sterling  as  part  of  an  automatic,  fixed 
exchange rate regime would serve to prevent any resurgence of economic and political 
difficulties, confining domestic economic conditions within internationally defined levels, 
and depoliticising monetary and economic policy-making. This, it was hoped, would force 
Britain to remain internationally competitive, encourage producers to shift to newer and 
more  advanced  branches  of  production,  reduce  labour  unrest,  and  increase  the  high 
86 Various in PRO:T176/16; BE:C92/111; BE:G14/312; and BE:G8/56.
87 BE:C40/737. Norman to Strong 27/3/25; 24/4/25; BE:G35/5. Norman to Strong 20/4/25. 
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political freedom of the core executive. By 1922 however this strategy was seen to have 
failed.  Despite  the  removal  of  the  state’s  wartime  controls  economic  conditions  had 
remained politicised,  and growing pressure from capital  and labour over  the effects  of 
deflation had forced the authorities to loosen their economic policy stance. In its place, 
state  officials  turned instead  to  a  ‘waiting policy’ in the hope that  US inflation would 
enable a return to gold at $4.86 with minimal risk and disruption.
This chapter has shown however that by 1924 it was increasingly apparent that this 
strategy too had failed. The prospect of a rise in US prices was diminishing, labour unrest 
had displayed renewed vigour, and key officials were now of the view that more active 
steps needed to be taken in order to address Britain’s economic and political difficulties. As  
such, the governing strategy of the core executive now shifted to one in which a return to 
the gold standard at a deliberately overvalued exchange rate was itself  to be used as a 
means of imposing deflationary financial discipline upon capital and labour. The relatively 
high value of the pound would force a reduction in prices and wages and encourage a 
reorientation of production, while the depoliticisation of monetary and economic policy 
would impose a firm discipline upon the expectations of capital and labour, and would 
displace any pressure over economic conditions away from the state, thereby improving 
the high political freedom of manoeuvre of the authorities. The success or otherwise of this 
strategy is the subject of the next two chapters.
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Chapter 6 : The Golden Shield, 1925-1928
This chapter assesses the gold standard strategy from 1925 to 1928. It shows that in 
economic terms the policy was unsuccessful in forcing any significant competitive 
breakthrough  or  productive  adjustment  from  capital  and  labour,  and  that 
subsequently Britain’s economy continued to struggle. This was made worse by the 
onset  of a global economic crisis  from 1926, and served to constrain rather than 
enhance  the  freedom of  manoeuvre  of  Britain’s  state  managers  as  dissatisfaction 
grew over economic conditions, and as opinion in Britain remained opposed to any 
overtly deflationary pressure.  Conversely however,  the return to gold was largely 
successful  in  removing  the  issue  of  economic  policy-making  from  the  political 
agenda,  and  provided  an  effective  means  of  shielding  state  officials  from social 
disquiet  over  economic  conditions.  Though  the  authorities  were  not  completely 
immune from criticism and pressure, monetary policy was no longer seen to be a key 
political  issue  during  this  time,  and  the  credibility  of  Britain’s  commitment  to 
maintain the par value of sterling was not seriously challenged. Dissatisfaction from 
capital  and  labour  over  economic  conditions  was  for  the  most  part  successfully 
displaced away from the state, and officials  on the whole now enjoyed a greater 
freedom of manoeuvre than they had under the politicised mode of economic policy 
regulation preceding the return to gold.
The Coping Stone
In May 1925 Britain returned to the gold standard at the prewar par of $4.86. The 
Bank of England were legally obliged to convert sterling into gold at the rate of £3 
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17s  10½d  per  standard  ounce,  though  in  contrast  to  the  prewar  system internal 
convertibility and the circulation of gold coin were both now abolished. Sterling was 
exchangeable into gold for international settlements only, and to help ensure this the 
availability of gold was restricted to a minimum purchase of 400 ounces. The return 
also made the Bank formally responsible for the conduct of monetary policy, though 
to provide a degree of flexibility the Gold Standard Act did not specify any minimum 
level for the gold reserves, and nor did it establish any fixed level for the fiduciary 
issue, with at least two years of normal operating experience on the gold standard 
being thought necessary before an appropriate level could be determined.88
More  fundamentally,  the  return  to  gold  at  $4.86  was  the  key  component  of  a 
governing strategy designed to address the long-term economic and political difficulties of 
the British state. As such, the policy had several interrelated objectives. The first of these 
was to secure favourable conditions for capital accumulation and address Britain’s relative 
economic decline. By stabilising the pound on gold, officials hoped to signal that Britain’s 
future economic policies would be governed by the need to maintain the parity of the 
exchange rate, thus reducing and confining the expectations and behaviour of capital and 
labour within these limits. In particular, it was hoped that a credible commitment would 
rule out any inflationary excesses, secure international confidence in sterling, restore and 
safeguard the invisibles earnings capacity of the City, and aid a return to global economic 
stability through encouraging other nations to return to gold. 
In fixing sterling at the prewar parity however, the state authorities not only hoped 
to ensure credibility for the return to gold but also sought to impose deflationary pressure 
on the British economy. With the rise in the pound since mid-1924 having been driven 
88 Various in BE:G35/5; Hawtrey (1933), p.110; Brown Jr (1940), Ch.12; Kemmerer (1944), Chs.5-6.
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largely by speculation of a return to par rather than any real economic improvement, an 
exchange  rate  of  $4.86  was  therefore  too  high  to  accommodate  Britain’s  economic 
activities  at  their  prevailing level of costs  and prices.  As such,  by raising the price  of 
Britain’s  exports  officials  hoped  the  move  would  put  pressure  on  capital  and  labour 
engaged  in  the  staple  trades  to  reduce  wage  costs,  adopt  more  efficient  methods  of 
production, and to move into newer and higher quality lines of production more attuned to 
the  changing demands of the  world market.  As Baldwin put  it,  the high pound would 
impose a ‘necessary and salutory’ discipline upon capital and labour to raise productivity, 
re-organise, and shift to more advanced sectors.89 Moreover, the fall in prices and wages 
would not simply affect the old export trades but would also enable and encourage those 
producing for the domestic market to follow suit, thus helping to reduce prices across the 
whole of Britain’s economy. Even the City would face pressure for adaptation as the high 
interest rates necessitated by the return would constrain any tendency towards excessive 
lending and force the adoption of more prudent financial practices. Describing the situation 
in the City shortly after the return for example, as Norman put it: 
“They have lived for ten years in a dream: they have not had to use their 
wits: they have not been able to help making money and they have not yet 
had time to shake off the habits of thought of these ten years.”90
The high value of the pound was also designed to assist Britain’s competitiveness 
by reducing the price of essential imports (thus helping to lower production costs), and by 
necessitating the adoption of an all-round tight economic policy stance by requiring high 
interest rates, high tax, and restrictions on public spending in order to maintain the parity 
89 Middlemas and Barnes (1969),pp.302ff; Williamson (1999), pp.145ff.
90 BE:G35/5. Norman to Strong 8/5/25.
161
until the economy adjusted.91 Again however, this would impact upon the whole economy. 
As Hawtrey explained, the measures required to maintain par would ‘depress all industries, 
including those which produce for export’.92 In addition, the return to gold would directly 
expose the British economy to the competitive discipline of the world market (a pressure 
compounded  by  a  falling  US  price  level),  forcing  domestic  economic  conditions  to 
conform to those pertaining globally. In this way, the return to gold would not only ensure 
that  Britain  became  economically  competitive,  but  that  it  remained  so.  As  Churchill 
explained, it would ‘shackle us to reality’.93
Alongside  these  economic  benefits  the  gold  standard  strategy  also  contained 
political advantages for Britain’s authorities. By conditioning the expectations of capital 
and labour as to the future economic policy direction of the state, the gold standard would 
help to fragment and confine class struggle to issues within these limits, thus easing the 
pressure on state managers. In addition, by placing legal control of monetary policy in the 
hands of the politically ‘independent’ Bank of England, the return would apparently rule 
out any interference by politicians, thus removing such matters (and hence questions about 
the direction of economic policy as a whole) from the realm of democratic accountability. 
Moreover, placing the Bank within the confines of an international regime constituted by 
the  need to  defend an  exchange rate  set  by  the  government  would also  neutralise  the 
accountability of Bank officials. By depoliticising the issue of economic policy-making in 
this way, the gold standard would thus enable the core executive as a whole to disclaim 
responsibility  for  economic  conditions  and  to  shield  themselves  from  the  unpalatable 
effects of their tight economic policy stance by displacing pressure away from the state, 
91 BE:G35/5. Norman to Strong 26/5/25; PRO:T172/1499B. Niemeyer to Churchill, 21/4/25.
92 BE:G3/15. ‘Industry and Overseas Investments’ (Hawtrey), 23/6/25. My Emphasis.
93 Parliamentary Debates. Vol.183, 4/5/25.
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thus securing a greater freedom of high political manoeuvre.94 As Baldwin put it, the return 
would  provide  ‘the  coping  stone’,  aiding  the  reinvigoration  of  Britain’s  economy  and 
enabling the state to minimise its directly visible economic involvement, which in turn 
would encourage economic efficiency and help keep an enlarged and ‘untrained’ electorate 
away  from  Socialism.95 Finally,  the  regime  would  also  simplify  the  management  of 
monetary policy by providing the authorities with a clear signal in the form of changes in 
the  level  of  the  gold  reserves  as  to  whenever  economic  conditions  in  Britain  were 
diverging  from  those  elsewhere.  Summarising  these  advantages,  as  Churchill  again 
explained:
“If  wages  are,  or  hours  of  labour  are,  out  of  economic  relation  to  our 
competitors, if employers become slack or unenterprising, if the plant of our 
industries  becomes  obsolete,  if  the  organisation  is  antiquated,  if  we 
consume too much or borrow too much or lend too much, all the alarm bells 
begin to ring immediately.”96
The Mountain and the Mouse
The  initial  reaction  to  the  return  to  gold  was  favourable.  The  commitment  to 
maintain the par value was deemed to be credible by the financial markets, the majority of 
press and Parliamentary opinion was largely welcoming, and there was no real criticism 
from either capital or labour.97 The City were strongly approving of the decision, and while 
the FBI felt that the immediate impact would be adverse, any difficulties were believed to 
be temporary and on the whole the step was viewed as being likely to bring long-term 
94 On the political benefits of an independent central bank also see notes by Norman in BE:G1/464.
95 Middlemas and Barnes (1969), pp.302ff; Williamson (1999), pp.145ff.
96 The Times 18/7/25; also see Gilbert (1976), p.128.
97 Parliamentary Debates. Vol.183, 4/5/25, 5/5/25; the Times 29/4/25; Manchester Guardian 29/4/25; Evening 
Standard 29/4/25; Financial Times 30/4/25; Boyce (1988), p.192; Kynaston (1999).
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economic benefits.98 For labour, although the more radical left continued to call for state 
control  of  the banking system and argued that  the  high parity  would damage  exports, 
increase unemployment, and put pressure on wages, the labour movement as a whole were 
largely unmoved by the return. The Labour Party and the TUC censured the government 
merely for having acted with ‘undue precipitancy’, while the TUCGC later noted that the 
labour movement were as yet uncertain as to whether the return would be detrimental to 
industry and trade.99
For  the  authorities,  though  confidence  was  high  the  return  to  gold  was  also 
accompanied by a degree of trepidation. As Norman remarked, ‘we must hope now that the 
‘gamble’ is as promising of success as even the doubters seem to believe.’100 Nonetheless, 
the absence of any significant controversy was viewed with satisfaction, and the move was 
generally deemed to have been a success. Niemeyer for example observed that fears over 
the return had been shown to be unjustified, and while Norman considered initial opinion 
to be ‘hesitating rather than defined’, the decision was also thought to have been ‘well 
received’ and the position to be one of ‘unexpected tranquillity.’ As he put it:
“the transition to free gold has been easier  and has caused not only less 
alarm  but  even  less  interest  than  could  have  been  expected.  We  rather 
prepared for a mountain and have (so far) brought forth a mouse!”101
This initial calm however was short-lived. Though industrial production continued 
to  rise  and  though  wholesale  and  retail  prices  both  fell,  the  balance  of  payments 
98 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/6. Nugent to Sir H. T. M. Roberts 4/5/25; and to F. Percival 6/5/25; 
MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/11. FBI Bulletin 15/5/25. 8(16); Williamson (1984), p.107. 
99 ILP Archives. ‘Twenty Points of Socialism’ (J. Maxton), 1925; The New Leader 8/5/25 XI(5); The 
Workers’ Weekly 8/5/25; Labour Party Annual Report 1925, p.93; MRC:MSS.292/135.01/1. 
‘Unemployment’ (TUCGC), January 1927; Middlemas (1969), p.316; Boyce (1988), p.192.
100 BE:C40/738. Norman to Sir Drummond Fraser 4/5/25. 
101 BE:G35/5. Norman to Strong 8/5/25; BE:C40/737. Norman to Strong 29/4/25; PRO:T172/1499B. 
Niemeyer to Churchill 7/5/25.
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deteriorated as the effects of the return began to assert themselves.102 With their already 
weak competitive position diminished further due to the rise in the pound, employers in the 
old export industries however began to try and overcome the decline not by attempting to 
raise productive efficiency through technological modernisation, capital investment, or by 
moving to more advanced lines of production, but by laying off workers and reducing 
wages. This entailed a direct confrontation with labour and led to a renewal of industrial 
unrest during the summer.103
The major sites of disturbance were located in the textile trades, and particularly in 
the coal industry. Highly dependent on exports, though long in decline and operating with 
outdated technology and production methods, Britain’s coal industry had only managed to 
survive at its present size due to a series of fortuitous events. The First World War, the 
postwar  boom, a  US mining  strike,  and  finally  the  Ruhr  occupation  had all  helped to 
maintain  a  level  of  demand  for  British  coal  far  above  that  which  could  normally  be 
expected. As the world’s production of coal began to rise once more however, and now on 
a larger scale due to retained wartime expansion, the dependency of new European states 
on coal exports, and a flood of German reparations coal, the global supply began to sharply 
exceed  its  demand,  putting  growing  pressure  on  coal  prices.  In  response,  the  Mining 
Association  of  Great  Britain  (MAGB)  sought  to  sustain  their  profits  by  introducing 
substantial  cuts  in  wages  and  lengthening  working  hours.  Such  moves  however  were 
rejected by the MFGB who instead called for a minimum wage,  nationalisation of the 
mines, and industrial restructuring.104 With the situation deadlocked, the government came 
102 Dowie (1968), pp.68-71; Aldcroft (1983), p.93; Alford (1986), pp.20-1.
103 The Sunday Worker 26/7/25 – 16/8/25; Cole (1948), p.416; Laybourn (1993), pp.22-4.
104 MRC:MSS.292/252.61/5-6. ‘Crisis in the Coal mining Industry’ (Various), 30/7/25; ‘The British 
Coalmining Industry’ (MFGB), 1925; MRC:MSS.292/603/1 & 6. ‘The Economic Position of the Coal 
Industry’ (MFGB), May 1925; Daily Herald 27/6/25; the Times 23/7/25; Cole (1948), p.415; Citrine (1964), 
pp.132-6.
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under increasing pressure to find a solution, though Ministers were unwilling to become 
involved. Not only was state intervention in the coal industry a well-established source of 
political trouble, but as Stanley Baldwin put it, the government’s view was that British 
wage levels now needed to be reduced across the board in order to ‘help put industry on its 
feet’.105
Fearing that the attack on the miners was therefore the prelude to a wider attack on 
working class living standards, the TUC lent the MFGB their full support, raising fears of 
an escalation in the unrest. In response, the government established a Court of Inquiry into 
the coal industry, though the subsequent report satisfied no-one.106 Doubtful of their ability 
to deal with any stoppage (with the anti-strike machinery of the early 1920s having been 
run-down), the government now tried to forestall industrial conflict by establishing a Royal 
Commission to examine the coal industry in more detail, and by agreeing to provide a six 
month subsidy to maintain present rates of wages and profits in the meantime. This event, 
known as ‘Red Friday’, was heralded as a great victory by the labour movement and as 
signalling the end of the capitalist attack on working class conditions. In reality though, it 
would prove to be a mere interregnum.107
Besides their more direct impact, these economic difficulties also fuelled criticism 
of the return to gold, calling into question its utility as a means of depoliticising economic 
policy. In a well-publicised addendum to the Court of Inquiry’s report for example, the 
economist Josiah Stamp cited the high pound as a key factor in the problems of the coal 
industry, a view shared by W. A. Lee (an MAGB leader), by the MFGB, and by Herbert 
Smith (an MFGB leader), who stated that the effect of the return was ‘to force a lower 
105 Middlemas and Barnes (1969), p.387; Farman (1972), p.25.
106 Report of the Macmillan Court of Inquiry. Cmd 2478 (1925).
107 The textile dispute was also resolved with the status quo intact. See Citrine (1964), pp.132-9; Renshaw 
(1975), pp.118-24; Laybourn (1993), pp.28-36.
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level of prices in this country, to increase unemployment, and to reduce wages.’108 The 
policy was also further attacked by the labour left, with the ILP, the LRD, and prominent 
figures such as Mosley, Strachey, and John Hill all protesting about its economic effects.109 
The FBI too were now critical, claiming that the return had been ‘somewhat precipitate’ 
and that a combination of the high pound, a lack of US inflation, and resistance to wage 
cuts  was driving Britain into recession.  For their part,  while  the City remained widely 
supportive, McKenna also now rejoined those remonstrating against the policy.110 The most 
studied and influential attack however came from Keynes, who argued that senior officials 
at the Bank and Treasury had miscalculated the discrepancy between British and US prices 
and as such had overvalued sterling by around 10%. This, he claimed, would now require a 
much  greater  level  of  deflation  than  that  anticipated  in  order  to  maintain  the  parity, 
resulting in greater pressure on wages and employment, and leading to a higher risk of 
serious industrial unrest.111
Though some concerns were also evident within official circles, with Hawtrey for 
example complaining that high interest  rates had been ‘disastrous’, the majority of key 
state managers were unmoved by these criticisms.112 The notion that the problems of the 
coal industry were due to the gold standard was summarily dismissed by Churchill with the  
retort  that  he had  ‘never  heard  any argument  more  strange  and so ill-founded’,  while 
Keynes’ claim that the rise in industrial unrest could have been avoided with a managed 
108 Addendum to the Report of the Macmillan Court of Inquiry. Cmd 2478 (1925); MRC:MSS.292/252.61/5-
6. ‘The Mining Dispute’ (TUCGC), 1925; ‘The Coal Crisis’ (MFGB), 22/7/25; Citrine (1964), pp.132-3; 
Farman (1972), pp.22-3; Renshaw (1975), pp.118-22; Laybourn (1993), pp.28-9.
109 MRC:MSS.292/135.2/2. ‘The Economic Position of the Coal Industry’ (TUCGC); Labour Party and TUC 
Annual Reports 1925; The New Leader 7/8/25. XII(6); 4/9/25. XII(10); Monthly Circular of the LRD, 
September 1925. XIV(9); Strachey (1925).
110 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/3/3. ‘Some Causes of the Present Stagnation of British Trade’ (FBIGC), July 1925; 
MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/11. ‘Position of British Trade’ (FBI), Reprinted in the Yorkshire Post 28/7/25; FBI 
Bulletin 30/7/25. 8(21).
111 ‘Unemployment and Monetary Policy’ (Keynes), Evening Standard 22 & 23/7/25; Keynes (1925).
112 BE:ADM16/3. ‘Gold and Bank Rate’ (Hawtrey), 11/7/25. 
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money policy was viewed with derision by the Bank.113 At the Treasury, Niemeyer was 
insistent that Britain’s economic problems were due to ‘many causes’ and that the effects 
of monetary policy were being ‘very greatly exaggerated’ by its critics, and Fisher was 
keen to emphasise that there should be no relaxation of the government’s tight economic 
policy  stance,  pointing  out  that  any  increase  in  public  spending  would  lead  to  rising 
inflation,  higher interest  rates,  and would render  the maintenance  of  the gold standard 
‘impossible’.114 Such a view was also now held by Churchill, who maintained that it was 
essential  to  encourage  economic  adaptation,  labour  flexibility,  and  ‘to  get  the  cost  of 
production down and to get the efficiency of production up’, while a similar point was 
made by Bradbury. As he explained, whilst the pressure on Britain’s struggling industries 
could theoretically have been reduced with a managed money policy or by a return to gold 
at  a lower exchange rate, both would have weakened confidence in sterling and would 
have therefore entailed even higher interest rates in order to prevent a decline in the pound 
and all its associated dangers.  A managed money policy would also,  he claimed,  have 
created exchange rate  instability,  the effects  of  which would be far  more damaging to 
Britain’s exporters than the present need for them to reduce their prices.115
For  key  state  officials  the  present  difficulties  of  Britain’s  exporters  were  not 
therefore seen as evidence that the gold standard was failing, but were rather a sign that it 
was operating as planned. Though resistance to wage cuts in the export trades had forced 
an immediate rise in real wages, these gains were expected to be reversed as the effects of 
the return worked their way through the economy. As Niemeyer put it:
113 The Times 13/7/25; BE:C40/738. Untitled Bank of England Document 27/7/25. 
114 PRO:T176/21. Niemeyer to Baldwin 26/6/25; Sir Warren Fisher to Baldwin 25/5/25; PRO:T208/105. 
‘Gold Standard Results’ (Niemeyer), 4/8/25.
115 The Times 18/7/25; ‘The Gold Standard : A Reply to Mr. Keynes’ (Bradbury), Financial News 12/8/25. 
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“as the process continues money wages will drop, real wages remaining in 
the previous relation to cost of living and wholesale prices. As wholesale 
prices are now in near correlation to world prices, when this happens, the 
temporary export handicap will have disappeared.”116
The Golden Shield
Though now formally in control of monetary policy, the Bank of England however 
were  unable  to  completely  ignore  public  opinion  for  fear  of  the  potential  political 
repercussions, and in August interest rates were cut to 4.5% in a bid to ease the strain. The 
move  though  failed  to  quell  concerns  over  the  economy  and  pressure  for  a  further 
reduction grew, now strengthened by a large influx of gold from France which swelled the 
Bank’s reserves, and by pressure from Churchill, increasingly concerned about the political 
consequences of continued high unemployment.117 The picture, as Norman observed, was 
now a mixed one:
“We seem to have slipped back to Gold with fewer pains and penalties than 
was generally expected – but we are not out of the wood yet. London still 
has to re-start as a free lender to all and sundry, while the industrial position 
in general and the coal position in particular are deplorable : they might 
jeopardise stability anywhere.”118
With the pressure continuing to rise, Norman was forced to cut rates in October to 
4% despite  the inflationary dangers,  explaining to Strong that nothing else would have 
done more ‘to silence criticism of the gold standard.’ In addition, to reduce the risk of 
similar difficulties arising in the future, the Bank also began to accumulate a secret hoard 
of US dollars in order to enable them to manipulate the exchange rate without attracting 
undue attention.119
116 PRO:T176/21. Niemeyer to Baldwin 26/6/25; PRO:T208/105. ‘Gold Standard Results’, 4/8/25. 
117 BE:G1/515. A. G. Anderson to Norman 7/8/25; BE:G35/5. Norman to Strong 21/8/25; PRO:T176/13 Pt.2. 
Norman to Niemeyer 21/9/25.
118 BE:G30/14. Norman to Sir Edward Cook 14/9/25.
119 BE:G35/5. Norman to Strong 23/11/25; BE:ADM34/14. Norman Diaries 19/10/25; BE:G3/182. Norman 
to Blackett 27/10/25; Sayers (1976), pp.214-20.
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In November however the situation worsened as the informal embargo on foreign 
lending in place since the end of 1924 was removed, unleashing a flood of new issues and 
leading to a weakening of sterling. This was compounded by renewed speculation in New 
York, which caused a large outflow of capital and forced Norman to put interest rates back 
to  5% in December  to  defend the  parity.120 The move led to  renewed protests  against 
monetary  policy.  The  FBI  were  sharply  critical  of  the  decision,  and  the  labour  left 
continued to argue that the gold standard was damaging Britain’s trade and industry, and 
was putting pressure on wages and employment. The rise also stirred further displeasure 
within official circles, with Churchill unable to contain his anger at the Bank’s decision, 
and with Hawtrey declaring it to be nothing short of a ‘national disaster’.121
Despite  these difficulties  however,  as  a  political  strategy the  gold  standard can 
nevertheless  be  seen  to  have  successfully  established  a  credible  economic  policy 
framework and on the whole  to  have shielded state officials  from political  stress  over 
economic conditions. For all the apparent furore over interest rates, monetary policy was 
not a major political issue, the majority of British opinion remained either uninterested in, 
or  unconcerned  about  the  subject,  and  only  a  minority  attributed  Britain’s  economic 
problems to the return to gold. The return had also successfully displaced responsibility for 
economic conditions away from the authorities, and generally speaking neither capital or 
labour now held state officials to be responsible for Britain’s economic difficulties. Despite 
official sensitivities to criticism, the authorities were thus now under less pressure than in 
more recent years in which they had been forced to operate  a managed money policy. 
Britain’s commitment to maintain the par value of sterling had not been challenged, the 
120 BE:G3/182. Norman to Blackett 27/10/25; to W. H. Clegg 8/12/25; Sayers (1976), pp.214-20.
121 PRO:T176/13. ‘The Credit Situation’ (Hawtrey), 5/12/25; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/12. FBI Bulletin 
30/1/26. 9(2); The New Leader (January-April 1926 issues); the Times 2/1/26; Daily Herald 1/10/26; Clay 
(1957), pp.293-5; Sayers (1976), pp.216-17.
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troubles of the export industries had not led to a wider resurgence of unrest, organised 
labour remained numerically weak, and industrial action as a whole was relatively low. The 
number of new stoppages during 1925 was 15% less than in 1924, while the number of 
working days lost were now at their lowest levels since the war.122
Furthermore,  although  many  on  the  labour  left  continued  to  press  for 
nationalisation of the banking system, others such as the CPGB paid little  attention to 
monetary  policy,  and  mainstream labour  too  remained  primarily  concerned  with  more 
traditional issues. Though supporting the general principle of banking nationalisation, the 
Labour Party conference for example rejected calls to devise specific means of doing so, a 
special trade union conference on unemployment emphasised the long-term nature of the 
problem and did not apportion any blame to the return to gold, while TUC representations 
to the Minister of Labour (Sir Arthur Steel Maitland), the President of the Board of Trade 
(Sir Cunliffe-Lister), the Prime Minister, and the Chancellor all failed to broach the issue 
of monetary policy.123 Indeed, as one observer put it, the working classes were about as 
interested in the subject ‘as they were in the nebular hypothesis.’124
Instead, labour attributed Britain’s problems to a number of other factors, including 
the global economic situation and the ‘natural’ process of structural change. Though citing 
the return to gold as a contributory factor in the coal dispute for example, both the MFGB 
and the TUC regarded it as of relatively minor importance, and considered the primary 
cause of the crisis to be the poor industrial organisation and management of the MAGB.125 
122 Einzig (1932), p.44; Clay (1957), p.139; Butler and Butler (1994), p.373; Hallwood and MacDonald 
(2000), p.346.
123 Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1925; MRC:MSS.292/252.61/5. ‘Report of the Special TUC 
Conference’, 24/7/25; Lansbury’s Labour Weekly 27/2/26, 12/6/26, 20/11/26; the Workers Weekly (1925 
issues).
124 F. Heaviside at the Labour Party conference. Labour Party Annual Report 1925, pp.262-6.
125 MRC:MSS.292/252.61/6. ‘The Economic Position of the Coal Industry’ (MFGB), May 1925; ‘The Coal 
Crisis’, (MFGB), 22/7/25; ‘Copies of all Official Documents and Communications Received and Issued in 
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The failure of employers more generally to modernise British industry was also regarded 
by the wider labour movement as the key element in Britain’s economic difficulties. Calls 
from mainstream labour for greater state intervention besides the nationalisation of the coal 
industry remained limited to schemes for the alleviation of unemployment through work or 
welfare,  and the  solution to  Britain’s ills  was chiefly  considered to  lay with  industrial 
restructuring in order to reduce production costs and improve competitiveness.126 As one 
joint  TUC-Labour  Party  report  put  it,  the  ‘real  remedy’ was  ‘the  adoption  of  better 
appliances and equipment, and improved organisation.’127 
Representatives  of  capital  were  also  of  the  view  that  the  principal  source  of 
Britain’s difficulties did not lie with the return to gold. Though Lord Weir, the President of 
the NCEO, argued that the return had been a ‘severe strain’, as T. B. Johnston, one of the 
few  industrialists  actively  opposed  to  the  gold  standard  bemoaned,  protests  from 
employers  against  the  policy  at  this  time  were  ‘practically  non-existent’.128 The 
overwhelming  majority  of  City  opinion  remained  in  favour  of  the  regime  despite 
McKenna’s criticisms, the MAGB also regarded the gold standard to be but one of several 
factors contributing to the coal crisis, and despite their concerns the FBI also argued that it 
was impossible to determine the extent to which the return had added to the problems of 
British  industry.  For  the  majority  of  industrial  opinion,  the  key  factor  was  instead 
considered to be the excessively high costs of production compared to those of competitor 
Connection with the Present Crisis’ (MFGB), 1925; ‘The Mining Dispute’ (TUCGC), 1925; Daily Herald 
21/5/25, 7/7/25; the Times 22/6/25; TUC Annual Report 1925.
126 Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1925; MRC:MSS.292/135.01/3. ‘Notes for TUCGC 
Unemployment Deputation’ (TUC/Labour Party), December 1925; MRC:MSS.292/135/5. ‘Notes on the 
Proposed Subsidy for the Shipbuilding Industry’ (TUC/Labour Party), November 1925; 
MRC:MSS.292/100/1. ‘The Possibility of a Higher Standard of Living Under Capitalism’ (TUCGC), March 
1927; also various in MRC:MSS.292/135.2/3.
127 Labour Party Annual Report 1925, pp.46-8.
128 PRO:CAB24/179. NCEO Deputation to the Prime Minister 20/4/26; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/6. T. B. 
Johnston to the Editor of the National Review 26/1/26.
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nations, and the main solution was seen to be cuts in wages, and reductions in tax and 
public spending rather than any change in monetary policy.129
The credibility of the gold standard can thus be seen to have acted as an effective 
constraint on the future expectations of capital and labour, and for most the regime was 
now simply seen as something to which Britain had to adjust. While many on the labour 
left continued to criticise, neither the TUC nor the Labour Party were now opposed to the 
regime as-such, and even the arch-critic Keynes was now arguing the need to work within 
the confines of the gold standard framework, claiming that if the policy led to a significant 
shift  away  from  the  old  export  industries  then  it  may  well  have  been  ‘a  blessing  in 
disguise.’130 From industry, as Roland Nugent  (a chief FBI economic advisor) explained, 
the task was not to challenge but to ‘put up with the position’ that the government had 
created, while as Charles Tennyson (the FBI’s Deputy Director) pointed out, the Federation 
now had no option but to accept the rigours of the regime since it was ‘very difficult to see 
what  definite  Government  action  could  be  possibly  undertaken’.  Tennyson  further 
observed  that  while  the  Federation  had  been  free  to  engage  in  open  discussion  of 
alternative monetary policies before the return, doing so now ‘would be tantamount to 
recommending  that  we  should  relinquish  the  gold  standard’,  something  to  which  the 
majority of the FBI were opposed and which was therefore ‘unthinkable’. Moreover,  the 
FBI were also optimistic about Britain’s future economic prospects and continued to regard 
the present difficulties as temporary. Britain’s return to gold was thought to be a key step 
129 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/11-12. FBI Bulletins 30/7/25. 8(21); 30/1/26. 9(2); PRO:T160/463. ‘The Gold 
Standard’; PRO:T176/21. Nugent to Churchill 15/10/25; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/6. P. G. Swann to the 
FBI. 14/7/25; FBI General Economic Dept. to Rowntree & Co. Ltd. 17/8/25; Nugent to Norman 15/10/25; 
MRC:MSS.292/252.61/6. ‘The Economic Position of the Coal Industry’, (MFGB). May 1925; ‘The British 
Coalmining Industry’ (MFGB), 1925; ‘Position of British Trade’ (FBI), reprinted in the Yorkshire Post 
28/7/25.
130 Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1925; Keynes (1951), pp.241-2.
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towards the restoration of international economic stability, and the gap between British and 
US prices would, it was thought, soon be eliminated either by US inflation and/or a mild 
domestic deflation.131
The Trial of the Strikes
In  spring  1926  industrial  tensions  in  Britain  rose  once  more  as  the  Royal 
Commission on the coal industry published its report. Rejecting longer hours, though also 
rejecting nationalisation and advocating limited wage cuts and an end to the subsidy, the 
report satisfied neither the MAGB or the MFGB, and with the TUC now threatening a 
sympathetic strike if the miners’ requirements were not met, industrial conflict once more 
seemed inevitable. The government though were still unwilling to become involved. State 
intervention, it was thought, would merely turn the authorities into a scapegoat for all the 
problems of the industry and would reduce the pressure for increased efficiency, leading to 
higher production costs and lower competitiveness. The government had also spent the last 
six months strengthening their anti-strike machinery and were now keen to resolve the 
matter  for  good.  Following  the  rejection  of  the  report  and  a  flurry  of  acrimonious 
negotiations, the MAGB announced sharp reductions in wages, provoking another strike 
declaration from the MFGB, who were subsequently locked out. At the end of April the 
subsidy also expired, and with the government refusing to grant any further concessions, 
the TUC decided to carry out their strike threat. The so-called ‘general’ strike (though only 
the  ‘first  line’ of  workers  such  as  those  in  the  transport,  heavy  metals,  building,  and 
131 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/6. Nugent to P. G. Swann 21/7/25; to Sir H. T. M. Roberts 4/5/25; C. Tennyson 
to T. B. Johnston 15/2/26; 24/2/26; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/3/3. ‘Some Causes of the Present Stagnation of 
British Trade’ (FBI), July 1925; ‘Position of British Trade’ (FBI), Reprinted in the Yorkshire Post 28/7/25; 
Boyce (1988), p.192.
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printing industries were ever called out) lasted for nine days and was presented by the 
government as a revolutionary challenge. The real aim of the TUC however was merely to 
secure a fair deal for the miners, and as the realisation dawned that the government would 
not  compromise  the  TUCGC  unilaterally  decided  to  call  off  their  action,  leaving  the 
miners, who were eventually defeated six months later, to continue struggling alone.132
The conventional view of the general strike is that this was primarily caused by the 
effects of the return to the gold standard at the prewar par. With the high pound having 
made  Britain’s  coal  exports  more  expensive,  thereby  leading  the  MAGB  into  a 
confrontation with the MFGB and the wider labour movement, the return is frequently held 
to have been the major cause of the unrest, and as such the strike is seen to provide firm 
evidence  that  the  policy  was a  disaster.133 Indeed,  similar  views  were  even present  in 
contemporary circles. Both the MAGB and the MFGB for instance considered the return to 
gold to have been a causal factor in the coal and general strikes, Blackett later claimed that 
they ‘were the natural sequel of the return to the old gold par’, and Churchill too later 
spoke of the return as having led to ‘fierce labour disputes.’ Many on the labour left also 
blamed the gold standard for the crisis, with even Citrine, the TUC’s General Secretary 
now claiming that monetary policy was ‘damaging in every way’, while for their part the 
FBI were now claiming that their warnings over the return had now been ‘fully borne out 
by events’. Both the FBI and the TUC also later attributed the general strike to the return to 
gold in their evidence to the Macmillan committee on the relations between Finance and 
132 On these events see PRO:CAB24/179; TUC Annual Report 1925, pp.158-9; Citrine (1964), p.167ff; 
Middlemas (1969a), p.76; Farman (1972); Arnot (1975); Renshaw (1975); Morris (1976); Phillips (1976); 
Laybourn (1993): Some on the left did see the strike as a revolutionary opportunity. See for example 
Lansbury’s Labour Weekly 1/5/26.
133 See for example Renshaw (1975), ps.108-9, 251-2; Kindleberger (1986), p.42; Boyce (1988), p.193; 
Ziebura (1990), p.35; Laybourn (1993), p.14; Kynaston (1999), p.126.
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Industry.134
The truth of the matter however is less clear-cut. While it cannot be denied that the 
return to gold was undoubtedly a causal factor  in the unrest,  it  is  also clear that  other 
factors played a more important role. Britain’s export industries (especially coal) would 
have faced great difficulties regardless of monetary policy due to their continued failure to 
modernise and adjust to the changing demands of the global economy, and it is almost 
certain that industrialists (especially in the old export trades) would have therefore still 
sought to force down wages in order to sustain profits. Indeed, what is most striking about 
domestic opinion at this time is that for the most part the gold standard was not thought to 
be chiefly responsible for Britain’s economic and social problems. As such, despite the 
strikes the return to gold can therefore be seen instead to have successfully depoliticised 
monetary policy, and to have effectively displaced responsibility over economic conditions 
away from the state. Neither the MAGB nor the MFGB for instance held monetary policy 
to be of primary importance in the strikes, with the former continuing to blame high wages,  
and with the latter continuing to blame factors such as the global economic situation and 
the inefficient organisation of the coal industry.135 Furthermore, in contrast to their later 
claims, neither the FBI nor the TUC made any significant link between the strikes and the 
return to gold during this period. The FBI did not refer to the gold standard as being a key 
influence, the TUC also primarily blamed the economic organisation and management of 
the coal industry, and the TUCGC made no mention of monetary policy either in their 
134 The Times 26/5/26; The New Leader 2/7/26. XIII(38); Lansbury’s Labour Weekly 30/4/27; 
MRC:MSS.292/252.61/5. ‘Statement on the General Strike’ (MFGB), 12/1/27; BE:G1/506. ‘Economic 
Developments in Post-War Britain’ (Blackett), 1935, p.16; PRO:T175/11. Churchill to Niemeyer 9/4/27; 
MRC:MSS.126/EB/FI/46/3 & 47/5. Evidence to the Committee on Finance and Industry by the FBI 
(26/2/30) and by the TUCGC (12/4/30); Citrine (1964), pp.137-8.
135 Various in MRC:MSS.292/252.61/3-6, including ‘Statement on Owners Proposals’ (MFGB), 27/4/26; ‘The 
Coal Situation’ (TUCGC), 6/9/26; ‘Mining Crisis 1926’, (TUCGC); the Times 22/5/26.
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internal discussions during the crisis or in their subsequent review of events.136 The TUC 
and Labour Party conferences also neglected the return to gold, and the issue was even 
ignored by a TUC deputation to the Minister of Labour sent to discuss the unrest.137 The 
subject was also largely overlooked by the labour left in their interpretations of the strikes, 
and subsequent accounts by Snowden, Arthur Pugh (the TUC President),  A. J. Cook (a 
radical MFGB leader), and H. Fyfe (editor of the labour paper the Daily Herald) also failed 
to yield any reference to the gold standard. The NCEO too, despite the views of Lord Weir, 
placed the responsibility not on the return to gold but on excessive trade union power.138
Moreover, the unrest also failed to generate serious concerns within official circles 
of any threat to the gold standard strategy. Though at the time the Bank of England were 
worried about the effects of the coal and general strikes on sterling, refraining from any 
rise in interest rates during the crisis in order to maintain financial confidence and ensure 
the availability of domestic credit, there is no evidence to suggest that such concerns were 
borne out of anything other than short-term anxiety, and Cabinet discussions also reveal no 
concerns that the strategy was under serious threat.139 Though remaining sensitive to any 
open debate of monetary policy the authorities did not therefore believe the strategy was 
now unravelling.  As Niemeyer  put  it  for  example,  while  open discussion  of  monetary 
policy was ‘ill-advised’, unlikely to help sterling, and that ‘the less said on it the better’, 
the recent experiences had shown that apprehensions over the return to gold ‘were not well 
founded’.140 Moreover,  the  unrest  also  failed  to  damage  the  credibility  of  Britain’s 
136 Various in MRC:MSS.292/252.61/4; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/12. FBI Bulletins (1926 issues). 
137 Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1926.
138 Cook (1926); Fyfe (1926); Snowden (1934), pp.725-34; the Workers Weekly (1926 issues); Lansbury’s 
Labour Weekly 22/5/26; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/34/1. ‘Government’s Proposed Amendment of Trade Union 
Law’ (NCEO), 5/10/26; MRC:MSS.292/252.61/3. ‘The Development of the Mining Crisis’ (Pugh).
139 BE:OV32/2. Norman to Strong 15/4/26; BE:G8/57. Committee of Treasury Minutes 28/4/26, 5/5/26; 
Various in PRO:CAB24/179.
140 PRO:T208/55. Niemeyer to Sir Sydney Chapman 15/5/26. 
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commitment to the gold standard in the eyes of the world’s financial markets, and just five 
days after the end of the general strike sterling reached a par with the dollar on New York 
for the first time since 1914.141 With the pound having successfully withstood the trial of 
the strikes, state officials were now convinced that the main danger to their position had 
passed. The American credits obtained for the return in 1925 were discontinued, and J. P. 
Morgan (the government’s US financial agents) declared this to be the ‘final proof’ that 
Britain’s return to gold had been a success.142
The  unrest  also  failed  to  provide  the  catalyst  for  an  upsurge  in  criticism  of 
monetary policy, and for most people the subject still failed to arouse much interest. The 
majority of the labour movement  remained primarily concerned with traditional  issues, 
while labour’s discontent over economic conditions was now directed mainly at employers 
rather  than  state  officials.  Despite  ongoing calls  from the  left  for  an  enquiry  into  the 
economic  effects  of  monetary  policy,  for  the  public  control  of  credit,  and  for  an 
expansionary policy,143 and despite continued labour attacks on the government over the 
persistence of high unemployment (with one Labour Party report  arguing that the state 
bore  ‘the  major  part  of  the  responsibility’),  for  the  most  part  calls  for  greater  state 
intervention outside the coal industry remained limited, and the true remedy for Britain’s 
economic ills was still  considered to be industrial  re-organisation and modernisation.144 
Monetary policy also remained an uncontentious issue for the ranks of capital. The City 
were still staunchly in favour of the gold standard, the FBI and the NCEO were not greatly 
concerned with the subject, and though there was some dissatisfaction within the ABCC, 
141 Daily News 17/5/26.
142 BE:G1/464. J. P. Morgan (New York) to E. C. Grenfell 12/5/27; Einzig (1932), p.124.
143 Marquand (1977), ps.452-4, 478; Pimlott (1977), p.61; Lansbury’s Labour Weekly (1926 issues).
144 Lansbury’s Labour Weekly 27/2/26, 16/6/26, 20/11/26; Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1926; 
MRC:MSS.292/135.01/6. ‘‘On the Dole’ – or off!’ (Report of the Joint Committee on the Prevention of 
Unemployment), p.12; also see the separate report and notes by Colonel J. C. Wedgwood 9/7/26. 
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an attempt to establish an internal enquiry into its effects was unsuccessful. The FBI, the 
NCEO and the ABCC also made no calls for a revision in monetary policy, maintaining 
that  the  best  means  of  improving  productivity  and competitiveness  was  through lower 
production costs.145
‘So Much To Be Done’
At the same time as the 1926 strikes failed to damage the gold standard strategy in 
terms  of  depoliticisation  and  the  displacement  of  pressure  over  economic  conditions 
however,  they also compounded Britain’s lack of economic adjustment.  Though Britain 
enjoyed  a  period  of  relative  prosperity  from  1927  to  1929,  unemployment  remained 
chronically high and the old export  industries continued to languish.  Moreover,  despite 
also  leading  to  a  numerical  weakening  of  organised  labour,  with a  fall  in  trade  union 
membership of more than 10% between 1926-28, the unrest was not followed by any great 
moves by employers towards cutting wages or lengthening hours, and only a minority such 
as Sir Alfred Mond and Sir Hugo Hirst (establishing ICI and General Electric respectively 
in 1926) engaged in any serious industrial restructuring. As a whole, Britain’s economy 
thus experienced no significant modernisation or adjustment, and its relative international 
decline  continued  unabated  as  competitor  nations  continued  to  press  ahead  with 
improvements  in  productive  methods  and  technology.  The  growth  of  newer  and more 
advanced industries also remained insufficient to offset the stagnation of the staple trades, 
and though import prices fell, production costs remained comparatively high due to the 
145 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/1, 3, & 6. Sir Max Muspratt to Neville Chamberlain 13/10/26; Memo. to the 
Prime Minister 30/11/26; ‘Industry’s Burden’ (FBI), December 1926; MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C531 Pt.1. 
Secretary of the ABCC to the secretary of the NCEO, 11/2/26; MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C625 Pt.7. Report on 
the Industrial Situation (NCEO), May 1926; PRO:T208/55. ABCC Report 22/4/26. 
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persistence of inefficient practices and pre-1926 wage levels. In addition, with Britain’s 
wholesale  and  retail  prices  both  gradually  continuing  to  fall,  real  wages  for  those  in 
employment  (though  16%  below  their  1920  peak)  also  continued  to  rise.  While  the 
authorities  had  therefore  survived  the  strikes,  as  Norman was keen to  point  out,  there 
remained ‘so much to be done.’146
The reasons for this lack of adjustment were varied. British labour for example was 
relatively immobile, with slow migration from areas of mass unemployment (such as the 
North and in South Wales) to areas of expansion (such as the Midlands and the South 
East),  while  many of  Britain’s  old  industries  were still  able  to  make sufficient  profits 
despite their economic problems, and thus lacked the incentive to embark on an expensive 
switch to new lines of production. The structure of Britain’s old industries was also still 
essentially the same as it  had been during the nineteenth century,  comprised mainly of 
family  firms strongly  resistant  to  improving productivity  through mergers,  while  those 
amalgamations which did take place were also frequently designed as a defensive move 
pursued in a bid to evade the need for adjustment.147 Industrial change was also hampered 
by a lack of access to capital, with many firms unable to accumulate sufficient investment 
funds out of their own profits due to the burden of high tax and debt servicing, and with 
Britain’s banks still heavily extended to British industry, many remained unwilling to make 
any  significant  new  advances  for  the  purposes  of  reconstruction  or  to  endanger  their 
146 BE:ADM34/15. Norman Diaries 20/5/26: Figures calculated from Board of Trade (1930); Report of the 
Committee on Finance and Industry. Cmd 3897 (1931). Table 3, Appendices IV and VI; Dowie (1968), 
pp.68-71; Moggridge (1969), pp.83-4; Feinstein (1972) Tables 2, 37, 51, 52, 57, 65; Clegg (1985), p.421; 
Alford (1986), pp.20-1; Gazeley and Rice (1992), pp.326-31; Butler and Butler (1994), ps.373-5, 383-5; 
Feinstein et al (1997), Tables 1.6, 4.4, 4.3.
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Branson (1977), pp.140-2; Best and Humphries (1987), pp.231-2; Heim (1987), pp.240-56; Tolliday (1987), 
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existing investments by forcing adjustment through the pressure of bankruptcy.148
These factors alone however cannot fully account for the continuation of Britain’s 
faltering economic performance. There is no evidence to suggest for example that Britain’s 
employers would have been more willing to engage in significant restructuring even had 
conditions for such an undertaking been more favourable, and labour immobility did not 
impede the growth of Britain’s new industries, which were not short of manpower. The key 
causes  behind  Britain’s  economic  failings  instead  lay  primarily  in  the  retrogressive 
attitudes  of  employers  (especially  in  the  old  export  trades),  who remained  wedded  to 
outmoded  technology  and  production  methods,  and  in  the  resistance  of  labour  to  any 
further compression of living standards, especially reductions in wages. 
These factors were clearly evidenced during the events of 1925-26. Provoked by 
the insistence of employers in the export trades that improvements in competitiveness were 
to come through wage cuts  and longer hours rather than industrial  re-organisation,  the 
unrest  served notice as to labour’s willingness to resist  any diminishing of their  living 
standards and of the high costs  that  would be incurred in  trying to force the issue.  In 
recognition of the fact that overt class struggle was now at a stalemate, the strikes were 
followed by an ‘industrial truce’, with employers keen to return to orderly business, and 
with labour now demoralised and weakened by the failure of direct action.149 As a result, 
industrial unrest declined markedly during 1927-28. The average number of working days 
lost was now nearly 90% lower, and the average number of new disputes over 50% lower 
than the annual average for 1922-25 (a period in which labour unrest was itself starting to 
subside from its postwar heights).150 
148 Clay (1957), ps.231, 332-42; Heim (1987), pp.240-55; Eichengreen (1993), pp.144-5.
149 Cole (1948), p.428.
150 Calculated from Butler and Butler (1994), p.373.
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The industrial truce was formalised in September 1926 with the establishment of 
talks between representatives of the TUC (led by the TUCGC chairman, Ben Turner) and a 
group of employers headed by Sir Alfred Mond.151 Though the FBI and the NCEO initially 
refused to participate in the talks, by 1927 a separate series of tripartite discussions had 
also been established with the TUC. With employers keen not to antagonise labour for fear 
of a future backlash, it was now deemed expedient to engage in a dialogue while the terms 
were still favourable.152
Though ensuring industrial stability, the class stalemate now further impeded the 
process of economic adjustment insofar as it entailed the forcing down of British prices via 
the compression of working class living standards. Despite this however,  state  officials 
remained unwilling to  become more directly and visibly involved in  order to force an 
adjustment  and continued to  insist  on  the  need  for  increased  economic  efficiency and 
adaptation.153 Direct state intervention remained limited to measures designed to encourage 
private enterprise (such as the establishment of the National Grid in 1926, set up in part to 
facilitate the adoption of mass production techniques), and to curtail the disruptive ability 
of labour, such as the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act of 1927 which introduced 
severe  restrictions  on  industrial  action.154 Nevertheless,  though  keen  to  minimise  their 
responsibility and involvement, Ministers were also aware of the political dangers posed 
by continued economic atrophy. As such, the government turned to the Bank of England, 
(already now tentatively involved with industrial restructuring in the armaments industry), 
whom it  was felt could encourage economic adjustment  through the provision of fresh 
151 TUC Annual Report 1928., pp.407-12; Cole (1948), pp.427-8; Citrine (1964), pp.246-9.
152 Various in MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/6; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/3/11.
153 Labour Party Annual Report 1927, p.97; PRO:BT55/49. ‘The Economic Situation in the United Kingdom 
1922-7’ (Cunliffe-Lister); PRO:CAB24/184. ‘Trade Union and Trade Disputes Bill’ (Steel-Maitland), 
23/3/27. 
154 Cole (1948), pp.423-9; Fulcher (1991), pp.120-1.
182
capital and the application of financial pressure without the attendant political risks. For 
the Bank’s part,  though also reluctant to accept any greater responsibility for economic 
conditions, officials were concerned that the government might be compelled to extend its 
involvement if they did not, and that this might lead to the possible nationalisation of the 
Bank itself. Moreover, Bank officials also felt that it would be impossible to confine state 
assistance to selected industries,  and that this would merely widen the clamour ‘to get 
some of the Government dope’ and delay the ‘more radical cure’ of industrial restructuring 
and amalgamation. As such, although the Bank now succumbed to government pressure 
and became increasingly involved with those parts of British industry in most difficulty, 
they also remained emphatic that their assistance would be strictly limited, and that the 
provision of new capital would have to be preceded by industrial restructuring.155
The Global Crisis
During the latter half of 1926, just as the world appeared to be recovering from 
over a decade of trauma, with many countries now back on gold and with the international 
economy enjoying a mild boom, global conditions again began to deteriorate.156 This was 
expressed as a growing unevenness in conditions for the exploitation of labour within the 
global  circuit  of  capital,  assuming  the  more  concrete  form of  a  disequilibrium firstly 
between  the  various  branches  of  the  world  economy,  and  secondly  between  national 
conditions for capital accumulation. For the former, the disproportionality was manifest in 
the overproduction and subsequent decline in the price of key commodities such as coal, 
155 BE:ADM34/16. Norman Diaries 21/11/27; BE:G14/55. Committee of Treasury Extracts; BE:OV9/479. 
Niemeyer to Grigg 19/7/28; Clay (1957), pp.320-59; Boyle (1967), pp.208-22; Sayers (1976), Ch.14; Heim 
(1984), pp.535-6; Kynaston (1999), pp.131ff.
156 Kenwood and Lougheed (1971), pp.193-4; Eichengreen (1992), p.192.
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heavy metals, and agricultural goods. This was not simply a result of the strains and the 
aftermath of the war, but was also due to the secular spread of industrialisation driven by 
capital’s  search  for  ever  greater  surplus  value  extraction,  and  by  the  uncoordinated 
character of capitalist  production ignoring the limits of the market.157 For the latter, the 
unevenness took the geographical form of a sharpening contrast between conditions for 
capital accumulation in most parts of the world, with those in America (now the world’s 
most productive economy),  leading to a vast expansion of global debt and a growth in 
speculation on the New York stock market. The roots of this crisis lay in the attempt by the 
United States to facilitate the postwar reconstruction of the world economy by providing a 
series  of large foreign loans,  primarily to Latin  America and Germany under the 1924 
Dawes  scheme.  For  the  most  part  however,  these  loans  were  not  invested  by  their 
recipients in ways that would ensure the smooth expansion of global capital accumulation, 
or  that  would  enable  them  to  repay  the  debt,  but  were  largely  invested  in  already 
overexpanded sectors  such  as  primary  goods,  or  were  spent  on  unproductive  schemes 
designed to contain social tensions and shore up balance of payments weaknesses such as 
public works and welfare provisions.158
The  continued  disparity  in  global  conditions  for  capital  accumulation  meant 
consequently that despite the huge scale of American foreign lending (around $6.4 billion 
between 1924-29) the United States nonetheless remained a net importer of world capital 
in the form of gold, further exacerbating its global maldistribution.159 In addition, the US 
economy was itself now also exhibiting signs of overproduction, with a swathe of mergers 
and the development of mass production techniques during the past decade having raised 
157 See for example Kenwood and Lougheed (1971), Chs.11-13; Ziebura (1990), passim.
158 Kindleberger (1986), pp.39-41; Marichal (1989), Ch.7; Feinstein et al (1997), Table 5.2; Bulmer-Thomas 
(1998), p.70.
159 Kenwood and Lougheed (1971), pp.198-9; Marichal (1989), Ch.7.
184
the growth of American industrial output far above that of real per capita income.160 As US 
producers  curtailed  by  international  and  domestic  overaccumulation  now  found  it 
increasingly difficult to maintain present levels of production at a sufficient rate of profit, 
and  as  fears  of  a  domestic  recession  therefore  began to  grow,  American  industry  and 
commerce  sought  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  the  overproduction  crisis  with  an 
expansion of domestic (especially consumer) credit. As such, by the latter half of the 1920s 
the scale of economic activity in both the global and US circuits of capital was thus being 
increasingly sustained only on the basis of an ever-growing mountain of debt.161
The problems within the US circuit of productive capital were also adding to the 
expansion of the US circuit of money capital, and hence to the growth of speculation on 
Wall  St.,  as capital  increasingly sought to bypass the need to engage in the productive 
exploitation of labour and instead sought to gain expansion on a purely financial basis.162 
Attempts by the FRBNY to address this with higher interest rates however, served merely 
to compound the magnetism of the United States for international capital and also forced 
central banks around the world to raise interest rates in defence of their gold reserves. As 
higher rates added to the burden of debtor nations by putting further downward pressure on 
world  commodity  prices  (especially  of  the  primary  goods  on  which  debtors  were 
frequently dependent) many states, particularly in Latin America, began to experience an 
intensification  of  their  balance  of  payments  difficulties.  As  the  crisis  deepened,  many 
debtor nations now found themselves unable to respond with higher interest rates due to 
economic weakness and domestic resistance to deflation, and instead turned to a further 
expansion of primary goods production and to even greater borrowing in a bid to sustain 
160 Soule (1947), passim; Beaudreau (1996), Tables A3.2, A3.6.
161 Soule (1947), passim; Clay (1957), p.226; Ziebura (1990), pp.41ff; Eichengreen (1992), pp.193-2.
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their position.163
The impact of these events on the British state was felt  in the form of renewed 
pressure  upon  the  reserves  of  the  Bank  of  England.  Gold  was  lost  to  the  US  for 
speculation; to France as refugee capital returned following the cessation of the financial 
crisis;  and to Germany, which was now borrowing heavily  from London to  sustain its 
balance of payments. The drain was also enhanced by an excessively high level of foreign 
lending by the City, and by a deterioration in the current account, both of which weakened 
sterling.164 The  Bank however  were  now constrained  in  their  response  by  the  political 
concerns surrounding the condition of the British economy. With unemployment rising, 
with industry struggling, with Churchill growing ever more anxious, and with the Bank 
themselves keen to avoid any adverse public opinion, considerations of a rise in interest 
rates were abandoned in favour of defending the pound once more with the use of open 
market operations.165
By 1927 it was increasingly clear that the gold standard was not functioning in the 
way in which officials had originally envisaged. As Norman complained, international gold 
flows were frequently ‘irrelevant’ to economic circumstances, while central banks were 
frequently ignoring the ‘rules of the game’ by intervening in order to neutralise their effects  
on national price levels.166 Moreover,  both France and Belgium had by now effectively 
returned  to  the  gold  standard  at  competitively  undervalued  exchange  rates,  further 
distorting the operation of the international monetary system, and the regime itself was 
163 Kenwood and Lougheed (1971), pp.186-97; Kindleberger (1986), pp.73-91; Bulmer-Thomas (1998), Table 
2.1.
164 Sayers (1976), ps.184-7, 213, 336; Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983), pp.46-8; Butler and Butler (1994), 
pp.373-4.
165 BE:ADM34/15. Norman Diaries 8/10/26; Sayers (1976), pp.212-16; Eichengreen (1992), pp.209-11.
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also coming under renewed criticism.167 Hawtrey for example was arguing that the costs of 
the return had been ‘much heavier than could have been foreseen’ and that tight credit had 
‘frightfully  aggravated’ Britain’s  difficulties,  the  FBI  were  also  protesting  against  the 
‘abnormally high’ level of interest rates, and the labour left, increasingly of the view that 
government policy was being dictated by the interests of finance, were continuing to call 
for the Bank of England to be nationalised.168 In addition, rumours were now circulating 
that  Norman himself  was  ‘extremely  worried’ about  the situation,  that  he believed the 
return to gold to have been a mistake, and that he was even considering its abandonment if 
things did not soon improve.169
In April a brief respite in the pressure allowed a politically expedient cut in interest 
rates  to  4.5%, though the ease was soon revealed to  have been a  false  dawn. In May 
problems resumed when the Banque de France began converting its reserves of sterling 
into gold in a bid to force British rates back up so as to ease upward pressure on the 
Franc.170 Moreover, senior Treasury officials and the Governor were now under increasing 
fire from Churchill, whose disappointment with Britain’s slow rate of recovery and the 
persistence  of  high  unemployment  was  palpable.  Though  Norman  was  insistent  that 
unemployment was the government’s responsibility, the Chancellor was equally insistent 
that it was ‘an immense fault and shortcoming in our economic organisation’, and that it 
could  not  be  ignored.  Although  the  gold  standard  policy  had  secured  international 
confidence in the pound and lowered the cost of living, it had he argued, also produced 
167 Sayers (1976), pp.192ff; Kindleberger (1986), pp.34ff.
168 PRO:T176/5. Pt.2. ‘Recent Price Movements’ (Hawtrey), 1/3/27; PRO:T176/13. Pt.2. ‘The Monetary 
Outlook According to the Times’ (Hawtrey), 18/3/27; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/6. FBI General Economic 
Department to Secretary of Ley’s Malleable Castings Co. Ltd. 11/4/27; Lansbury’s Labour Weekly (April 
1927 issues).
169 BE:G1/421. Note by the Whaley-Eaton news service, spring 1927; Sayers (1976), pp.334-5.
170 Kindleberger (1986), pp.34ff.
187
labour unrest, a huge increase in unemployment, and had raised the threat of a dangerous 
political backlash in the not too-distant future. In all, Britain’s monetary policy since the 
war had, Churchill warned, been ‘entirely unsatisfactory’.171
Again however, such events cannot be seen as evidence of the failure of the gold 
standard strategy. Contrary to the rumours for example,  Norman did not now view the 
return  to  gold  as  having  been  a  mistake  and  nor  was  he  remotely  contemplating  its 
abandonment, while even Churchill, in spite of his dissatisfaction, could see no alternative 
to the regime. Indeed, for all its problems the Chancellor was nevertheless of the view that 
the  gold  standard  had  been  ‘less  disastrous’ than  would  have  been  the  case  under  a 
discretionary  monetary  policy  with  all  its  ‘successive  alterations  and  reversals’.172 
Moreover,  the  criticism  from  Hawtrey  was  also  not  considered  by  Norman  to  be 
representative of any significant body of official opinion in Britain. As he later remarked:
“Except  perhaps  in  the  range of pure theory I  have never heard anyone 
agree with him: and indeed it would have been true to say, for years past, 
that  he  represents  neither  opinion  in  the  City,  nor  the  official  views  of 
Whitehall, nor any deliberate and instructed views in political circles.”173
Furthermore,  the pressures of the global economic situation also soon subsided. 
French sales of sterling quickly halted once it was realised that Norman could not raise 
interest rates and that damaging the pound would also endanger the Franc, and indeed the 
gold standard as a whole. In July international tensions were further eased as central bank 
Governors from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany gathered in New York to 
171 BE:G1/464. Churchill to Norman 18/5/27; Note by Norman; PRO:T175/11. Churchill to Niemeyer 9/4/27; 
PRO:T208/121; ‘Memo. on Draft Currency and Bank Notes Bill’ (Churchill), 1927. 
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discuss ways of improving global stability. One of the most important outcomes of this 
conference was a cut in US rates to 3.5% in August, a move designed as much to address 
growing fears of domestic recession as to ease the pressure on Europe. Nonetheless, the 
reduction provided a welcome relief for the global economy, diverting capital away from 
the  US,  enabling  the  lowering  of  European  interest  rates,  and  aiding  the  recovery  of 
sterling throughout the rest of the year.174
The Crisis Grows
The easing of the crisis in the summer of 1927 however served merely as the point 
of departure for its intensification. With the New York conference seeking to deal with the 
world’s economic difficulties through a relaxation of credit rather than by addressing its 
structural  deficiencies,  the way was cleared  for  continued overproduction and renewed 
speculation  on  Wall  St.  As  global  capital  once  more  gravitated  to  the  US,  New York 
interest  rates were again increased,  reaching 5% by July 1928. Again however the rise 
failed to break the speculative boom but served only to increase the inward flow of gold 
and to force a tightening of rates elsewhere, while in addition,  much American foreign 
lending now also began to be redirected to the domestic money circuit. The global effects 
of this sudden curtailment of US credit were severe, forcing many debtor nations into an 
even more pronounced state of crisis and threatening to undermine the stability of global 
capitalist  relations as  a whole.  In  an effort  to  sustain their  balance of  payments many 
debtor nations were now forced to run down their reserves, much of which was held in the 
form of sterling, and several countries including Holland, Germany, and especially France, 
also began converting their sterling holdings in a bid to move to a full gold, as opposed to a 
174 Brown Jr (1940), pp.452-8; Clay (1957), pp.221-37; Sayers (1976), pp.184ff, 341-3; Eichengreen (1992), 
pp.211-213; Cottrell (1995), pp.93-5.
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gold exchange standard, putting pressure on the pound and heightening fears of a global 
gold shortage.175 Compounding this still further, the issue of reparations was now back on 
the  agenda,  with German grievances  over  the provisions of the  Dawes scheme (which 
included external monitoring of the German budget) and pressure for a final settlement 
leading  to  the  establishment  of  the  Young Committee  in  September  to  re-examine  the 
subject.176
The deepening of the crisis once again put growing pressure on Britain. Though the 
current account was now registering its highest surplus since 1923, unemployment was 
once again rising and industrial production was once again falling following a brief respite 
during 1926-27. Moreover, the issue of monetary policy now also began to attract renewed 
attention, with the question of amalgamating the Bank and Treasury note issues, the final 
stage of the process of returning to gold by unifying the money supply under the complete 
control of the Bank of England, now on the political agenda and raising interest in the gold 
standard.177 Once more, criticism of the state authorities came from representatives of both 
capital  and labour. The ‘Mond-Turner’ conference for example complained that interest 
rate movements were now being determined too rigidly by the level of the gold reserves, 
and called for an enquiry into monetary policy and for greater attention to be given to the 
domestic economic situation.178 The wider labour movement were also dissatisfied. The 
TUCGC were of the view that the unemployment situation was now a threat to ‘the very 
175 Various in PRO:T176/27; BE:EID4/102. ‘Monetary Stability and the Gold Standard’ (League of Nations), 
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176 Kindleberger (1986), pp.65-8.
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stability of the nation’ and thought that monetary policy was ‘highly injurious’, whilst the 
Labour Party conference as a whole, and not merely the labour left were now also calling 
for an enquiry and for the nationalisation of the Bank of England (albeit within the indirect 
model of a public corporation run by a board of politically neutral appointees).179 Some on 
the more radical left however were now calling for the wholesale abandonment of the gold 
standard, while the government were also under concerted attack over their attempts to 
neuter the labour movement through the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Bill.180 
From capital,  although the  City  maintained  their  support  for  the  gold  standard 
(despite McKenna continuing to call for lower interest rates and an enquiry), the FBI were 
now also discontent, claiming that their warnings over the return to gold had been proved 
‘right in every single particular’,  while the Mond group attacked the return to gold for 
having damaged trade and promoted industrial unrest. Along with the labour left there was 
now also a growing feeling within industrial circles that monetary policy was biased in 
favour of the interests of finance, with Vincent Vickers, a former Bank of England director 
proclaiming for example that an increasing number of ‘influential industrialists’ were now 
coming to realise this fact.181
Dissatisfaction with economic conditions was also increasingly evident from other 
sources.  Public  petitions  were  presented  to  Parliament  demanding  an  enquiry  into  the 
179 MRC:MSS.292/560.1/1. ‘Development of Economic Policy’ (TUCGC), November 1928; 
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effects  of  monetary  policy,  while  in  Parliament  itself  the  Liberals  were  leading  calls 
(publicly supported by Keynes and Henderson) for reducing unemployment with large-
scale public works.182 Official circles too were now growing more concerned. The high and 
rising cost of unemployment benefit for example was an increasing source of anxiety to the 
Treasury, forcing the adoption of ever more manipulative accounting measures in order to 
sustain the impression of a balanced budget, while Hawtrey continued to press for lower 
interest rates to help stimulate the economy. Sir Richard Hopkins (the head of the civil 
service) was concerned that the amalgamation of the note issues would generate greater 
public  interest  in  the  issue  of  monetary  policy  and  create  ‘constant  difficulties  as  to 
publicity’,  while  Churchill,  still  concerned with  the political  impact  of  unemployment, 
continued to berate senior figures at the Bank and the Treasury for their indifference to the 
problem, and for ‘their’ policy of forcing economic reconstruction through the pressure of 
deflation.183 
At  the  Bank itself,  such  criticisms continued  to  constrain their  response  to  the 
crisis. The possibility of easing pressure on the pound through higher interest rates was 
again rejected by Norman firstly in November 1927 on the basis that this would be ‘grossly 
unfair to industry’ and beneficial to no-one, and then by Cecil Lubbock, the Bank’s Deputy 
Governor in mid-1928 (temporarily in charge with Norman absent through illness) on the 
grounds that this would merely force even higher rates elsewhere, and would attract undue 
‘public  attention’ given the  scale  of  unemployment.  Instead,  the  Bank were  yet  again 
forced into the use of open market operations to protect the pound, while Norman now 
182 Various in MSS.200/F/3/S1/19/1; Winch (1969), pp.108-9.
183 PRO:T175/125. Hopkins to Churchill 27/3/28; to Sir William Graham-Harrison 11/4/28; and to Niemeyer 
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began to seek greater central bank co-operation as an international means of addressing the 
crisis.  The Governor was also keen however to ensure that such co-operation would be 
kept strictly secret, arguing that publicity would not only ‘make a public target out of the 
decisions [arrived at] and would leave them much more difficult to achieve’, but would 
also risk politicising the function of central banks by raising the issue of their ability to 
influence economic conditions through the discretionary regulation of credit.184
Despite these constraints on state managerial freedom of manoeuvre and the rising 
concerns  over  monetary  policy  however,  the  gold  standard  was  still  nevertheless 
continuing  to  provide  a  credible  framework  for  economic  policy-making.  For  all  his 
dissatisfaction with the regime, Churchill for example could still see no alternative to gold, 
and  though  Hawtrey  continued  to  harangue  the  Bank,  he  was  also  opposed  to  any 
government control over monetary policy. Parliament, he maintained, should ‘content itself 
with prescribing the end’, and complete responsibility for monetary policy should continue 
to rest with the Bank, even though they themselves may not desire it.185 At the Bank itself, 
though increasingly anxious that the global crisis might soon force Britain off the gold 
standard, Norman did not believe that there was any great desire in Britain for a change in 
the  monetary  system.  As  he  put  it,  the  number  and  influence  of  people  wishing  to 
significantly alter it was ‘almost negligible’, and consisted of:
“certain  professors  who  no  longer  convince  or  even  tickle  the  public: 
doubtless  a  number  of  manufacturers  and  exporters  in  the  North  whose 
attitude is more understandable than reasonable, and others, mainly cranks, 
184 BE:ADM34/16. Norman Diaries 27/8/27; BE:G1/421. Norman to Strong 5/10/27 [My Insert]; BE:G1/422. 
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who think in solitude more than they mix and argue with others.”186 
Indeed, this assessment was largely accurate. Despite the growing difficulties, for 
the  most  part  monetary  policy  remained  a  non-political  issue,  and  state  officials 
predominantly managed to continue avoiding the responsibility for the poor state of the 
British economy. Although it had raised public awareness of monetary policy, the Currency 
and Bank Notes (Amalgamation) Act was successfully passed in July 1928, by November 
Britain’s money supply had been unified under the control of the Bank of England, and the 
return  back  to  the  gold  standard  was  now  fully  complete.187 Moreover,  despite  their 
concerns, representatives of capital and labour continued to blame other factors rather than 
the  government  for  Britain’s  difficulties.  The  ABCC,  the  Mond  (now  Lord  Melchett) 
group,  and  the  FBI  for  example  placed  most  of  the  responsibility  on  factors  such  as 
excessively  high  wages  and  the  self-interested  behaviour  of  foreign  central  banks, 
especially the FRBNY.188 For the FBI, the Bank of England were considered to have had no 
choice but to maintain high interest rates due to world economic conditions, and indeed 
were  even  thought  to  have  done  their  best  to  help  British  industry  even  though  they 
themselves were in a ‘very difficult situation’. The Federation also regarded most critics of 
Britain monetary policy as ‘cranks’, and while generally having no strong views on the 
issue were now also arguing against any enquiry on the basis that it would give credence to 
labour’s calls for the nationalisation of the Bank.189 
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For labour, the TUCGC continued to regard the decline of the staple trades as being 
due to ‘natural and other causes beyond our control’, and Britain’s difficulties in general 
were still primarily thought to derive from global economic circumstances and the failure 
of British industry to adapt. Monetary policy was still  not a central  issue, and the key 
concerns of the movement remained those such as living standards, unemployment, and 
the government’s legislative attack on labour. Debates on unemployment at the TUC and 
Labour Party conferences made no reference to the gold standard, and the TUC did not 
hold the Bank to be responsible for economic conditions, arguing instead that the reason 
Britain had high interest rates was “not because the Bank wishes to bring them about….but 
because the rigid working of an automatic system leaves the financial authorities with no 
alternative.”190 Even the more radical left were now not entirely critical of the authorities. 
Though calling for an enquiry into monetary policy and for the nationalisation of the Bank 
of England at the Labour Party conference, the ILP representative Frank Wise explicitly 
refused to criticise the motives or the intentions of the Bank, and indeed the resolution 
itself was withdrawn following an intervention by MacDonald and a promise to establish 
an official Labour Party committee of investigation instead.191
In  addition,  both  capital  and  labour  continued to  argue  that  Britain’s  problems 
could not be resolved with greater state intervention, and there were no significant calls for 
any great change in the direction of monetary policy. The main emphasis was still placed 
on  the  need  for  international  co-operation  and  industrial  re-organisation,  and  pressure 
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concerning monetary policy was directed at the need for reform in order to make the gold 
standard  work  properly  rather  than  at  securing  its  abandonment.  The  Mond-Turner 
representatives for instance continued to highlight the need for global co-ordination and 
industrial adjustment whilst the TUCGC also continued to emphasise the necessity for re-
organisation and modernisation, arguing that “we have to produce more….to produce it 
more  efficiently….and  compete  more  effectively  in  foreign  markets  with  our  export 
goods.” On the subject of monetary policy the majority of the Labour Party also remained 
deferential to Snowden, still resolutely committed to the gold standard and of the view that 
monetary policy should be kept free from political control since Parliament was ‘not a 
competent  body  to  deal  with  such  highly  delicate  and  intricate  matters.’ Furthermore, 
representatives  of  both  capital  and  labour  remained  optimistic  as  to  Britain’s  future 
economic prospects.  To the TUCGC and the FBI alike,  Britain’s  difficulties  were now 
thought to be coming to an end, the export industries were finally seen to be on a par with 
their major competitors, and the economic outlook was the brightest it had been since the 
war. The international situation was also soon expected to ease, and the Bank of England 
was soon expected to regain its prewar freedom of action.192
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has examined the period following the return to the gold standard from 
April 1925 until the end of 1928. It has shown that this policy was designed to address 
Britain’s  economic  difficulties  and  to  contain  labour  unrest  by  imposing  competitive 
192 See references from the previous footnote and also: Industrial Review (1928 issues); 
MRC:MSS.292/135.01/2. Summary of Mond-Turner Meetings, 17/10/28; ‘Development of Economic 
Policy’ (TUCGC); MRC:MSS.292/110.1/1. ‘The Trend of Real Wages in Britain 1850-1928’ (TUCGC); 
MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/13-14. FBI Bulletins (1927-1928 issues); MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/13/5/2. ‘Note on Sir 
Alan Anderson’s Proposals’ (Glenday), 1/9/27; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/1-7. ‘Government Economy’ 
(FBI), 31/3/27; Sir Max Muspratt (FBI President) to various bank chairmen 3/2/27.
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discipline upon the expectations and behaviour of capital and labour, and by depoliticising 
the issues of economic conditions and policy-making. It has also shown however that this 
strategy was not entirely successful. The financial pressure imposed by the high exchange 
rate  did  not  overcome  the  resistance  of  capital  and  labour  to  significant  economic 
restructuring,  and although prices fell,  Britain’s relative  global competitiveness did not 
substantially  improve.  In  part  however,  this  was  also  due  to  factors  beyond  Britain’s 
control such as the disproportionate conditions for capital accumulation within the world 
economy,  and  the  onset  of  an  international  economic  crisis  from 1926.  Despite  these 
difficulties, and despite the fact that the continuation of economic problems led to growing 
criticism of state officials and constrained their freedom of manoeuvre in response to the 
crisis,  the gold standard nevertheless still  managed to provide distinct political benefits. 
The  strategy was successful  in  establishing a credible  and depoliticised framework for 
economic policy management, and was for the most part largely successful in insulating 
the core executive from political pressures. Class unrest subsided following the general 
strike of 1926, disquiet from capital and labour over economic conditions was now largely 
displaced away from the state, and for all their problems Britain’s state authorities were 
now under less pressure and less constraints than they had been under the politicised mode 
of economic policy regulation prior to the return to gold.
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Chapter 7 : The Collapse of the Strategy, 1929-1931
This chapter examines the breakdown of the gold standard strategy between 1929 
and 1931. It shows that the development of the international crisis combined 
with a continued lack of economic adjustment in Britain put growing pressure 
on  the  state  authorities  over  economic  conditions  and  served  to  further 
constrain their freedom of policy manoeuvre. Nevertheless, this chapter also 
shows that despite these difficulties the gold standard continued for the most 
part  to provide a credible and depoliticised framework for economic policy 
management,  and to provide officials with an effective means of displacing 
such pressures away from the state. As such, although increasingly restricted, 
the high political freedom of the core executive during most of this period was 
still greater than it had been under the regime preceding the return to gold. This  
chapter shows too however, that as the economic crisis continued to worsen, 
the  credibility  and  the  depoliticising  effects  of  the  gold  standard  were 
progressively  undermined,  eventually  culminating  in  an  enforced  departure 
from the regime in September 1931.
Manic Depression
The period 1929-31 was dominated by an intensifying crisis in the international 
circuit  of  capital.  Speculation on Wall  St.  continued to  grow, high interest  rates at  the 
FRBNY continued to draw capital from the rest of the world and to force other central 
banks to maintain tight credit, and the Banque de France (who combined with the US now 
held over half the world’s monetary gold stock) also continued to accumulate gold. Global 
198
difficulties  were  also  exacerbated  during  the  second  half  of  the  year  as  the  crisis  of 
overproduction  in  the  American  economy  finally  erupted,  sending  the  world’s  single 
largest market into a steep depression.193 These factors led to a sharp fall in international 
commodity  prices  between  1929-32,  with  the  price  of  raw  materials  falling  by  56%, 
manufactured  articles  by  36%,  and  food  prices  by  48%.  The  situation  was  further 
compounded  as  primary  producers  now introduced  tariff  restrictions  and  continued  to 
expand  production  in  a  vain  attempt  to  resolve  their  balance  of  payments  difficulties, 
swelling  the  oversupply  of  primary  goods  on  the  world  market.  Moreover,  as  debtor 
nations found it increasingly difficult to service their obligations, many were also forced to 
adopt  austerity  measures,  provoking widespread  social  resistance  and adding to  global 
political and economic instability. By the end of 1929 the depression was almost universal, 
and was rapidly becoming the worst in the history of world capitalism.194
The  global  crisis  impinged  directly  upon  the  British  state.  Though  domestic 
industrial  production  during  1929  was  at  its  highest  since  the  war,  Britain’s  staple 
industries  continued  to  languish,  unemployment  remained  high,  and  the  balance  of 
payments weakened.195 There remained little indication of any substantial economic shift 
towards newer and more advanced lines of production,  little sign of any significant re-
organisation  or  modernisation  of  old  technologies  and  production  methods,  and  no 
evidence of any end to Britain’s relative economic decline.196 This lack of adjustment was 
also compounded by the industrial truce since 1926. Though organised labour remained 
numerically  weakened, and though the number of new disputes and working days lost 
193 Hawtrey (1933), p.218; Soule (1947), passim; Kindleberger (1986), p.101; Beaudreau (1996), Table A3.9.
194 Kindleberger (1986), p.103; Eichengreen (1992), pp.14ff, 222ff; Feinstein et al (1997) Table.6.2, pp.99-
105; Bulmer-Thomas (1998), p.78.
195 Feinstein (1972), Tables.37, 51-2, 57; Eichengreen (1992), pp.14ff.
196 Clay (1957), pp.156-7; Sayers (1976), p.96; Branson (1977), pp.143-8; Alford (1986), pp.57-9; (1996), 
ps.119, 156-8.
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remained comparatively low in relation to the first half of the 1920s, employers were still 
generally reluctant to try and impose wage cuts, longer hours, or modernisation for fear of 
inciting labour unrest. Indeed, though both wholesale prices and the cost of living had now 
fallen since 1924, real wages had risen by an average of 8.5%.197
The crisis also put increased pressure on the gold reserves of the Bank of England, 
sustaining the Bank’s fears that Britain could soon be forced off the gold standard. In their 
response however, state officials were now constrained by the growing political difficulties 
surrounding  the  problems  of  the  British  economy.  With  the  persistence  of  high 
unemployment an increasingly sensitive political issue, especially given the approaching 
general election, and with pressure (led primarily by the Liberals) now mounting for the 
introduction of public works to alleviate the problem, the Bank were once more forced to 
avoid a rise in interest rates. This position though was unsustainable. Following a further 
rise in interest rates at the FRBNY in February, the Bank were now forced to raise their 
rates to 5.5% in order to defend sterling, and to warn of even tighter credit in the near 
future. This move attracted fervent protests from the press, the Parliamentary opposition 
parties,  and  from representatives  of  both  capital  and  labour.198 Though  the  City  were 
unsurprised by the move, the FBI were sharply critical of the rise, both sides of the Mond-
Turner talks now reasserted their calls for an enquiry into monetary policy, and the ILP 
reissued their demands for an expansionary economic policy and the nationalisation of the 
Bank of England.199 Government Ministers too were disconcerted by the decision, with the 
197 BE:G1/455. Economic Advisory Council Report. 24/10/30, p.4; Board of Trade (1930), ps.18-19, 61-2; 
Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry (1931). Cmd.3897, p.85; Industrial Review July 1929-June 
1930; Gazeley and Rice (1992), passim; Butler and Butler (1994), pp.373-4.
198 PRO:T176/13. Pt.2. Lubbock to Hopkins 9/2/29; BE:ADM34/18. Norman Diaries 19/2/29; Sayers (1976), 
ps.222-6, 361-2; Middleton (1985), pp.145-9.
199 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/15. FBI Bulletin 15/2/29. 12(2); MRC:MSS.292/135.01/1. ‘Interim Joint Report on 
Unemployment’ (Mond-Turner), March 1929; TUC Annual Report 1929, pp.188-202; ILP Archives. ‘Re-
Organise Industry’ (ILP). March 1929; ‘National Finance’ (Pethick-Lawrence), April 1929; the Times 8/2/29; 
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Minister  of Labour,  Sir  Arthur  Steel-Maitland,  publicly voicing his  concerns,  and with 
Churchill warning the Cabinet that the rise would have a ‘chilling effect’ on the British 
economy. Indeed, as one official report later put it, criticism of monetary policy was now at  
its highest level since the mid-nineteenth century.200
Shifting the Blame
Despite this growing pressure over economic and monetary policy however, the 
gold standard  was still  capable  of  providing  state officials  with  a means of  displacing 
criticism.  The  Cabinet  for  example  continued  to  insist  that  the  government  had  ‘no 
responsibility’ for interest rate movements and no control over the policy of the Bank of 
England, whilst Blackett, Bradbury, and Niemeyer also maintained that the Treasury did 
not,  and  indeed  should  not  have  any  influence  over  the  Bank.  On  their  advice,  the 
Chancellor responded to Parliamentary criticism of the high level of interest rates with the 
claim that he had no knowledge of, nor any role in the decision to raise rates, that such 
decisions were the ‘sole responsibility’ of the Bank, and that there was ‘no remedy which 
would be more ill-judged than interference on political grounds with the working of our 
banking system.’201
Furthermore, though under intense pressure, Churchill, in contrast to his previous 
misgivings was now also favourably predisposed to the gold standard, putting forward a 
staunch defence of the regime to his Conservative party colleagues. Although the process 
Pollard (1969), p.156; Williamson (1984), pp.117-18.
200 PRO:CAB23/60. Cabinet Meeting 7/2/29; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/15. FBI Bulletin. 15/2/29. 12(2); 
PRO:CAB24/20. Note by Churchill 25/2/29; Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry. (1931). 
Cmd.3897, p.6.
201 PRO:CAB23/60. Cabinet Meeting 7/2/29; PRO:T176/13 Pts.1-2. Blackett to Phillips 17/2/29; Bradbury to 
Phillips 18/2/29; Niemeyer to Phillips 18/2/29; Untitled memo. (Hopkins), undated; ‘Relations Between the 
Treasury and the Bank of England’, 12/2/29, 19/2/29.
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of  economic  adjustment  had,  he  admitted,  been  ‘larger  and  more  difficult’ than  had 
originally been anticipated, he maintained that the ‘transitional difficulties’ had now been 
surmounted  and there  was ‘not  a  shadow of  a  doubt’ that  the  return had  ‘contributed 
materially to the national well-being’. Britain’s problems he claimed, were not the result of 
monetary policy but were due rather to the international situation and the failure of both 
capital  and labour to adapt to postwar conditions. Nevertheless, with a general election 
now approaching Churchill was also anxious to minimise public discussion of the subject, 
warning colleagues against engaging in any open debate of the issue on the grounds that it 
would ‘be inexpedient to open the door for fresh controversies’. In addition, the Chancellor 
was  also  anxious  for  the  government  to  continue  resisting pressure for  increased  state 
intervention, claiming that the economic and political risks involved were too great, and 
that  attempting  to  cure  unemployment  with public  works would lead to  criticism of  a 
‘devastating nature’.202 
As  such,  Churchill  also  requested  that  Treasury  officials  draw up  a  systematic 
refutation of the case for public works in order to further defend the government. In the 
resulting document, the Treasury argued that the only remedy for Britain’s problems lay 
with increased competitiveness  through lower production costs,  improved efficiency of 
both  capital  and  labour,  and  industrial  modernisation  and  restructuring  to  meet  ‘the 
changes that have taken place in world demands’. In contrast, the introduction of public 
works  would  they  claimed,  merely  serve  to  discourage  private  enterprise,  hinder  the 
transference of labour from depressed areas, lead to pressure for higher wages, resurgent 
inflation, and alleviate pressure for essential economic adjustments.203
202 PRO:CAB24/20. ‘Unemployment’ (Churchill) 25/2/29. 
203 ‘Memo. on Certain Proposals Relating to Unemployment’, May 1929. Cmd.3331., pp.51-3; Various in 
PRO:T175/18 Pts.1-2; BE:G1/466. Untitled memo. (Hopkins), undated. 
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Such views  were also  evident  elsewhere  within the  core  executive.  In  its  final 
report  for  example,  the  Balfour  committee  stated  that  although the  return  to  gold had 
reduced exports, raised unemployment and led to industrial unrest, such difficulties had 
been now overcome and abandonment of the regime was now ‘unthinkable’. Sir Richard 
Hopkins was insistent on the need to avoid ‘direct Government aid and intervention’, while 
Sir Cunliffe-Lister was similarly emphatic, arguing in relation to the coal industry that state  
intervention would merely deter firms from ‘facing the stringent terms of reconstruction’ 
and would encourage other industries to sit and wait for government help.204 At the Bank of 
England,  Norman  was  also  continuing  with  efforts  to  minimise  state  intervention, 
establishing  a  Securities  Management  Trust  in  November  to  assist  with  industrial  re-
organisation,  and stating that he wished ‘to keep Government out of Industry in every 
way.’205
Bank officials  were  also  anxious to  counter  the  growing criticism of  monetary 
policy. As they argued, interest rates had been forced upon them by the need to defend 
Britain’s  gold  reserves,  while  the  poor  state  of  the  economy was not  due  to  the  gold 
standard but  to  the  long-term failure  of  British industry to  adapt  to  changes  in  global 
economic  conditions,  a  problem which  the  return  to  gold  itself  had  been  designed  to 
address.  Though  admitting  that  stabilisation  at  the  prewar  par  had  created  ‘temporary 
difficulties’, the Bank were also insistent that these had been offset by the provision of 
economic stability and cheaper imports. As Norman put it, the return to gold had “directed 
attention  to  the  need  for  the  re-equipment,  re-organisation  etc.  of  productive  industry 
204 BE:G1/466. Untitled memo. (Hopkins), undated; PRO:CAB24/20. ‘Government Assistance to 
Rationalisation’ (Hopkins), 24/2/29; ‘Final Report of Committee on Industry and Trade’ February 1929, 
pp.54-8. Cmd. 3282.
205 BE:ADM34/18. Norman Diaries. 5/3/29; BE:G14/55. Various including Norman to Committee of 
Treasury 21/11/29; Tolliday (1987), p.96; Booth (1993), p.46.
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necessary  to  enable  it  to  compete  with  foreign  industries.”  The  main  problem facing 
Britain therefore, was believed to be the failure of British industrialists  to adapt  to the 
conditions imposed by the gold standard, and their continuing to cling to outdated methods 
and practices.206
Restating the Rules
Though  providing  state  officials  with  a  defence  against  criticism  of  economic 
policy, the gold standard was not an automatic guarantor of political success. In the May 
general  election,  although  the  issue  of  monetary  policy  itself  did  not  feature  highly, 
discontent  over  economic  conditions  (primarily  unemployment)  nonetheless  saw  the 
Conservatives defeated and a second minority Labour government installed in their place. 
In  economic  policy  terms  however  the  change  again  made  little  difference.  The  gold 
standard remained the cornerstone of the new government’s economic strategy, and more 
proactive measures remained limited to palliatives such as the introduction of some small-
scale public works, and the establishment of the relatively ineffective Economic Advisory 
Council (EAC).207
Despite  the electoral  shift  however,  the new government were also soon facing 
difficulties over monetary policy. In August New York interest rates were suddenly raised 
from 5 to 6% in another attempt to check speculation, renewing the outflow of gold to the 
US and driving the Bank’s gold reserves below the unofficial minimum of £150 million as 
206 BE:OV9/587. Untitled memo. (signed by Norman but written in collusion with Niemeyer), 1929; 
BE:G1/466. ‘Some Notes on the Return to the Gold Standard’ (Norman), 3/4/29; ‘Resumption of the Gold 
Standard’ (Norman), 3/4/29; ‘Rationalisation’, unsigned and undated Bank memo; BE:G30/19. Norman to J. 
W. Nightingale 1/1/29; BE:G1/455. Evidence by Norman to the Cotton Industry Committee of the Economic 
Advisory Council, 11/4/30.
207 Cole (1948), pp.429-32; Cross (1966), pp.236-57; Middlemas (1969a), pp.164ff; Middleton (1985), 
pps.45ff; Dale (2000, 2000a, 2000b).
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recommended by the Cunliffe report.208 At the same time, foreign confidence in sterling 
was also being  damaged by an international  dispute  over  plans  for  a  final  reparations 
settlement, with Snowden unilaterally rejecting proposals at a conference in the Hague for 
an  all-round  reduction  in  global  debts  on  the  grounds  that  Britain  would  suffer 
disproportionate  losses.209 The  efflux  of  gold  however  did  not  lead  to  another  rise  in 
interest  rates.  Instead,  with Bank officials  worried that  such a  move would exacerbate 
tensions  in  Europe,  and  with  Snowden having publicly  declared  his  opposition to  any 
further rate increases for fear of antagonising public opinion, the Bank were once again 
forced to defend the pound by other means, this time by selling a large portion of their 
secret dollar hoard.210
Following  the  conclusion  of  the  Hague  conference  (at  which  the  Chancellor’s 
dogmatism eventually secured a renegotiated settlement), Norman and Snowden met to 
discuss the crisis and to establish a means of insulating themselves against its political 
consequences. With the Labour Party having committed itself in opposition to establishing 
an  enquiry  into  the  effects  of  monetary  policy,  officials  were  growing  increasingly 
concerned that this might generate greater public interest in the subject, and might not only 
endanger the independence of the Bank of England but even the gold standard itself. The 
Governor for example was anxious to furnish the Bank with an ‘insurance against Labour 
snipers’,  whilst  the Chancellor was now keen to  reaffirm the Bank’s  responsibility  for 
monetary policy. The outcome of this meeting was a re-assertion of the formal distinction 
of duties and responsibilities between the Bank and the Treasury embodied under the gold 
standard, with the Bank to possess complete  control  over all  financial  issues, and with 
208 BE:G1/452-3. Correspondence between Norman and Harrison (the new Governor of the FRBNY). 
209 BE:G1/453. Norman to Harrison 9/8/29, 13/8/29; Middlemas (1969a); Kunz (1987), pp.21-2.
210 BE:G1/515. Harvey to Norman 26/7/29; PRO:T176/13. Pt.2. Lubbock to Hopkins 12/8/29; Sayers (1976), 
pp.227-8.
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Snowden agreeing to restrict  himself  to the spheres of fiscal  and political matters.  The 
Chancellor also accepted Norman’s prognosis that interest rates would have to rise in the 
near future, though with concerns still apparent about the effects on Britain’s trade, public 
opinion, and the international situation, the Governor was forced to render assurances that 
such a step would not be taken until it was absolutely necessary.211
At the end of September however, under the cover of a financial crisis in the City 
Norman raised interest rates to 6.5%, their highest levels since 1921.212 Despite this cover, 
and though welcomed by the City, the move nonetheless attracted a hostile response from 
the ABCC, the FBI, and the TUC, with the Federation and prominent trade union figures 
such as J. H. Thomas and Bevin reissuing calls for an enquiry into the Bank of England.213 
Snowden though dismissed all responsibility for the rise, arguing that the Treasury had no 
influence over interest rates, and that the decision was one for the Bank alone. Even so, the 
Chancellor nonetheless sought to defend the Bank, arguing that the rise had been forced 
upon  them  by  international  events,  and  tried  to  placate  the  criticism  by  publicly 
announcing the establishment of the enquiry into the effects  of monetary policy (to be 
headed by Lord Macmillan). The Chancellor was also keen to point out however, that the 
government remained committed to maintaining the gold standard, and in secret collusion 
with Treasury officials had also sought to prevent the enquiry from engaging in too close 
an examination of the Bank by ensuring that most of its members were of known orthodox 
opinion, and by making its remit ‘as vague and nebulous as possible’.214
211 BE:G1/515. Harvey to Norman 12/7/29, to Stamp 12/7/29; BE:ADM34/18. Norman Diaries 9/9/29, 
16/9/29, 30/9/29; Clay (1957), pp.296-7; Leith-Ross (1968), Ch.11; Sayers (1976), pp.227-8.
212 On the ‘Hatry crisis’ see Kynaston (1999), pp.178-80.
213 The Financial Times 29/7/29; the Times 27/9/29; the Daily Herald, 28/9/29; Labour Party Annual Report 
(1929); Kynaston (1999), p.181.
214 BE:G1/515. Harvey to Norman 12/7/29, to Stamp 12/7/29; BE:ADM34/18. Norman Diaries 30/9/29; 
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Despite these growing pressures over monetary policy and unemployment however, 
the  gold  standard  still  remained  a  credible  and  largely  depoliticised  framework  for 
economic policy. Though constrained in their policy freedom by the lack of adjustment and 
improvement in Britain’s economy, key state managers were still under less pressure than 
during the  period of  managed money after  the  war,  and  while  there was a  substantial 
degree of disquiet over the effects of the gold standard from capital and labour, there was 
no real  support  for  its  abandonment  and the  regime  was still  proving  to  be  relatively 
successful  (notwithstanding  the  Conservative’s  election  defeat)  in  enabling  officials  to 
displace  responsibility  for  economic  conditions.  The  vast  majority  of  City  opinion for 
example  (with  the  notable  exception  of  McKenna),  remained  firmly  committed  to  the 
system and did not consider it to be a primary cause of Britain’s economic difficulties, and 
while  industrialists  were  increasingly  discontent  the  primary  responsibility  for  the 
economic situation was not seen to lay with the authorities but with other factors beyond 
their control such as the economic policy behaviour of other nations.215 As Robert Glenday 
(the head of the FBI’s General Economics department) for example explained:
“It is not so much the policy of the Bank of England which is responsible 
for  our  present  difficulties,  as  the  operation  of  the  gold  standard 
internationally....It certainly cannot be denied that the Bank of England has 
recently done its best to prevent industry suffering from a contraction of 
credit in the face of an extremely difficult exchange position.”216
215 MRC:MSS.292/135.01/1. ‘Interim Joint Report on Unemployment’ (Mond-Turner representatives), March 
1929; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/4/4. Minutes of Industry and Finance Committee (FBI), 13/11/29; 
MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/15. FBI Bulletin 15/5/29. 12(5); 20/8/29. 12(8); 20/11/29. 12(11); 
MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/15/6. Glenday to Lord Barnby 21/8/29; Einzig (1932), pp.59-60; Sayers (1976), 
pp.360-1; Williamson (1984), pp.117-18.
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Furthermore, the FBI were also convinced that the government’s commitment to 
the  gold  standard  was  resolute,  and  though  remaining  critical  about  the  high  level  of 
interest  rates were still  opposed to any attempt at  resolving Britain’s problems with an 
expansionary policy. Trying to stimulate economic growth in this manner it was argued, 
would merely nullify the reduction of costs and prices which British manufacturers had 
struggled to achieve since the return to gold, and would thus erode Britain’s international 
competitiveness. As such, though the Federation themselves had no fixed economic policy 
at  this  time,  the  only  solution  was  thought  to  lay  with  economic  modernisation  and 
restructuring, and with the implementation of global reforms to enable the gold standard to 
work properly. As the British Engineers Association put it, what was needed was ‘not so 
much a revolutionary change of system as a fair chance for the existing system to function 
effectively.’217
Similar views were also widely held within the labour movement. Although the ILP 
continued  to  call  for  the  nationalisation  of  the  Bank and a  more  expansive  economic 
policy, and though several prominent labour leaders were also sharply critical – with Bevin 
for  instance  calling  for  an  ‘entirely  new’ international  financial  regime,  and  with  Ben 
Tillett  (formerly  Turner)  arguing  that  Norman  was  directly  responsible  for  Britain’s 
economic failure – such issues nonetheless remained a minority concern.218 The majority of 
the labour movement remained preoccupied with more traditional struggles, and as with 
217 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/18/6.  BEA Bulletin.  February  1929.  10(2),  p.26;  MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/19/1. 
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the FBI still gave primary emphasis to the need for restructuring and adjustment rather 
than state intervention as the solution to Britain’s  economic problems.  The majority  of 
labour opinion was also in favour of reforming rather than replacing the gold standard to 
ensure its proper working, and a fully functioning international  regime was seen to be 
‘indispensable to the restoration of national and world economic prosperity’. For most, the 
notion  of  leaving  the  gold  standard  was,  as  Milne-Bailey  of  the  TUCGC  put  it,  ‘a 
thoroughly unsound idea’, while Bevin himself even later confessed that he had no ‘clear 
understanding’ of the regime. Despite calls by labour’s representatives to the Mond-Turner 
talks for an enquiry into the Bank of England,  the vast  majority  of labour opinion,  as 
Milne-Bailey again explained, did not hold monetary policy to be a key factor in ‘all or 
even the chief difficulties of British industry.’219
Cracks in the Shield
Despite the September hike in interest rates there was no easing of the strain on the 
Bank  of  England,  whose  gold  reserves  continued  to  drop  alarmingly.  As  the  crisis 
threatened to reach breaking point however, the pressure was suddenly relieved in October 
by the collapse of the New York stock market, now vastly over-inflated in relation to the 
profitability of the US economy. Though disastrous within the US itself, the initial effects 
of the crash elsewhere were beneficial, enabling a worldwide relaxation of interest rates, 
and allowing the Bank to begin replenishing their reserves and to reduce their rates to 5% 
by December.220
219 MRC:MSS.292/110.1/1. ‘Wages and Unemployment’ (TUCGC), 7/2/29; MRC:MSS.292/561/2. ‘The 
Economic Programme of the IFTU’; MRC:MSS.292/560.1/1. ‘Economic Programme’; 
MRC:MSS.292/462/3. Milne-Bailey to Mr. Firth 28/5/29; MRC:MSS.292/135.01/1. ‘Interim Joint Report on 
Unemployment’ (TUCGC), March 1929; Labour Party and TUC Annual Reports 1929; House of Commons 
Debates 21/9/31.
220 Soule (1947), pp.306ff; Clay (1957), ps.254-5, 360; Sayers (1976), pp.229-33.
209
The international crisis  however continued to intensify throughout 1930. A brief 
revival of American foreign lending early in the year soon relapsed, raising the real threat 
of  defaults  and  devaluations,  while  national  attempts  to  evade  the  crisis  through  the 
imposition  of  protectionist  measures  such  as  tariffs  and  quotas  escalated  dramatically 
following  the  introduction  of  US tariffs  in  June.  The  net  result  was  that  world  trade 
declined still further, pressing debtor nations into an ever-greater expansion of production, 
and forcing creditor nations to reciprocate in turn by further extending their own protective 
measures.221 Economic conditions in Britain also continued to deteriorate throughout 1930. 
Despite  further  interest  rate  cuts  to  3%  by  May,  industrial  production  fell  back  and 
unemployment  rose  by  58%  to  almost  2.4  million.  The  balance  of  payments  also 
weakened, and with wholesale and retail prices continuing to fall, real wages continued to 
rise  even  though  levels  of  trade  union  membership  and  industrial  unrest  remained 
relatively low.222
This deepening economic malaise also put more strain on Britain’s state managers 
over economic and monetary policy. In Parliament, pressure continued to mount for greater 
state intervention to help deal with the economic situation, with the Liberals continuing to 
press  for  public  works,  and  with  the  Conservatives  now  pressing  for  a  policy  of 
protectionism.223 Beyond Parliament, the EAC stated in March that the ‘real  causes’ of 
Britain’s  economic  gloom were  ‘impossible  to  grasp  without  an  analysis  of  monetary 
questions’, and in April the TUCGC told the Macmillan enquiry of their dissatisfaction 
with monetary policy, restating their call for a policy of price stability and criticising the 
221 Kindleberger (1986), pp.107-23; Eichengreen (1992), pp.253-7.
222 Figures calculated from Board of Trade (1930), p.325; Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry 
(1931), p.85; Feinstein (1972), Tables.37, 51-2, 57; Sayers (1976), pp.231-3; Eichengreen (1992), pp.253-7; 
Butler and Butler (1994), pp.373-4.
223 PRO:T208/38. ‘Bank Rate Policy’ (Hawtrey), February 1930.
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return to gold at the prewar par for having forced employers to try and cut wages in order 
to maintain profits.224 The labour left also continued to press vigorously for greater state 
intervention, and such measures also now drew substantial support from the labour rank-
and-file,  with  the  Labour  Party  conference  declaring  itself  to  be  in  favour  of  greater 
intervention and for public control of the Bank of England.225
Representatives of capital were also increasingly critical of monetary policy. The 
FBI for example now considered the return to gold to have been a deliberate attempt to 
force  down British  production  costs  and  prices,  and  to  have  been  a  ‘major  cause’ of 
Britain’s economic difficulties. It had, they claimed, led to higher interest rates, taxation, 
and unemployment, had produced industrial unrest and rising real wages, and had reduced 
selling prices, exports, and general economic activity. This view was also shared by many 
other representatives of capital, such as the MAIE and the NUM, who called for a more 
relaxed  credit  policy.  Moreover,  for  the  vast  majority  of  capitalist  opinion  in  Britain, 
including the ABCC and even the City, the general view was that economic re-organisation 
was no longer sufficient to deal with the economic difficulties, and that drastic cuts in tax, 
public  spending,  and  wages,  as  well  as  the  introduction  of  protective  tariffs  and  the 
fostering of  closer  economic  links  with the  Empire  were necessary in  order  to  reduce 
production costs and improve competitiveness.226
224 MRC:MSS.292/560.1/1. EAC: Committee on Economic Outlook. March 1930; 
MRC:MSS.126/EB/FI/47/5. ‘Précis of Evidence’ Pt.1 (TUCGC), 12/4/30; MRC:MSS/292/462/3. ‘The 
General Price Level and Stabilisation’ (TUCGC), 15/5/30.
225 PRO:CAB24/29. Memo. by Mosley; Labour Party Annual Report 1930; Cross (1966), pp.246-7.
226 MRC:MSS.126/EB/FI/46/3. Evidence to the Macmillan Committee by the FBI 26/2/30, pp.1-4; by E. L. 
Payton and E. Berkeley (NUM) 27/2/30; and by Lakin-Smith (ABCC) 11/7/30. Minutes of Evidence Vols.1-
2; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/16. FBI Bulletins (1930 issues); MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/13/1. ‘Fiscal Policy’ (FBI), 
14/10/30; MRC:MSS.292/135/1. ‘Unemployment’ (ABCC), 29/7/30; PRO:T208/55. Leaf to the Morning 
Post 2/7/30; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/3/7. MAIE Bulletin. January 1930; Williamson (1984), pps.106-21; 
Kynaston (1999), pp.204-5.
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In response,  state officials  once again sought to distance themselves from these 
difficulties.  Calls  for  greater  state  intervention  were  rejected  on  the  basis  that  tariffs, 
nationalisation, public works, or increased public spending would not only alleviate the 
pressure for economic adjustment and improved competitiveness, but would also render 
the  state  increasingly  responsible  for  economic  conditions.  Instead,  the  government 
insisted on the necessity of reducing costs, prices, and public spending, and remained keen 
for the Bank to continue assisting with the process of industrial re-organisation in order to 
avoid any overt state intervention. The rising cost of unemployment was also dealt with by 
establishing  a  cross-party  committee  (the  Gregory  Commission)  in  order  that  the 
government could avoid having to tackle the problem directly.227 Further, the government 
refused to accept that the gold standard was a key cause of Britain’s difficulties, though 
were anxious to minimise public debate of the issue. Snowden for example, under pressure 
from  the  labour  left  to  nationalise  the  Bank  publicly  reasserted  his  commitment  to 
maintaining its independence, telling the House of Commons on the advice of Hopkins that 
it would be ‘improper’ to comment on monetary policy now that the Macmillan enquiry 
was  in  session,  while  the  Prime  Minister,  Ramsay MacDonald,  was  now pressing  the 
committee not to include any inflammatory recommendations on monetary policy in its 
report.  MacDonald was also insistent that Britain’s problems were not due to monetary 
factors but to living beyond its means and failing to adapt to changing conditions.228
At the  Bank  of  England,  officials  too  were  anxious  to  avoid responsibility  for 
economic conditions. Though continuing to extend their involvement with the economy 
(most  notably  through an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  engage the  City  in  the  financing  of 
227 Middlemas (1969a), p.237; Pollard (1969), pp.149-50.
228 Labour Party Annual Report 1930, p.182; Middlemas (1969a), pp.257ff; BE:G1/427. Hopkins to Harvey 
24/11/30.
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industrial  re-organisation with the establishment of the Bankers Industrial  Development 
Corporation in April), the Bank remained emphatic that such involvement would be strictly 
temporary, limited to areas where re-organisation was urgently needed, and that in order to 
avoid encouraging inefficiency firms would, as Norman put it, have to get ‘their own house 
in  order’ before  being  supplied with  capital.  The  Governor,  who remained  implacably 
opposed to any notion of leaving the gold standard, also continued to insist that ‘just as we 
must now go into Industry so we must be sure that we get out of it!’, and stated to the 
Macmillan  committee  that  while  the  Bank  were  legally  independent,  its  actions  were 
nonetheless constrained by the necessities of the gold standard, and that as such they were 
‘not at all a free agent’ in their policy decisions.229 
Bank  officials  also  denied  that  their  policy  stance  had  been  detrimental  to  the 
British economy. The effects of high interest rates upon industry, Norman argued, were 
‘more psychological  than real’,  and their  benefits  in  maintaining Britain’s  international 
economic activities were considered to outweigh any domestic disadvantages they might 
produce. Once more the Governor argued that Britain’s troubles were not due to monetary 
policy but to certain ‘misfortunes’ such as the undervaluations of France and Belgium, and 
to the failure of industry to modernise and adapt. Indeed, as he put it:
229 Evidence to the Macmillan Committee by Norman (uncorrected proof in BE:G1/428), Minutes of 
Evidence Vols.1-2; BE:G14/55. Committee of Treasury Extracts; BE:ADM34/19. Norman Diaries 24/10/30; 
BE:G30/21. Norman to V. A. Malcolmson 12/9/30; BE:G1/455. Evidence by Norman to the Iron and Steel 
Committee of the EAC, 31/3/30; BE:G1/470. Norman to Sir Oswald Stoll 17/7/33; Tolliday (1987), pp.96-
100; Kynaston (1999), ps.190, 407ff.
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“I have never been able to see myself why for the last few years it should 
have been impossible for industry starting from within to have readjusted its 
own position….I believe that had it been done the whole face and prospect 
of industry would look different to-day.”1
These sentiments were also endorsed by Niemeyer (now an economic advisor to 
the Bank), who argued that Britain needed to adjust to the ‘brute facts’ of the changed 
postwar  international  economy;  by Henry  Clay (also  a Bank of  England advisor)  who 
argued that re-organisation was ‘the only hope’ given that it was now impossible to reduce 
wages without provoking labour unrest; and by the Bank’s chief statistician, J. C. Osborne, 
who maintained that an earlier and ‘more drastic deflation’ could have helped avoid many 
of the present difficulties. As he explained, such a policy:
“might  have  overcome  the  resistance  of  the  sheltered  industries  to  the 
conditions imposed upon the unsheltered industries by the return to gold: 
wages might have been forced to fall more uniformly with effect on the cost 
of living, which might have been bought into as close an approximation to 
wholesale prices as was the case in 1924, and industry might then have been 
placed on a paying basis.”1
Even now however, with political sensitivities over economic and monetary issues 
increasing, the gold standard was still able to provide state officials with a credible policy 
framework and a means of shielding themselves from the full force of discontent. The vast 
majority of the City for example remained staunchly supportive of the regime, and though 
the FBI and the TUC were becoming increasingly restive, both continued to place most of 
the  responsibility  for  Britain’s  predicament  on  other  factors  such  as  the  behaviour  of 
foreign central banks (especially in France and America), and with City financiers, who 
1 Evidence by Norman to the Macmillan Committee 28/3/30. Minutes of Evidence Vol.1.
1 Evidence by Niemeyer to the MacMillan Committee 4/6/30. Minutes of Evidence Vol.2; PRO:PREM1/70. 
‘The Industrial Situation’ (Clay), 1929; BE:C43/137. ‘Answers to Governor’ (J. C. Osborne), 15/4/30, p.3.
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were seen to have manipulated monetary policy in favour of their own interests. Moreover, 
the majority of the labour movement  continued to place a  premium on re-organisation 
rather  than  direct  state  intervention  as  the  means  of  resolving  Britain’s  economic 
difficulties, and the FBI remained sympathetic to the position of state officials.2 Nugent for 
example  told  the  Macmillan  committee  that  in  the  Federation’s  opinion  the  Bank  of 
England could not have done more for British trade, and indeed with the gold standard 
having placed the Bank ‘in a position in which its freedom of movement was definitely 
restricted’,  the FBI considered that  it  had ‘put  up a  very fine  fight  against  impossible 
circumstances.’ Thus:
“if other events had not happened over which the monetary authorities in 
this country....had very little control – if other people had not done other 
things – probably the course our financial authorities took could have been 
fully justified.”3
Furthermore, although dissatisfaction with the gold standard was rising there were 
as yet still no substantial calls for the regime to be abandoned, and criticism of monetary 
policy remained overwhelmingly directed at  the need for  reform in order to  make the 
international system work properly. Though calling for the pursuit of price stability, the 
TUC for example were unsure if or how monetary policy could be utilised for this end, and 
though the  FBI  were  increasingly  predisposed  to  tariffs  and  closer  Empire  links,  they 
nonetheless thought that ‘a very determined effort’ should be made ‘to get the old system 
2 MRC:MSS.292/135.01/3. Untitled memo (TUCGC). 4/2/30; MRC:MSS.292/135/1. ‘Displacement of 
Workers Due to Rationalisation’ (TUCGC), 8/4/30; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S2/26/1. FBI and TUC meeting 
15/5/30; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/15-16. FBI Bulletins 20/8/29. 12(8); 20/2/30. 13(2); 
MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/3/7. Lithgow to Walker 5/3/30; Kynaston (1999).
3 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/3/6. MacMillan committee evidence 20/3/30, pp.13-21. 
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going’ before such measures should be introduced.4 Similar sentiments were also present 
elsewhere,  and many of those who were sharply critical  of the return in 1925 such as 
Keynes, Henderson, and Stamp were now opposed to the notion of leaving the regime. As 
they put it,  although  the return had created difficulties, other factors such as increased 
international competition and the inflexibility of capital and labour were also largely to 
blame, while departing from the system would now create more problems than it might 
possibly solve.5
From Bad to Worse
The crisis in the national and international circuits of capital became increasingly 
pronounced during the early months of 1931. Global economic activity and confidence was 
further  depleted as protectionist  restrictions  continued to  multiply and as  several  Latin 
American  countries  suspended  their  debt  servicing.6 Britain’s  domestic  economic 
performance  too  progressively  deteriorated.  Industrial  production  continued  to  fall, 
unemployment  rose  to  the  unprecedented  heights  of  3.25  million,  and  the  balance  of 
payments position was now calamitous. The current account registered its largest deficit 
since 1918 despite a drop in imports by nearly a fifth, as exports slumped by almost 30% 
and as invisible earnings fell by over a third, and though money wages now fell slightly, 
real wages remained firm as both wholesale and retail prices continued to fall by a greater 
amount.7 Furthermore, sterling also came under renewed pressure early in the year as the 
4 MRC:MSS.292/560.1/1. TUCGC Economic Committee meeting. 25/2/29; MRC:MSS.292/462/3. ‘The 
General Price Level and Stabilisation’ (TUCGC), 15/5/30; MRC:MSS.126/EB/FI/47/5. Evidence to the 
Macmillan Committee by the TUC 12/4/30; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/3/6-7. Evidence to the Macmillan 
Committee by the FBI 26/2/30; 20/3/30, p.23; MRC:MSS.126/EB/FI/46/3. Nugent to A. N. Gray 14/3/30; 
MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/16. FBI Bulletins 20/2/30, 13(2); 20/11/30. 13(11).
5 BE:G1/455. EAC Committee of Economists Report 24/10/30, p.27; ‘The Economy Report’ 7/8/31.
6 Marichal (1989), Table.8. Ch.8; Bulmer-Thomas (1998).
7 Calculated from Feinstein (1972), Tables 37, 51-2, 57; Butler and Butler (1994), p.383.
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combination  of  another  gold  drain  to  France,  a  large  budget  deficit,  high  government 
borrowing  to  fund  unemployment  benefits,  and  the  absence  of  any  real  prospects  for 
significant wage reductions began to raise doubts in the minds of international investors as 
to  whether  Britain’s  authorities  would,  or  indeed could,  make the  necessary  efforts  to 
remain on gold.8
These problems now also led to a sharpening of class antagonisms, the focal point 
of which proved to be the issue of the budget. Though representatives of both capital and 
labour were broadly agreed as to the necessity of continuing to work within the confines of 
the gold standard, and hence of the need to maintain a balanced budget, their proposed 
means for achieving this were now diametrically opposed. For the majority of the press 
and capital (including the FBI, NCEO, ABCC, and the City)  the general view was in favour 
of the adoption of tariffs and closer Empire links, and for a programme of cuts in tax, 
wages, and public spending, especially on unemployment benefits which were seen to be 
holding up wages and reducing labour mobility. Moreover, industrial re-organisation and 
monetary reform were no longer seen as the principle  remedies for Britain’s economic 
problems  as  competitor  nations  had  themselves  already  engaged  in  far  reaching  re-
organisation,  and  indeed  there  was  now  thought  to  be  a  ‘grave  danger’  of  excessive 
emphasis  being given  to  problems which were inherently  beyond Britain’s  capacity  to 
solve  alone,  and  hence  of  deflecting  attention  away  from  the  need  for  domestic 
retrenchment.9
8 Hawtrey (1933), p.141-8; Kunz (1987), pp.29-45.
9 See for example the Manchester Guardian 5/8/31; the Times 10/8/31; Morning Post 14/8/31; 
MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/15/6. Nugent to G. B. Wolfe 22/4/31; MRC:MSS.292/560.1/21. ‘Industry and the 
Nation’ (FBI); MRC:MSS.292/560.1/2. ‘The Industrial Situation’ (NCEO), 11/2/31; 
MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/17. FBI Bulletins (1931 issues); Keynes (1951), pp.271-9; Williamson (1984), p.122; 
Kynaston (1999), pp.213-14. 
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Labour opinion however was vehemently opposed to such measures. Lower wages 
and  public  spending  cuts  they  argued,  would  merely  reduce  economic  demand,  thus 
intensifying the slump and leading to ‘widespread industrial unrest’, and in contrast the 
TUC  called  for  a  programme  of  greater  state  spending,  public  works,  and  higher 
progressive  taxes.  Monetary  policy  too  was  now  also  seen  to  be  of  ‘overwhelming 
importance’, with both the TUCGC and rank-and-file opinion increasingly displeased with 
the way the gold standard was operating. Though still of the view that a concerted effort 
should be made to ensure the ‘proper functioning’ of the system, key labour figures were 
now of the opinion that if the requisite international co-operation did not materialise, then 
Britain  should  take  unilateral  action  and  devalue  in  order  to  ease  the  pressure  on  its 
economy. At the same time however such a step was not considered to be a panacea, and 
economic  re-organisation  and  modernisation  were  still  thought  to  be  essential  for  any 
recovery. Although monetary changes would no doubt be useful, they were chiefly thought 
to be ‘one of the conditions of better trade rather than a direct cause of it’.10
Most state officials however continued to side with the views of capital. Though 
Hawtrey now thought the gold standard to be ‘quite intolerable’, the majority of Treasury 
opinion remained resolutely in favour both of the regime and of implementing cuts in tax 
and public  spending.  This  view was  also  supported  by  the  Bank of  England.  Though 
harbouring concerns that Britain might soon be forced off the gold standard if the situation 
failed  to  improve,  Norman  refused  to  countenance  any  voluntary  departure  and  was 
emphatic that the Bank would take whatever measures were necessary, however drastic, to 
prevent this from happening. The Governor was also now certain however that financial 
10 MRC:MSS.292/560.1/20. ‘Economic Policy of the TUC’ (TUCGC), 4/3/31, p.4; Economic Policy 
Statement (TUCGC), 25/3/31; Milne-Bailey to Citrine 6/3/31; MRC:MSS.292/471/1. Milne-Bailey to E. E. 
Canney 28/5/31; MRC:MSS.292/135.01/3. ‘The Unemployment Situation’ (TUCGC), 13/7/31; Various in 
MRC:MSS.292/626/1; Cross (1966), pp.260-1; Cronin (1991), pp.101-3.
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pressure from the Bank would be insufficient to resolve the crisis or to force an adjustment 
in Britain’s economy, and argued that while wages still needed to be reduced, more active 
measures were required from the government in order to balance the budget and increase 
Britain’s  economic  competitiveness.11 The  government  however  were  less  enthusiastic 
about  assuming  such  responsibility,  and  key  Ministers  continued  to  try  and  distance 
themselves from these events. MacDonald for instance bemoaned that efforts to resolve the 
economic  crisis  were being hampered by cross-party disputes (with  MP’s  being ‘more 
interested  in  scoring  partisan  victories’ than  seeking  a  practical  solution),  and  though 
Snowden  told  Parliament  that  ‘drastic  and  disagreeable  measures’ were  necessary  to 
balance the budget, detailed consideration of such matters was once more farmed out by 
the government with the establishment of another official enquiry (the May committee) to 
examine means of reducing public expenditure.12
By early summer the international situation was accelerating in intensity. Despite 
further interest rate cuts in America and Britain (where at 2.5% rates were now at their 
lowest since 1909), economic conditions continued to deteriorate. The focal point of the 
world  crisis  now  centred  on  Europe,  were  tensions  were  rising  following  a  recent 
announcement by Austria and Germany of their intention to form a customs union, a move 
raising fears (especially in France) of a Germanic revival.  In May these tensions were 
further strained with the collapse of Credit-Anstalt, the largest bank in Austria, dealing a 
severe blow to international confidence and sparking a fierce scramble for liquidity. By the 
end of the month the crisis was rapidly spreading throughout the region, with Germany in 
11 BE:G1/468. ‘Industrial Depression’ (Hawtrey), 5/3/31; Norman to D. Ferguson 27/1/31; BE:G14/341. 
Comments by Norman to a committee of MP’s. Financial Chronicle 9/5/31; Evening Standard 16/6/31; 
Untitled article by S. Cocks (MP); Kunz (1987), pp.30-43.
12 BE:G1/455; MacDonald to E. R. Peacock 15/4/31; Cole (1948), p.432-3; Cronin (1991), pp.100-3.
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particular haemorrhaging badly, and with many countries around the world now also in 
deep financial turmoil.13
Despite the severity of the crisis,  efforts by various central banks (including the 
Bank of England) to allay fears of a crash by providing liquidity loans were hampered by 
the  French,  who refused  to  help  in  retaliation  against  the  proposed  customs union.  In 
response,  the  US  President  Hoover  declared  a  twelve-month  moratorium  on  all  inter-
governmental debts in a desperate bid to avoid a global economic meltdown. Initially this 
move prompted a small recovery, though continuing French intransigence and a series of 
delays in finalising the scheme led to a relapse in confidence. An eventual compromise 
deal brokered with France and the provision of further central bank loans proved too late to 
rescue the situation, and in July the German financial system ground to a halt, compelling 
the introduction of economic controls, the suspension of debt repayments, and the de facto 
abandonment of the gold standard.14
The financial collapse had a severe impact upon Britain. With the City having long 
pursued a strategy of borrowing short-term money and re-lending it on a long-term basis 
(especially after the cessation of US foreign lending from 1928), and with the Bank of 
England having been forced to court short-term capital to maintain sterling since the return 
to gold, Britain had by now accumulated a volume of short-term liabilities far in excess of 
its short-term assets. With many of the City’s European investments now suddenly frozen 
as a result of the liquidity crisis, foreign investors began to grow increasingly concerned 
about  the security of their  British funds,  raising further uncertainty as to  the future of 
sterling.15 
13 Kindleberger (1986), p.153; Kunz (1987), ps.46-64; Eichengreen (1992), pp.264-70.
14 Clay (1957), ps.267-71, 364ff; Kindleberger (1986), pp.144-8; Kunz (1987), pp.57-71; Eichengreen 
(1992), pp.259ff.
15 Cole (1948), p.432; Boyle (1967), pp.261-2; Sayers (1976), p.225; Aldcroft and Oliver (1998), pp.35-41.
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Foreign confidence in Britain was undermined still more in June as the Gregory 
Commission published its findings, recommending a 30% cut in unemployment benefit, a 
shortening  of  its  length,  and  a  tightening  of  qualifying  conditions.  These  unpalatable 
proposals though were rejected by the government, who instead heightened doubts about 
their  willingness to  balance the budget  by increasing the ability of the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund to borrow in order to continuing paying benefits at existing rates.16 In July, 
the Macmillan enquiry also published its findings, though in contrast these were broadly 
favourable for the authorities, primarily emphasising the need for lower production costs 
and industrial  re-organisation,  and recommending that Britain  continue  to  maintain  the 
gold  standard  at  $4.86.  A fixed  exchange  rate,  it  argued,  was  both  economically  and 
politically superior to a managed money, with exchange rate stability essential for Britain’s 
international  trade,  and  with  a  managed  money  being  thought  to  ‘place  greater 
responsibility on the banking authorities.’ This view was also supported by Bradbury, who 
in a note of dissent to the report argued that a managed money would lead to disputes over 
the interpretation of economic data and would place the Bank of England in an impossible 
situation vis á vis the government, leading ultimately to state control.17
The publication of the Macmillan report however failed to reinvigorate confidence 
in sterling, and just two days later the pound suffered a large and sudden fall as European 
commercial  banks  with  funds  locked  up  in  Germany  began  liquidating  their  London 
assets.18 The fall prompted a strong rise in interest rates to 4.5%, and also compelled the 
Bank to seek an emergency extension of the fiduciary issue and supportive credits from the 
US and France. By now though, the majority opinion within the Bank and the Treasury 
16 Grigg (1948), p.253; Cross (1966), pp.273-4.
17 Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry, and Memo. of Dissent by Lord Bradbury. Cmd.3897.
18 Kindleberger (1986), p.154; Kunz (1987), pp.97-100.
221
was that such measures could merely provide a temporary respite and that the only real 
solution  was  government  action  to  rectify  the  budgetary  imbalance,  especially  on 
unemployment  benefit  spending.  Indeed,  Treasury  and  Bank  officials  were  now 
increasingly  fearful  that  Britain  would  soon  be  forced  off  gold  if  more  fundamental 
measures were not taken, and to impress this fact  upon the government, the Bank now 
ceased providing support for the pound, allowing it to fall below the gold export point in 
order that the full seriousness of the situation be conveyed to Ministers through a decline in 
the gold reserves.19 
Towards  the  end  of  July  Norman  finally  cracked  under  the  pressure  and  was 
replaced for the duration of the crisis by the Deputy Governor, Sir Ernest Harvey.20 Almost 
immediately Harvey’s nerve was also put to the test by the publication of the May report, 
which dealt yet another blow to confidence in Britain by predicting a huge budget deficit 
of £120 million for the next financial year. This was further enhanced by public hostility to 
the  report’s  proposals  for  eradicating  the  deficit,  with  recommendations  for  increased 
taxation  and  severe  cuts  in  public  spending  (two-thirds  of  which  was  to  come  from 
unemployment benefits) sharpening the divide in class opinion on the means of dealing 
with the crisis, and provoking outbreaks of civil unrest.21 
While economic conditions in Britain were now an increasingly political issue, and 
while  the  government’s  commitment  to  the  gold  standard  was  increasingly  under  the 
spotlight, the gold standard itself however was still managing to retain its credibility with 
19 BE:G14/316. Committee of Treasury Extracts; PRO:T175/51. Hopkins to Snowden, July 1931; 
BE:G1/468. Harvey to Snowden 6/8/31; Clay (1957), pp.384-7; Boyle (1967), pp.266-7; Williamson (1984), 
p.125; Kunz (1987), pp.64ff.
20 BE:ADM34/20. Norman Diaries. 
21 MRC:MSS.292/420/5. Various; BE:G1/109. ‘Domestic Financial Policy Since 1925’, Unsigned Bank of 
England memo; MRC:MSS.292/420/2 Pt.2. ‘The Crisis’ (Bevin and Cole), 1932; Grigg (1948), pp.254-5; 
Clay (1957), pp.389-90.
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capital and labour as a general framework for economic policy-making. The necessity of 
balancing  the  budget  in  order  to  maintain  the  par  value  of  sterling  was  still  widely 
accepted, and there were as yet still no substantial calls for leaving the regime. Though 
pressure was growing for a devaluation in order to ease the strain on the economy, a move 
now supported by Keynes and one regarded by the TUCGC as possessing great benefits, 
the  majority  of  capital  and  labour  opinion remained convinced of  the  need to  defend 
sterling at its present parity. As Glenday for example explained, devaluation would not 
resolve Britain’s problems but on the contrary, would severely damage Britain’s credit and 
precipitate  a  crisis  ‘of  the  first  magnitude.’  Instead,  most  representatives  of  capital 
(including the FBI, the ABCC, and the City) continued to press for cuts in public spending, 
tariffs, and closer Empire links, while the greater part of the labour movement, though now 
also prepared to consider the adoption of a tariff, also continued to argue that the budget 
should be balanced through a combination of higher progressive tax, and cuts in non-social 
service expenditure.22
Nevertheless,  with the  May report  casting serious doubt  upon the credibility of 
Britain’s commitment to maintain the gold standard at $4.86, the pressure on sterling grew 
ever stronger. Fearful that any further rise in interest rates would now be seen as a sign of 
weakness and trigger a full-scale  panic,  the Bank were forced to turn to  their  US and 
French credits to defend the pound. Increasingly worried, Harvey now doubted whether 
MacDonald and Snowden were ready to face up to the situation, and was concerned that 
they might seek to take Britain off gold rather than take the necessary action to balance the 
budget. In the opinion of the Bank however, leaving the gold standard or devaluing were 
22 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/14/1. ‘Statement on Macmillan Report’ (Nugent), 14/7/31; Glenday to J. J. Butler 
18/8/31; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/17. FBI Bulletin 21/9/31. 14(9); 20/11/31. 14(11); MRC:MSS.292/420/2. W. 
C. Lees (ABCC) to the Times 14/8/31; ‘The Financial Situation’ (TUCGC), 17/8/31; Daily Herald 24/8/31; 
Jay (1985), p.96.
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both considered to be unthinkable. Abandoning gold would, it was thought, lead to a surge 
in inflation, while devaluation would merely alleviate the pressure for lower wages and 
industrial modernisation and would thus do little to provide for a real recovery. As such, 
the  Bank’s  view  was  that  swift  action  along  the  lines  advocated  by  the
May report was now urgent.23 The government though continued to waver, and Ministers 
were  reluctant  to  impose  politically  unpopular  measures  in  order  to  defend  the  gold 
standard at the par value. Despite predicting a budget deficit for the following year some 
£50 million greater than that envisaged by the May report, Snowden for example continued 
to argue that Britain’s fundamental position was sound, and that the declining international 
confidence in sterling was unjustified.24
Going…Going…Gone!
The final events of the 1931 crisis are well documented. At a meeting with trade 
union representatives, Snowden and MacDonald emphasised the necessity of defending the 
parity  and balancing the budget,  with the Chancellor  raising the spectre  of ten million 
unemployed if sterling collapsed. The TUCGC however refused to accept any means of 
balancing the budget through cuts in unemployment benefits, with Citrine arguing that this 
would merely encourage an employers’ attack on wages. At the Bank of England, officials 
continued to press the government for ‘very substantial economies’ to balance the budget 
(including benefit cuts), though the government continued to prevaricate for fear of the 
political consequences.25 In an attempt to buy more time the government tried to obtain 
23 BE:SMT5/60. ‘Sterling and the Gold Standard’ (Siepmann), 25/8/31; BE:G1/468. Harvey to Snowden 
6/8/31; BE:G14/316. Committee of Treasury Extracts; BE:G1/459. ‘Going off the Gold Standard’ (Clay), 
19/8/31. 
24 Daily Herald 17/8/31; Boyle (1967), p.269; Kunz (1987), ps.96, 110(n86).
25 MRC:MSS.292/420/2 Pts.1-2. Various including ‘The Trade Unions and the National Financial Situation’ 
(1931); MacDonald to W. Citrine 21/8/31; MSS.200/B/3/2/C798 Pt.1. Manchester Guardian 19/9/31; 
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further  credits  from the  United  States,  but  were informed by American financiers  that 
further  loans  would  require  cuts  in  public  spending.  On  proposals  for  cutting 
unemployment benefit however the Cabinet were sharply divided (11-9), prompting the 
collapse of the Labour government. Amidst cries from the labour movement of a ‘bankers’ 
ramp’,  MacDonald  and  Snowden  re-emerged  at  the  head  of  a  ‘national’  (though 
Conservative  dominated)  coalition  government,  ostensibly  constructed  as  a  temporary 
measure to defend the gold standard and guide Britain through the financial crisis.26 
Driving  the  offensive  for  public  opinion,  MacDonald  quickly  reiterated  the 
necessity of saving the pound, claiming that a departure from gold would lead to a collapse 
in  sterling  and  an  inflationary  crisis  comparable  to  that  of  postwar  Germany,  while 
Snowden similarly claimed that leaving the regime would mean a 50% reduction in wages, 
pensions, and investments. More practically, an emergency budget quickly introduced £80 
million of new taxes, cut unemployment benefits  by 10% and suspended Britain’s debt 
repayments, while credits for the defence of sterling amounting to £80 million were also 
now found to be readily available from France and America.27
Though the effectiveness of the gold standard as a shield from political pressures 
was now severely damaged, with monetary policy a key topic of political debate and with 
the government having now been forced to become directly and visibly involved, the crisis 
had not yet destroyed the credibility of the gold standard as a framework for economic 
policy  management  with  capital  and  labour,  and  the  general  expectation  was  that  the 
government  would  continue  with  the  regime.  Representatives  of  capital  for  example 
welcomed the establishment of the national government, continued to regard excessively 
PRO:CAB23/67. Cabinet Meeting 21/8/31; BE:G14/316. Committee of Treasury Extracts.
26 Daily Herald 4/9/31; the Times, 8/9/31; Williamson (1984), pp.126-8; Kunz (1987), pp.94-105; Kynaston 
(1999).
27 The Times 26/8/31; Grigg (1948), p.256; Williamson (1984), pp.128-9; Kunz (1987), ps.105, 117.
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high production costs as the key cause of Britain’s problems, and continued to call for cuts 
in  wages  and  public  spending.28 Representatives  of  labour  on  the  other  hand  were 
vehemently  opposed to  the  new government.  Britain’s economic  difficulties  were  now 
attributed to ‘unsound’ monetary policies and to the failure of British industry to adjust, 
and  while  continuing  to  call  for  higher  tax  and  public  spending,  the  government’s 
commitment  to  the  gold  standard  was  nonetheless  considered  to  be  resolute  and  a 
devaluation was seen as ‘politically impossible.’29 Despite this however, the Labour Party 
(now led by Arthur Henderson), the TUC, and even the ILP continued to accept that a 
flight from sterling would produce catastrophic consequences and that the budget needed 
to be balanced. Even Keynes was now vacillating between calls for the abandonment of 
gold  and  devaluation,  and  calls  for  giving  the  international  gold  standard  one  ‘last 
opportunity’.30
In the eyes of international investors however the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to maintaining the gold standard at $4.86 was by now fatally weakened, and 
though the  emergency  budget  measures  initially  appeared  to  be  successful,  a  renewed 
efflux  of  gold  was  soon  underway.  Confidence  was  further  damaged  by  government 
complacency over the crisis, with Ministers now preoccupied with the forthcoming general 
election rather than with bolstering support for the regime; by the imposition of cuts in 
politically sensitive areas such as teachers’ pay, which threatened to arouse further social 
unrest;  and  by  proclamations  by  the  Labour  Party  and the  TUC threatening  industrial 
conflict if attempts were made to cut wages. This was further compounded by a mutinous 
28 Daily Telegraph 3/9/31; Various in MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C530 Pt.2; Cross (1966), p.203; Kunz (1987), 
pp.114-18.
29 MRC:MSS.292/420/2. Pts.1-2. ‘The Financial Situation’ (TUCGC), 25/8/31; ‘The Trade Unions and the 
National Financial Situation’, 7/9/31; MRC:MSS.292/471/1. ‘Gold Standard’ (TUCGC), 17/9/31. 
30 ILP Archives. ‘Oppose the Bankers ‘Ramp’’ (ILP), 1931; MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C798 Pt.1. New Statesman 
and Nation 19/9/31; Daily Herald 17/9/31; Keynes (1951), pp.280-5; Pimlott (1977), pp.14-15.
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outbreak of unrest at a British naval base in Invergordon over proposed salary cuts, which 
sent shockwaves through official circles and around the world.31 
By mid-September the Bank’s credits for the defence of sterling were becoming 
dangerously  low,  and both MacDonald and Snowden were increasingly concerned that 
Britain might soon be forced off gold. Despite French offers of further credits, the Bank 
finally conceded defeat on the 19th, and formally requested that the government relieve it of 
its legal obligation to sell gold. To this the Cabinet agreed without dissent, and on the 21st 
Britain was withdrawn from the gold standard, apparently for a temporary period of six 
months. In reality though, it was now for good.32
Concluding Remarks
From 1925-1928 the  governing strategy of  a  return to  the  gold standard at  the 
prewar par failed to produce any significant economic breakthrough in Britain, though was 
largely  successful  in  confining  class  unrest,  in  depoliticising  economic  conditions  and 
policy-making, and in displacing political pressure over these issues away from the state. 
The subject of this chapter has been to trace the breakdown of this strategy from 1929-
1931. A key characteristic of this period was that the continued lack of domestic economic 
adjustment and the impact of the worsening global crisis combined to put growing pressure 
on state officials over economic conditions in Britain. Nevertheless, for the most part the 
gold standard still  continued to provide the authorities with a credible and depoliticised 
framework for economic policy management, and continued to provide an effective means 
31 Grigg (1948), p.256; Clay (1957), pp.397-8; Boyle (1967), pp.274-5; Kunz (1987), pp.119-31.
32 PRO:T188/30. MacDonald and Snowden to Stimson and Flandin 18/9/31; BE:G1/459. MacDonald and 
Fisher to Norman and Harvey 19/9/31; BE:G14/312. Committee of Treasury Extracts; Also see various in 
PRO:CAB23/68; Hawtrey (1933), ps.150, 180-1; Kunz (1987), pp.135-7.
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of displacing political pressure away from the state. This depoliticising capacity however 
was  progressively undermined  as  the  economic  situation  continued to  deteriorate.  The 
credibility of Britain’s commitment  to maintain the gold standard at  the par value was 
finally destroyed during the summer of 1931 when a growing budgetary crisis led to a 
renewal  of  overt  class  struggle.  This  raised  serious  doubts  about  the  government’s 
willingness to take  the harsh measures necessary to defend the regime,  and eventually 
produced a fatal speculatory attack on the pound. The next chapter examines the shift to a 
new governing strategy following the collapse of the gold standard.
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Chapter 8 : The Search for a New Regime
This  chapter  examines  the  period  following Britain’s  abandonment  of  the  gold 
standard  and  analyses  the  development  of  a  new  governing  strategy.  It  shows  that 
economic conditions and policy-making were now once again key political issues, and that 
the main aims of the core executive remained the creation of favourable conditions for 
capital  accumulation,  the  containment  of  class  struggle,  and  the  minimisation  of  the 
directly  visible  involvement  of  the  state  in  economic  policy-making.  As  such,  the 
authorities adopted a governing strategy based around low interest rates, protective tariffs, 
and  a  managed  exchange  rate  buttressed  by  a  commitment  to  maintaining  budgetary 
orthodoxy in order to help them achieve these aims. Despite the sterling crisis and the 
growing economic difficulties however, key state managers still held a return to the gold 
standard to be the ultimate aim of monetary and economic policy. This though was now 
ruled out by a combination of international instability, domestic opposition, and fear of the 
political and social consequences of deflation. Any remaining hopes for a return to gold 
were  effectively  shattered  in  1933  when  a  US  devaluation  ruled  out  any  prospect  of 
international co-operation, and were completely extinguished by 1936 when the remaining 
international gold standard regime itself finally collapsed.
The Aftermath
As with the return to the gold standard in 1925, the decision to abandon the regime 
was greeted favourably by British opinion. The FBI along with the majority of the press 
welcomed the departure, there was no panic in the City, and although the ABCC regretted 
the decision it was nonetheless regarded as a sound one given the circumstances. The news 
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was also welcomed by labour, with the TUC believing it would lead to lower interest rates, 
and with the Daily Herald describing it as ‘highly desirable’. As Keynes observed, there 
were now few who did not rejoice ‘at the breaking of our golden fetters.’33
The exit from gold however was not without dissent within official circles. Both 
Norman and Niemeyer (neither of whom were consulted over the decision) were critical of 
the move, and the departure did not provide any respite for the authorities.34 Indeed, the 
immediate fear was that the exit would provoke a collapse in sterling and a resurgence of 
inflation. To counter this threat the departure was thus accompanied by a rise in interest 
rates to 6% and by the introduction of various economic controls including a prohibition 
on  foreign  loans,  restrictions  on  imports  and  currency  exchange,  and  a  temporary  six 
month tariff.35 Officials also sought to secure confidence in sterling with a series of public 
declarations claiming that Britain had only been forced off gold due to economic problems 
elsewhere,  that  Britain’s  budgetary  position  was  fundamentally  sound,  and  that  the 
government were committed to ensuring that it remained so.36 In spite of this, Britain’s 
departure  from the gold standard was  also followed by an increase  in  global  financial 
instability.  Many countries  followed Britain  off  the  regime,  and while  sterling  did  not 
collapse  it  nonetheless  fell  heavily  despite  an  overwhelming  victory  for  the  national 
government in the October general election, reaching a low point of $3.24 in December.37
33 Keynes (1951), pp.288-94; the Times 21/9/31, 25/9/31; the Financial Times, the Daily Telegraph, the 
Manchester Guardian, the Daily Express, the Morning Post, the Daily Herald 22/9/31; 
MRC:MSS.292/135.01/3. ‘Observations on Draft of ‘Labour’s way to Provide Work and Leisure’’ (TUCGC), 
11/5/35.
34 BE:OV48/9. Untitled memo. by Niemeyer 22/12/31; BE:G1/459. Untitled memo. by Niemeyer. 26/9/31; 
BE:G15/30. Various.
35 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/2/8-14. FBI 15th Annual Report, 1930-31, pp.9-10; Dimsdale (1981), p.335.
36 PRO:T188/30. Foreign Office Telegram, 20/9/31; PRO:PREM1/97. McDonald and Official Press 
Statement.
37 Clay (1957), pp.399-400; Howson (1975), p.109.
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As  the  economic  crisis  continued  to  worsen,  economic  conditions  and  policy-
making now became an even greater political issue, and with the state once more seen to 
be directly and visibly involved,  the pressure on the authorities  grew.38 Though still  in 
favour  of  maintaining  a  balanced  budget,  the  labour  movement  for  example  remained 
vehemently hostile to the national government for continuing with cuts in public spending, 
a policy seen as ‘class-biased’, as a prelude to wage cuts, and which provoked widespread 
protests  and  demonstrations  from  rank-and-file  trade  unionists  across  the  country.39 
Instead,  the  labour  left  continued  to  call  for  a  policy  of  extensive  state  planning  and 
economic control including public works, widespread nationalisation, higher progressive 
tax,  and  an  expansion  of  credit  in  order  to  stimulate  the  economy  and  ameliorate 
unemployment. The influence of the left within the labour movement however,  already 
undermined by high unemployment, was now becoming increasingly marginal (a process 
augmented by the disaffiliation of the ILP from the Labour Party in June 1932), and as 
such the general views of the movement were now increasingly moderate.40 
The response of the Labour Party and the TUC to the crisis was not to call for any 
radical measures, but to argue for international co-operation to raise wholesale prices and 
for greater economic links with the Empire. Nonetheless, both the TUC and the Labour 
Party were also now unequivocally opposed to any restoration of the gold standard. As the 
TUCGC put it, such a move would be ‘sheer madness’, and would lead to price instability 
and widespread industrial unrest. Although Britain’s economic difficulties were still seen to 
have been partly due to wider international factors, the return to gold at $4.86 was now 
considered to have overvalued the pound, to have led to high levels of interest rates, to 
38 MRC:MSS.292/420/2 Pt.2. ‘The Crisis…’ (Bevin and Cole); also see various in MRC:MSS.292/135/1.
39 Various in MRC:MSS.292/420/2-3.
40 Pimlott (1977), pp.28ff; Jones and Keating (1985), pp.57-8.
231
have damaged industry, and to have created high unemployment. Furthermore, a return at a 
devalued level was also rejected on the basis that this would merely provide temporary 
benefits,  would  be  detrimental  to  Britain’s  long-term  competitiveness,  and  would  risk 
foreign  retaliation.  On  the  other  hand,  a  managed  money  was  also  thought  likely  to 
produce exchange rate instability, and as such the TUCGC therefore felt that it would be 
better to accept the ‘compromise’ of a return to gold if other leading nations also returned 
and if the imperfections of the regime could be overcome. If these conditions could not be 
met however, the Council argued that the next best policy would be to remain off the gold 
standard and to cultivate an economic policy based around a sterling zone of Empire and 
other appropriate countries.41
Along with the labour movement, representatives of capital were also now critical 
of the government and opposed to the gold standard. The FBI, the MAIE, the NCEO, and 
the LCC for instance were all of the view that monetary policy was central to the present 
crisis  and  that  the  return  to  gold  had  proved  detrimental  to  Britain’s  economic 
performance.42 While welcoming the decision to leave the regime however, representatives 
of capital were also keen that this should not be seen as a panacea for Britain’s economic 
difficulties, and despite warnings by the LCC that any attempt to cut wages would lead to 
‘serious social disorders’, most continued to press for reductions in wages, tax, and public 
spending, as well  as for the introduction of tariffs and greater Empire links in order to 
41 Labour Party Annual Report 1932; MRC:MSS.292/420/2 Pt.2. ‘Labour Party Draft Resolutions’ (TUC), 
28/9/31; ‘The Crisis…’ (Bevin and Cole), 1932; MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C800 Pt.2. ‘Tariffs and World Trade’ 
(TUCGC) 22/6/32; ‘Imperial Conference, Ottawa 1932’ (TUC), July 1932; MRC:MSS.292/561/3. 
‘Conference of Workers’ Representatives…’ (TUCGC), April 1932; MRC:MSS.292/563.2/7. ‘World 
Monetary Conference’ (TUCGC), October 1932; ‘Policy’, (TUC), 9/6/33; the Times 21/10/31; Cole (1948), 
pp.435-40; Cronin (1991), pp.123-8; Dale (2000); Also see various in MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C798 Pt.1.
42 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/46/4. ‘Report on Empire Monetary and Financial Policy’ (FBI and the Empire 
Economic Union), 7/10/31; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/4/2. MAIE Bulletin No.54; MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C798 
Pts.1-5. Lord Leverhulme to J. B. Forbes Watson 11/1/32; J. B. Forbes Watson to Ramsay MacDonald 
11/11/31.
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address the situation. Moreover, although some within the City continued to believe that 
Britain would eventually return to gold, and although some industrial groups such as the 
National  Federation  of  Iron  and  Steel  Manufacturers  (NFISM)  favoured  a  return  to  a 
reformed gold standard, the majority of capitalist opinion was now of the view that there 
should be no return unless it  could be clearly and unequivocally demonstrated to be in 
Britain’s economic interests.43 If this could not be shown, then along with the Labour Party 
and the TUC, the general view of capital was also that Britain’s monetary policy should 
now be based around a floating exchange rate and a sterling zone, and while further state 
intervention and widespread economic planning were abhorred, there was nonetheless a 
growing feeling that the state should engage in a greater degree of consultation with capital 
over economic policy.  In addition,  though remaining averse to domestic  expansionism, 
arguing that this would merely lead to greater difficulties in the future, the FBI were now 
also in favour of moderately raising and then stabilising prices as a means of restoring 
profitability and stimulating economic activity.44
The exit  from gold also led to an intense debate  over  the immediate  course of 
economic policy within official circles. While now seeking to develop a new regime for 
economic  policy  regulation  however,  official  aims  themselves  remained  essentially 
unchanged and the emphasis was predominantly on the need for a change in policy style 
43 MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/19. FBI Bulletin March 1932. 16(2); MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/14/1. ‘Future 
Monetary Policy’ (NFISM), 24/10/31; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/4/2. NFISM to Glenday 18/4/32; 
MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C800 Pt.2. ‘Imperial Conference’, July 1932. 
44 MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/4/2. MAIE Bulletin No.54; LCC Director to Sir J. Lithgow 22/1/32; BE:G1/459. J. 
S. McConechy (MAIE) to Chamberlain 14/11/31; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/46/3-4. ‘Industry and the Crisis’, 
(FBI). September 1931; MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/17-18. FBI Bulletins (October 1931 – May 1932 issues); 
MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/4/1-2. ‘Industry and Monetary Policy’ (FBI), April 1932; Director of the LCC to Sir 
J. Lithgow 22/1/32; MRC:MSS.292/560.1/21. ‘Industry and the Empire’ (FBI), 1932; Industry and the 
Nation’ (FBI); MRC:MSS.292/560.1/2. ‘The Industrial Situation’ (NCEO); BE:EID4/102. ‘Memo. on 
Currency’ (LCC), November 1931; Manchester Guardian, 2/11 /31; the Times 25/9/31; Drummond (1981), 
p.14; Kynaston (1999), ps.361-3, 396-7.
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rather than substance.45 Primarily, Britain’s authorities were still concerned to contain class 
struggle, provide favourable conditions for capital accumulation, improve competitiveness, 
and to maintain the pressure for economic adjustment while simultaneously minimising the 
directly visible involvement of the state with the economy in order to displace political 
pressure over economic conditions and policy-making. More specifically, in sharp contrast 
to  the  official  view  during  the  1920s  that  Britain’s  economic  problems  were  due  to 
excessively high prices, the key difficulty  now was thought to be that excessively low 
prices were reducing profitability  and deterring private  enterprise.  As such,  though the 
Bank  of  England  continued  to  argue  that  lower  prices  were  necessary  to  restore 
competitiveness,  key  Treasury  officials  thought  the  best  means  of  encouraging  an 
economic revival was by moderately raising and then stabilising prices. At the same time 
however, with officials remaining keen not to ease the pressure for economic adjustment, 
and  remaining  anxious  to  secure  international  confidence  in  sterling  for  fear  that 
depreciation  would  lead  to  an  uncontrollable  resurgence  of  inflation,  interest  rates 
continued to be held at a relatively high 6%.46
As such, although the case for a managed money regulated by the Bank of England 
with the aim of maintaining domestic price stability was once more being vigorously put 
by Keynes, such a notion again attracted little support within official circles. Key figures at 
the  Treasury  and  the  Bank  (now  increasingly  concerned  about  the  possibility  of 
nationalisation) were insistent that a managed money would not work, and argued that such 
a  policy  would  also  contain  significant  economic  and  political  dangers.  Unstable 
international conditions combined with the Bank’s low level of reserves and high external 
45 On this also see Booth (1983; 1987); Tomlinson (1990), pp.116-17.
46 BE:G1/453. Harvey to MacDonald 28/9/31; BE:G1/459. Fisher to Snowden 30/9/31; BE:G15/30. Various 
including ‘Note on the Possible Rise in Prices’ (untitled and undated); ‘Queries’ (unsigned), 29/9/31; Clay to 
Lubbock 30/9/31; also see Dimsdale (1981), pp.329-30; Ham (1981), pp.65-6; Tomlinson (1990), pp.118-19.
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liabilities  for example  were seen to preclude any possibility of regulating the value of 
sterling, whilst it was also thought that direct state control would adversely affect foreign 
confidence in the pound, and would therefore render sterling more difficult to manage and 
leave the way open for even greater criticism. Furthermore, it was also claimed that linking 
sterling to a commodity index would lead to a run on the pound whenever prices fell, since 
the  market  would  assume  an  inflationary  response,  whilst  a  rising  pound  was  also 
considered to be dangerous due to the downward rigidity of domestic costs and prices. As 
such, the general view within official circles was therefore that since it had proved to be 
impossible to reduce money wages without stimulating labour unrest, sterling should now 
be allowed to fall in order to raise domestic prices and profits, thus easing the pressure for 
cuts  in  money  wages  whilst  simultaneously  eroding  their  real  value.47 As  Graham-
Harrison, the financial secretary to the Treasury explained, since a rise in the pound was 
believed to carry the risk of difficulties similar to those experienced during 1925-26 the 
choice was therefore between ‘a low exchange and an attempt to cut wages severely’. Or as 
Hopkins put it:
“the risk of our suffering a second time so close an analogy to the past 
trouble  of  the  export  trades  is  surely  conclusive  against  the  [managed 
money] scheme.”48
Official unity in opposition to a managed money however, did not extend to any 
agreement over the level to which the pound should be allowed to fall. Though it was felt 
that sterling should not be allowed to depreciate too severely due to the risk of excessive 
47 BE:G1/455. ‘Notes on the Currency Question’ (Keynes), November 1931; ‘Memo. on Mr Keynes ‘Notes 
on the Currency Question’’ (Clay), 24/11/31; ‘Comments on Notes on the Currency Question by Mr. Keynes’ 
(O. M. Sprague), 24/11/31; BE:G1/50. ‘Note by the Treasury’ (unsigned), 17/8/32; PRO:T177/12 Pt.2. 
Siepmann to Phillips 9/7/32; the Times 12/3/32; Clay (1957), p.462; Howson (1975), p.176; Sayers (1976), 
pp.381-2.
48 PRO:T175/57 Pt.1. Untitled Memo (Graham-Harrison), 5/3/32; ‘The Goods or Commodity Standard’ 
(Hopkins), undated [my insert]; also see BE:G15/30. ‘Note of a Conversation with Lord Bradbury’ 
(Siepmann), 24/9/31; ‘Views of R.G.H’ (Hawtrey), 5/10/31.
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inflation  or  foreign  retaliation,  views  on  the  most  ‘appropriate’  level  were  greatly 
divergent.  Leith-Ross  for  example  favoured  a  level  of  between  $4.00-$4.25,  Hopkins 
favoured a rate of $3.90, Hawtrey felt that $3.40-60 would be most appropriate,  while 
Bradbury even suggested letting the pound fall to $1 or $2.49 Despite this uncertainty over 
immediate policy however, officials were still  generally of the opinion that the ultimate 
aim of economic policy should be a return to the gold standard at the old par. Though some 
were now opposed to such a move, such as Hawtrey, who thought that a lower exchange 
rate might now be more credible, and H. A. Siepmann (a Bank of England advisor) who 
thought that $4.86 was now discredited in the public mind due to the ‘evil consequences’ it 
was believed to have produced, Ministers remained keen for a return to orthodox economic 
policies and most Treasury and Bank officials continued to believe that a return at the old 
par was desirable.50 
Officials were however also now of the view that a return was not possible at the 
present  time.  International  conditions  were  felt  to  be  too  unstable,  while  the  essential 
conditions  for  a  successfully  functioning  gold  standard,  namely  ‘an  ample  supply  of 
foreign loans….and a general public belief in the permanency of the system’ were now 
gone.51 Nevertheless, given the importance of maintaining foreign confidence in sterling, 
49 BE:G1/455. Norman to N. Chamberlain 26/11/31; to Keynes 27/11/31; PRO:T188/48. Untitled memo 
(Phillips), 22/3/32; PRO:T188/29. ‘Pegging the Pound – II’, (Hawtrey), 2/10/31; PRO:T188/28. 
‘International Co-operation and the Gold Standard’, 16/10/31; PRO:T188/48. ‘Note of a Conversation with 
Lord Bradbury’ (Siepmann), 24/9/31; Henderson to Phillips, 29/2/32; Various in BE:G15/30; Dimsdale 
(1981), p.329; Kunz (1987), p.160. 
50 BE:G15/30. ‘Note of a Conversation with Monsieur Van Zeeland’ (Siepmann), 22/9/31; Untitled Memo. 
(Siepmann), 23/9/31; ‘Note of a Conversation with Lord Bradbury’ (Siepmann), 24/9/31; ‘Views of R.G.H.’ 
(Hawtrey), 5/10/31; BE:OV48/9. Untitled memo. (Siepmann), 23/8/31; Untitled Memo (Niemeyer), 23/9/31; 
BE:G1/455. ‘Notes on Mr Keynes’ Memo’ (Hopkins), 3/12/31; PRO:T188/28. ‘International Co-operation 
and the Gold Standard’, 16/10/31; BE:G14/165. ‘B.I.S. Gold Guarantees’. (Siepmann), 3/11/31; 
PRO:T188/28. ‘The Gold Standard and the Rules of the Game’ (Hawtrey), 17/10/31; Cross (1966), pp.314-
15; Howson (1975), p.176.
51 BE:G1/109. ‘The International Exchange Structure’ (unsigned Bank memo.), 27/7/49; BE:G1/459. Untitled 
Document (Niemeyer), 26/9/31; BE:OV48/9. Untitled memo. by Niemeyer, 22/12/31; Various in BE:G15/30.
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the  authorities  were  also  keen  that  this  inability  should  be  kept  strictly  secret.  With 
Hopkins reasoning that it would be possible to re-stabilise sterling against gold on a  de 
facto basis within a ‘reasonably short time’, as Norman put it, any debate over a managed 
money at  the  moment  would be  destabilising  and ‘unwise’,  and  ought  therefore to  be 
suppressed.52
A New Regime
The key components of the new regime for economic policy management were 
installed  during  the  first  half  of  1932.  With  continued  international  instability  making 
sterling look relatively safe and leading to a recovery in the pound from December 1931, 
officials soon became convinced that the threat of a collapse was now over, allowing a 
series of cuts in interest rates to 2% by June (where they remained until 1939).53 This was 
buttressed by a massive operation to convert Britain’s war debt to a lower rate of interest, 
thus easing the burden of debt funding, and by the introduction of a general 10% tariff on 
most foreign goods, a move designed to strengthen Britain’s balance of payments, bolster 
sterling,  and  address  the  concerns  of  industrialists.  In  turn,  these  measures  too  were 
strengthened by the easing of foreign exchange controls in March to reinvigorate Britain’s 
invisible  earnings,  by  the  introduction  of  an  Imperial  preference  trading  policy  at  the 
Ottawa conference during the summer, and by the maintenance of tight fiscal discipline. 
Neville Chamberlain (the new Chancellor since the general election) continued with the 
emergency budget measures of late 1931, while pressure for loan-financed public works 
52 PRO:T188/28. Leith-Ross to Keynes 15/10/31; PRO:T175/57 Pts.1-2. ‘The Future of the Pound’ 
(Hopkins), November 1931; ‘Imperial and International Monetary Conference’ (Hopkins), undated; ‘Notes 
on Mr. Keynes’ Memo’ (Hopkins), 3/12/31; Untitled Memos. (Hopkins), 6/4/32, 2/4/33; BE:G1/455. Norman 
to Hopkins 11/12/32; Howson (1975), p.177; Drummond (1981), pp.121-2.
53 Eichengreen (1992), p.302; Kynaston (1999), p.362.
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was repelled on the basis that such schemes would take a long time to implement, that they 
would merely generate new unemployment when finished, and that they would either be 
inflationary (in which case the extra credit would be better spent on normal trade), or that 
they would divert funds from more productive channels.54
Unable  yet  to  return to  the gold standard,  officials  now also adopted a  loosely 
managed exchange rate regime. The Bank of England intervened to sell sterling whenever 
its value rose in order to hold it at around $3.50 (though  Norman favoured a more anti-
inflationary level of around $3.60), and used the foreign exchange accumulated in so doing 
to repay the US and French credits obtained for the defence of sterling during 1931. This 
process  was  formalised  by  July  with  the  establishment  of  the  Exchange  Equalisation 
Account (EEA) which enabled a more structured means of smoothing out fluctuations in 
sterling by providing a set portion of funds specifically for this purpose.55 In addition, the 
value of the pound was also supported by the construction of an informal ‘sterling area’ 
based around the Empire (the main exceptions being Canada and initially South Africa) 
and other countries with close economic links to Britain such as Scandinavia, Egypt, Iraq, 
and most  of South America.  Along with ensuring confidence in sterling,  this was also 
designed  to  help  maintain  a  degree  of  global  exchange  rate  stability,  and  to  increase 
Britain’s influence over international issues such as war debts, reparations and tariffs.56
54 Various in PRO:CAB58/183, PRO:T160/488, and PRO:T175/17 Pts.1-2; BE:G1/50. ‘Note by the Treasury’ 
(unsigned), 17/8/32; MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C800 Pt.2. ‘Imperial Economic Conference’ (ABCC), September 
1932; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E1/14/1. ‘Future Monetary Policy’ (NFISM), 24/10/31; Einzig (1932), pp.158-65; 
Nevin (1953), pp.83-4; Clay (1957), pp.400-1; Howson (1975), pp.92-9; Drummond (1981), ps.26-7, 134; 
Tomlinson (1990), pp.109-10.
55 PRO:T175/57 Pts.1-2. Untitled Memos (Hopkins), 6/4/32, 30/3/33; Nevin (1953), pp.76-83; Clay (1957), 
ps.399-401, 460-1; Jucker-Fleetwood (1968), p.67; Leith-Ross (1968), p.140; Drummond (1981), ps.15-16, 
162-3.
56 Various in PRO:T160/488 [F13017/7]; BE:G1/459. Untitled Document (Niemeyer), 26/9/31; PRO:T175/57 
Pt.1. ‘Empire Currency and the Sterling Block’ (Hopkins), undated; Drummond (1981), p.9; Tomlinson 
(1990), pp.102-3; Cottrell (1995), p.105.
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The introduction of this new regime for economic policy regulation however did 
not mean that state officials were now prepared to accept direct responsibility for economic 
conditions.  Indeed,  with  economic  conditions  and  policy-making  now overtly  political 
issues,  state  officials  were  anxious  to  continue  trying  to  minimise  the  directly  visible 
involvement of the state, and to minimise public discussion of economic and monetary 
policy issues.  Control over tariffs for example was handed over to an independent and 
ostensibly non-political Import Duties Advisory Committee, and while officials were still 
keen  to  emphasise  the  need  for  a  balanced  budget,  a  substantial  degree  of  creative 
accounting remained necessary in order to avoid further cuts in politically sensitive areas 
such as unemployment benefits while maintaining a semblance of fiscal rectitude.57 In the 
construction of the sterling area, officials were also anxious to discourage inappropriate 
nations  from  joining  (especially  those  still  on  gold),  since  this  would  not  only  risk 
devaluations and thus undermine the advantages of a depreciated pound, but would also 
impose a moral responsibility on state officials to help with any difficulties that should 
arise, thereby complicating the management of economic policy.58 Moreover, the EEA was 
also  designed  to  maintain  secrecy  over  the  level  of  Britain’s  reserves,  the  depleted 
condition of which was still thought likely to attract speculation, and indeed details of the 
Account  itself  were  kept  secret  until  1937  for  fear  of  provoking  controversy  and 
criticism.59 As such, although the Treasury now had a more direct role in the running of 
monetary policy, Treasury officials remained keen for the Bank to retain a great deal of 
57 BE:G1/459. Fisher to Snowden, 30/9/31; BE:G15/30. ‘Note of a Conversation with Monsieur Van 
Zeeland’, (Siepmann). 22/9/31; Untitled memo. by Siepmann 23/9/31; BE:OV48/9. Untitled memo. by 
Siepmann 23/8/31; Various in PRO:T175/17 Pt.1; Middleton (1985), pp.89-91; Booth (1987), p.509; 
Tomlinson (1990), pp.106ff.
58 Various in PRO:T160/488; BE:G1/459. Untitled Document (Niemeyer), 26/9/31; PRO:T175/57 Pt.1. 
‘Empire Currency and the Sterling Block’ (Hopkins), undated; Drummond (1981), p.9; Tomlinson (1990), 
pp.102-3; Cottrell (1995), p.105; Kynaston (1999), pp.363-4.
59 PRO:T175/17 Pt.2. Notes by Hopkins and Phillips; Artis (1965), pp.4-5.
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political  independence  and  autonomy  over  day-to-day  operations.  As  Norman  later 
explained,  the Treasury purposefully allowed the Bank to have ‘an extraordinarily free 
hand’ in the running of the EEA. As he put it: 
“the executive management of the Account is normally left entirely to the 
Bank….we are not called upon to explain our interventions or our failure to 
intervene, nor to justify the complete discretion which the Treasury allow us 
in matters of day to day practice.”60
Officials  also refused to accept any responsibility for the problems resulting from 
the return to gold at the prewar parity. As Norman again explained, while the return was 
‘probably a mistake’:
“in those circumstances I should do the same thing again. It is easy to see it 
afterwards. But a great deal of what has happened in the meantime was not 
necessary but depended on policy. It might have been different.”61
These  sentiments  were  also  echoed  by  Chamberlain,  who  sought  to  blame 
international factors for the failure of the strategy, arguing that although it had entailed 
‘heavy sacrifices….in the shape of prolonged unemployment and depression’, there was 
‘no reason why the return to gold should not have been a great success’. Such views were 
also later emphasised by Niemeyer. As he put it: 
“It is perhaps easy to attribute to it all sorts of later misfortunes which might  
well have arisen anyhow from political and economic conditions which it 
was hoped in 1925 to avert in part by this very attempt at stability.”62
60 In Clay (1957), pp.437-8.
61 In Jucker-Fleetwood (1968), p.68.
62 MRC:MSS.292/563.2/3. ‘Statement by the Chancellor…at the Monetary and Economic Conference’, 
14/6/33; BE:G14/312. Niemeyer to A. C. Turner 19/11/43.
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Despite the apparent accommodatory character of this new regime however, Bank 
and Treasury officials were also keen to ensure that lower interest rates did not ease the 
pressure for improved economic efficiency and adjustment. Both capital and labour were 
still thought to be resistant to change, with wages remaining rigid, with industrialists still 
reluctant to engage in any substantial modernisation or shift in production, and with the 
banks  still  continuing  to  avoid  the  imposition  of  restructuring  through the  pressure  of 
bankruptcy.  As Robert  Kindersley  and Henry  Clay  (Bank of  England advisers)  stated, 
Britain’s banks were continuing to prop up inefficient industries which ‘ought to have been 
eliminated years ago’. As such, while lower interest rates were thought to be necessary to 
stimulate  an economic  recovery,  officials  were  also  certain  that  cheaper  credit  was  no 
remedy for Britain’s economic difficulties, since as Kindersley and Clay again explained, 
this would simply ‘defer the re-adjustment of industry by making it easier for redundant, 
inefficient and water-logged concerns to avoid elimination’. Instead, what was needed was 
improved competitiveness, a ‘contraction of over-expanded industries’, technological re-
organisation and ‘the development of new lines of production’.63 Such views, especially 
the need for competitive improvements, also gained wider gained international support. 
The gold bloc in particular (and especially France) now regarded inflation to be the root 
cause of the global  crisis,  and the general  view of many countries  was in  favour of a 
deflationary  response,  with  France  and America  also now pressing Britain  for  a  quick 
return to gold.64
63 BE:C42/17. ‘Credit Policy and Trade Recovery’ (Kindersley and Clay), 13/4/32; BE:ADM34/2. Norman 
Diaries. 26/2/32; PRO:T177/12 Pt.1. Untitled memo. by Siepmann 15/12/32; BE:G1/50. ‘The Non-Monetary 
Factors Affecting Prices’ (unsigned Bank memo), 1/9/32.
64 Various in PRO:T175/57 Pt.1 and PRO:T177/12 Pt.2; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/21/62. ‘Conclusions of 
Report…’, 27/4/33; ‘Meeting of Representatives’ (Nugent), 29/5/33; Drummond (1981), pp.130-9; 
Eichengreen (1992), pp.320-1.
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Treasury officials however were now opposed to the use of deflation (especially in 
the  form of  a  return  to  gold)  as  either  a  domestic  or  an international  response  to  the 
depression. Such a process it was argued, would not only be too slow in its operation but 
would  also  run  the  risk  of  provoking  international  defaults  and  an  intensification  of 
domestic labour unrest. It would they claimed, be ‘a desperate gamble’ and would produce 
‘such social stresses as would assuredly bring collapse’. Further, even Bank officials were 
forced to recognise that public opinion was unlikely to countenance such a move and that a 
return  to  gold was not a  viable  option in  anything other than the long term.  With the 
general opinion being that it was too difficult and risky to reinvigorate the domestic circuit 
of  capital  by trying to  force down money wages, official  efforts  were instead directed 
towards achieving a moderate inflation in order to raise and then stabilise prices at a level 
conducive  to  encouraging  trade  and  industry  through  raising  profits  and  eroding  real 
wages.65
 Moreover, with sterling under no immediate threat, officials were by the summer 
also  sufficiently  confident  to  declare  this  publicly.  As Chamberlain  informed  both  the 
House of Commons and the Ottawa Empire conference, Britain would not engage in a 
quick return to the gold standard and the question of currency stabilisation was not one 
which could now be discussed at the present time. In addition, officials were now also 
emphatic  that  extensive  conditions  would  have  to  be  met  before  any  return  could  be 
possible. In particular, there would need to be a rise in the general level of commodity 
prices and an adjustment of the various political and economic factors which had led to the 
collapse of the regime. The Bank of England reserves would need to be strengthened, the 
65 Various in PRO:T177/12 Pts.1-3 including ‘Observations on Main Memorandum’(unsigned Treasury 
memo), 1932; ‘Joint Meeting of Financial Sub-Committee…’ (Treasury document), 1/11/32.
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questions of war debts, reparations, tariffs, and other protective measures would need to be 
resolved, and international co-operation and economies in the use of monetary gold would 
have to be significantly improved.66
The Point of No Return
Throughout 1932 the international crisis continued to worsen. Economic controls 
and restrictions on world  trade such as tariffs and quotas grew, international commodity 
prices continued to fall, and political and economic tensions continued to rise. These were 
fuelled  by  the  collapse  of  agreements  on  war  debts  and  reparations,  by  the  continued 
suspension of debt servicing in Latin America, and by the increasing electoral advance of 
Fascism  in  Germany. International  financial  instability  also  increased  as  countries 
continued  to  abandon the  gold  standard,  and  by  the  end  of  1932  the  only  significant 
adherents  remaining  on  the  regime  were  the  USA and  a  core  European  ‘gold  bloc’ 
composed of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, Italy, and Germany 
(albeit with extensive controls).67
Domestically the picture was mixed. Though unemployment rose to an interwar 
peak of 3.4 million, from the middle of the year signs of a recovery driven largely by a 
housing boom and enabled by low interest rates were increasingly evident. Unemployment 
(though remaining chronically high) now began to fall slowly, exports (though remaining 
sluggish) began to revive, the current account (though still in deficit until 1934) started to 
66 MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C800 Pt.2. ‘Imperial Economic Conference’ (ABCC), September 1932; 
PRO:CAB58/183. ‘The Foreign Demand for the Return of the UK to Gold’ (unsigned), October 1932; 
PRO:T175/17 Pt.2. ‘Note on the Programme for the World Conference’ (undated and unsigned); Leith-Ross 
to Phillips 20/12/32; BE:G1/50. ‘The Non-Monetary Factors Affecting Prices’ (unsigned Bank memo), 
1/9/32; Also see various in PRO:T177/12 Pts.1-2 and PRO:T160/488; Keynes (1951), p.ix; Howson (1975), 
p.197 (n29); Drummond (1981), pp.26-7.
67 Leith-Ross (1968), pp.148-51; Drummond (1981), pp.126-7; Kindleberger (1986), pp.230-1; Kunz (1987), 
pp.154-70; Marichal (1989), Table 8. Ch.8; Eichengreen (1992), pp.258ff.
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improve, and the balance of payments as a whole was strengthened over the next five or so 
years by an inflow of capital as sterling remained a relatively safe haven for investors. 
Industrial  production too began to recover, growing by 50% between 1931-37 to reach 
record  levels,  and  with  growth  now particularly  strong in  newer industries,  while  real 
earnings fell  slightly until  1937.68 Despite such improvements however,  there remained 
little sign of any substantial economic adjustment in terms of increased competitiveness or 
a significant shift away from the old staple industries, which by 1937 still comprised over 
82% of British exports. Moreover, British industry and finance now both sought refuge 
from  the  international  crisis  by  turning  to  easy  markets  instead  of  facing  up  to  the 
competitive challenge. The vast majority of new City issues were now directed inward, 
while the proportion of British exports going to the Empire and the sterling area grew from 
35% between 1920-29, to 47% between 1930-38.69
The views of capital and labour on the economic and political situation from 1932 
remained essentially unchanged, maintaining the pressure on state officials.  The labour 
movement for example continued to attack the government for its policy of retrenchment 
and for the persistence of high unemployment. Public protests, mass demonstrations, and 
outbreaks of civil unrest all continued to threaten political stability, and though remaining 
numerically weakened (with trade union membership continuing to fall  until 1935), the 
number of new stoppages rose steadily, reaching their highest levels since 1920 by 1937.70 
Moreover, the majority of labour opinion was still firmly opposed to a return to gold. The 
68 Feinstein (1972), Tables.2, 17, 37, 51, 52, 57, 64, 65; Howson (1975), pp.108ff; Dimsdale (1981), pp.333-
41; Aldcroft (1983), p.133; Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983), ps.84, 102; Middleton (1985), pp.24-6; 
Kindleberger (1986), pp.240-2; Feinstein et al (1997), p.91.
69 Kahn (1946), Table.21, ps.139, 188-9; Dimsdale (1981), pp.333-4; Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983), 
pp.90-8l; Alford (1996), pp.142-3.
70 MRC:MSS.292/135/1. Citrine to MacDonald 3/11/32; H. B. Usher to Citrine 17/11/31; TUC Annual 
Report 1932; Pollard (1969), pp.156-61; Butler and Butler (1994), pp.373-4.
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TUC argued that it would be a ‘dangerous mistake’ to return either at or near the old par, 
and the general consensus of labour was that the preferred economic policy programme 
was one based upon a managed money with the aim of maintaining price stability. Despite 
the weakening of the left, whose attentions had now begun to turn towards foreign policy 
issues such as the rise of Fascism, labour also continued to call for a more interventionist 
stance,  with  moderately  higher  prices  and  a  progressive  fiscal  policy  to  maintain  a 
balanced budget, and with  increased  public spending,  public works,  and nationalisation 
(though calls for the nationalisation of the Bank of England were quietly dropped after the 
general election defeat of 1935). Though facing a decline in real wages and falling trade 
union membership, the labour movement were also still able to mount sufficient resistance 
to prevent them from falling at an even faster rate. A large part of this was due to the 
establishment  of  the  National  Unemployed  Workers’ Movement,  primarily  under  the 
auspices of the CPGB (and thus shunned by the TUC), which successfully  maintained 
effective opposition to any erosion of living standards by refusing to allow the unemployed 
to return to work at less than trade union rates of pay.71 
For capital  on the other  hand the necessary elements for an economic recovery 
were still considered to be the restoration of profitability through moderately higher prices, 
cuts  in tax and public spending,  and through the development of Empire links and the 
sterling area. Despite this however, most employers were now also unwilling to antagonise 
further labour unrest by trying to press for large wage cuts.72 Moreover, although some 
groups  such  as  the  Cotton  Spinners  and Manufacturers’ Association  (CSMA),  and the 
71 MRC:MSS.292/563.2/1 and 7. ‘Observations on Mr. Neville Chamberlains’ Speech’ (Walkden and 
Citrine), 14/6/33; ‘World Monetary and Economic Conference’ (TUCGC), 1933; MRC:MSS.292/560.1/1-3. 
‘Unemployment Policy’ (TUCGC), 21/11/34; ‘TUC and the Gold Standard’ (TUCGC), 1936; 
MRC:MSS.292/462/3. ‘Policy on International Gold Standard’ (TUCGC), 1936; Pimlott (1977), ps.38, 55; 
Butler and Butler (1994), pp.373-5; Kynaston (1999), pp.377-8.
72 Cole (1948), p.441; Pollard (1969), pp.159-61; Pimlott (1977), p.55.
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Chambers of Commerce of the British Empire (CCBE) favoured a return to gold,73 the 
majority of domestic capitalist opinion continued to favour a managed money and thought 
that there should be no return unless it was certain to work in the best economic interests of 
Britain. The City for example were now of the view that a return to gold at the present time 
was impractical given the international situation, while the FBI, the ABCC, and the LCC 
all declared themselves to be ‘most strongly averse’ to any notion of a return to gold that 
did not meet these requirements.74
The general position of state officials however also remained unchanged. The core 
executive  continued  to  insist  on  the  need  for  a  balanced  budget  and  retrenchment, 
continued to resist pressure for public works, and continued to insist that there would be no 
return to gold until the various preconditions outlined earlier had been met.75 A series of 
high  level  discussions  on  pegging  the  pound,  involving  Hopkins,  Chamberlain,  and 
Norman  also re-emphasised that the pursuit of deflation was now too economically and 
politically risky, and that the gold standard had been discredited in the public mind.76 As 
Leith-Ross for example later wrote:
“public  opinion  in  this  country  has  been  decidedly  hostile  to  any 
stabilisation on gold because of the experience which we had in the years 
73 MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C107. T. Ashurst (CSMA) to J. B. Forbes Watson 17/6/33; PRO:T175/84. Pt.1. 
‘Report of the Congress Preparatory Committee on Monetary Policy’ (CCBE), July 1933. 
74 See for example MRC:MSS.292/420/1. ‘Public Expenditure’ (FBI), October 1932; 
MRC:MSS.200/F/3/S1/14/11. Various; MRC:MSS.200/F/3/E3/3/2. Locock to de. V. Leigh 6/4/33; to 
MacDonald 12/4/33; ‘Industry’s Monetary Policy’ (FBI), 8/2/33; Letter from the Central Landowners 
Association to MacDonald 12/4/33; Locock to O. Jones 19/1/34; Glenday to Lord Barnby 14/3/34; 
MRC:MSS.200/F/4/24/19; FBI Bulletin. March 1933. 16(2); PRO:T160/840. ‘Various Significant Facts’, 
(undated).
75 BE:G1/52. Various including ‘General Principles of the Working of the Gold Standard’ (unsigned Bank 
memo), 7/5/33; BE:EID4/103. ‘Notes on the Possibility of an Early Restoration of the Gold Standard’ (Clay), 
2/5/33; PRO:T175/57 Pt.2. ‘Note on the Programme for the World Conference’ (unsigned and undated 
Treasury memo.); also see various in PRO:T175/17 Pt.2, and Notes by Norman in BE:G1/515; Hawtrey 
(1933), p.215; Middleton (1985), p.167.
76 BE:ADM34/22. Norman Diaries. 6/3/33, 9/3/33.
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1924 to 1931, and of the fear that linking ourselves to gold might lead to a 
deflationary strain.”77
The difficulties surrounding any future return to gold became more pronounced 
from spring 1933. The international situation became increasingly complicated, with the 
United  States  forced  to  suspend  adherence  to  the  gold  standard  following a  domestic 
banking crisis, leading to a fall in the dollar and a sharp rise in sterling despite the efforts 
of the EEA. This was followed by increased US pressure for Britain to stabilise the pound 
against the dollar on a de facto basis, though this was strenuously resisted by the Treasury. 
The question of stabilisation was again raised in June however as part of a series of talks 
between  Britain,  America,  and  France  preceding  an  international  conference  that  was 
convening in London during the summer to discuss the world economic crisis. Although 
continuing global uncertainty was seen to preclude any formal and permanent stabilisation, 
it  was nonetheless informally agreed that the three countries would strive to keep their 
exchange rates mutually stable for the duration of the conference, with sterling to be held 
within the range of $3.88-$4.12.78
Before these plans could be put into operation however the proposals were leaked, 
causing a speculative rise in the dollar in the expectation of tighter US economic policies. 
As American  fears  of  deflation grew,  in  July  the  US President  Roosevelt  rejected  the 
stabilisation scheme and formally took the United States off gold, arguing that the most 
important  contribution the US  could make to  global recovery was to aim for a rise  in 
domestic prices. This was also followed by a policy of selling dollars for gold in a bid to 
77 PRO:T160/770. Untitled Memo (Leith-Ross), 21/11/37.
78 BE:G1/515. Harvey to Norman 27/4/33; Also see various in BE:G1/53; Clay (1957), pp.404-5; Drummond 
(1981), pp.139ff; Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983), p.86; Kindleberger (1986), pp.194ff; Eichengreen 
(1992), pp.323-32.
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secure  this  end,  effectively  scuppering  the  international  conference  in  mid-course  and 
destroying any remaining hopes for international exchange rate stability.79
Events at the conference itself were in any case also proving to be a failure, with 
sharp disagreements persisting over the causes of, and hence the most appropriate response 
to the world crisis. British representatives for instance continued to assert that a return to 
gold was their ultimate economic policy objective, though remained equally insistent on 
the  preconditions  that  needed  to  be  met  prior  to  such  a  move,  and  pressed for  an 
internationally  co-ordinated  policy  of  low interest  rates in  order  to  raise  world prices. 
Equally adamant however were the members of the gold bloc who continued to regard 
inflation  itself  as  the  key  cause  of  the  crisis,  and  who thus  continued  to  press  for  a 
deflationary response.  As a result,  the final  resolutions of the conference,  which broke 
down in October, were imbued with compromise and ambiguity, calling  inter alia for a 
general return to gold, though at a time and manner of countries’ own choosing, and for a 
moderate rise in prices to be accompanied by the avoidance of excessive inflation ‘at all 
costs’, and by balanced budgets and improved economic flexibility.80
The Final Curtain
The events that followed the failure of the world economic conference signalled the 
final collapse of the gold standard as an international regime. Though world wholesale 
prices  began  to  rise,  world  trade  in  general  continued  to  stagnate,  international  co-
operation  remained  sparse,  and  global  exchange  rate  instability  intensified  as  the  US 
79 Various in BE:G1/52-53; BE:G1/109. ‘The International Exchange Structure’ (unsigned), 27/7/49; 
Drummond (1981), Ch.6; Kindleberger (1986), pp.202-20; Eichengreen (1992), pp.317-33; Kynaston (1999), 
p.398.
80 MRC:MSS.292/563.2/2, 3, and 10. ‘Draft Annotated Agenda’, 20/1/33; ‘World Economic Conference’, 
The Economist (Supplement), 10/6/33; ‘Monetary and Financial Commission : Draft Report’, 20/7/33; 
‘Statement by the Chancellor…’ 14/6/33, p.6; Drummond (1981), pp.171-2; Kindleberger (1986), p.204.
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continued to drive down the dollar in a bid to raise domestic prices. In January 1934 the 
United States returned to the gold standard, though at the significantly undervalued rate of 
59% of  their  old  par.  This  once  again  caused  gold  to  gravitate  towards  America,  and 
exacerbated global tensions by putting the remaining gold bloc countries under growing 
deflationary pressure.81
 Domestically, the economic situation also remained mixed. Though unemployment 
continued to fall and industrial production continued to expand, Britain’s old industries 
remained weak, officials remained concerned over the lack of economic re-organisation 
and adjustment, and were now increasingly worried about the growth of monopolies and 
price fixing cartels. As Clay for example put it, loss-making industries needed to reduce 
costs or switch ‘to some new branch of production’, while Britain as a whole needed to 
change the ‘character of its export trade’. State officials were also concerned that tariffs 
had ‘protected inefficiency’ and that they were insulating certain industries such as iron, 
steel,  and automobile  manufacturing  from the  pressures  for  adjustment.82 Despite  such 
concerns however, the authorities were also unwilling to extend their direct involvement in 
order to force the issue, and state measures remained limited to minor instances such as the 
Special  Areas  (Development  and  Improvement)  Act  1934,  designed  to  assist  the 
establishment of light industries and firms moving into depressed areas.83 Bank officials 
too  remained  keen  to  keep  free  of  direct  economic  involvement.  The  Committee  of 
Treasury for example agreed to a request from within the City to help establish a ‘non-
political’ fund to provide counter-propaganda to labour’s calls for nationalisation, stating 
81 MRC:MSS.292/563.2/2. ‘World Monetary and Economic Conference’, (Walkden and Citrine), 14/12/33; 
BE:G1/109. ‘The International Exchange Structure’ (unsigned), 27/7/49; Drummond (1981), pp.182-3; 
Kindleberger (1986), pp.222-4; Eichengreen (1992), pp.317ff; Butler and Butler (1994), p.381.
82 BE:ADM28/1. ‘The Douglas Social Credit Scheme’ (Clay), 6/10/33; ‘Purchasing Power Parity’ (Clay), 
10/4/34; PRO:T160/770. Untitled memo. by Clay 21/11/37; Clay (1957), pp.442-3; Grant (1991), pp.107-8.
83 Kindleberger (1986), p.241; Tolliday (1987), pp.101-4; Alford (1996), pp.155-6.
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that  the  Bank  welcomed  ‘any  effective  steps  that  might  be  taken  with  the  object  of 
educating public opinion on the whole subject’, and with growing pressure for increased 
industrial representation within the Bank being dismissed by its secretary, E. M. Stapley, as 
a ‘dangerous’ move which would take the Bank into the field of politics.84 
Officials generally also remained in favour of a return to gold as the ultimate aim of  
economic policy. Norman for example continued to argue that no other monetary system 
offered  the  same degree  of  stability  ‘or  the  same  safeguard  against  unsound financial 
policies’,  and  as  such  sought  to  reconstruct  the  operation  of  the  system  through  the 
auspices of the newly established  Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Making the 
regime  operational  through  the  BIS  rather  than  individual  central  banks  would,  the 
Governor  argued, not  only enable  maximum international  co-operation,  but  would also 
minimise  public  discussion  and  speculation  over  central  bank  behaviour.  Despite  the 
unanimous adoption of this proposal at a BIS meeting of 23 central bank Governors in 
1934 however, the majority of official opinion in Britain still maintained that such a step 
was still  not yet  possible.85 Persistent international instability and a marked lack of co-
operation were seen to mitigate against any such move, and with the US continuing to 
draw in gold many thought that the gold bloc itself would soon be forced to abandon the 
regime and devalue. Also mitigating against a return was the fact that domestic deflation 
was still considered to be too economically and politically dangerous given the continued 
high level of unemployment and the degree of antipathy with which such measures were 
regarded in the public mind. Instead, the overriding aim of the Treasury was to maintain 
84 BE:ADM34/22. Norman Diaries. 18/10/33; BE:G8/61. Committee of Treasury Minutes 25/10/33; 
BE:G14/55. ‘The Bank and Industry’ (E. M. Stapley), 21/7/35.
85 BE:G3/200. Norman to an unnamed Australian Correspondent, 15/9/33; BE:G14/165. ‘Draft Resolution’ 
(undated); Norman to J. D. B. Fergusson 7/5/34; Norman to L. Fraser 9/5/34; Various in BE:G1/52 and 
MRC:MSS.200/B/3/2/C798 Pt.2; the Times 4/10/33, 15/5/34; Clay (1957), p.436.
250
low interest rates in order to avoid any further rise in unemployment and any resurgence of 
unrest. As one Treasury official put it, the British people would ‘not contemplate even the 
risk of having to deflate’, and as Hopkins maintained, stabilisation now would ‘not only 
prejudice  our  own  recovery  but  would  aggravate  the  world  crisis’.  Furthermore,  as 
Chamberlain explained, with even the discussion of stabilisation risking a disturbance in 
confidence,  the time was not yet right ‘to tie  our hands’,  and ‘even the most tentative 
approach to stabilisation’ was ‘quite unthinkable’.86 
Official  reluctance  over  a  return  was  further  entrenched  as  the  gold  bloc  were 
indeed forced to leave the gold standard and devalue, beginning with Czechoslovakia in 
1934. These pressures also led to  the tripartite  agreement  of September  1936 between 
Britain, France, and the US, which provided France with an orderly devaluation in return 
for a reduction in protectionist measures, and which  was followed by devaluations from 
Holland, Switzerland and Italy, effectively signalling the end of the gold standard as an 
international regime. Though official hopes of an eventual return nonetheless continued to 
persist in some degree, it was now clear that the international gold standard, and with it 
any hopes of reviving the postwar strategy, were gone.87
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has examined events in the wake of Britain’s enforced departure from 
the gold standard in September 1931 until the final collapse of the international system in 
1936. It has shown that economic conditions and policy-making were now once more key 
86 PRO:T160/840. Treasury Report…’, 15/7/35; Notes by S. D. Waley (Treasury); S. D. Waley to Hopkins 
25/9/35; Phillips to Hopkins 14/9/35; Financial News 2/10/35; Clay (1957), p.422; Drummond (1981), 
pp.190ff.
87 For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Kindleberger (1986), pp.227ff; Drummond (1981), 
Chs.9-10; Eichengreen (1992), pp.357ff.
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political  issues in Britain,  and that despite the adoption of a less restrictive regime for 
economic  policy  management,  the  central  aims  of  state  officials  remained  essentially 
unchanged from those of 1918. The key priorities of the core executive at this time were to 
improve Britain’s economic competitiveness, to sustain pressure for a shift in its pattern of 
economic activity, to contain class unrest within politically non-threatening limits, and to 
enhance  their  freedom for  high  political  manoeuvre  by  minimising  the  state’s  directly 
visible involvement with the economy.  To achieve  these aims,  officials  adopted a  new 
governing strategy designed to stimulate economic growth and profitability through mild 
inflation  and  the  erosion  of  real  wages,  and  to  constrain  any  excessive  inflationary 
pressures  and  to  sustain  international  confidence  in  sterling  through  a  tight  budgetary 
policy, the use of the EEA, and the establishment of an informal sterling area. At the same 
time  the  directly  visible  involvement  of  the  state  in  economic  policy-making  was 
minimised through a series of measures such as the establishment of an independent tariff 
advisory board, the secrecy of the EEA, and by permitting the continued control of sterling 
by the Bank of England. Key state managers also sought an eventual return to the gold 
standard at the prewar par as the ultimate aim of economic policy, though this was now 
impossible  to  achieve  given  the  persistently  high  level  of  international  political  and 
economic instability, and the strength of domestic antipathy both to the regime itself and to 
any prospect of further deflation.
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Conclusion : Exchange Rate Policy-Making Reconsidered
This thesis has made two key claims. Firstly it has argued that the existing literature  
on the political economy of exchange rate policy-making is problematic and that a more 
useful  means  of  understanding  the  subject  is  provided  from  a  Marxist  perspective. 
Secondly, it  has claimed that such an approach offers a new means of interpreting and 
assessing  Britain’s  return  to  the  gold  standard  in  1925.  This  concluding  chapter 
summarises the arguments supporting these claims, and draws some implications for future 
research.
Exchange Rate Policy-Making and the Return to Gold
Conventionally, the subject of exchange rate policy-making has been understood 
from the analytical perspectives of ‘rational choice’, ‘country characteristics’, or ‘interest 
group’ approaches.  These  approaches  however  have been shown to be  problematic.  In 
particular, it was argued that their failure to consider the fundamental question of social 
form precludes  an understanding  of  the  internal  constraints  that  are  imposed upon the 
policy-making activities of the core executive by the wider framework of the state and 
capitalist society. In contrast, this thesis has presented an alternative approach based on a 
Marxist methodology which begins precisely by considering the question of social form. 
From  this  perspective,  the  apparently  disparate  phenomena  of  capitalist  society  are 
understood as internally related forms of social relations that are determined during the 
course  of  social  reproduction,  and  which  are  constituted  by  the  development  of  class 
struggle. By viewing political and economic activity as integral parts of a unified social 
whole,  this  approach  may therefore  offer  a  more  useful  means  of  conceptualising  the 
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framework within which core executive behaviour takes place, and hence may offer a more 
useful method for analysing the development of exchange rate policy-making. From this 
viewpoint, it is argued that exchange rate policy-making should not be seen as the result of 
an  interaction  between  equally  rational  public  and  private  actors,  as  deriving  from  a 
particular combination of national structural characteristics, or as the outcome of interest 
group pressure,  but  should instead  be seen as  a  component  part  of  a  wider  governing 
strategy made by the core executive with a view to providing favourable conditions for 
capital accumulation, to containing and regulating class struggle, and for improving their 
freedom of manoeuvre for the pursuit of high political activity.
This alternative approach to exchange rate policy-making has provided the basis for  
a  reassessment  of  Britain’s  return  to  the  gold  standard  at  the  prewar  parity  in  1925. 
Conventionally,  the  motivations  underlying  this  policy  are  understood  in  terms  of  an 
eclectic mix of factors such as a desire to return to prewar conditions, to reduce postwar 
unemployment,  or because of the undue influence of the City over the core executive. 
These traditional analyses however, have been shown to contain a variety of shortcomings. 
These include an overemphasis on ideational factors such as ‘prestige’ and ‘tradition’ at the 
expense of material considerations in the policy-making process, the use of an insufficient 
time-frame  for  analysis,  and  an  absence  of  empirical  evidence  concerning  the 
disproportionate influence of financial capital. In contrast, this thesis has argued that the 
return  to  gold  at  $4.86  was  designed  to  address  long-term  economic  and  political 
difficulties within the British state. In economic terms it is claimed that the policy was 
designed  to  impose  financial  pressure  upon  capital  and  labour  through  the  use  of  a 
deliberately  overvalued  exchange  rate  in  an  attempt  to  improve  competitiveness  and 
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efficiency, and to encourage an adjustment in Britain’s pattern of economic activity away 
from old and declining industries and into newer and more advanced lines of production. 
In political  terms it  is  argued that the policy was adopted in order to help reduce and 
contain class unrest, and to shield the core executive from the adverse consequences of 
their tight economic policy stance through the depoliticisation of monetary and economic 
policy-making.
The  empirical  evidence  in  support  of  this  argument  was  founded on  three  key 
pillars.  Firstly,  that  by  the  1920s  Britain  was  facing  severe  political  and  economic 
difficulties which the core executive were increasingly anxious to address; secondly, that 
state  managers  were  aware  that  any  resolution  of  these  problems  would  not  only  be 
difficult, but would risk exacerbating class unrest and would therefore be politically and 
economically  dangerous;  thirdly,  that  they  believed a  return to  gold  at  the  prewar  par 
would help to resolve these difficulties by the imposition of financial pressure and by the 
depoliticisation of monetary and economic policy-making.
The first of these pillars began with an examination of Britain’s growing economic 
and political difficulties from the last third of the nineteenth century. These were expressed 
in the form of a relative economic decline, a progressively outdated pattern of economic 
activity, and an increasingly militant challenge from the labour movement which became 
increasingly acute during the period of the Great Unrest from 1910. These pressures were 
further  exacerbated  by  the  impact  of  the  First  World  War.  Economically,  the  conflict 
intensified Britain’s relative decline through high inflation, the depletion of its resources, a 
loss of foreign markets, and by the expansion of state control over the economy, which 
deterred private enterprise and helped to sustain uncompetitive practices. In political terms, 
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the  war  added  to  domestic  instability  as  inflation  and  state  expansionism  led  to  an 
intensification of overt class struggle, politicised economic conditions and policy-making, 
and  raised  the  expectations  of  capital  and  labour  as  to  the  future  economic  policy 
behaviour of the state. In addition, these factors also served to constrain the policy-making 
freedom of the core executive in their response to the crisis. 
These difficulties, and their persistence into the postwar period, formed the context 
within  which  the  gold  standard  policy  developed.  A return  to  severely  high  levels  of 
industrial unrest in 1919 further constrained the high political freedom of the authorities 
and added to political instability, while the onset of an economic boom led to an over-
expansion of old industrial sectors and sustained uncompetitive practices and inflation by 
insulating Britain’s economy from pressure for adjustment. From 1920 to 1922 efforts to 
impose deflation in order to clear the way for a return to gold were assisted by the onset of 
a fierce slump, but failed to produce any significant economic breakthrough. Moreover, 
despite the withdrawal of the state’s directly visible wartime economic controls, economic 
conditions and policy-making remained live political issues, class unrest remained a major 
concern, and representatives of both capital and labour continued to direct much of their 
discontent at state officials, forcing the authorities to relax their approach by the end of 
1922.  Between 1923 and the  return to  gold  in  1925 the  constraints  and difficulties  of 
managing  the  domestic  circuit  of  capital  with  a  discretionary  and politicised  mode of 
economic  policy  regulation  continued  to  be  readily  apparent.  While  labour  militancy, 
unrest, prices, and wages all began to subside, disquiet continued to flare intermittently and 
economic  conditions  remained  poor.  The  growth  of  newer  industrial  sectors  remained 
insufficient  to  offset  Britain’s  continuing  relative  economic  decline,  capital  and  labour 
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were still resistant to any significant modernisation and adjustment, while pressure over 
economic conditions and policy-making continued to constrain the core executive’s high 
political freedom of manoeuvre.
For the second pillar  of the argument it  is clear that while the authorities were 
increasingly  keen  to  address  these  ongoing  difficulties,  they  were  nonetheless  acutely 
aware that doing so would risk exacerbating class unrest and would therefore be politically 
and economically  dangerous.  Ever since the deliberations of the Cunliffe  committee in 
1918, the core executive had recognised that the process of forcing down prices and wages 
and of decontrolling the economy would not only be difficult and economically painful, 
but that it would also carry the risks of intensifying class unrest and heightening political 
criticism. Measures to implement deflation in 1919 were postponed for fear of the social 
and political consequences, while the eventual introduction of such measures during 1920-
1922  abundantly  revealed  the  difficulties  involved  in  this  process.  Though  prices  and 
wages  both  fell,  the  level  of  economic  adjustment  achieved  remained  insufficient  to 
overcome  Britain’s  competitive  deficiencies,  while  rising  economic  and  political 
difficulties forced the suspension of this strategy by 1922. Although this was followed 
during 1923 by the adoption of a ‘waiting policy’ in the hope that US inflation would 
obviate the need for a significant reduction in domestic prices, the dangers of deflation 
remained present and state managers were increasingly anxious to keep economic policy 
issues off the political agenda. A resurgence of labour unrest during the first half of 1924 
served as a pertinent reminder that  class  discontent had not been eradicated, while the 
persistence of global political and economic tensions over issues such as reparations and 
war debts now also made the resolution of Britain’s problems ever more complicated.
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The third pillar of the empirical evidence demonstrated that the core executive saw 
a return to the gold standard at the prewar parity as offering a key means of helping to 
overcome these problems. Initially, the gold standard mechanism was primarily seen as a 
way of  preventing  a  resurgence  in  inflation,  deemed to  be  a  main  cause  of  declining 
competitiveness and social unrest, and was to be implemented only after a prior period of 
deflation had reduced prices and wages and restored the pound to par. The re-establishment 
of  sterling  on  gold  would  then  help  to  maintain  favourable  conditions  for  capital 
accumulation by ensuring exchange rate stability, by securing international confidence in 
the pound, and by providing a credible anti-inflationary framework for economic policy-
making. The regime would also help to reduce and confine the expectations of capital and 
labour, would simplify the management of monetary policy by placing it on an ‘automatic’ 
basis, and would help to displace class struggles over economic conditions away from the 
state through the depoliticisation of monetary and economic policy-making.
By 1924 however, state managerial opinion on a return to gold was undergoing a 
strategic  shift  in  emphasis.  With  officials  having  been  unable  to  enforce  a  sufficient 
deflation, and with US inflation having failed to materialise, a return to gold at $4.86 itself 
came to be seen as a useful means of imposing financial discipline on capital and labour. 
By deliberately setting the par value of sterling at a relatively high rate given domestic 
levels of prices and wages, officials recognised that this, and the all-round tight economic 
policy  stance  it  would  necessitate,  would  put  competitive  pressure  upon the  whole  of 
Britain’s economy. The old export sectors would be forced to reduce their production costs 
(primarily wages), to cut prices, adopt more efficient production methods, and adjust to 
newer and more advanced sectors of production more attuned to the changing demands of 
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the world economy. This would also enable those producing for the domestic market to 
reduce their costs and prices, and would put the City under pressure to adopt more prudent 
financial  practices.  In  this  way,  the  return  to  gold  would  not  only  ensure  that  Britain 
remained internationally competitive, but would now force it to become so. 
In  addition  to  this,  the  policy  was  still  seen  to  offer  distinct  political  benefits. 
Primarily, the return would provide state officials with a simpler means of economic policy 
management, and would also provide a means of shielding themselves from the potential 
dangers  of  deflation  by  depoliticising  monetary  and  economic  policy.  Whilst  it  was 
recognised that the authorities would not be completely free from pressure, a return to gold 
was believed to be less dangerous than continuing with a discretionary monetary policy, 
and was also seen as providing an effective means of defence against any criticisms that 
should arise as a result of their tight economic policy stance. Placing monetary policy in 
the hands of the Bank of England would enable the government to absolve themselves of 
responsibility for it, while in turn the Bank would be able to justify their actions on the 
basis that they were simply following the legal remit prepared by the government. In this 
way, adherence to the gold standard would not only help to provide favourable conditions 
for capital accumulation, but would also make it easier to regulate the domestic circuit of 
capital, to contain class struggle, as well to improve high political freedom of manoeuvre.
In terms of success or failure, this alternative view of the gold standard strategy 
also  provides  an  alternative  assessment  from  those  offered  by  conventional  accounts, 
which either argue that the policy was a disaster, or which seek to absolve the policy from 
being  primarily  responsible  for  Britain’s  difficulties  after  1925.  Indeed,  from  this 
alternative perspective it is possible to view the return to gold as having been a relative 
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success. Although the strategy failed to achieve all of its economic aims, it nevertheless 
succeeded in fulfilling most of its political ambitions. On the one hand, although prices and  
wages  were  lower  in  1931  than  they  were  in  1925,  the  strategy  failed  to  force  any 
significant breakthrough in Britain’s competitiveness, or any substantial adjustment in its 
pattern of economic activity. Capital on the whole remained unwilling to engage in any 
great  modernisation,  restructuring,  or  reorientation  of  production,  while  labour  were 
generally successful in resisting any attempt by capital to impose a large compression of 
living standards. Class resistance to the financial pressure of the gold standard also formed 
a contributory  factor in  blocking the  process  of  adjustment,  with  the  coal  and general 
strikes of 1926 (though not directly attributable to the gold standard) being followed by a 
five year industrial truce which effectively ended any prospect of significantly lower wages 
and prices in Britain. It was this failure to produce any significant improvement in Britain’s  
competitiveness which led to persistently high levels of unemployment, interest rates and 
tax,  as  well  as  continuing  balance  of  payments  difficulties,  and  which  therefore  also 
increased the political pressure on the core executive, constraining their freedom of policy 
manoeuvre,  especially  over  interest  rates.  In  turn,  the  inability  of  state  managers  to 
maintain  the  sufficiently  restrictive  economic  policies  needed  in  order  to  force  an 
economic adjustment also helped to sustain Britain’s poor economic performance, leading 
eventually to the collapse of the regime amidst a confidence crisis over the budget.
Despite such failings however, the return to gold can nonetheless be regarded as 
having been largely successful in reducing class unrest, in easing the pressure on the core 
executive,  and  in  depoliticising  the  issues  of  monetary  and  economic  policy-making. 
Although  this  was  by  no  means  absolute,  and  though  members  of  the  core  executive 
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remained under pressure from capital and labour over the poor state of the economy, such 
pressure was still less constricting than it had been under the discretionary economic policy 
regime from 1919 to 1925, and was therefore less restrictive than would have been likely 
should  the  authorities  have  decided  to  continue  remaining  off  the  gold  standard. 
Furthermore, despite pressure over economic conditions, monetary and economic policy 
issues were also for the most part displaced from the political agenda, with representatives 
of capital and labour continuing to attribute Britain’s difficulties primarily to other factors, 
and with state officials no longer held to be the main focus for blame and responsibility. 
Moreover, although economic conditions and policy-making became increasingly sensitive 
political issues from 1928-29, the credibility of Britain’s commitment to maintain the gold 
standard at the par value was not seriously challenged until the crisis of 1931. This enabled 
the  government  to  shift  responsibility  for  interest  rate  rises  onto  the  ‘politically 
independent’ Bank of England, and enabled the Bank to justify such actions on the basis 
that  they  were  merely  acting  in  accordance  with  a  policy  regime  introduced  by  the 
government.
Future Research Implications
The implications of these findings for future research into exchange rate policy-
making are not confined to this case-study of Britain’s return to the gold standard, but also 
point the way towards a reinterpretation of other episodes of exchange rate management. 
As seen for example, the state managerial aims and motivations which characterised the 
development  of  the  gold  standard  policy  were  also present  in  the  development  of  the 
governing strategy and exchange rate regime during the immediate post-gold standard era. 
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With economic conditions and policy-making once more regarded as key political issues, 
and with state officials increasingly seen to be responsible, the authorities were now under 
growing  pressure  from capital  and  labour,  and  were  increasingly  fearful  of  resurgent 
inflation,  declining  competitiveness,  and  class  unrest.  As  such,  the  aims  of  the  core 
executive  during this  period can also be seen as  consistent  with  those outlined by the 
alternative theoretical approach to exchange rate policy-making developed by this thesis, 
namely the provision of favourable conditions for capital accumulation, the containment of 
class struggle, and the minimisation of directly visible state involvement with the economy.
In  a  similar  fashion,  the  establishment  of  the  Bretton  Woods  System after  the 
Second  World  War,  conventionally  understood  as  an  attempt  by  the  US  to  impose 
hegemonic dominance, or as a benevolent attempt to restore global political and economic 
stability also appears applicable for re-examination along these lines.88 So too does the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods regime and the generalised move to a system of floating 
exchange rates by the world’s major industrial nations from 1973, especially (insofar as 
Britain is concerned) given the impending availability of official archival resources. More 
recently, the field is also replete with research examples. Recent events throughout Asia 
(notably the crises of 1999-2000) and the move to monetary union in Europe for instance 
provide  excellent  terrain  for  examination,  especially  with  the  debate  on  Britain’s 
membership of the Euro poised to gather in political intensity and significance. One other 
primary example of exchange rate policy-making which remains ripe for reinterpretation, 
and one which has both clear  implications  for  any possible  participation  by Britain  in 
European  Monetary  Union,  and  clear  parallels  to  the  return  to  gold,  is  Britain’s 
membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from 1990-1992. Using 
88 For a Marxist account of the Bretton Woods System see for example Burnham (1990).
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some of the limited empirical material available for this policy decision, the remainder of 
this chapter shows that it is also possible to interpret Britain’s ERM membership from the 
alternative perspective developed for the analysis of exchange rate policy-making.
The ERM was the central component of the European Monetary System established 
in 1979, and was a pegged exchange rate regime in which participating countries pledged 
to maintain their exchange rates within either +/- 2.25% or 6% of a centrally defined rate. 
This  commitment  was  buttressed  by  a  series  of  mutual  support  provisions,  and  was 
effectively underpinned by the ‘anchor’ role played by the system’s strongest currency, the 
German Deutschmark. With the constitutionally independent German Bundesbank legally 
committed  to  the  pursuit  of  low inflation,  countries  joining  the  ERM were  obliged  to 
adhere to its monetary policies in order to maintain their exchange rate within the system, 
thereby  enabling  them  to  import  the  Bundebank’s  anti-inflationary  credibility  for 
themselves. Britain however, was not an original participant in the ERM, and joined the 
regime relatively late in October 1990. Adherence to the system lasted until September 
1992, when after less than two years as a member, Britain was ignominiously forced to 
abandon it following a speculative attack on the pound.89
The conventional view of this policy is that  Britain’s  state managers joined the 
ERM in a bid to reduce inflation with the aim of improving the general welfare of the 
citizenry, and as with conventional assessments of the return to gold, the policy is also 
commonly thought to have been a disaster. Britain is seen to have joined at an overvalued 
exchange rate, forcing the maintenance of high interest rates in order to defend the pound 
at a time of recession, thereby exacerbating domestic economic and political difficulties.90 
89 Gros and Thygesen (1992); Minikin (1993); Giavazzi and Pagano (1988); Eichengreen (1996); Tsoukalis 
(1997); Giordano and Persaud (1998).
90 See Gros and Thygesen (1992), pp.126ff; Smith (1992), pp.164ff; Barrell et al (1994); Thygesen (1994); 
Mullard (1995), pp.99ff; Thompson (1995); Green (1996); Cobham (1997), passim.
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Also as with the return to gold, the revisionist view of this policy claims instead that these 
difficulties  were  not  simply  due  to  having  joined  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  at  an 
overvalued rate, but to other contingent factors. Primarily, these are seen to have been the 
necessity for high interest rates in Germany (and hence in Britain) due to the inflationary 
pressures of German reunification, and the structure of the ERM itself, which is seen to 
have precluded sufficient policy co-operation to deal with these problems.91
Alternatively however, it is also possible to interpret Britain’s membership of the 
ERM as the key component of a governing strategy of depoliticisation designed to provide 
favourable conditions for capital accumulation, to contain class unrest, and to increase the 
high political freedom of the core executive. Here the similarities with Britain’s return to 
gold are again apparent. By 1990 Britain’s core executive were faced with rising political 
and  economic  difficulties,  were  aware  that  their  resolution  would  be  difficult  and 
dangerous, and saw membership of the ERM as offering a useful means of assisting them 
in  their  efforts  to  do  so  through  the  imposition  of  financial  discipline  and  the 
depoliticisation of monetary and economic policy. 
Firstly, the development of the ERM policy was set against a backdrop of rising 
political  and  economic  difficulties  from  the  1970s.  A  continuing  deterioration  in 
productivity  and  output  growth  was  matched  with  entrenched  and  persistent  inflation, 
exchange rate instability and industrial unrest, while the postwar mode of economic policy 
regulation  based  upon discretionary state  intervention had once  more  turned economic 
conditions and policy-making into overtly political issues.92 Moreover, by the mid-1980s 
the initial attempt by the Thatcher-led Conservative government to address these problems 
91 Barrell et al (1994), pp.120-34; Eichengreen (1996), pp.167-92; Taylor (1996); Tsoukalis (1997), pp.150-
60.
92 de Brunhoff (1978), pp.129ff; Fine (1979), pp.178-84; Holloway (1996), pp.132ff; Burnham (1999).
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through  a  domestically-based  strategy  of  monetarism  was  widely  seen  to  have  failed. 
Though helping to reduce producer prices and unit  labour costs, and though helping to 
erode the strength of organised labour through the disciplining effects of recession and 
unemployment, the politicised character of economic conditions and policy-making had 
not been diminished, and the attempt to control or even measure the money supply had 
proved  to  be  virtually  impossible,  making  the  management  of  the  domestic  circuit  of 
capital increasingly difficult.93
This failure led several members of the core executive, most notably Nigel Lawson 
(the  Chancellor),  and  Geoffrey  Howe  (the  ex-Chancellor,  and  now  the  Foreign  and 
Commonwealth Secretary) to the view that membership of the ERM would offer a better 
means of addressing Britain’s difficulties. It would they claimed, not only help to provide 
exchange rate  stability,  but  would also  help to  reduce  and contain  the expectations  of 
capital and labour, and to impose a credible anti-inflationary discipline upon the economy 
by  sending  a  clear  signal  that  continued  uncompetitive  practices  would  not  be 
accommodated  through a  depreciation  in  the  exchange  rate.  Moreover,  this  credibility 
would also ensure political benefits by removing the issue of monetary policy away from 
the direct control of the core executive, thus providing officials with an easier means of 
regulating economic policy, and effectively insulating them against pressure from capital 
and labour for any relaxation of economic policy, or for any increase in state intervention.94 
Despite wide support for ERM membership from Ministers, Bank of England and 
Treasury  officials,  the  press,  British  business,  and  labour  opinion  however,  entry  was 
continually vetoed during the 1980s by Thatcher. This, she thought, would not only be an 
93 Lawson (1992), Chs.5-8, 39-40; Thatcher (1993), ps.566, 688-9; Butler and Butler (1994), ps.374-5, 384; 
Economic Trends. Annual Supplement, 1994. Table.1.20; Thompson (1995), pp.251-2; Buller (1999), p.698; 
(2000), p.321.
94 Lawson (1992), Ch.39, Annexe II, and passim; Thatcher (1993), pp.694-7; Howe (1994), ps.112, 448-50.
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‘admission of failure’ on the part of domestic economic policy, but would also impose an 
unacceptable constraint on the government’s freedom of manoeuvre, and would run the 
risk of needing politically damaging levels of interest rates to defend the pound.95 As such, 
the  government  continued  to  operate  with  a  discretionary  economic  policy  regime 
throughout  the  rest  of  the  decade.  This  however  failed  to  make  any  substantial 
improvement in Britain’s economic or political difficulties (though labour unrest declined 
during  the  second half  of  the  1980s),  and  by 1990 these  appeared  to  be  deteriorating 
significantly. Unit labour costs, commodity prices, interest rates, and unemployment were 
all rising, output and productivity growth were falling, discontent from capital and labour 
over economic conditions was growing, and the government’s electoral popularity was in 
decline.96 Of particular concern to the core executive was that rising inflation would now 
not only continue to undermine Britain’s competitiveness, but that it would lead to a return 
to the high levels of political  and social  unrest  of the 1970s. As John Major (the new 
Chancellor) described the scene, there was now an increasing ‘atmosphere of crisis’ within 
Britain, the government were ‘steering the economy in a fog’, and its economic policy was 
‘falling apart’.97 Officials also recognised however that addressing these difficulties would 
be difficult  and unpopular.  As Norman Lamont  (the  Chancellor  from November 1990) 
explained,  the process  of reducing inflation would entail  ‘high interest  rates,  frustrated 
hopes, bankruptcies, and lost jobs’, and as Major later confessed to have recognised, the 
government would ‘not have an early recovery in the polls’.98
95 Thatcher (1993), pp.692-700; TUC Annual Report 1989; Lawson (1992), p.111, Chs.39-40; ps.418-20; 
Howe (1994), ps.274-5, 448-50; Thompson (1995), pp.253ff: Also see comments by C. Smith 27/3/1990. 
Hansard, Cls.370-1; B. Sedgemore 15/6/1990. Hansard, Cls.592-602.
96 Smith (1992), pp.164ff; Healey (1993), pp.140-7; Barrell et al (1994), pp.120-34; Butler and Butler (1994), 
pp.374-5; Economic Trends. Annual Supplement, 1994. Tables.1.20, 3.1, 3.5, 5.10; Thompson (1995), 
pp.259-61; Bonefeld and Burnham (1996).
97 Major (2000), ps.138-145, 202, 660-1: Also see Norman Lamont. Hansard, 19/3/1991, Cls.165-7. 
98 Lamont 19/3/1991. Hansard. Cl.167; Lamont (1999), pp.55-6; Major (2000), ps.136-160, 661-2. 
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Against this background ERM membership once more appeared to offer a useful 
governing  strategy.  As  Major  again  put  it,  membership  would  determine  ‘the  total 
framework for policy’, and would offer a ‘safe and secure discipline’ for enabling ‘the 
destruction of inflation’ by putting pressure on capital and labour to reduce prices (and 
especially wages) to internationally competitive levels. ‘The key message’ given by ERM 
membership he explained, was that competitive deficiencies would no longer ‘be bailed 
out  by  a  devaluation  of  the  currency’,  or  as  Lamont  conceded,  “it  was  central  to  the 
economic  discipline  imposed  by  the  ERM  that  earnings  growth  should  fall  to  levels 
comparable with the rest of Europe.”99 Such views were also held by other key members of 
the core executive. Robin Leigh-Pemberton, the Governor of the Bank of England, later 
put  it  for  instance  that  ERM  membership  imposed  ‘an  external  discipline  on  policy-
makers’, establishing both the regime and the value of the exchange rate ‘as facts of life to 
be  taken  into  account  when  taking  decisions  about  prices  and  wages’.  Both  sides  of 
industry, he explained, would now have ‘to recognise conditions for what they are, and 
adjust behaviour’.100
In  addition,  key  state  officials  also  recognised  that  the  regime  offered  distinct 
political benefits. By conditioning the expectations and hence the behaviour of capital and 
labour, the anti-inflationary credibility of the ERM would not only enable lower levels of 
tax and interest  rates than would otherwise be possible,  but would also help to protect 
officials from political  pressure for a less restrictive economic policy stance. In turn, a 
clear economic policy would help to unite the Conservative Party, thus strengthening the 
government’s electoral prospects, while the credibility of the government’s commitment 
99 Major 15/10/1990. Hansard, Cls.928-935; Lamont 23/10/1990. Hansard, Cls.278-280; Lamont (1999), 
ps.36, 107, 274; Major (2000), p.137: Also see Lawson (1992), p.67; Howe (1994), p.639.
100 Leigh-Pemberton (1991), pp.53-5.
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would also be buttressed by the displacement of responsibility for economic conditions to 
an external regime. As Major astutely observed, the ERM would be seen by many as ‘a 
convenient scapegoat’ for Britain’s problems.101 With pressure growing from all sides for 
Britain to join the ERM, by the summer of 1990 Thatcher had finally been forced to relent, 
and in October Britain entered the system in the 6% band at the rate of DM2.95. As has 
since been made clear by various officials, this relatively high rate given domestic levels of 
costs and prices was also deliberately chosen in order that high interest rates would be 
required  to  defend  it,  thereby  also  helping  to  impose  deflationary  pressure  on  the 
economy.102
The parallels with the return to gold in 1925 also extend beyond a reinterpretation 
of the motivations governing Britain’s membership of the ERM to produce an alternative 
assessment of the policy in terms of its having been a relative success. On the negative 
side, during the period of ERM membership GDP and output both fell, unemployment rose 
from 1.8 million to 2.9 million, and bankruptcies increased markedly. Productivity also 
failed to increase in relation to other European Union states, Britain’s global position failed 
to improve, and wages continued to rise above the rate of inflation. Sterling also remained 
under pressure within its ERM band, public support for the Conservative party continued 
to  decline,  and  as  the  recession  intensified,  pressure  from  capital  and  labour  for  a 
devaluation in order to ease the pressure on the economy grew.103
On the positive side for the authorities however, the regime enabled a reduction in 
interest  rates  from  15%  to  10%  by  May  1992,  the  credibility  of  the  government’s 
101 Major (2000), ps.154-9, 202: Also see Thatcher (1993), pp.719-20; Bonefeld and Burnham (1996, 1998).
102 See for example Thatcher (1993), pp.721-2; Lamont (1999), p.210; Major (2000), pp.158-65.
103 TUC Annual Report (1991), ps.276, 284, 338; Financial Times, 4/1/92; Smith (1992), ps.193, 237; 
Economic Trends. Annual Supplement, 1994. Table.3.1; Jay (1994); Bonefeld et al (1995); Mullard (1995; 
1995a); Bonefeld and Burnham (1996), p.24; Kennedy (1996), p.122; Chorney (1997), p.358; Cobham 
(1997), p.221.
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commitment  to  maintain  the  exchange  rate  was  largely  unchallenged,  and  sterling 
remained relatively stable until the summer of 1992. Inflation also fell from 10% to 3.5%, 
productivity, though failing to rise in relative terms nonetheless rose for the first time since 
1987, while labour unrest was also further diminished. Between 1990-92 there were now 
73% fewer working days lost and 53% fewer stoppages than there were during 1985-89.104 
Moreover, despite calls for devaluation, the general view of capital and labour was that 
internal economic conditions would now have to adjust to the constraints of the ERM, and 
for the most part state officials remained shielded from the adverse social consequences of 
the recession. The majority of people in Britain attributed their economic difficulties to the 
poor state of the international economy, enabling the government to gain re-election in 
April 1992, and enabling John Major to enjoy ‘the longest electoral honeymoon’ for a post-
war British Prime Minister.105 
In contrast to conventional viewpoints then, on this basis it is therefore possible, as 
with  the  return  to  gold,  to  view Britain’s  membership  of  the  ERM as  having  been  a 
relatively successful governing strategy of depoliticisation. In turn, this also offers further 
support  for the claim that  the alternative  approach to exchange rate  policy-making put 
forward  by  this  thesis  may  offer  a  more  useful  means  of  analysis  than  those  of 
conventional perspectives. While more work in this field is undoubtedly necessary in order 
that these claims can either be further substantiated, refined, or refuted, on the basis of the 
evidence presented thus far there appear to be firm grounds for believing that it will, at 
least, not be the latter.
104 Calculated from Butler and Butler (1994), pp.374-5; Economic Trends. Annual Supplement, 1994. 
Tables.1.20, 3.5: Also see Gros and Thygesen (1992); Smith (1992); Thatcher (1993), p.724; Barrell et al 
(1994); Mullard (1995a), p.100; Cobham (1997), p.221; Lamont (1999), p.8; Buller (2000), p.319; Major 
(2000), pp.152-65.
105 Crewe (1994), p.99; TUC Annual Report 1991; Bonefeld and Burnham (1998).
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Concluding Remarks
The alternative theoretical framework developed in this thesis enables researchers 
to analyse the political economy of exchange rate policy-making in a way which highlights 
the centrality of ‘class struggle’ in the deliberations of the core executive. In contrast to 
conventional approaches, this approach enables the political and economic phenomena of 
capitalist society to be analysed as integral parts of a unified social whole, and thereby 
enables a view of exchange rate policy-making as a component part of a wider governing 
strategy designed to provide favourable conditions for capital accumulation,  to regulate 
class struggle, and to improve the high political freedom of the core executive. As with 
other  approaches  however,  this  framework  also  has  its  limitations.  In  particular,  the 
collection  of  empirical  evidence  is  crucial  in  order  to  substantiate  its  unorthodox 
theoretical claims. As such, research will therefore be largely confined to areas in which 
such  empirical  material  is  sufficiently  available.  Due  to  the  political  sensitivities 
surrounding much of this material however, it is likely that detailed research will remain 
limited to instances of exchange rate policy-making that are covered by the availability of 
archival  resources,  a  methodological  approach  which  itself  contains  a  number  of 
difficulties.106 For this reason, a case-study of Britain’s return to the gold standard in 1925 
was chosen for the analytical  body of this thesis due to the ample supply of available 
material, while an examination of more recent policy-making episodes such as the ERM, 
which in turn provides a wider body of evidence against which the theoretical approach 
developed here can be tested, remains necessarily circumscribed.
106 On the various problems posed by archival research see the following Appendix.
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Appendix :   A Note on Sources and Methods 
Much of the empirical material contained in this thesis was discovered in the course 
of primary archive research carried out at the Public Record Office, the Bank of England, 
and the Modern Records Centre between 1999-2002. The methodological difficulties posed 
by such an undertaking are varied. A key problem for example is that the archival record 
may be incomplete, and that important information may have been destroyed or lost, or 
may never have been documented at all. Personal conversations between key actors for 
instance  may  not  be  recorded,  while  official  papers,  such  as  the  minutes  of  Cabinet 
meetings, may be deliberately or unconsciously selective in the details and the conclusions 
they present. As such, the impressions gleaned from an examination of archive documents 
may  therefore  be  misleading,  while  the  truth  of  a  situation  may  remain  elusive  and 
hidden.107
In addition to these difficulties, the nature of archival research itself is also such 
that  the discovery of important information is often as dependent upon the vagaries of 
fortune  as  it  is  upon  the  diligence  and  cataloguing  skills  of  those  compiling  and 
maintaining the archive. With valuable data frequently turning up in unexpected places, a 
purely  systematic  examination of  apparently  pertinent  documents  may therefore  fail  to 
uncover all the relevant material, while by the same token, attempting to discover relevant 
information  through  an  analysis  of  documents  not  appearing  to  be  directly  useful  can 
substantially increase the time spent on research with no guarantee of reward. Furthermore, 
archive analysis is also subject to the problem of ‘generalisation’, relating to the question 
as to what extent it is possible to extrapolate the views of an institutional body such as ‘the 
107 On the various problems and difficulties associated with archival research see for example Lowe (1997).
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Bank of  England’ or  ‘the  Treasury’ from the  surviving  and  stated  views  of  its  senior 
figures.  Equally,  this  difficulty  also applies to  wider  social  groups  such as ‘the  labour 
movement’, ‘industrialists’, or ‘financiers’, and to the problems involved in drawing wider 
inferences from the stated views of their senior personnel, or their ‘peak’ representative 
organisations such as the TUC or the FBI.
These  difficulties  however  are  not  insurmountable.  While  archival  records  are 
rarely (if  ever)  complete,  this  does  not  necessarily  mean that  their  use  will  provide  a 
fundamentally inaccurate reflection of events or opinions. Available documentation may 
still contain sufficient data from which to draw conclusions, and while costly in terms of 
time and energy, it is still nonetheless possible to supplement an analysis of ‘core’ archives 
with an examination of indirectly useful material, and to construct a chronological picture 
of  changing developments  over  a  period of  time.  Difficulties  may also  be reduced by 
examining archives  at  related agencies such as the Bank of England and the Treasury, 
where ‘cross-relevant’ documentation may be present, and can be diminished further by 
analysing ‘lower order’ files (such as personal collections) in which the views and opinions 
of key actors may be more likely to be revealed than in ‘high level’ documentation such as 
official papers and minutes.108 Furthermore, while organisations such as the TUC and the 
FBI may not be fully representative of their memberships, and while the views of senior 
figures may not correspond exactly with the opinion, or the variety of opinions present 
within a particular organisation, this does not necessarily preclude the drawing of wider 
generalisations. Indeed, the key question in this instance is not so much whether or not 
these organisations are completely representative, but whether or not their stated views are 
sufficiently representative.  As such, given that the membership base of an organisation 
108 Ibid.
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does not desert it or does not protest vigorously over the official line taken on a particular 
issue,  then  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  the  views  stated  on  that  issue  are  sufficiently 
representative.
The  process  of  archive  research  and  analysis  is  therefore  not  without  its 
methodological  problems.  However,  while  such a  process is  undoubtedly difficult,  and 
while  it  is  ultimately  necessary  for  researchers  to  weigh  up  its  relative  benefits  and 
disadvantages in terms of the time required compared to the insights one may hope to 
glean,  primary archive  documents  can nonetheless  provide  an invaluable  resource,  and 
their diligent examination can thus enable researchers to bolster their theoretical claims 
with more substantive  material.  Indeed,  given the  contentious nature  of  much political 
analysis, an archive examination which proceeds with due care and caution can therefore 
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